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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to address the question of love’s possibility as it is explored in a 
selection of literature from the disciplines of philosophy, psychoanalysis and poetry. 
The works of nine authors, selected from these disciplines, provide an overview of the 
question in these particular realms, and also in the three historical dimensions of 
romanticism, modernism and postmodernism. The works of Nietzsche, Buber and 
Ricoeur provide the philosophical exploration; psychoanalysis is represented by Freud, 
Lacan and Žižek; and the poetic contribution focuses on the works of Wordsworth, Eliot 
and Kennelly.  
 The inter-disciplinary nature of the thesis is based on the assertion of an 
interconnection between the three disciplines, and that this interconnection enables a 
unique and insightful exploration of the question of love’s possibility. Thus, the 
question is explored from diverse view-points, and also from different time-frames; 
convergences and divergences are noted and discussed, and conclusions are drawn from 
the ensuing findings. 
 The question has been chosen because, it is argued, it is a fundamental inquiry in 
any attempted understanding of the human condition, and is thus a foundational link 
between the disciplines under review. It is a question which provokes investigation and 
exploration of concepts which are integral to human being and human life, and, it is 
argued, such investigation and exploration is enhanced by the integrative nature of the 
research and analysis which is undertaken in the study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For one human being to love another; that is perhaps the most difficult of all 
our tasks, the ultimate, the last test and proof, the work for which all other 
work is but preparation (Rilke, 2004: 37). 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the possibility of love in human experience as a key 
question which forms a foundational link between the separate disciplines of 
philosophy, psychoanalysis and poetry. It is the contention of the thesis that the question 
of love’s possibility is an essential human question, essential in the sense that it is 
endemic to humanity and, therefore, endemic to any discipline concerned with the 
exploration of what it means to be human. In some way, and on some level, the question 
preoccupies the thrust and direction of the three disciplines chosen as the basis of 
research in this study; all three pose this question as a central and essential concern of 
human living, albeit that their methods and responses take different formats. According 
to this argument, the three disciplines are linked in their assertion that the question of 
love’s possibility cannot be ignored even if it cannot be answered. This interconnection 
between the three disciplines is the focus of inquiry in the thesis. It is explored in the 
literature of nine writers selected across an inter-disciplinary reading of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and poetry, and across different historical periods. It examines how the 
selected writers pose, discuss and answer the question of whether the experience and 
communication of love is possible in inter-relational encounters, or whether such 
experience remains an unattainable ideal inevitably blocked and limited by personal and 
societal forces. An examination of this expansive question is confined to a concentration 
on how the concept of love has been, and continues to be, interpreted and explored in 
the three disciplines, and it is limited to a concentration on a small selection of writers 
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within these areas. 
The thesis aims at a limited and a selective reading of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and poetry; as three disciplines wherein language is the key mode of 
inquiry, practice, and expression; each of these disciplines is directly and indirectly 
concerned with questions pertaining to concepts of truth, being, and the experience of 
the human condition, and each strives to approach the elusive yet essential issues of 
subjectivity, existence and essence, and particularly the needs and deprivations which 
enhance or diminish the experience of human living. The concept of love pertains 
inevitably to these questions, and it is argued that this concept enables a significant and 
insightful connection between the three disciplines. There are some common ways in 
which the concept of love is explored in relation to the three disciplines, and some ways 
that are specific to particular schools of inquiry; this commonality and difference also 
applies to different historical periods. A focus on key figures/writers from the three 
areas and from three time-frames ranging from romanticism, through modernism, to 
contemporary postmodernism, enables an analysis of the concept of love through 
diverse situations, personalities and cultural/literary/philosophical contexts. The 
limitation of the analysis to this time-frame, which necessarily excludes an examination 
of the question through periods prior to romanticism, results from both the constraint of 
the required word-count of the thesis, and from an attempt to maintain coherence and 
focus in the discussion. 
The question has been chosen because, it is asserted, the possibility of love is a 
question that lies at the deepest and most secret part of humanity. It is a question that, 
down through the ages and across different disciplines, has intrigued, disturbed, 
challenged and ultimately formed the (often unacknowledged) foundation of theoretical, 
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creative or philosophical inquiry. It is a question that, although it defies conclusive 
analysis and the boundaries of discipline, is firmly rooted in any concept of what it is to 
be human, and therefore has never been - and can never be - ignored. It is consequently 
central to these three disciplines which are motivated, at least in part, by the search for 
an understanding and an expression of the human condition and truths thereof.  
The notion of love is traditionally and conventionally associated with idealistic 
expressions of self-denial, object-worship, self-transcendence, and god-like 
characteristics. Sentimentality, cliché, and consumerist depictions of human relatedness 
often supersede the human reality of love, in its ambivalence, its contradictions, its 
failures and its diversity. Humanness, the pursuit of truth, the striving for happiness, 
indeed the full spectrum of lived experience, is impacted to at least some degree by the 
concept of love; from birth to death, across cultural and historical divides, the 
need/urge/instinct to love and to be loved may be discerned, at times clearly and 
obviously, more often hidden and disguised, in diverse manifestations of human 
behaviour. As a result, questions relating to the concept of love have exercised thinkers 
and writers across many disciplines; attempts have been made to define and describe 
love, to provide theories of love, and to explain the meaning of love. However, this 
thesis seeks to ask how the selected writers respond to the question as to whether, in the 
light of philosophical insight, psychoanalytic observation and poetic inspiration, all of 
which attempt a realistic and truthful appraisal of human nature, and in the light of the 
contentious and disturbing facts of human history, love is possible at all.  
‘Is love possible?’ It may be argued that this is a question which is too vague 
and too complex to be posed, explored or answered in any comprehensive way. Its 
analysis necessitates the construction of a definition of love which is comprehensive 
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enough to embrace a broadly acceptable understanding of the concept; it also demands 
an explanation of the notion of possibility within the context of the question. This thesis 
accepts the complexities, limitations, and inconclusiveness pertaining to a theoretical 
inquiry into the question of love’s possibility, and thus it seeks to approach a narrower 
and more focused aspect of such an investigation. It places the question within a 
framework of historical and disciplinary boundaries, and asks how it is explored, 
analysed and pronounced by selected writers within this framework. Thus, definitions 
and conceptual explanations are limited to those which emerge from a reading of these 
writers. The thesis proposes that the central importance of the question lies, not in such 
analysis or exploration, but rather in the incontrovertible evidence of the centrality of 
the question to human experience. Great thinkers and writers have always, in various 
ways, represented or anticipated the great questions of their particular age or time. In the 
following chapters, evidence of the centrality of the question ‘is love possible?’ will be 
explored through selected writers from the disciplines of philosophy, psychoanalysis 
and poetry. Essentially – and crucially – this is an exploration that gains its strength 
from the interdisciplinary nature of the exercise. 
Over the centuries, the phenomenon of love has inspired and occupied 
philosophers, psychologists/psychoanalysts and poets, as well as students and 
researchers in fields of study which are outside the scope of this thesis. Hence, perennial 
questions of philosophy such as ‘who am I?’, ‘how should one live?’ and ‘whence 
meaning and significance?’ reflect in a direct way concepts and definitions of love. 
Platonic, Aristotelian and Pauline discourses on love differentiate between eros, agape 
and philia, and explore diverse manifestations of love in sexuality, friendship, and 
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divine worship and adoration.
1
 Subsequent philosophers analyse and interpret these 
conceptions of love, query their boundaries, and offer traditional or revolutionary 
understanding and conclusion. Within philosophical discourse, religious, ethical and 
practical aspects of the phenomenon of love are explored, and the opposition between 
self-love and altruism is examined and sometimes deconstructed altogether. On this 
point, philosophy encounters psychoanalytic theory regarding selfhood and otherness 
and the complex relationship between subject and object. Psychoanalysis seeks to free 
the human psyche from the constrictions of deception and compulsion, and, in the 
words of its founder, aims to liberate man ‘to love and to work’.2 Manifestations of 
mental and emotional distress are addressed with a view to their amelioration, and this 
is mainly achieved through an understanding of their origins. Tracing the sources of 
trauma or distress to the enduring influence of early childhood experience inevitably 
results in a portrayal of the subject’s desire for love, a desire which is replicated in the 
phenomenon of transference in the clinical setting. Poetry, in a manner different to other 
literary genres such as narrative and drama, has traditionally been seen as the creative 
exploration and expression of individual emotion and passion, and in lifting the veil of 
fixed assumptions and rational limitations, it explores and expresses the common 
experience of love as the nucleus of human life. The vicissitudes, losses, joys and 
sorrows pertaining to love are approached in a unique way through the poetic word, as it 
simultaneously addresses these issues intellectually, emotionally and creatively. Thus, 
the three disciplines share a common emphasis on the question of human love; they 
                                                 
1
 For an exploration of these concepts, see Alan Noble’s Eros, Agape, and Philia. 
2
 This phrase is attributed to Freud by Erik Erikson, in Identity and the Life Cycle, p.102. 
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each contribute a unique commentary on the subject. However, it is the argument of this 
thesis that a richer exploration of the question is enabled through a combined reading of, 
and an attempted dialogue between, philosophy, psychoanalysis and poetry. 
 The concept of love has inspired much of the literature of the three disciplines, 
as seen through diverse personalities and historical periods. Titles such as The Reasons 
of Love, The Nature of Love, the Way of Love, and The Psychology of Love, form but a 
miniscule reflection of the existing selection. However, this thesis asks if, according to 
the writers selected, love, as defined in myriad forms and descriptions, is actually 
possible within the human condition. Through a reading of selected authors of 
philosophy, psychoanalysis and poetry, it examines some of the obstacles to such a 
possibility, the impact of love on the concept of the individual subject, and ultimately 
the role of love in human living. It investigates how the concept of love has been 
explored not only through the three disciplines mentioned, but also through different 
historical periods. This impacts on and influences, the writers chosen for exploration 
and analysis. 
The philosophical contribution centres on Friedrich Nietzsche, whose 
deconstructive assault on fixed forms of being rejected the separation of philosophy 
from lived experience, and who suggested an inescapable relationship between thought 
and feeling, mind and body, and philosophy and psychology; Martin Buber as a 
philosopher concerned with authenticity and love in human relations, with a particular 
emphasis on the concrete events and encounters of lived experience, and in particular 
the complexities and ambivalence pertaining to the encounter between self and other; 
and Paul Ricoeur as a contemporary philosopher concentrated on a hermeneutical 
approach to subjectivity, personhood, and the interpretation of human action and 
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motivation, especially as this enables an investigation of the interrelatedness of self and 
other. Psychoanalytic literature focuses on Sigmund Freud as the founder and instigator 
of the discipline, Jacques Lacan as both an interpreter of Freud and an influential 
innovator of new developments in psychoanalysis, and Slavoj Žižek as a commentator 
and thinker in the postmodern world of psychoanalysis, and the most prominent 
psychoanalytic writer of the contemporary time. The selection of poetry starts with 
William Wordsworth as a prime figure in the development of romanticism, with its 
rejection of the one-sided concentration on rationalism characteristic of the 
metaphysical poets, and an embrace of emotion as a worthy contributor to truth; the 
poetry of T.S. Eliot provides an exposé of modernity and its disillusionments; and the 
work of Brendan Kennelly enables an examination of the global experience of 
postmodernism. An assertion of Kennelly’s articulation of the self between local and 
global particularities is proposed here, but it is offered in acknowledgement of the fact 
that the verdict on his contribution awaits historical hindsight. The three poets have 
been chosen as representative of their literary eras; the length of the thesis prohibits a 
more inclusive study of romantic, modernist and postmodernist writers. All nine writers 
provide exploration, analysis and commentary on the concept of love; each will be 
examined from their own perspective and from the perspective of their particular 
historical framework. 
Definitions of love abound in myriad forms, sexual, spiritual, parental, brotherly, 
divine, and many more; terms such as romantic, neighbourly, reciprocal, selfish, 
altruistic and ethical, variously prefix the concept and appear to suggest a vital 
difference in their diverse descriptions. It is not the intention of this thesis to outline the 
manifold interpretations of the experience of love, nor is it suggested that the meaning 
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of love is reducible to theoretic abstraction, definition or signification. The thesis refers 
to inter-personal love in the broadest sense, and does not seek to extrapolate different 
kinds of love from each other as it is considered that they intermingle in thought and 
experience. Above all, love is a subjective experience, its communication is essentially 
personal, and thus it resists easy generalisations and proclamations; this study is 
undertaken in acknowledgement of the ambiguities and restrictions necessarily ensuing 
from this reality, and it modestly attempts, through the selected readings, to explore 
glimpses of an experience which is somehow universally known while also universally 
disputed: ‘This is a reality that each one of us knows all too well, even from our own 
meagre experience of what it means to really love’ (Hederman, 2000: 105).  Love is 
something more than the sum of its expressions and the variety of its manifestations, 
and it is not within the scope of this thesis to transcend the incommensurable nature of 
the concept. The subjective nature of love’s experience and the difficulties inherent in 
its articulation and signification is acknowledged here, and thus recourse to language 
and theory as media of exploration is inevitably limited and incomplete. The focus on 
the ‘possibility’ of love rather than on the ‘existence’ of love is justified within this 
argument; the existence of love cannot be measured or validated objectively because it 
is a metaphysical entity. Consequently, the study is limited to an exploration of the 
insights of selected thinkers as an avenue towards highlighting at least some of the 
conditions of the possibility of love. 
The study is structured in three sections, each dealing with a particular discipline 
across three historical periods. Section One examines, in three separate chapters, the 
works of Nietzsche, Buber, and Ricoeur as they relate to the thesis question. Chapter 
One explores a reading of Nietzsche’s work concentrated on the following texts: Beyond 
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Good and Evil, Human, All Too Human, Will to Power, The Genealogy of Morality, and 
Zarathustra.  Within these texts, Nietzsche’s arguments relating to the misinterpretation 
of morality and the corresponding distorted view of human nature are explored with the 
view to ascertaining how these deceptions and duplicities impact on the experience of 
love and pose obstacles and distortions to its communication. The possibility of love is 
explored through a reading of the proclamations articulated in Zarasthustra, and 
particularly through an analysis of Nietzsche’s doctrines of eternal recurrence and amor 
fati. Chapter Two outlines Buber’s vision of love and the obstacles to its experience 
through a reading of his works, I and Thou, The Way of Man, and Between Man and 
Man, as well as through the recorded memoirs of some of his contemporaries. Topics 
explored through a reading of these texts include the alluring attraction of crowd 
membership as an escape from personal responsibility, the practice of monologue as a 
substitute for dialogue within relationships, and the resulting alienation from the self 
which negates the communication of love between subjects or selves. The possibility of 
love, as interpreted through Buber’s work, focuses on the concrete, experiential 
character of love’s experience, and on the practical responsibilities incurred in the 
encounter between I and Thou. Chapter Three examines a selection of Ricoeur’s work 
which reflects his thoughts on the fragmented nature of subjectivity, the narrowing and 
distorting restrictions on vision and understanding, and the fragility of identity; these are 
some of the obstacles to the possibility of love which are explored in his work, 
particularly in the aptly titled texts such as Fallible Man, Oneself as Another, and The 
Course of Recognition. Ricoeur’s acknowledgement of fallibility and evil in human 
nature is explored in conjunction with his belief and hope in the possibility of solicitude 
as an avenue to love of self and others.  
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Section Two concentrates on the work of three psychoanalytic writers and the 
insights into love’s possibility which may be gleaned therein. Chapter Four introduces 
the work of Freud as the originary expression of psychoanalysis. Freud’s seminal work, 
The Interpretation of Dreams, is explored, while a selection of Freudian texts is read 
within collected volumes of his work, such as those edited by Adam Phillips and Peter 
Gay; these texts are supplemented by a reading of a selection of his private letters. 
Freud’s ‘discovery’ of the unconscious, and his elaboration of its impact on human 
behaviour and motivation, his observation and description of the many manifestations of 
psychic conflict, and his theory of repression as a universal human phenomenon, are 
outlined as they relate to the possibility of love. Freud’s exposition of the conflict 
between the happiness of the individual and the constraints of civilization, as outlined in 
his work Civilization and its Discontents, is considered in the light of the thesis 
question, and his unique and often unflattering appraisal of human nature is juxtaposed 
with his description of the possibility of an art of living based on love. In Chapter Five, 
the theories and insights of psychoanalysis are further explored through the seminars 
and Écrits (a compilation of selected publications) of the French psychoanalyst, Lacan. 
Lacan’s pronouncements on the paradox of language, the wall of language, and the law 
of language, suggesting the inescapable alienation and isolation of the human subject 
constrained by the impossibility of full or complete expression of human existence, are 
explored. Lacan’s vision of the subject and of the human condition, and his cynical and 
controversial observations of human nature are outlined as possible responses to the 
thesis question. His assertion of the potential of psychoanalysis to liberate the subject 
from constraints and denials, and his call for an acknowledgement of the truth of human 
desire as a prerequisite to the experience of love are examined and discussed. Chapter 
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Six explores a selected reading of the contemporary theorist, Žižek, and concentrates on 
aspects of his work which are pertinent to the thesis question. Texts chosen from his 
prolific oeuvre include characteristically titled works such as Enjoy Your Symptom!, The 
Plague of Fantasies, and The Neighbour, as well as a selection of articles and essays. 
Žižek’s affirmation of the emergence of the new big Other, an introjected and almost 
involuntary acquiescence to unspoken laws, rituals and behaviours, especially as they 
relate to the relationships between human beings, is explored as a barrier to authentic 
communication, and so to love. His paradoxical response to the dictum of neighbourly 
love is examined, and his insistence on the unknowable and ungraspable nature of the 
other is explored as it appears to discount the possibility of love. His demand for truth, 
for traversing the fantasy, leaves the question open, and his work is increasingly seen to 
focus on the concept of love in its diverse manifestations. 
Section Three departs from the concentration on theory and introduces a poetic 
exploration of the topic. Chapter Seven begins with an examination of the work of 
Wordsworth and his instigation of the principles of literary romanticism. His Collected 
Works is used for reference with a particular focus on his major poems such as “The 
Prelude”, “The Immortality Ode”, “Tintern Abbey”, and a selection from the shorter 
poems. This selection is supplemented with his “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads” and 
with letters and essays of relevance to the topic. Wordsworth’s arguments against an 
over-reliance on rationalism, science and logic, to the exclusion of emotion and 
imagination, are outlined as an elucidation of some of the obstacles to love. His 
portrayal of the human experience of inevitable loss and change is explored, particularly 
in the light of Freud’s interpretation of mourning and melancholia as basic reactions to 
such vicissitudes. The autobiographical nature of “The Prelude” provides a poetic 
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exposition of the relationship between solitude and attachment, self and other, past and 
present, and these concepts enable a commentary on the possibility of love. Chapter 
Eight concentrates on the poetry of Eliot as a body of work which reflects many of the 
characteristics of modernity while also providing a uniquely individual portrayal of the 
modern subject. His collected works are explored with a special emphasis on “The Love 
Song of J.Alfred Prufrock”, “The Waste Land”, and “Four Quartets”. Eliot’s essays are 
also examined for the elucidation which they provide in formulating the impetus and 
motivation of the poet’s work. Eliot’s portrayal of the modern subject as essentially 
fragmented, and often split between private and public realities, is analyzed as a 
commentary on the subject’s frequent failure to express his/her needs and desires, and 
hence as a contributing factor to the failure of love. The failure of language to 
communicate the innermost depths of human being is explored and linked with the ideas 
of Buber and Lacan relating to language as a barrier to intersubjectivity and hence to 
love. The barriers erected and maintained between separate individuals are mirrored in 
the denial and disavowal of certain aspects of the self as portrayed in Eliot’s vision. This 
loss of self is considered in its impact on the possibility of love, of self and of others. 
An exploration of the poetry of Kennelly in Chapter Nine expands the realm of the 
thesis question to the experience of postmodernism, and therefore suggests comparison 
with the theories of Ricoeur and of Žižek. Indeed, this final chapter, in its discussion of 
the essential interplay between past and present, in its outline of the postmodern 
phenomenon of relativism and the loss of traditional meaning and authority, provides a 
poetic resonance with the thoughts of the writers explored in previous chapters. 
Kennelly’s collected works are the focus of this chapter, with a broad selection across a 
wide chronological spectrum. This reading is supplemented by an examination of 
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Kennelly’s latest publication, Now, as well as recorded and published interviews. This 
section closes with an investigation of Kennelly’s persistence and optimism in spite of 
the vicissitudes, happenchance and unpredictability of human being, and his eloquent 
celebration of life in all its messiness and elusiveness provides a chorus to the 
Nietzschean exhortation of amor fati of the first chapter. 
The reading and the exploration of primary texts is illuminated by a broad 
contribution from secondary sources, and an attempt is made to draw from these texts a 
selection balanced between diverse views. While the chosen disciplines, and the 
individual writers selected therein, are outlined and explored in separate sections and 
separate chapters, the thesis attempts a dialogue between these independent and separate 
realms of thought. Agreement, disagreement, links and divergences are noted and 
explored. These are highlighted and discussed in the conclusion of the work, which 
provides an overview of the questions, insights and possible answers resulting from the 
research.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION ONE 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
he discipline of philosophy is rooted in its Latin translation, ‘love of 
wisdom’. The vagueness and ambiguity of this term allows for diverse 
concentrations in different areas of philosophy, including philosophy of 
mind, philosophy of language, phenomenology, metaphysics, ethics, and the 
history of philosophy, to name but a few. Yet the question inevitably arises: what is the 
wisdom which is loved, and what is its relation to lived experience as distinct from 
theoretical abstractions? In the words of Martha Nussbaum, this question asks ‘what 
philosophy has to do with the world’ (Nussbaum, 1994: 3). The question poses others, 
such as, what is the function, reason, and significance of philosophy in the realm of 
human life, and how do the insights and explorations of this discipline reflect, interpret, 
and enhance the experience of the human condition? A concentration on this question is 
the focus of the philosophical exploration in this thesis, and in particular, the 
philosophical reflections on the concept of love as central to human experience. 
In this section, the philosophical reflections of Nietzsche, Buber, and Ricoeur, 
on the obstacles and barriers to the possibility of love are explored. While the 
philosophies of Buber and Ricoeur are particularly grounded in an emphasis on 
relationship as a central and pervading concept in the experience of human living, 
personal, communal, and political, the choice of Nietzsche, as a philosopher who 
contributes in a unique way to the discussion of love, is not so immediately validated. It 
is argued that Nietzsche’s philosophy, while dealing in a more obvious way with issues 
such as ‘truth’, perspectivism, and ‘will to power’, is no less concerned with the 
T 
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Platonic and Aristotelian explorations of ‘the good’, ‘practical wisdom’, and ‘the 
meaning of love’. Underlying Nietzsche’s reflections on morality, philosophy, history, 
and truth, is a persistent concern with the possibilities and hindrances to optimum 
human living or flourishing, personal integrity, solitude and connection, happiness and 
sorrow, and the full spectrum of experience which promotes or diminishes the 
possibility of love; love of self and of others, manifested in a love of life in all its 
ambivalence and mystery.  Nietzsche sees the enjoyment of life, the inevitable corollary 
of amor fati, or love of one’s fate/life, as the most crucial purpose of human living:3 ‘As 
long as men have existed, man has enjoyed himself too little…if we learn better to enjoy 
ourselves, we best unlearn how to do harm to others and to contrive harm’ (Nietzsche, 
2003a: 112), and he argues for a truthfulness and a comprehensiveness which would 
enhance rather than diminish life: ‘And let that day be lost to us on which we did not 
dance once! And let that wisdom be false to us that brought no laughter with it!’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 228). 
Nietzsche’s writings, in both style and content, provide an unconventional 
analysis of the individual subject through a revolutionary appraisal of philosophy, 
humankind, morality and truth. In rejecting hitherto unquestioned assumptions 
regarding the human condition, Nietzsche overturns some of our most precious 
                                                 
3
 Slavoj Žižek and other contemporary theorists, offer an ironic version of this idea whereby the 
injunction to enjoy is exposed as a societal command, an imposition of the superego, and therefore a 
constraining limitation on the individual; perhaps the dilemma lies in the variously possible 
interpretations of the concept of enjoyment, ranging from the struggle pertaining to the ‘performance’ or 
‘appearance’ of enjoyment to a personal and often private experience of joy which is independent of 
public validation. 
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depictions of ourselves and our world. As a radical and revolutionary thinker 
confronting uncomfortable questions regarding philosophy, psychology, and a host of 
traditionally held convictions relating to human nature, Nietzsche continues to resound, 
either in agreement or debate, with all the writers explored in the thesis. In particular, 
Nietzsche’s writings, through revolutionising our assumptions regarding self and others, 
morals and values, rationality and instinct, provoke debate and reflection on the actual 
experience of the human condition, and this inevitably involves an analysis of the 
concept of love as a central element of human living.  
Throughout his work, Nietzsche is critical of the narrowness and deceptions 
which he sees as characteristic of philosophy throughout history, but especially in his 
own time. He accuses philosophers of basing their convictions on a biased and distorted 
view of the human subject, an assumption of absolutism and certainty in questions of 
truth and meaning, and an aversion to self-analysis and self-interrogation. He refers to 
this as ‘the struggle of belief in opinions, that is, the struggle of convictions’ (Nietzsche, 
1984: 262), and explains that ‘conviction is the belief that in some point of knowledge 
one possesses absolute truth’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 261). In contrast, many of Nietzsche’s 
proclamations evoke shock and disbelief, as they blatantly overturn long-held 
assumptions regarding the human being and the human condition; his philosophy denies 
the validity of revered concepts of truth, being, will to life, and cause and effect; he 
rejects conventional interpretations of values such as responsibility, guilt, power and 
knowledge. The impact of the shock emanating from his thought is intensified by his 
aphoristic style and unapologetic mode of address. The style and language adopted by 
Nietzsche is radically different from that of his predecessors, and often reflects his claim 
that ‘truth tends to reveal its highest wisdom in the guise of simplicity’ (Nietzsche, 
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1984: 253). 
Nietzsche rejects what he perceives as the dogmatism and arrogance of previous 
philosophers, which, according to his argument, often disguised a dishonesty, an 
ostensible objectivity that is in fact highly subjective. This is the view of Maudmarie 
Clark: ‘What Nietzsche objects to in previous philosophers is not that they read their 
values into the world, but that they pretended to be doing something else’ (Clark, 1990: 
240).  Nietzsche’s philosophy is not proffered as a prescription or a roadmap for 
mankind; he constantly asserts that his thoughts are merely his thoughts, his 
interpretations, and his truths. He explains that he ‘came to [his] truth by diverse paths 
and diverse ways’, he insists that ‘this – is now my way’, and asks ‘where is yours?...for 
the way – does not exist!’ (Nietzsche: 2003a: 213). The most important questions in life 
can never be answered by anyone except oneself. This is an assertion which he applies 
to all philosophy, and it is an individual perspective which is adopted variously by all 
the writers explored in this thesis: ‘It has gradually become clear to me what every great 
philosophy has hitherto been; a confession on the part of its author and a kind of 
involuntary memoir’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 37). Furthermore, Nietzsche acknowledges the 
co-existence of concealment and revelation in such confessions: ‘Every philosophy also 
conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding-place, every word is also a mask’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003: 216). He looks forward to the philosophers of the future who will 
embrace these sentiments: ‘these coming philosophers…will not be dogmatists…[but 
will assert that] my judgement is [only] my judgement’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 71). Walter 
Kaufmann suggests that Nietzsche embodies the characteristics of ‘these coming 
philosophers’ and that his ‘greatest value may well lie in the fact that he embodied the 
true philosophical spirit of “searching into myself and other men”’ (Kaufmann, 1974: 
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xvi).  Solomon, in his existential reading of Nietzsche, concurs with this evaluation as 
he claims that ‘he is not a philosopher of abstract ideas but rather of the dazzling 
personal insight, the provocative comment’ (Solomon, 2003: 13). Nietzsche bases his 
reflections, discoveries, and proclamations on actual lived experience as he perceives it, 
and there is an underlying awareness that his writings, in fact all literature, is secondary 
to individual experience in the pursuit of personal truth, as he asks: ‘What I find, what I 
am seeking – Was that ever in a book?’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 268). His emphasis on actual, 
concrete experience of human living renders Nietzsche’s philosophy vital for this thesis, 
as it is a focus often absent from the work of other philosophers, and it is fundamental in 
an exploration of the concept of love.
4
 
 
                                                 
4
 Concentration on actual lived experience as distinct from abstract theorization is also deemed essential 
by Buber and Ricoeur, and is a pervading characteristic of all the writers explored in this thesis; a 
willingness to look honestly at personal experience is a courage and humility shared by these writers, and 
their insights are ultimately based on this attempted appraisal of introspection and interrogation. 
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Misinterpretation of Morality 
The beast in us wants to be lied to; morality is a white lie, to keep it from 
tearing us apart (Nietzsche, 1984: 45). 
 
The possibility of love is a question approached directly and indirectly in Nietzsche’s 
work as he addresses the obstacles and deceptions which militate against love of self, of 
others, and of life. A major impediment to the experience of love is, according to his 
argument, the misinterpretation of morality involving an unquestioned acceptance of a 
range of values and morals which suppress and distort personal truth, motivation and 
desire. In what is considered his most controversial work, The Genealogy of Morality, 
Nietzsche provides a critique of morality, values and philosophy. In calling for a 
reevaluation of all morals, Nietzsche brings into question common assumptions 
regarding accepted values and moral virtues which have been extolled and encouraged 
as being inherent to human nature, and which have served to portray an image of 
humanity which is basically good, well-meaning, and other-centred. Virtues such as 
altruism, generosity, sympathy, and compassion, have historically been seen as the best 
expressions of human nature, and are encapsulated in the Christian dictum to love one’s 
neighbour as oneself.
5
 Nietzsche rejects the assumption that these virtues are inherent to 
human nature, that they are natural to humankind, and he disputes any absolutist 
conception of these virtues. Rather, he argues that ‘values’ and codes of morality are ‘in 
a continual state of fluctuation’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 53), and he seeks to expose the 
cultural and historical relativity of our values, crucially our moral values, ‘the utility 
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 This dictum of universal love is debated in diverse ways by many of the writers explored below, i.e., 
Freud, Lacan and Žižek. 
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which dominates moral value-judgements’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 122); in so doing he casts 
a particularly critical and sceptical eye on Christian sources of morality. The deleterious 
effect of unrealistic codes of morality results, according to Nietzsche, in a diminishment 
of human experience and a distorted appraisal of the human subject: ‘All these 
moralities…[are] recipes to counter his passions’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 119). This is 
particularly evident in the concept of love:  ‘Christianity gave Eros poison to drink – 
and he did not die of it, to be sure, but degenerated into vice’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 105).6 
The poet D.H. Laurence describes this as ‘the mess of love’: ‘We’ve made a great mess 
of love, / Since we made an ideal of it’ (Laurence, 2002: 387). According to Nietzsche’s 
argument, many assumptions, norms and practices that are accepted as inevitable and 
unavoidable in fact have a contingent, utilitarian and relativist character. It could be 
argued that the importance of modern literary theory lies in its unveiling of values that 
appear natural and self-evident as contrived and created, whether relating to language, 
identity, otherness, morality or sexuality. In this way Nietzsche can be seen as precursor 
to this mode of thinking, and this creates a strong link between his work and that of the 
theorists discussed later in the thesis. 
Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals suggests that all moral values, rather than being 
natural and inherent to human existence, actually serve the interests of influential 
groups or institutions. Morality is, in this analysis, a body of rules which has come 
down through centuries, appropriated by a religion or a culture, and uncritically 
received and accepted. Nietzsche maintains that moralities are essentially instruments of 
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 The distortion and perversion of love through a religious pronouncement on the superiority of divine 
love and the denigration of human love is a theme explored in Kennelly’s poetry, while Eliot’s work 
progressively turns to divine love as the ideal. 
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social control, usually related to the establishment or preservation of the interests of one 
group or another. ‘“Value” is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease 
of…dominating centres’ (Nietzsche, 1968:  715). This critique of ‘dominating centres’ 
is expanded in the deconstruction of Western metaphysics undertaken by the French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida. Like Nietzsche, Derrida argues that centres or hegemonies 
validate themselves by making their situation at the centre seem natural and fixed, and 
by perpetuating the illusion of binary oppositions such as male/female, nature/culture, 
and mind/body. He suggests that it is necessary to consider ‘that the centre had no 
natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function’, and he looks to ‘the 
Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of being and 
truth…and the Freudian critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness’ 
in outlining his attempt to deconstruct these ‘centres’ (Derrida, 1981: 280).  
Nietzsche’s attack on morality centres on its commitment to untenable claims 
about human nature, and on what he sees as the deleterious impact which these claims 
have had on the flourishing of life; deception, resentment, and guilt ensue: ‘how dearly 
the erection of every ideal on earth has exacted its payment? How much reality always 
had to be libelled and mistaken, how much lying sanctified, how much conscience 
disturbed?’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 65). Nietzsche promotes his argument by insisting on a re-
examination of the origins of these values, and thereby he seeks to expose their 
historical and utilitarian character. Thus, his attack is not centred primarily on the nature 
of the values and morals which are accepted unquestionably as ‘good’ and ‘true’; he 
insists on the necessity of examining the origins of these values as a route to 
understanding their historical and cultural sources. According to Solomon, ‘Nietzsche’s 
genealogy of morals is, first of all, a thesis about the motivation of morality’ (Solomon, 
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2003: 54). Nietzsche argues that the true nature of morality can only be approached if 
one analyses and acknowledges the sources and purposes of moral teaching, and hence 
he calls for a more honest, a more factual appraisal of human nature. He insists that 
moral values do not exist in themselves; they are not absolute or transcendent, and they 
can be modified according to changing situations and circumstances: ‘Unchanging good 
and evil does not exist!’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 139). This appraisal would relinquish the 
possibility of fixed absolutes, in relation to truth, goodness, or the human being. As 
Richard Kearney states: ‘Nietzsche’s project of transvaluation effected not only the 
moral question of good but also the epistemological question of truth. The age-old quest 
for absolute truth is now exposed as a hidden will to power’ (Kearney, 1998: 212).  
Nietzsche’s question regarding our values of good and evil is, ‘have they 
inhibited or furthered human flourishing up until now? Are they are a sign of distress, of 
impoverishment, of the degeneration of life?’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 3). Only by recognising 
the pragmatic nature of all morals, and by acknowledging the premise and the purpose 
of all ethical rules and judgements, can we, according to Nietzsche, attempt to come to 
terms with the multi-faceted character of life as we experience it. Such honesty, 
involving the abandonment of established ‘ideals’ which act as a barrier to instinct, 
passion, and an appreciation of human nature as it is, inevitably results in a transitional 
period of nihilism, an uneasiness portrayed in the literature of the age;
7
 but, it is, 
according to Nietzsche, prerequisite to overcoming the resentment inherent in a slave 
morality, whereby individual responsibility is sacrificed for the illusions of certainty and 
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 The sense of disillusionment, alienation and hopelessness which characterizes much of the literature of 
modernism is characteristic of Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism, and it is particularly captured in the 
poetry of  Eliot. 
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truth, social and personal guidelines, and a fixed script of rules and expectations.
8
 These 
assumptions and limitations alienate the subject from individual truth and expression: 
‘The first opinion that occurs to us when we are suddenly asked about a matter is 
usually not our own, but only the customary one, appropriate to our caste, position, or 
parentage; our own opinions seldom swim near the surface’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 245). 
Nietzsche disputes any inherent or consistent meaning pertaining to the concepts 
of good and evil, and suggests that such signifiers are conditioned by historical and 
cultural fluctuations. On this point, Alexander Nehamas, in his interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy in Nietzsche: Life as Literature, draws a comparison between 
the thought of Nietzsche and that of Socrates: ‘Nietzsche argues in a manner very close 
to the manner of Socrates that what we commonly consider good depends essentially on 
the context that we implicitly introduce into our evaluation, and that it is not therefore 
good in itself’ (Nehamas, 1985: 212). In his analysis of the history of philosophy, 
Nietzsche suggests an absence of honesty in relation to these matters: ‘The errors of the 
great philosophers usually start from a false explanation of certain human actions and 
feelings….an erroneous analysis of so-called selfless behaviour, for example, can be the 
basis for false ethics’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 41). Solomon argues that Nietzsche’s criticism 
of philosophy is based on the tendency of philosophers to ‘ignore the concrete social 
and psychological situations out of which ideas, ideologies, and whole philosophies are 
born’ (Solomon, 2000: 45). 
 Nietzsche challenges the foundations of traditional thought; he calls for a 
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 The abdication of personal responsibility and the embrace of ‘collective’ and popular assumptions of 
authority and truth is also seen by Buber as an impediment to genuine relationship. Directly and 
indirectly, all the writers explored in the thesis concur with this analysis. 
Chapter One: Friedrich Nietzsche 
 32 
questioning of everything, especially the concepts through which we have viewed the 
world and ourselves without seeing their underlying assumptions and deceptions. He 
demands that we reconsider what we have taken for granted, and that we consider afresh 
what a good human life consists of, by putting our usual assumptions about the world 
into brackets. Nehamas, in his discussion of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, states 
that ‘Nietzsche’s opposition to traditional histories of morality and his sometimes 
extravagant claims for the novelty and importance of his own approach are primarily 
caused by his aversion to this linear or static conception of the nature of values and 
institutions’ (Nehamas, 1985: 112). The Italian poet, Antonio Porchia concurs with this 
critique of the narrowness of linear thinking and vision: ‘Following straight lines 
shortens distances, and also life’ (Porchia, 2003: 43), while William Blake notes what is 
sacrificed in the attempted ‘improvement’ of human nature: ‘Improvement makes strait 
roads; but the crooked roads / without improvement are roads of Genius’ (Blake, 2004: 
139). In probing the inconsistencies and deceptions which form the background of much 
of our convictions about ourselves and our world, Nietzsche, like Freud, calls into 
question our illusions of self-knowledge and self-awareness: ‘We remain of necessity 
strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves, we must mistake ourselves, for 
us the maxim reads to all eternity; “each is furthest from himself”- with respect to 
ourselves we are not “knowers”’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 1), and he suggests that self-
deception is sometimes chosen, either consciously or unconsciously: ‘Where my 
honesty ceases I am blind and want to be blind’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 264). 
 Freud later reiterates this assertion that we can never fully know ourselves, 
particularly in the light of his description of the unconscious as a part of mental life over 
which we have little or no control, and which can be aptly described as a stranger in the 
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house, suggesting its inaccessibility and alienation from rational thinking. Thus 
Nietzsche claims that ‘Man is difficult to discover, most of all to himself’ (Nietzsche, 
2003a: 212). The impossibility of complete self-transparency is difficult to 
acknowledge, and this difficulty is also an obstacle to the acceptance of the alterity of 
the other as something which can never be fully penetrated; the state of ‘unknowing’ 
discomfits the demands and expectations of human pride and propels an insistent desire 
to ‘know’ and so to evaluate that which cannot be known. Derrida looks to Nietzsche’s 
analysis of this dilemma as part of his exploration of love and friendship, and he 
concludes that love and friendship involve an acceptance of distance and ‘unknowing’: 
‘Whereby those who are separated come together without ceasing to be what they are 
destined to be…dissociated, ‘solitarized’, singularized, constituted into monadic 
alterities…what is proper to the alter ego will never be accessible’ (Derrida, 2005: 54). 
Accordingly, love of the other is possible in an acknowledgement that one can never 
fully know another, and in a gracious appreciation of this difference and mystery. 
  Nietzsche philosophizes from ‘the perspective of life’, from the awareness that 
all knowledge is ultimately based on one’s interpretation of reality, on one’s experience 
in the world. He therefore urges an expansion of this experience to include a broad 
spectrum of perspectives and interpretations: 
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival “knowing”; and the 
more affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, 
we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more 
complete will our “concept” of this matter, our “objectivity” be (Nietzsche, 
1998: 85).
9
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 This plea for the acceptance of a plurality of perspectives resounds with the other writers explored in 
this thesis, and pre-empts a central characteristic of postmodernism. 
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 According to Nietzsche, our lack of self-knowledge is mirrored in our crippling 
dependence on overly rationalistic or metaphysical conceptions of human nature, and on 
external sources of value, such as religion and society. This one-sided and distorted 
view of human nature has, in Nietzsche’s view, been mirrored in traditional philosophy, 
a criticism which is echoed by Nussbaum: ‘Philosophy has often seen itself as a way of 
transcending the merely human…The alternative I explore sees it as a way of being 
human and speaking humanly’ (Nussbaum, 1992: 53). Nietzsche urges us to abandon 
the false certainties which we have unknowingly inherited and internalised, and 
concludes that there are no absolutes, no certainties, no ‘truth’, only the unique 
experience of the individual. Only then, when we face the reality of our experience, of 
ourselves and of the world, can we begin to confront the actual obstacles to our 
experience of love and happiness. The absence of this honest encounter with reality 
ensures that we recoil from life as it is, and therefore dismiss the challenge to overcome 
the barriers to self-knowledge and self-fulfilment. What is not faced, acknowledged, and 
accepted, persists, and cannot be changed.  
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Distorted View of Human Nature 
For all too long man has regarded his natural inclinations with an “evil” eye 
(Nietzsche, 1998: 65). 
 
The desire to love and to be loved can only be genuinely pursued within an honest, 
albeit constantly changing, acknowledgement of human nature. Without this acceptance, 
the experience of love is supplanted by fantasy and pretence, where the flesh and blood 
reality of self and other is camouflaged by denial of certain aspects of human nature and 
exaggeration of more acceptable traits; the result is an array of pseudo-loving 
encounters which recoil from the complex and ungraspable nature of living 
relationships. This distorted view of human nature is necessitated and maintained by the 
demands and expectations of civilization and socialization, and clearly functions as an 
impediment or obstacle to love. Nietzsche sees the evolution of civilization, and the 
changes and adaptations that this has entailed, as both a blessing and a curse on the 
actual life of the individual. While accepting the practical necessity of some control and 
order which civilization inevitably imposes on the citizens of particular societies, he 
laments the corresponding loss of life-affirming and life-enhancing values which he 
ascribes to the Dionysian world-view of ancient Greece. Qualities such as power, 
aggression, mastery, self-advancement and the full embrace of all that humanity is, are, 
according to Nietzsche, since the advent of Christianity especially, denigrated as sinful 
and evil. Under the influence of established institutions such as Church, state, and the 
prevalent conventions of legal and penal systems, these values have been replaced by 
euphonic qualities; humility, service, pity, sacrifice, and self-effacement are now 
established as the ideal components of love and goodness, and are encouraged as 
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essential guidelines in the living of a good life. Nietzsche rejects this diminishment of 
life as it is, ‘all those aspirations to go beyond, to that which is contrary to the senses, 
contrary to the instincts, contrary to nature, contrary to the animal…libel the world’ 
(Nietzsche, 1998: 65). However, in attempting to uncover the origins of these values, 
Nietzsche rejects the possibility that they are natural, actual, or unequivocally beneficial 
to human life; ‘the wickedest in man is necessary for the best in him’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 
235). Rather, he suggests that powerful institutions of Church and state have wittingly 
imposed these unrealistic ideals in order to establish and maintain their positions of 
power and authority. Acceptance of these values has been enabled by offering the 
reward of an other-worldly existence, the comfort of an all-seeing, all-knowing, all-
powerful deity, and the relaxation consequent to a diminished sense of personal freedom 
and responsibility: ‘For out of fear and need each religion is born, creeping into 
existence on the byways of reason’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 79).10  
 Hence the emergence of a herd-mentality, where morality is grounded in the 
anonymity of the crowd, and where security is sought in the euphoria of consensus. This 
compliance to the herd-mentality constricts individual spontaneity and freedom, and 
forbids the expression of many natural experiences: sexuality, aggression, hatred and 
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 The ‘fear’ and ‘need’ which, according to Nietzsche, propel religious fervour and conviction, as well as 
other doctrines which purport to explain/guide/judge human existence, resonates in some way with 
Freud’s theory of the superego and with Lacan’s exposition of ‘The Big Other’ as an internalized system 
of self-governance. Nietzsche’s word choice in the phrase – ‘creeping into existence on the byways of 
reason’ (emphases mine) prompts a questioning of ‘reason’ as an infallible source of truth. It resounds 
with Wordsworth’s arguments against an over-reliance on reason to the exclusion of feeling and 
imagination.  
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anger are denigrated as evil; concealment and subterfuge are inevitable, and empirical 
experience in the here and now is devalued: ‘Many men wait all their lives for the 
opportunity to be good in their way’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 243). Adherence to public 
expectations, concern with recognition and acceptance, and consciousness of image and 
reputation, result in loss of self: ‘Who has not for the sake of his reputation – sacrificed 
himself?’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 94).11 This need to belong, this fear of one’s separateness 
and difference, is outlined as one of the obstacles to love, by the psychoanalyst Erich 
Fromm, in his exploration of the topic, The Art of Loving, and is referred to as ‘fusion 
without integrity’ (Fromm, 1995: 16).12  Nietzsche argues that such escapism, 
deception, and rejection of reality, rather than enhancing life, diminishes and weakens 
the human being, and thus inhibits the possibility of experiencing the full spectrum of 
human existence. Although he states that ‘there is much in man that is horrifying’ 
(Nietzsche, 1998: 64), Nietzsche argues that the repression of this fact entails a 
simultaneous blindness to human goodness and potential: ‘Much hidden goodness and 
power is never guessed at; the most exquisite daisies find no tasters!’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 
212).  The possibility of love, as part of this spectrum, is therefore blocked and 
distorted. 
The unquestioned acceptance of artificial dualities such as mind/body, 
appearance/reality, human/nature, and good/evil, is seen by Nietzsche as both 
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 Sacrifice and loss of self in pursuit of public acceptance is a theme addressed by the other writes 
explored here, and is given vivid expression in the persona of Eliot’s “Prufrock”. 
12
 Buber also refers to this craving to belong, and he differentiates between collectivity, as a type of 
‘fusion without integrity’, and community, where individuals attempt to relate to each other as authentic 
human beings. 
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originating from and contributing towards, a denial of life as it is, and particularly of 
humanity as it is: ‘The false opposites…have always been dangerous hindrances to the 
advance of truth’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 371).13 The resulting deception posits reason as 
superior to sensual experience,
14
 suggests a ‘reality’ beyond what is perceived by the 
senses, elevates ‘human’ unrealistically above the realm of animal passion and instinct, 
and imposes impossible judgements of good and evil which disavow the inevitable 
ambiguity inherent in all such concepts. This critique of a distorted portrayal of human 
nature, which has hitherto been prevalent in Western philosophy, is the starting point for 
the French philosopher/psychoanalyst, Luce Irigaray, in her work, The Way of Love, 
which she introduces with a call for ‘a philosophy which involves the whole of a human 
and not only that mental part of ourselves’ (Irigaray, 2002: ix). She defines this 
philosophy as ‘the wisdom of love’, and argues that 
This possible interpretation would imply that philosophy joins together, 
more than it has done in the West, the body, the heart, and the mind. That it 
is not founded on contempt for nature. That it not resort to a logic that 
formalizes the real by removing it from concrete experience; that it be less a 
normative science of the truth than the search for measures that help in living 
better: with oneself, with others, with the world (Irigaray, 2002: 2).  
 
Her call for a more holistic, and a more realistic assessment of the human being concurs 
with Nietzsche’s exhortation to see the human condition as it really is, in all its 
complexity and ambivalence: ‘we who are of a mixed nature, sometimes aglow with fire 
and sometimes chilled by intellect’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 266). Nietzsche sees ‘all these 
moralities…as…recipes to counter his passions’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 119), and reiterates 
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 These ‘false opposites’ resonate with Derrida’s false binaries mentioned above. 
14
 Wordsworth is also critical of the exaltation of reason above the realms of feeling and imagination. 
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his conviction that such moralities diminish life and being: ‘Every morality is…a piece 
of tyranny against ‘nature’…it is a protracted constraint’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 110).  
 In exposition of his argument, Nietzsche examines, with ruthless self-scrutiny, 
so-called virtues such as gratitude, pity and generosity. He probes beneath the surface 
interpretation of behaviour based on these values, and suggests that in many cases, self-
interest, fear, and will to power provide the real motivational drive of such behaviours. 
In outlining this drive as ‘self-enjoyment’, Nietzsche’s description finds echoes in 
Freud’s theory of the ‘pleasure principle’: 
Good actions are sublimated evil actions; evil actions are good actions 
become coarse and stupid. The individual’s only demand, for self-enjoyment 
(along with the fear of losing it), is satisfied in all circumstances: man may 
act as he can, that is, as he must, whether in deeds of vanity, revenge, 
pleasure, usefulness, malice, cunning, or in deeds of sacrifice, pity, 
knowledge. His powers of judgement determine where a man will let this 
demand for self-enjoyment take him (Nietzsche, 1984: 75). 
 
Nietzsche looks behind the physical and verbal expression of an array of familiarly 
understood emotions – compassion, sympathy, outrage, grief - and suggests that behind 
the outward show of expected response lurks an ever-present concern with audience, 
image and impression: ‘Ultimately, not even the deepest pain can keep the actor from 
thinking of the impression of his part and the overall theatrical effect’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 
50). Following this assertion, Nietzsche continues to give detailed analysis of the less 
accepted motivational direction of a wide range of ‘good’ and admirable behaviour. 
Gratitude is exposed as empowering the giver rather than the benefactor; pity is 
portrayed as being evoked as evidence of power within the pitiable individual;
15
 and 
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 Many of the writers explored in the thesis offer interpretations of the phenomenon of pity; these 
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punishment is revealed as ‘the means to frighten others away from certain future 
actions’ rather than having any intrinsic relation to the crime or its perpetrator 
(Nietzsche, 1984: 73). Nietzsche therefore expresses a warning: ‘distrust all in whom 
the urge to punish is strong’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 124), and he is adamant in his assertion 
of the contradictions inherent in the desire for punishment: ‘‘Punishment’ is what 
revenge calls itself; it feigns a good conscience for itself with a lie’ [because] ‘no deed 
can be annihilated: how could a deed be undone through punishment?’ (Nietzsche, 
2003a: 162). The duplicity, conscious or unconscious, underlying many ‘moral’ virtues, 
entails a contradiction between theoretic ideals and hidden motivation; the concept of 
love is often abused in this way, for example: ‘Ultimately ‘love of one’s neighbour’ is 
always something secondary, in part conventional and arbitrarily illusory, when 
compared with fear of one’s neighbour’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 123).  Freud also refers to the 
‘hypocrisy’ whereby ‘the suppression and inversion of affects is useful…in social life’ 
(Freud, 1997: 320), and proceeds to offer some easily recognizable examples: ‘If I am 
master of the art of dissimulation I can hypocritically display the opposite affect – 
smiling where I should like to be angry, and pretending affection where I should like to 
destroy’ (Freud, 1997: 321). Public expressions of moral rectitude often belie a different 
personal perspective: ‘Men are not ashamed to think something dirty, but they are 
ashamed when they imagine that others might believe them capable of these dirty 
thoughts’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 62).16 In summary, human motivation and behaviour are 
                                                                                                                                               
interpretations range from an analysis of pity as something which empowers the individual evoking the 
emotion to an assertion that pity is often motivated by a sense of superiority and disdain which is 
patronizing and/or disguised. 
16
 In a similar vein, Lacan is sceptical of the motivations of philanthropic acts. 
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often ambiguously inspired, and transcend the polarities of good and evil: ‘Our actions 
shine alternately in differing colours, they are seldom unequivocal – and there are cases 
enough in which we perform many-coloured actions’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 148).  
The deception involved in denying the self-serving impetus underlying much of 
one’s virtuous behaviour militates, according to Nietzsche, against authentic 
confrontation with self and others; the experience of love, friendship, and mutuality is 
forfeited through an embrace of ‘safer’, less-demanding, weaker forms of pseudo-
intimacy and approval-seeking performances; dismissal of one’s ambiguity diminishes 
one’s engagement with life, and muffles one’s experience with a cloak of security and 
fear. Nietzsche sees in this willingness of the subject ‘to let itself be deceived’, a 
rejection of alternative possibilities and perspectives:  
a sudden decision for ignorance, for arbitrary shutting-out, a closing of the 
window, an inner denial of this or that thing, a refusal to let it approach, a 
kind of defensive posture against much that can be known, a contentment 
with the dark, with the closed horizon, an acceptance and approval of 
ignorance (Nietzsche, 2003: 161).  
 
 The passive and outward acceptance of a world view which suppresses much of our 
natural inclinations, and the ensuing frustration of life, results in an ongoing cycle of 
resentment, guilt, and atonement, ‘where universal slow suicide is called – life’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 77). The repression of the individual’s human nature does not 
obliterate it: ‘All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves 
inwards’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 57); as Freud later discovered, what is repressed finds 
expression in intra-psychic and inter-relational conflict, personal and social discontent, 
and private and public negation of life and love. A reluctance to embrace a more 
realistic and integrative appraisal of the motivation of human behaviour is accepted as 
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understandable and predictable by Solomon in his discussion of Nietzsche’s theories, 
but he admits a recognition of the truth of these theories: ‘Much of what Nietzsche says 
about pity is quite outrageous, but at least some of what he says strikes us as exactly on 
the mark. How often is our supposed compassion a mask for our sense of superiority, or 
at least, our relief that the victim wasn’t us?’ (Solomon, 2000: 208). In a poem 
exploring ‘the fruit of Deceit’, William Blake echoes this sentiment: ‘Pity would be no 
more / If we did not make somebody poor’ (Blake, 2004: 76). Ricoeur makes a similar 
point when he differentiates sympathy from ‘simple pity, in which the self is secretly 
pleased to know it has been spared’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 191).  Solomon argues from this 
analysis that Nietzsche’s exposure of deception and pretence inherent in much of human 
behaviour paradoxically, and simultaneously, enables a more honest and realistic 
acknowledgement of the baseness and the greatness which constitute the potential of 
human being (Solomon, 2000: 208). Nietzsche argues for a comprehensive integration 
of all aspects of  human nature, free of moralistic and guilt-inducing judgements of 
good and evil: ‘The great epochs of our life are the occasions when we gain the courage 
to rebaptize our evil qualities as our best qualities’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 97).17 Only thus – 
and not in a vacuum of deception and pretence - can love of self and other be 
experienced.  
                                                 
17
 The work of the Italian poet Antonio Porchia, Voices, has many Nietzschean echoes, both in its 
aphoristic style and its embrace of apparent contradictions: ‘That in man which cannot be domesticated is 
not his evil but his goodness’ (Porchia, 2003: 31). 
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Fear of Freedom and Responsibility 
we wish that there will one day no longer be anything to fear! (Nietzsche, 
2003: 124). 
 
Fear of confronting the complex, ambiguous, and contradictory nature of being human, 
has, according to Nietzsche’s philosophy, diminished and weakened human life by 
cutting off the joys and tribulations of experiencing all that a person is. ‘For fear – that 
is man’s original and fundamental sensation’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 312). Fear of 
embracing the potentiality and danger, the uncertainty and ambivalence of individual 
freedom and responsibility, curtails the possibility of love, as priority is directed 
towards the attainment of security, recognition and identity through externally imposed 
standards and definitions. The child-like yearning for an external authoritative and 
protecting figure, the rejection of instinctual and sensual realities, and the exclusive 
emphasis on rationality as characteristic of human nature, is fuelled by the forces of 
civilization and by the constraints of individual and private concerns.  ‘As soon as we 
imagine someone who is responsible for our being thus and thus, etc. (God, nature), and 
therefore attribute to him the intention that we should exist and be happy or wretched, 
we corrupt for ourselves the innocence of becoming’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 299). As Sartre 
later argued, man is afraid of his freedom, he is terrified of his own power to choose, 
and he seeks refuge in the safety and anonymity of the crowd. Seeking security in 
conformity, ‘the cowardly man always said “no” inwardly, [and] he always said “yes” 
with his lips’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 59). The hidden conflict of this contradiction is the price 
of this pseudo-belonging, and Nietzsche suggests as a more life-enhancing alternative 
the welcoming acceptance of difference and diversity: ‘rather than making oneself 
uniform, we may find greater value for the enrichment of knowledge by listening to the 
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soft voice of different life situations’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 256).18  
Afraid to face the reality of himself or herself, the subject prefers to attain 
consolation from distorted versions of ‘mankind’, and promotes rules and judgements in 
an endeavour to keep these distortions in place: ‘Thus they have eliminated the affects 
one by one…[and] placed reality in the negation of the desires and effects’ (Nietzsche, 
1968: 309). The individual refuses a more comprehensive awareness of what he/she is, 
and similarly prevents an encounter with the full range of possibility inherent in others. 
The result is a negation of life in all its complexity and possibility, a resentment which 
opposes a love of life in all its manifestations and results in ‘The tired pessimistic 
glance, the mistrust toward the riddle of life, the icy “no” of disgust at life’ (Nietzsche, 
1998: 43). Mistrust and fear result in avoidance of life in its complexity and richness, 
and the possibility of love is averted because, ‘Love desires; fear avoids…love 
acknowledges no power, nothing that separates, differentiates, ranks higher or 
subordinates’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 252).  
Nietzsche urges an integration of all the complexities and ambiguities of the 
individual subject, rather than a selective and exclusive depiction. In the words of 
Nehamas, ‘in Nietzsche’s view every aspect of the personality is equally essential to it’ 
(Nehamas, 1985: 159). What is not welcomed and accepted as laudable and ‘good’ is 
often projected onto others, whether in the guise of criminality, madness, or evil.
19
  
                                                 
18
 It is interesting to note the echo between Nietzsche’s ‘soft voice’ of different life situations and Freud’s 
reference to ‘the soft voice of the intellect’. 
19
 This concept of projection, a hall-mark of psychoanalysis, is radically explored by Michel Foucault, in 
his analysis of institutions such as Church, state, education, judiciary and medicine, as sources of 
manipulation and control. 
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Nietzsche explains the attraction of this phenomenon as the desire to escape from the 
reality of the self:  
When, as happens so often, we let our annoyance out on others, while we are 
actually feeling it about ourselves, we are basically trying to cloud and 
delude our judgement; we want to motivate our annoyance a posteriori by 
the oversights and inadequacies of others, so that we can lose sight of 
ourselves (Nietzsche, 1984: 253). 
 
The individual therefore attempts to escape from the demands of personal responsibility, 
and seeks refuge in the bland mediocrity of ‘normal’ humanity, ‘the inevitable dominion 
of the average’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 364), where less acceptable traits and drives are 
disowned and denied: ‘To this end, they need an appearance of justice, i.e., a theory 
through which they can shift responsibility for their existence, for their being thus and 
thus, on to some sort of scapegoat’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 400).20 
William Kaufmann, in his prolific commentary on Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
traces the origins of many contemporary ideas on subjects such as alienation, 
depression, resentment and guilt back to Nietzsche’s insights, and he credits Nietzsche 
with counteracting ‘the ostrich prudery of his age’ (Kaufmann, 1974: 274). Release 
from the fear of responsibility, however, necessitates a simultaneous release from the 
fear of freedom. The freedom which is feared is the freedom to create oneself and one’s 
life, to be master of oneself in all one’s humanness, and to embrace with honesty and 
courage what one is at any moment. Nietzsche accepts the presence of fear as a 
                                                 
20
 The evasion of responsibility and the projection of evil onto convenient scapegoats is a recurring theme 
in the works discussed in this thesis; for example, Kennelly’s epic poems, “Cromwell” and “The Book of 
Judas”. It is also explored in Richard Kearney’s Scapegoats, Gods, and Monsters, and Julia Kristeva’s 
Strangers to Ourselves. 
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pervading experience of living, but he argues for the necessity of meeting this fear with 
courage and honesty: ‘He possesses heart who knows fear but masters fear; who sees 
the abyss, but sees it with pride’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 298).  Solomon gives the following 
appraisal of Nietzsche’s thoughts on fear and courage: 
Courage, for Nietzsche, refers not so much to over-coming fear (the standard 
account) or having “just the right amount” of fear (Aristotle’s account), and 
it certainly doesn’t mean having no fear (the pathological conception of 
courage). Rather, as in so many of his conceptions of virtue, Nietzsche has a 
model of “over-flowing” – overflowing with an assertiveness that 
overwhelms fear (Solomon, 2000: 183). 
 
In contrast to this courage, the selective rejection of aspects of one’s humanness 
precludes a genuine encounter with oneself, and consequently prevents an encounter 
with another in the fullness of his/her being; the experience of love is therefore blocked 
and thwarted.  
 The dichotomy between human nature as it is and the ideals which are promoted 
as human aspirations is attacked by Nietzsche as a negation of life. He abhors the 
elevation of one aspect of being human to the detriment of another, and he advocates an 
embracing of the totality of life, with all its uncertainties and frustrations. He calls for a 
translation of ‘man back into nature; to master the many vain and fanciful 
interpretations and secondary meanings which have been hitherto scribbled and daubed 
over that eternal basic text homo natura’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 162). He tells us that ‘there 
is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 62), that our 
senses are the instruments whereby we relate to the world: ‘All credibility, all good 
conscience, all evidence of truth comes only from the senses’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 100), 
and that our instincts, all of them, are central to our nature and cannot be successfully 
denied or censored; they are, like all of life, ‘beyond good and evil’. 
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 Acknowledgement of human nature as it is, acceptance of contradiction and 
uncertainty in human living, and accommodation of the reality of personal freedom and 
responsibility, opens the way, according to Nietzsche, for the emergence of an 
affirmative nihilism, whereby we construct our own values, our own truth, our own life, 
our own self: ‘To live as I desire to live or not to live at all’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 285).  In 
the words of Solomon, ‘Nietzsche insists that each of us must find our own way’ 
(Solomon, 2003: 139). This ideal of self-creation, ‘become what you are!’ (Nietzsche, 
2003a: 252), explored by Nietzsche through the prophetic reflections of Zarathustra, 
confronts the joys and tribulations of personal freedom which insists that the subject 
‘must become judge and avenger and victim of its own law’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 137).  It 
insists on the necessity of self-belief: ‘Only dare to believe in yourselves – in yourselves 
and in your entrails! He who does not believe in himself always lies’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 
146). Genuine self-belief involves an acceptance that one is not supernaturally 
wonderful or hopelessly despicable, but humanly complex and indefinable. It demands a 
rejection of the illusions of external sources of values and authority and the defences of 
projection and conformity; it accepts the self as the ultimate creator and evaluator of 
one’s life: ‘One should not avoid one’s tests…tests which are taken before ourselves 
and before no other judge’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 70).  
Chapter One: Friedrich Nietzsche 
 48 
Self-acceptance and Amor Fati 
Go out to where the world awaits you like a garden (Nietzsche, 2003a: 236). 
 
Confronting the obstacles and difficulties which diminish human living enables 
Nietzsche to affirm the possibility of love within this imperfect realm. His critique of 
morality, duplicity and conformity is motivated by an insistent assertion of love’s 
central force in human life: ‘Good nature, friendliness, and courtesy of the heart are 
ever-flowing tributaries of the selfless drive and have made much greater contributions 
to culture than those much more famous expressions of this drive, called pity, charity, 
and self-sacrifice’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 48). Acceptance of the multi-faceted nature of the 
self enables an acceptance of the experience of life in all its manifestations, and opens 
the way towards the possibility of love, of self, of others, and of life, amor fati. 
 In his doctrine of the eternal recurrence Nietzsche offers a theoretical formula 
of a ‘test’ whereby life is embraced and loved. According to Nehamas, ‘the eternal 
recurrence is not a theory of the world, but a view of the self’ (Nehamas, 2002: 150), 
and Solomon argues that Nietzsche presents eternal recurrence…as a “test” of our 
attitudes towards life’ (Solomon, 2003: 14). Anticipating Ricoeur’s theory of narrative 
identity as fluid and ongoing, Nietzsche claims that the individual’s life is a continuum 
of creation, and that it is constructed and reconstructed again and again: ‘Existence 
begins in every instant’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 234).  He sees life as the ongoing creation of 
the self. Accordingly, the idea of a fixed self, ego or soul is a mere fiction; there is no 
being, only becoming. Life is synonymous with change; avoidance of the risks inherent 
to change may provide illusory comfort and security, but only at the cost of stagnation 
and death. An affirmation of life necessitates an acceptance of this fluidity, and a 
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simultaneous acknowledgement of the individual’s unique power of self-creation as a 
continually evolving endeavour. This is not a static response to selected experiences, but 
rather a love of life in its totality; a positive response to life must embrace and integrate 
every experience, joyful and sorrowful, proud and shameful, loving and hateful, for, 
Nietzsche argues, one can only accept a particular experience if one accepts that all of 
the events and experiences of one’s life have directly or indirectly led to this moment. 
Thus, nothing can be denied or regretted; everything is essential to the process of 
becoming, and what one is at any moment encompasses all of one’s experience, past 
and present. Nietzsche poses the question: 
What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest 
loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live and have lived it you 
will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh 
and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all 
in the same succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight 
between the trees, and even this moment and I myself….the question in each 
and every thing, ‘do you want this again and innumerable times again?’ 
would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well disposed 
would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more 
fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (Nietzsche, 
1974: 341). 
The frightening possibility of endlessly replaying the single life we each have, and the 
demand that we affirm everything that we have experienced in that life, is an approach 
by which we can strive towards a celebration of life as it is. In a poem titled “A 
Dialogue of Self and Soul”, Yeats echoes the possible connection between the eternal 
recurrence and amor fati:  
I am content to live it all again 
And yet again…. 
I am content to follow to its source 
Every event in action or in thought; 
Measure the lot; forgive myself the lot! 
When such as I cast out remorse 
So great a sweetness flows into the breast 
We must laugh and we must sing, 
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We are blest by everything, 
Everything we look upon is blest (Yeats, 1967: 145). 
 
The theoretical and conditional nature of the eternal recurrence – ‘if’, ‘would’, etc. – is 
given more concrete form as Nietzsche particularises the question: ‘Did you ever say 
Yes to one joy?...then you said Yes to all woe as well. All things are chained and 
entwined together, all things are in love’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 332). According to Clark, 
the eternal recurrence is ‘a test of affirmation…one’s affirmation of life’ (Clark, 1990: 
270). This affirmation of life, amor fati, implies an acceptance of one’s fate,21 a delight 
in all aspects of life, an accommodation of chance, accident and uncertainty. This is a 
life lived without regret, remorse or guilt, but open to love, of self, others, and the world 
as it is experienced in all its manifestations; the possibility of love is closely related to 
acceptance and love of life: ‘we love life, not because we are used to living but because 
we are used to loving’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 68). Nietzsche believes in the 
interconnectedness of all our actions; what one is at any moment is influenced and 
created by all of one’s past. To live one’s life in such a way that one wants it again, 
helps us to make a selection of what is important and significant for us in our lives. It 
also fosters appreciation of the moments of genuine wonder which speckle ‘the 
symphony of real life’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 247). Nietzsche includes the experience of love 
in his depiction of these moments: 
                                                 
21
 Nietzsche’s advocation of amor fati, love of one’s fate, appears paradoxical, as it is complemented by 
his insistence on the need for self-creation, responsibility. This is the apparent paradox between 
determinism and autonomy, and is an issue central to philosophy and psychoanalysis. (The question is 
explored in my MA thesis, 2006). 
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Life consists of rare, isolated moments of the greatest significance, and of 
innumerably many intervals, during which at best the silhouettes of those 
moments hover about us. Love, springtime, every beautiful melody, 
mountains, the moon, the sea – all these speak to the heart but once 
(Nietzsche, 1984: 247). 
These ‘rare, isolated’ moments may be rare and fleeting, but when life is experienced as 
an interconnected process, such glimpses of love and beauty can ‘hover about us’ and 
impact on all of life. 
 This is the task of self-creating, self-mastery, self-overcoming; to work out what 
an affirming life could be, and to develop a life-affirming world view which has no 
remorse, no melancholy, no end; it is a process of becoming and creating,  ‘processus in 
infinitum’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 552). In this life-affirming stance, the past is embraced, 
mistakes, losses and disappointments are acknowledged, as are joys, achievements and 
fortuitous encounters and occurrences, and the future is seen as the offshoot of the 
present. Nietzsche acknowledges that this is a difficult path, as it necessitates the 
humility of self-honesty and the courage of individual responsibility in place of the 
comfort and security of the ‘herd’: ‘One has to get rid of the bad taste of wanting to be 
in agreement with many’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 71). Self-honesty, self-direction and self-
empowerment enable one to be the artist of one’s own life, and to answer affirmatively 
Nietzsche’s question: ‘Do you possess courage?...Not courage in the presences of 
witnesses, but hermit’s eagles’ courage, which not even a god observes any more?’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 298). In his discussion of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, 
Gadamer states that Nietzsche ‘was a great moralist’,22 and that he was posing the 
question, ‘to what extent can human life endure truth at all?’: 
                                                 
22
 Gadamer’s description of Nietzsche as ‘a great moralist’ echoes Philip Rieff’s study, Freud: The Mind 
of the Moralist’ 
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This is a question which Nietzsche formulated and it represents one of the 
provocative challenges which his thought poses for our epoch with ever 
greater force. In his despair at the ability of the enlightenment and of modern 
science to answer the most fundamental human questions, Nietzsche arrived 
at his provocative doctrine of the eternal return of the same…with this 
doctrine he wanted to show how in the face of absolute hopelessness we 
must learn to be resolute…what he demanded of us was genuine morality 
(Gadamer, 1996: 160). 
 
Gadamer’s response to Nietzsche suggests the crucial necessity of a personal morality, 
and this acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the self is intrinsic to the possibility of 
love. Taking responsibility for the creation of one’s life diminishes the perceived 
necessity to seek refuge, recognition and acceptance in the ‘herd’; it promotes a constant 
reevaluation of the values one chooses to adopt, and it defines one’s life as an ongoing 
process of becoming.  
The possibility of striving towards this affirmative engagement with life is 
glimpsed in Nietzsche’s description of the Ubermensch. The overman succeeds in 
overcoming himself
23
 and all the illusions which constitute this falsity, as he takes 
responsibility for his life at every moment and in every action. This life-affirming 
perspective leaves no room for remorse or melancholy; it sees ‘truth’ as the practice of 
one’s own values – the way one lives one’s life – and it recognises a continuity between 
the values which are espoused and the actions which characterize one’s life experience: 
‘A human being’s evaluations betray something of the structure of his soul’ (Nietzsche, 
2003: 206). The process of self-overcoming is the expression of the will to power, as 
Nietzsche sees everything alive as seeking to perfect itself and to become stronger. Thus 
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 The overcoming of the self, in particular the illusions and deceptions of the self, is central to the 
psychoanalytic process as outlined by Lacan and Žižek. 
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the human subject is never satisfied with his/her ‘self’, but is constantly driven by the 
urge to grow, to flourish, and to surpass what he/she is at any moment.
24
 The will to 
power, the desire to grow beyond what one is, is inherent in the moments of life which 
are fully lived; its absence or denial results in melancholy, ennui, or any other attempted 
withdrawal from the fullness of life: ‘Need forces us to do the work whose product will 
quiet the need…but in those intervals when our needs are quieted and seem to sleep, 
boredom overtakes us’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 254).25 
 Deception, fear, denial and repression are constant impediments to authenticity, 
self-creation, freedom and responsibility. The overman resists such limitation and 
restraint; he refuses to deny the multiplicity of drives which propel him, drives which 
vary in strength and direction in various circumstances. He acknowledges his 
aggression, selfishness, greed, sexuality, as well as his power, autonomy, uniqueness 
and energy. Nietzsche asserts that ‘Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, 
overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of one’s 
forms’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 194). The overman does not deny his animal nature, he does 
not repress his basic instincts, and he does not use a splitting mechanism to overcome 
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 Nietzsche’s description of the insatiability of the will to power, and its constant striving to overcome 
resistance, resounds with Lacan’s insistence on desire as the key propellant of life. 
25
 Nietzsche’s assertion that ‘will to power’ is the basic driving force of human life, and his description of  
this drive as a ceaseless striving to overcome all that resists it, bears a strong relevance to Freud’s 
reflections on the competing motivations of the pleasure principle, the reality principle, and the death 
drive. The pleasure principle, according to Freud, is motivated, at least in part, by the desired avoidance 
of pain, and thus seeks an equilibrium of minimum resistance, but this is countered by an opposing drive 
which is never quite satisfied with the ensuing stagnation congruent with this state.  
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his impulses. Rather, he embraces the truth of his humanity, and in so doing, he is 
enabled to achieve what Kaufmann refers to as ‘an organic harmony’ (Kaufmann, 1974: 
227). The overman, rather than denying aspects of himself, rejoices in his full humanity, 
and by overcoming his illusions and deceptions, his complaints and excuses, he 
achieves self-mastery; he overcomes himself. In his willingness to integrate the totality 
of his personality, he accepts the ambiguity inherent in being human, ‘the wickedest in 
man is necessary for the best in him’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 235), and acceptance of this 
reality enables a joyous celebration of life: ‘One must have chaos in one, to give birth to 
a dancing star’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 46). 
 In this ideal of human living, Nietzsche rejects universal definitions of 
‘mankind’; the overman is not a specimen of ‘everyman’, but an ideal of the individual 
person creating and living a unique life. Nietzsche acknowledges the tremendous 
difficulty of living within such expansive honesty, and he offers it as an ideal which is 
worth striving towards. The acknowledgement and integration of all aspects of life 
enables a celebratory love of life, and, according to Solomon, this is Nietzsche’s 
‘cardinal virtue…he will not deny that cruel reality or human tragedy but rather see past 
our suffering to the miracle of life itself’ (Solomon, 2003: 11). Thus, Nietzsche claims 
that ‘though woe be deep: Joy is deeper than heart’s agony’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 331). 
Nietzsche is non-prescriptive in suggesting an account of how to live a fuller life as he 
merely offers the possibility. His perspectivism extends to his own work, and he 
repeatedly asserts that these are merely his ideas: ‘these are only – my truths’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003: 163). This avowal of ‘personal truth’, correlates to the experience of 
love itself, as love is essentially subjective, primarily personal, and necessarily 
experiential rather than theoretic, objective or measurable. 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy attempts to reveal the deceptions and duplicities which 
characterize much of life, of philosophy, and of human relations. It offers a different 
perspective which embraces what he sees as a more realistic appraisal of human life and 
human being, and through this he envisages the possibility of a life where love, of self, 
of others, and of life, is possible. It is a life which embodies self-acceptance, self-
responsibility, and self-created values: ‘To have and not have one’s emotions, one’s for 
and against…to remain master of one’s four virtues, courage, insight, sympathy, 
solitude’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 214). Dichotomies of mind and body, instinct and reason, 
heart and soul, good and evil are dissolved, the co-existence of solitude and connection 
– ‘sympathy’ – is embraced, and the way for love’s possibility is cleared, because ‘That 
which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 
103).  
Nietzsche ascribes the experience of love to ‘the genius of the heart’26 which 
integrates the ‘gold’ and the ‘mud’ of human existence, and which exudes its richness 
and blessing in the spirit of Derrida’s gift,27 wherein neither giver nor receiver 
consciously interpret the gift as gift: 
The genius of the heart…who divines the hidden and forgotten treasure, the 
drop of goodness and sweet spirituality under thick and opaque ice, and is a 
divining-rod for every grain of gold which has lain long in the prison of 
much mud and sand; the genius of the heart from whose touch everyone goes 
away richer, not favoured and surprised, not as if blessed and oppressed with 
the goods of others, but richer in himself, newer to himself than before, 
broken open, blown upon and sounded out by a thawing wind, more 
                                                 
26
 This phrase resonates with Wordsworth’s philosophy, as expressed poetically and personally. 
27
 Derrida outlines his theory of the gift in Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, where he explains, ‘For 
there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, counterfeit, or debt…At the limit, the 
gift as gift ought not appear as gift: either to the donee or to the donor’ (Derrida, 1994: 12, 14).  
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uncertain perhaps, more delicate, more fragile, more broken, but full of 
hopes that as yet have no names (Nietzsche, 2003: 219). 
 
The juxtaposition of images in the above quotation, blessed/oppressed, opaque 
ice/thawing wind, broken open/full of hopes, suggests the ambiguity, risk and 
vulnerability which the experience of love necessitates, the fullness of life which it 
embraces, and the enrichment which it proffers to both the lover and the loved. This 
experience entails the humility of ignorance co-existing with the reception of otherness, 
an openness to life which Nietzsche describes in one ‘who shares profusely in others’ 
joy, who wins friends everywhere, who is touched by everything that grows and 
evolves, who enjoys other people’s honors and successes, and makes no claim to the 
privilege of alone knowing the truth’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 255). According to this view, 
love is rooted in attention and interest, devoid of judgement and expectation, receiving 
the other in its irreducible alterity:  
Whoever wants really to get to know something new (be it a person, an 
event, or a book) does well to take up this new thing with all possible love, 
to avert his eye quickly from, even to forget, everything about it he finds 
inimical, objectionable, or false…by doing this, we penetrate into the heart 
of the new thing, into its motive centre; and this is what it means to get to 
know it (Nietzsche, 1984: 257). 
 
Engaging with life, with self and others, ‘with all possible love’, is enabled through a 
divestment of deception and disguise, distortion and image, projection and 
defensiveness, and the willingness to stand in a naked vulnerability and a courageous 
simplicity: ‘Where one can no longer love, one should – pass by!’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 
198). In such moments of personal honesty and agenda-free encounters with life, love is 
possible: ‘Fine, with one another silent, Finer, with one another laughing’ (Nietzsche, 
1984: 268). The possibility of love suggested in these lines, evoking ease and 
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acceptance, joy and silence, enables the experience of a relationship engaging the full 
expression of who one is, and the open reception of who the other is; this is the subject 
of Buber’s philosophy outlined in the ‘I/Thou’ encounter which is the starting point of 
the next chapter. 
 CHAPTER TWO 
Martin Buber 
he philosophy of Buber evolves through the idealistic and romantic 
involvements of his early years to a personal and political realism inevitable 
in the light of the historical developments of his mature years.
28
 He has 
been criticized for his overly optimistic opinion of human nature, for example in the 
work of Irving Singer in his analysis of love as explored by various philosophers: ‘we 
may also be repelled by Buber’s simpleminded, and possibly delusory, vision. He 
depicts the cosmos as an expression of God’s love; he says little about the existence of 
suffering, hatred, or brutality’ (Singer, 1987, 338).29 Iris Murdoch, while acknowledging 
positive and illuminating aspects of Buber’s work, also gently criticizes its simplicity 
and exclusiveness:  ‘Buber’s memorable distinction between the I – Thou and the I – It 
relation seems too simple and exclusive, and may indeed suggest the old fascinating 
division of fact from value, which makes nothing of the greater part of our ordinary life 
of knowings and actings’ (Murdoch, 1993: 478). Throughout his work, lectures and 
letters, Buber persistently answers his critics, mainly by insisting that his philosophy is 
                                                 
28
 Buber describes this change as a ‘conversion’ which he experienced after an encounter with a young 
man who sought his help; while Buber ‘conversed attentively and openly with him’, he was not ‘there in 
spirit’. Shortly afterwards he learned that the young man had died; believing that he had failed the 
individual in his hour of need, Buber made a decision: ‘Since then I have given up the “religious” which 
is nothing but the exception, extraction, exaltation, ecstasy…I possess nothing but the everyday out of 
which I am never taken’ (Buber, 2004: 16). 
29
  Irving Singer refers to Buber as one of the ‘idealistic existentialists’, in his commentary on the 
philosopher, in Volume 3 of The Nature of Love. 
T 
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founded on the actual, lived experience of the individual in his world, including 
suffering, hatred and evil. Buber later renounced his adolescent euphoria on 
encountering Nietzsche’s work, and endeavoured to distance himself from what he 
came to see as Nietzsche’s extremism and exaggeration. In his analysis of Nietzsche’s 
philosophical contribution outlined in section five of Between Man and Man, Buber is 
critical of the limitations of Nietzsche’s anthropology; yet he is lavish in his praise for 
what he sees as Nietzsche’s achievements: ‘like no other previous thinker, he brings 
man into the centre of his thought about the universe…The questionableness of man is 
Nietzsche’s great theme…in elevating, as no previous thinker has done, the 
questionableness of human life to be the real subject of philosophizing he gave the 
anthropological question a new and unheard-of impulse’ (Buber, 2004: 176, 182). For 
Buber, this ‘anthropological question’ can only be pursued through an exploration of the 
relationships which constitute human being: ‘The question of what man is cannot be 
answered by a consideration of existence or of self-being as such, but only by a 
consideration of the essential connexion of the human person and his relations with all 
being’ (Buber, 2004: 214). 
 The two philosophers explore questions relating to self and others, 
responsibility and freedom, good and evil, and in their unique and disparate reflections, 
they initiate and expand upon existential dilemmas and conflicts. Their approach to 
philosophical inquiry is similar in its concentration on lived experience rather than 
abstract theory: ‘All philosophical discovery is the uncovering of what is covered by the 
veil woven from the threads of a thousand theories’ (Buber, 2004: 216). It may be 
counter-argued that ‘theories’ can illuminate as well as disguise their objects of study, 
particularly when they resist definitive conclusions and remain open to ongoing 
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interrogation and revision, and when they are constantly focused and tested in the 
diverse and changing concreteness of lived reality. An examination of Buberian texts 
suggests a Nietzschean influence, both in the aphoristic and poetic style of his literature 
and in his insistence on an embrace of the totality of what it is to be human. Maurice 
Friedman, colleague, interpreter and biographer of Buber, refers to Nietzsche’s 
influence on his philosophy: 
In one of his earliest articles Buber spoke of Nietzsche as ‘the first 
pathfinder of the new culture’, ‘the awakener and creator of new life-values 
and a new world-feeling’. Nietzsche’s influence may account in part for the 
dynamism of Buber’s philosophy, for its concern with creativity and 
greatness, for its emphasis on the concrete and actual as opposed to the ideal 
and abstract, for its idea of the fruitfulness of conflict, and for its emphasis 
on the value of life impulses and wholeness of being as opposed to detached 
intellectuality (Friedman, 2002: 39). 
 
While Buber necessarily developed his own unique philosophical thought, many of his 
pronouncements resound with those of Nietzsche, particularly on issues such as 
morality, human nature, deception, freedom and responsibility. 
In his writings, most notably I and Thou, Buber expresses his belief that the 
deepest reality of human life lies in the relation between one being and another and that 
human understanding is a communal process: ‘The fundamental fact of human 
existence, according to Buber’s anthropology, is man with man’ (Friedman, 2002: 98). 
In his invitation to a dialogue between author and reader, in his observance and 
honouring of the ordinary, and in his assault on unquestioned conventions of thought 
and language, Buber challenges the reader to reassess one’s encounter with oneself and 
with the surrounding world. His philosophy is concerned with diverse issues of human 
living, personal, sociological, educational, and political: ‘Buber proceeds to set up 
philosophical anthropology as a systematic method which deals with the concrete, 
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existential characteristics of man’s life in order to arrive at the wholeness of man’ 
(Friedman, 2002: 91). Buber examines the concrete situations of the individual’s life in 
the world, with a view to both the nature of the human being and the nature of the world 
in which he/she lives, and the inevitable relation between the two. Buber sees this 
relation as indissoluble, and through it he seeks the essence of humanness, personhood, 
and love. His writings centre on the ever recurring encounter between the self and all 
that lies outside it, between the subject and other subjects, between the individual and 
nature, between the human being and what he/she divines as ‘God’. These encounters 
are, according to Buber, the expression of the human condition, and their manifold 
characteristics of mutuality and withdrawal, embrace and rejection, subjectification and 
objectification, reflect, in their sometimes alternating, sometimes contemporaneous 
experience, the potentialities and limitations of human existence in the world. 
The modern world which forms the backdrop of Buber’s observations and 
reflections is characterized by the necessity to confront anew questions regarding 
humanity, nature, technology, and society, as political and cultural developments effect 
reactions of alienation, disillusionment, and despair.
30
 Friedman refers to ‘four types of 
evil of which the modern age is particularly aware’: 
The loneliness of modern man before an unfriendly universe and before men 
whom he associates with but does not meet; the increasing tendency for 
scientific instruments and techniques to outrun man’s ability to integrate 
those techniques into his life in some meaningful and constructive way; the 
inner duality of which modern man has become aware through the writings 
of Dostoyevsky and Freud
31
 and the development of psychoanalysis; and the 
                                                 
30
 These reactions are evident in the literature of the modern age, and are uniquely portrayed in the poetry 
of Eliot. 
31
 Buber was critical of some of Freud’s theories and methods and suggested that the psychoanalytic 
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deliberate and large-scale degradation of human life within the totalitarian 
state (Friedman, 2002: 15).
32
 
 
The work of Buber engages with the reality of these issues while maintaining a 
conviction that their acknowledgement does not preclude their opposites: dialogue, 
relationship, integration and love are realistic goals which, though never experienced in 
a fixed and absolute attainment, are potentially present to each new moment of being: 
‘none of the contacts of each hour is unworthy to take up from our essential being as 
much as it may’ (Buber, 2004: 26). 
Avraham Shapira, in his study of Buber’s life and work, argues that ‘polar 
duality…occupies a central place in all of Buber’s writings’ (Shapira, 1999: 193), and 
lists these as Distance - Relation, Vortex - Direction, Moment - Eternity, and I-It – I-
Thou’ (Shapira, 1999: 8). According to Buber, these dualities and the tensions between 
them characterize human life; they co-exist in varying degrees of discord and harmony, 
and are never mutually exclusive: ‘behind the common pairs of opposed concepts, good 
and evil, beautiful and ugly, there stand others in which the negative concept is 
intimately bound to the positive’ (Buber, 2004: 87). Thus, in the interplay between 
Distance, wherein the self is experienced as a separate and private entity, and Relation, 
whereby this same self is also experienced as interacting with and relating to the outer 
world, the polarities of human existence are embodied. Interpersonal relationships are 
                                                                                                                                               
encounter should approach the I-Thou relationship. These ideas are outlined in Martin Buber on 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 1999. 
32
 The work of Lacan is also fore-grounded in the reality of totalitarianism, its emergence, maintenance, 
power, control and destructiveness, and he attempts, through psychoanalytic insight, to approach an 
explanation and an understanding of this phenomenon. 
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also the canvas upon which is drawn the conflicts and questions, the dreams and 
solutions, the certainties and disruptions, which originate in, and belong to, the inner 
psychic experience of one’s relationship with oneself.33 In his attempts to comprehend 
the complexities and contradictions observable throughout history and in his own time, 
Buber concludes, similarly to Nietzsche, that understanding can only begin with 
personal truth. Only thus is it possible to confront otherwise theoretical abstractions, 
such as good and evil, love and hate, self and other: ‘A man should himself realize that 
conflict-situations between himself and others are nothing but the effects of conflict-
situations in his own soul’ (Buber, 2002: 21). Thus, while Buber’s philosophy is 
essentially a philosophy of dialogue, of relationship, it also supports Nietzsche’s 
concentration on introspection, self-honesty, and self-acceptance, as it insists on an 
examination and an awareness of the self as the starting point of all genuine encounters, 
and for any realization of the possibility of love. 
                                                 
33
 Buber’s reference to inner conflict and the difficulties involved in over-coming internal oppositions 
echoes Freud’s description of the mind as a tripartite apparatus, often in conflict with itself. 
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The Crowd as an Escape from Responsibility 
A man in the crowd is a stick stuck in a bundle moving through the water, 
abandoned to the current or being pushed by a pole from the bank in this or 
that direction (Buber, 2004: 74). 
 
The philosophy of Buber is primarily concerned with the possibility of genuine 
relationship, mutuality and love, and it therefore examines the personal and societal, 
political and historical obstacles to these ideals. Murdoch sees Buber’s analysis of 
relationship as an illumination of the concept of love: ‘The well-known contrast made 
by Buber between I – Thou and I – It relations can illuminate morality, the dealings of 
people with each other, can serve as commentary upon the concept of love’ (Murdoch, 
1993: 469). One such obstacle to genuine relationship, according to Buber, is the 
tendency of the individual to seek safety and companionship in the crowd; the ‘crowd’ 
resonates with Nietzsche’s ‘herd’, with popular opinion, and with the assumed validity 
of the majority. Buber refers to ‘the historical paradise of crowds’ where ‘uniformity is 
the real thing’, and describes the crowd ‘as non-truth’ and ‘unfreedom’ (Buber, 2004: 
74, 75). He realistically offers an analysis of the individual as a being inevitably existing 
in relationship with his/her society and community. He is interested in the constitutive 
correlation and tension between society and community, and between individual and 
social experience. While Buber sees the goals of authentic relationship, dialogue, and 
love, as being sought and attained in community – communication between self and 
others – he is critical of the more common misrepresentations of the experience of 
community, which foster a false sense of belonging and contributing. Buber 
distinguishes between community as ‘being no longer side by side but with one another 
of a multitude of persons’ (Buber, 2004: 37), and its counterpart, collectivity. Friedman 
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outlines this distinction: 
In opposition to true community stands not only individual monologue, but 
the collectivity, the totalitarian states of left and right in which, bundled 
together without Thou and without I, hostile and separated hosts march into 
the common abyss. True community emerges only out of the breakthrough 
from the repressed and the pedestrian to the reality of the between 
(Friedman, 1988: 116).  
 
Collectivity, whether expressed through religion, morality, or politics, whether glorified 
in the group, the institution, or the ideology, is based, according to Buber, on a 
renunciation and a distortion of personal existence, responsibility and freedom, and it 
cancels any genuine encounter with self or other: ‘Collectivity is based on an organized 
atrophy of personal existence’ (Buber, 2004: 37). Here, as in Nietzsche’s depiction of 
herd morality, the individual takes refuge in the security of obedience to the dictates of 
the group, adheres to a ‘simplified mode of valuation’ (Buber, 2004: 36), and turns 
away from the possibility of a personal response to life’s questions: ‘[this] marks the 
beginning of the paralysis of the human search for the truth’ (Buber, 2004: 96). 
Responsibility is evaded ‘by a flight into a protective “once-for-all”’ (Buber, 2004: 82).  
In his personal recollections of Buber, Aubrey Hobes states that ‘he was 
completely against any dogma or system imposed upon the individual…because a 
dogma states as absolute truth a conclusion in advance of any given situation, it stifles 
the individual response which has in it the power of creating a dialogue with life’ 
(Hobes, 1972: 33). Immersion in the opinions and dictates of the crowd or the group 
releases the individual from the responsibility of finding his/her own answers, 
undergoing his/her own tests, and responding to Nietzsche’s challenge of the eternal 
recurrence: ‘everything is decided. What you once thought – that you had to answer 
ever anew, situation by situation, for the choice you made – is now got rid of. The group 
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has relieved you of your…responsibility. You feel yourself answered for in the group’ 
(Buber, 2004: 79). According to Friedman, reneging on the responsibility ‘to answer 
ever anew’ in the uncertainty of each experience and encounter, withdrawing into the 
illusory security of fixed judgements and responses, and avoiding the vulnerability of 
‘unknowing’ and exposure, obliterates the possibility of real relationship: ‘the various 
types of ‘once for all’…make unnecessary the ‘ever anew’ of real response to the 
unique situation which confronts one in each hour. This false security prevents us from 
making our relationships to others real through opening ourselves to them’ (Friedman, 
2002: 131). Recalling Nietzsche’s exposition of the dubious nature of traditional codes 
of morality, Buber claims that adherence to such codes precludes the possibility of 
encountering the humanity of the other: ‘there is nothing that can so hide the face of our 
fellow-men as morality can’ (Buber, 2004: 21).34 As Shapira notes, ‘Buber is wary of 
ideologies whose human subject is not kept in view, of a “progress” based on the 
masses, in whom the “human visage” disappears’ (Shapira, 1999: 33). The desire for 
certainties and absolutes and the aversion to doubt and ambivalence restricts the 
possibilities of open and vital relationship, because as the German poet Rilke states: 
‘fear of the inexplicable has not alone impoverished the existence of the individual; the 
relationship between one human being and another has also been cramped by it’ (Rilke, 
2004: 118). Avoidance of the challenge of living with doubt and uncertainty originates 
in the illusory attractions of control and protection, but results in the denial of personal 
freedom:  
                                                 
34
 Žižek says something similar when he argues that abstract notions of universal human rights are often 
assumed as convenient, self-congratulatory theories which maintain others/foreigners/strangers at a 
comfortable distance which precludes responsibility or recognition. 
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a man tries to find a system in the universe around him, a pattern that he can 
apply to a solution of the problems of his existence. He seeks a formula, a 
governing rule. And he thinks this will make him free. But the formula 
imprisons him. He lives with only one part of his being, surrendering the 
quest and insecurity which alone can make him truly free (Hobes, 1972: 33). 
 
The attempt to avoid the inescapable aloneness of the individual is often 
expressed in the striving to belong, to be part of the group/crowd/collectivity, with its 
illusions of connection and uniformity. The outcome of this reliance on the palliative 
offerings promised by membership of the crowd is also seen by Fromm as an obstacle to 
the possibility of love:  
Human relations are essentially those of alienated automatons, each basing 
his security on staying close to the herd, and not being different in thought, 
feeling or action. While everybody tries to be as close as possible to the rest, 
everybody remains utterly alone, pervaded by the deep sense of insecurity, 
anxiety and guilt which always results when human separateness cannot be 
overcome (Fromm, 1995: 67).
35
 
 
This attraction to the comfort of the crowd, reminiscent of Nietzsche’s depiction of a 
‘herd-mentality’, involves the renunciation of personal freedom and responsibility, the 
refusal to respond creatively to that which presents itself to one in the concrete 
experience of each moment, and the ‘flight from the vital dialogic, demanding the 
staking of the self, which is in the heart of the world’ (Buber, 2004: 37). Acquiescence 
with general, universal, and absolutist interpretations of the individual’s life in the world 
is based, according to Buber, on an unquestioned acceptance of a priori assumptions 
and definitions of the human subject, and is far removed from the actual, concrete 
experience of each moment, with its ever-new challenges and possibilities; it is an 
                                                 
35
 The paradox of loneliness, isolation, and alienation amid the crowd, the multitude, and the city, is a 
central theme of Eliot’s poem, “The Wasteland”. 
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evasion of personal responsibility which demands that ‘I answer for my hour. My group 
cannot relieve me of this responsibility’ (Buber, 2004: 80). The price of this 
acquiescence, of this illusory belonging, is the suspension of individual thought and 
responsibility and the assumption of externally imposed opinions and convictions; 
consequently, the alterity of the other is averted:  
I am either completely excused from forming an opinion and a decision, 
or…convicted…of the invalidity of my opinions and decisions, and in their 
stead fitted out with ones that are approved as valid. By this means I am not 
in the least made aware of others since the same thing happens to them and 
their otherness has been varnished over (Buber, 2004: 74). 
 
 Rejecting the pseudo-security and illusory comfort offered by conformity and 
uniformity, Nietzsche expresses the hope that ‘perhaps a future survey of the needs of 
mankind will reveal it to be thoroughly undesirable that all men act identically’ 
(Nietzsche, 1984: 31), and concurs with Buber’s claim that ‘Mankind’s great chance lies 
precisely in the unlikeness of men’ (Buber, 2002: 10).36 Acceptance of difference, of 
otherness, of the other-than self is essential to the experience of love wherein ‘I wish his 
otherness to exist, because I wish his particular being to exist’ (Buber, 2004: 72). 
The craving to belong, to be an accepted part of something larger than oneself, 
necessitates the real or imaginary erection and maintenance of a defining boundary, 
protecting and insulating the collective – family, group, institution, nation, or party – 
against the perceived threat of what is different, the other, the foreigner. The illusory 
                                                 
36
 The ‘unlikeness’ or difference between individuals is stressed here by Buber and by Nietzsche; while 
this reality is acknowledged by the other writers outlined in the thesis, Wordsworth and Ricoeur assert 
that these differences are less significant than the likenesses and links that also exist between human 
beings. 
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camaraderie of the group or the crowd is only maintained by a projection of society’s 
ills onto convenient scapegoats, strangers, outsiders. The price to be paid for the 
construction of the ‘happy crowd’ is often the ostracizing of some outsider or 
difference; this was blatantly obvious to Buber with the rise of Nazism and the 
corresponding condemnation of the Jewish world. In this sense, inclusion is based on 
exclusion of the different. The splitting off of the ‘unacceptable’ and its convenient 
projection onto some demonic other resounds with the findings of psychoanalysis, and 
particularly with the writings of Carl Jung, who described what is split off as the 
‘shadow’, and who suggested that the result of such an artificial division is psychic 
conflict and self-alienation (Jung, 2005: 75). Friedman also makes reference to this 
practice of demonizing the ‘other’ in his discussion of Buber’s work: ‘The demonic 
Thou sees the beings around him as Its, as machines capable of various achievements 
which must be taken into account and utilized in the cause’ (Friedman, 1988: 345). This 
resounds with Hegel’s master and slave theory, in which the other is objectified by the 
self, becoming a slave or an ‘It’; but as Hegel explains, the duality of master/slave, I/It, 
obliterates the reality and humanity of both, as the self cannot find recognition in a 
demonized or diminished other. The identity of self and other is jeopardized, as it is 
splintered into convenient but illusory oppositions of good/bad, strong/weak, friend/foe. 
The unquestioned adherence to popular values and morals as ends in themselves 
results in an alienation from personal response to concrete experience, and a 
simultaneous restriction of the other to fixed and distorted images. Arguing for a 
courage which would embrace ‘that dangerous insecurity [which] is so much more 
human’, Rilke claims that ‘only someone who is ready for everything, who excludes 
nothing, not even the most enigmatical, will live the relation to another as something 
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alive and will himself draw exhaustively from his own existence’ (Rilke, 2004: 119). 
Agreeing with Nietzsche, Buber rejects the authority and the validity of externally 
created codes of morality which are unquestioningly accepted as absolute and complete: 
‘Morality and piety, where they have in this way become an autonomous aim, must also 
be reckoned among the show-pieces and shows of a spirit that no longer knows about 
Being but only about its mirrorings’ (Buber, 2004: 51). The concept of ‘mirrorings’ 
resonates with Lacan’s theories regarding self-knowledge, identity and image. 
According to Lacan, the subject, in the mirror stage of development, defines his/her 
identity by identifying with its reflection in the mirror; ‘the transformation that takes 
place in the subject when he assumes an image’ (Lacan, 1977: 4). This is the start of a 
life-long process of identifying the self in terms of the other. The influence of this 
Buberian analysis is also evident in the work of the psychoanalyst, R.D. Laing, in which 
he focuses on the impact of environmental conditions on mental health. Echoing 
Buber’s reference to a ‘simplified mode of valuation’, Laing describes ‘normality’ as a 
state of unwitting complicity in ‘social phantasy systems’, wherein shared assumptions 
about reality define the perspectives of a particular group, culture, or any powerful 
majority: ‘We see the shadows, but take them for the substance’ (Laing, 1999: 33). 
Buber suggests that our acceptance of the constrictions inherent in collectivity is 
enabled by the ‘perversion of thought’ and by ‘chatter’, portrayed in our duplicitous use 
of language itself (Buber, 2004: 36). The use of words such as ‘comradeship’, 
‘obedience’, ‘sacrifice’, and ‘achievements’, is based on the attempt to conceal the 
escapism involved in marching to the popular drum. 
Collectivity is not a binding but a bundling together: individuals packed 
together, armed and equipped in common, with only as much life from man 
to man as will inflame the marching step (Buber, 2004: 37). 
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This critique of an adherence to already defined meanings, to a dependence on a rigid 
conception of language, is echoed by Irigaray. She, like Buber, rejects speech or 
language which ‘submits body and spirit to already pronounced words which paralyze 
life, breath, energy, and prevent a living communication with the other’ (Irigaray, 2002: 
84). For Buber, this paralysis of communication is far removed from the possibility of 
authentic encounter with the world, it precludes a genuine dialogue between self and 
other, and it remains a serious obstacle to the experience of an I-Thou relationship, and 
so to the experience of love: ‘Dialogue and monologue are silenced. Bundled together, 
men march without Thou and without I, those of the left who want to abolish memory, 
and those of the right who want to regulate it: hostile and separated hosts, they march 
into the common abyss’ (Buber, 2004: 38).  
According to these arguments, the conditioning influence of collectivized 
society, with its unquestioned values and rules, its accepted demands and expectations, 
depersonalizes the human being, generalizes the human condition of the individual, and 
reduces the immeasurable complexity of the human person to an abstract concept of 
‘mankind’. Irigaray points to the repercussions of this mode of thinking: ‘Man always 
wanders further away from himself towards some remote universal [and is] more and 
more chained by a priori constructions that conceal from him a possible perception of 
himself, and of his environment’ (Irigaray, 2002: 91). Such abstractions, applied to 
complex issues such as subject, truth, friendship and love, often fail to symbolize the 
concepts in any meaningful way; as Derrida urges in his discussion of love and 
friendship ‘Let us cease speaking of friendship, of the eídos of friendship, let us speak 
of friends’ (Derrida, 2005: 302). Buber’s analysis of civilization and society resounds 
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with Nietzsche’s exhortation to consider ‘man’ rather than ‘mankind’,37 and also with 
Freud’s portrayal of the constraints of civilization on the potential and happiness of the 
individual,
38
 and his assertion of ‘the gulf between an actual individual and the concept 
of a species’ (Freud, 1995: 644). Simplistic generalisations of the human subject and of 
human society, expressed in political, social, religious or ideological platitudes, disavow 
the diverse multiplicity and indefinability of the human condition, the human subject, 
and the relations between individuals, and reduce human experience to abstraction and 
stagnation: ‘If a culture ceases to be centered in the living and continually renewed 
relational event, then it hardens into the world of It, which the glowing deeds of solitary 
spirits only spasmodically break through’ (Buber, 2004a: 46).  
 
                                                 
37
 Nietzsche repeatedly points to the incompatibility of the concepts ‘man’ and ‘mankind’: ‘society, where 
one hears a lot of talk about men, but none at all about man’  (Nietzsche, 1984: 39). 
38
 Freud outlines the tensions between civilization and the individual in his work Civilization and its 
Discontents, where he argues that the ‘good’ of society is often at variance with the ‘good’ of the 
individual . 
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Monologue as pseudo-dialogue 
There are not merely great spheres of the life of dialogue which in 
appearance are not dialogue, there is also dialogue which is not the dialogue 
of life, that is, it has the appearance of dialogue but not the essence of 
dialogue. At times, indeed, it seems as though there were only this kind of 
dialogue (Buber, 2004: 22). 
 
In his outline of human relationships, Buber posits another polarity and contrasts two 
different approaches and attitudes in the subject’s encounter with existence. He 
contrasts the I-Thou relationship of openness, mutuality, and presence with the more 
common mode of experience whereby the other is encountered as an object – ‘It’ – 
without the intention of genuine connection. The former is the approach of genuine 
relation, dialogue, and love, and the pervasiveness of the latter is a serious obstacle to 
this experience. In many encounters between human beings, there may be the 
appearance of communication, yet the other remains an object unconnected with the 
self– an ‘It’. As Friedman explains, ‘In general, people do not really speak to one 
another. Each turns to the other, to be sure, but he speaks in reality to a fictitious 
audience which exists only to listen to him’ (Friedman, 2002: 144). The deceptions 
involved in many experiences of human encounter are analyzed by Buber as being 
inherently limited to an I-It relationship, whereby the reality of the other is negated 
either by an effort to impose an element/concept/desire of the self, or by a need to 
satisfy a lack in the self through appropriation of the other. This echoes Nietzsche’s 
observations: ‘You cannot endure to be alone with yourselves and do not love 
yourselves enough, [so] one man runs to his neighbour because he is looking for 
himself, and another because he wants he wants to lose himself’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 87). 
Either way, the other is not embraced in his/her alterity, but rather is reduced or 
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subsumed as a means to an end.  
Denial of the radical alterity of the other, which is an inevitable counterpart of 
the I-It relationship, also cancels the ethical phenomenology which derives from this 
concept. The consequence of a life without a real reaching out to the other is a life 
where love, of self or of other, is not possible, because, as outlined by Friedman 
The monological man is not aware of the ‘otherness’ of the other, but instead 
tries to incorporate the other into himself. The basic movement of the life of 
monologue is not turning away from the other but ‘reflexion’, bending back 
on oneself. ‘Reflexion’ is not egotism but the withdrawal from accepting the 
other person in his particularity in favour of letting him exist only as one’s 
own experience, only as a part of oneself (Friedman, 2002: 103).  
 
Buber refers to this withdrawal of the self from a genuine encounter with the other as 
self-contradiction, because in his view it contradicts an essential aspect of being human: 
‘Self-contradiction…Buber uses that concept to designate a life of monologue that, in 
his opinion, contradicts human nature. The end of a monologic life, he claims, is self-
immolation’ (Shapira, 1999: 55). Buber gives concrete examples of pseudo-dialogue, 
apart from the practical necessity of gaining and exchanging information which is 
inherent in much human interchanges, i.e. ‘technical dialogue…which is prompted 
solely by the need of objective understanding’ (Buber, 2004: 22). Echoing Nietzsche’s 
statement that ‘I and Me are always too earnestly in conversation with one another’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 82), Buber points to the intrinsic preoccupation with self which often 
underlies the pretence at genuine communication: 
A debate in which the thoughts are not expressed in the way in which they 
existed in the mind…a conversation characterized...by the desire to have 
one’s own self-reliance confirmed by marking the impression that is 
made…a friendly chat in which each regards himself as absolute and 
legitimate and the other as relativized and questionable; a lovers’ talk in 
which both partners alike enjoy their own glorious soul and their precious 
experience...what an underworld of faceless spectres of dialogue! (Buber, 
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2004: 22, 23).  
 
The possibility of expressing thoughts as ‘they existed in the mind’ is explicitly or 
implicitly questioned by all the writers explored in this thesis. For example, Lacan 
argues that as our thoughts are mediated through language, they are inevitably changed 
by that language. Lacan refers to this everyday language as ‘empty speech’ and suggests 
that it reveals little about the real self. In contrast, he argues that full speech is the 
language of the unconscious – before it has been distorted and formalized – and as such 
it exists in any way in which the unconscious is brought to the fore, such as symptoms 
of illness, in dreams, in language spoken under hypnosis (Lacan, 1977: 46). Perhaps 
full, transparent expression is impossible, but perhaps there are degrees of distortion and 
of revelation. The difficulties inherent in the use of language is acknowledged by Buber 
as he refers to attempted expression and response as ‘stammering perhaps’, but he 
suggests that the effort, the ‘stammering’, while imperfectly voicing the inner world, 
nevertheless may attain its goal:  ‘the soul is but rarely able to attain to surer articulation 
– but it is an honest stammering, as when sense and throat are united about what is to be 
said’ (Buber, 2004: 20).  
For Buber, the appearance of relationship, of dialogue, is merely the public play 
of parallel monologues, where neither partner hears, nor is interested in hearing, what 
the other says: ‘The most eager speaking at one another does not make a conversation’ 
(Buber, 2004: 3). Nietzsche is even more emphatic in his analysis of ‘social dialogue’, 
where ‘three-quarters of all questions and answers are framed in order to hurt the 
participants a little more’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 50), and he points to the potential of speech 
to disguise and distort: ‘Speech is a beautiful foolery: with it man dances over all 
things’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 234). The duplicity and distortion underlying this 
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masquerade of relationship reflects and maintains internal and external conflict, 
because, as Buber states, ‘The origin of all conflict between me and my fellow-men is 
that I do not say what I mean, and that I do not do what I say. For this confuses and 
poisons, again and again and in increasing measure, the situation between myself and 
the other man’ (Buber, 2002: 22). This pseudo-encounter cancels any possibility of 
meeting with the person/presence/reality of the other, whether this is expressed in words 
or silence, in action or stillness, in expectation or despair. Hence, growth, of self-
understanding and self-awareness, and of appreciation and welcome of the otherness of 
the other, is absent from the experience. Irigaray echoes Buber’s analysis of pseudo-
dialogue, and says that ‘our rational tradition has been much concerned with “speaking 
about” but has reduced “speaking with” to a speaking together about the same things’ 
(Irigaray, 2002: 7).  
Buber realistically accepts the necessity of the I-It relationship in one’s dealings 
with the world, and observes that we could not live unless we, to some extent, 
manipulated nature in order to meet our basic needs; he accepts the criticism of the I-
Thou relationship as idealistic and only imperfectly attainable; he sees the reality of 
human relationships as inevitably oscillating between the two; but he warns against the 
limitations inherent in an exclusive and one-sided concentration on the separation and 
incompatibility of subject and object. As Donald Berry asserts in his analysis of Buber’s 
vision, ‘Fundamental to an appreciation of Buber’s thought is the recognition that the 
mutuality of which he speaks admits of degrees’ (Berry, 1985: 41). Buber argues that 
when we allow the ‘I-It’ way of viewing the world to dominate our thinking and actions, 
we are spiritually emaciated and pauperized, and our lives are a narrow reflection of 
what they could be. The potential of the human being, and his/her potential relationship 
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with his/her world, is thus restricted and distorted: 
The fulfilment of this nature and disposition is thwarted by the man who has 
come to terms with the world of It that it is to be experienced and used. For 
now instead of freeing that which is bound up in that world he suppresses it, 
instead of looking at it he observes it, instead of accepting it as it is, he turns 
it to his own account (Buber, 2004a: 37). 
 
A similar reference to what is lost to human experience through a concentration on the 
world of It is made by Irigaray; ‘the ability to say oneself to the other without for all that 
forcing upon the other one’s truth. The ability to listen to the other as well, to hear a 
meaning different than the one from which a world of one’s own has achieved its 
course’ (Irigaray, 2002: 8). In the absence of communication in dialogue, in the 
withholding of one’s presence from the other, in the recoiling from the unfamiliarity and 
difference of the other, the narrow complacency of the self is carefully guarded, and the 
possibility of reciprocity, connection, and love is averted and denied. According to 
Buber, this is a rejection of life’s possibilities, a distortion of relationship, and a 
negation of the reality of human living: 
When a man withdraws from accepting with his essential being another 
person in his particularity – a particularity which is by no means to be 
circumscribed by the circle of his own self, and though it substantially 
touches and moves his soul is in no way immanent in it – and lets the other 
exist only as his own experience, only as a “part of myself”…then dialogue 
becomes a fiction, the mysterious intercourse between two human worlds 
only a game, and in the rejection of the real life confronting him the essence 
of all reality begins to disintegrate (Buber, 2004: 28).  
 
The rejection of the real life confronting the individual is, in Buber’s view, a 
withholding of the self on some level from the ambiguity and unpredictability of a fully-
embraced encounter, it entails a guarded and partial address to the other, and it sets 
limits on the reception and response to the call of the other in all its possibilities, 
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dangers, and challenges. 
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Alienation from Self 
 
Man…must find his own self, not the trivial ego of the egoistic individual, 
but the deeper self of the person living in a relationship to the world (Buber, 
2002: 22). 
  
Buber insists that one cannot become a person by oneself, that life is essentially 
relational, and that ‘I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say 
Thou. All real living is meeting’ (Buber, 2004a: 17). However, Buber also accepts the 
inevitable solitariness of the human condition, whereby each person ‘goes the narrow 
way from birth towards death, tests out what none but he can, a wrestling with destiny, 
rebellion and reconciliation’ (Buber, 2004: 146). In asserting emphatically that ‘one is 
alone’, Rilke argues ‘that even between the closest human beings infinite distances 
continue to exist, [but] a wonderful living side by side can grow up, if they succeed in 
loving the distance between them which makes it possible for each to see the other 
whole and against a wide sky’ (Rilke, 2004: 34). Various experiences, historical, 
political, and cultural, can portray this essential solitude as a burden to be evaded, and 
thus attempt to alienate the subject from responsibility for himself or herself and the 
world. An attempted escape from the self, with all its contradictions and ambiguities, 
results ‘from the fear of being left…to rely on themselves, on a self which no longer 
receives its direction from eternal values…the unconscious desire to have responsibility 
removed from them by an authority in which they believe or want to believe’ (Buber, 
2004: 137). Nietzsche’s assessment of ‘a necessary nihilism’ following the ‘death of 
God’, is echoed here.  
 Buber argues that meeting of selves or of ‘I’s is only possible when one has 
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recognized the necessity of attaining a sense of one’s own self, when one has honestly 
encountered all of one’s humanity, and when one has accepted that encounter, presence, 
and communication only occur in the immediate, concrete situations which involve the 
self in all its complexity and ambiguity, and what lies beyond it: ‘in order to be able to 
go out to the other you must have the starting place, you must have been, you must be, 
with yourself’ (Buber, 2004: 24). Otherwise, in an obvious or repressed alienation from 
the self, one meets the other either as a threat to one’s fragile, false, identity, or as an 
object which might be utilized as a supporting prop to this false self.
39
 This analysis is 
clearly summarized by Irving Singer, in the third volume of his treatise on The Nature 
of Love, where he states that ‘Buber frequently denies that beings can be related to one 
another as I and Thou if either is absorbed in the other or deprived of ultimate 
independence’ (Singer, 1987: 334).  
 A focus on concrete examples of lived experience in order to explore questions 
regarding relationship, dialogue and communication is a persistent element of Buber’s 
philosophy; it examines particularities such as marriage, family, work, politics, and the 
many areas of influence and reaction which impact on the individual. As Shapira notes, 
‘Buber repeatedly glorifies “the infinite ethos of the moment”. For him the transitory 
situations of the stream of life receive a particular gravity of their own’ (Shapira, 1999: 
3). When Buber outlines his criteria for teaching and education he insists on the 
necessity of the I-Thou relationship. As in other caring professions to which he refers, 
such as psychotherapy, Buber cautions against the dangers of resorting to technique and 
                                                 
39
 The quest for recognition, affirmation, validation and reflection in the other is a theme explored, albeit 
in different directions, by Ricoeur and Lacan, and is poetically portrayed in Eliot’s “Prufrock”. 
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formulae in an effort to remain distant from the self. In a discussion on ‘the self-
education of the educator’ as it applies to the psychoanalyst, Carl Jung makes a similar 
point: ‘He will discover that the ultimate questions which oppress him as well as his 
patients cannot be solved by any amount of “treatment”’, and he insists that ‘the 
physician may no longer slip out of his own difficulties by treating the difficulties of 
others’ (Jung, 2004: 53). The importance of self-awareness and self-honesty in the 
person of the carer/educator/psychoanalyst is crucial according to Nietzsche: ‘A genuine 
physio-psychology has to struggle with unconscious resistances in the heart of the 
investigator’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 53), and is explored by Freud as the phenomenon of 
countertransference. In these, as in all human relationships, Buber insists that mutuality 
is essential, the mutuality of persons meeting each other without presumption, 
conviction, or the superiority of a one-sided expertise.
40
 
Reminiscent of Freud’s theory of defence mechanisms, Buber’s reference to the 
dulling of awareness and consciousness, particularly with regard to one’s ultimate 
aloneness and individual responsibility for one’s life (Buber, 2004: 131), suggests that 
in an attempted flight from the reality of the self, one necessarily refuses the immediate 
experience of life itself: ‘But the risk is too dangerous for us…we perfect the defence 
apparatus…Each of us is encased in an armour which we soon, out of familiarity, no 
longer notice’ (Buber, 2004: 12).41 In this position of self-alienation, genuine encounter 
                                                 
40
 Buber insists on the necessity of mutuality in all real relationships whilst acknowledging that in areas 
such as education and psychotherapy this mutuality cannot be fully developed. 
41
 Buber’s reference to the gradual incorporation of an ‘armour’ which is no longer discerned by the 
individual evokes reflection on the relationship between the real and the false self, between inner and 
outer realities, and in particular the various interpretations of ‘the mask’ as a conscious or unconscious 
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is precluded, and the possibility of love is thwarted. Instead, according to Buber, we 
approach the other either as an object of our observation in an attempt to measure and 
categorise, or with the interest of the onlooker detached from any personal relation, ‘the 
aloof fields of aesthesis’ (Buber, 2004: 11). The use of this defence apparatus sets 
between the individual and the world a rigid religious dogma, a rigid political belief and 
commitment to a group, or a rigid wall of personal values and habits. Thus, we seek to 
avoid the nakedness of risk and vulnerability which would result from the shedding of 
these defences.
42
 Limited by this protective armour, the subject seeks security in 
illusions of sameness and denial of difference, and thus loses sight of the potential and 
mystery of his or her unique self.
43
 Echoing Nietzsche’s reference to ‘slow suicide’ and 
his observation that ‘the most exquisite daisies are never tasted’, Buber describes the 
consequence of self-alienation: ‘Most of us achieve only at rare moments a clear 
realization of the fact that they have never tasted the fulfilment of existence, that their 
life does not participate in true, fulfilled existence, that, as it were, it passes true 
existence by’ (Buber, 2002: 30). Concurring with Nietzsche’s thesis of self-
actualization, Buber states that ‘Every man’s foremost task is the actualization of his 
                                                                                                                                               
disguise adopted in order to hide the reality of the self, or as an integral component of the integration of 
the public and private expression of being. (These issues are explored by writers as diverse as Yeats and 
Žižek). 
42
 Richard Kearney explores this avoidance of vulnerability in his work, The God Who May Be, and 
explains: ‘this reality of the ego’s fundamental insecurity and frailty is something most prefer to ignore, 
compensating instead, from childhood on, with fantasies of power and omnipotence’ (Kearney, 2001: 12). 
43
 Eliot’s “Prufrock” is a poetic expression of the loss of self in the attempt to merge with the social 
world. 
Chapter Two: Martin Buber 
 83 
unique, unprecedented and never-recurring potentialities, and not the repetition of 
something that another, and be it even the greatest, has already achieved’ (Buber, 2002: 
9). When individuals are alienated from themselves, when they are concerned with the 
impression made on the other, they favour seeming over being, opt for approval over 
authenticity, and refuse to proceed from what they really are. 
Buber acknowledges the duality of being and seeming, and realistically accepts 
the vacillation between the two modes of living. The human being inevitably dons a 
variety of masks in an attempt to protect the vulnerability of the self, and in the quest for 
recognition and affirmation from the other: ‘Man wishes to be confirmed in his being by 
man, and wishes to have a presence in the being of the other. The human person needs 
confirmation because man as man needs it’ (Buber, 1999: 16). Concern with 
appearance, performance, and the perceived effect of one’s self-presentation on the 
other has its source in ‘man’s need for confirmation’, and the fear that one’s real self 
would fail in this quest, according to Friedman: ‘It is no easy thing to be confirmed by 
the other in one’s essence; therefore, one looks to appearance for aid’ (Friedman, 2002: 
99). This phenomenon of human behaviour suggested in terms such as ‘seeming’, 
appearance’, ‘mask’, ‘persona’, ‘false self’ or ‘public self’, is an issue explored in 
diverse ways by all the writers outlined in the thesis. According to these analyses the 
motivation underlying the various manifestations of this behaviour lies in a 
commingling of fear and desire; the desire for recognition, affirmation, confirmation, 
acceptance and belonging, and fear of exposure, rejection, denial, ridicule and 
misunderstanding. All the writers validate this motivation as understandable, and 
Nietzsche and Žižek, particularly, suggest that authenticity may involve an interplay of 
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the two modes of being, and an eventual integration of being and seeming, essence
44
 
and mask, inner and outer experience. 
                                                 
44
 The concept of ‘essence’ is used here in an acknowledgement of its elusive, ambiguous and open-ended 
interpretation. It resounds with ideas which are similarly complex and ambivalent, such as ‘real self’ and 
‘core self’. It is not asserted here that ‘essence’ is an unchanging, static form of being; however, it is 
suggested that the potential existence of a ‘mask’ implies a phenomenon/reality which is being ‘masked’. 
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Where One Stands 
There is something that can only be found in one place. It is a great treasure, 
which may be called the fulfilment of existence. The place where this 
treasure can be found is the place on which one stands (Buber, 2002: 30). 
 
Buber situates the event of dialogue, of genuine meeting, in the particular, concrete 
experiences of daily life, rather than in the high moral ground of generalized platitudes 
and easy clichés: ‘The life of dialogue is not one in which you have much to do with 
men, but one in which you really have to do with those with whom you have to do’ 
(Buber, 2004: 23). This concentration on the particular and the concrete, on the 
demands and responsibilities of the face-to-face encounter with actual lived experience 
in the present moment, is central to the possibility of love, according to Buber, and his 
assertion that, ‘I know no one in any time who has succeeded in loving every man he 
met’ (Buber, 2004: 24), resounds with the opposition of Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan and 
Žižek to the dictum of universal love. 
Buber insists that ‘the essential thing is to begin with oneself’, but this is only 
the start; the ultimate direction is a departure from the exclusively subjective and 
exclusively objective points of view, and is an embrace of both polarities and what is 
possible between them: ‘to begin with oneself, but not to end with oneself’ (Buber, 
2002: 25). This is a movement which is necessarily outward, intersubjective, relational, 
and it is an attempt ‘to breach the barriers of the self and to come out from ourselves to 
meet with essential otherness’ (Buber, 2004: 213). This is where the possibility of love 
is enabled: ‘Love is responsibility of an I for a Thou’ (Buber, 2004a: 20). In the words 
of Shapira, ‘the importance of individualization [is] as an anticipation of a life of 
communion’ (Shapira, 1999: 148), because ‘someone who concentrates on his 
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individuality, must, in Buber’s view, realize that the formation of personality is not an 
end in itself but rather a stage prior to a life of relationship, to dialogical existence’ 
(Shapira, 1999: 126). 
 This ‘dialogical existence’, the authentic relationship between persons, and the 
experience of love, are glorified concepts devoid of meaning as long as they remain 
confined to theoretic and absolutist abstractions. As such, they are easily espoused, gain 
popular adherence, and fit comfortably with ideals of what life and love should be as 
distinct from what it is on a personal and experiential level. Buber does not situate his 
vision of authentic relationship and genuine conversation in this unreal realm but asserts 
its possibility, ‘the break-through’, as contingent on an acceptance of the imperfect 
nature of human existence: ‘I am not concerned with the pure; I am concerned with the 
turbid, the repressed, the pedestrian, with toil and dull contraryness – and with the 
break-through. With the break-through and not with perfection’ (Buber, 2004: 41). 
Belief in the possibility of authenticity, genuineness, and relationship implies a belief in 
the possibility of love, and Buber asserts his conviction that this experience is open to 
the human being in spite of and perhaps because of the complexity and imperfection of 
human nature: ‘You are really able. There are no gifted and ungifted here, only those 
who give themselves and those who withhold themselves’ (Buber, 2004: 40). With a 
resounding echo of Nietzsche’s view, Buber states that: ‘Man is not good, man is not 
evil; he is, in a pre-eminent sense, good and evil together…that is the nakedness in 
which he recognizes himself’ (Buber, 2004: 92). 
 Buber’s acknowledgement of the complex ‘nakedness’ of human being is 
enabled by a concentration on concrete, actual situations of lived experience: ‘Into 
nothing exalted, heroic or holy, into no Either or no Or, only into this tiny strictness and 
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grace of every day’ (Buber, 2004: 41). It is here, away from the comforting protections 
of morality, ideology and academic rationalizations that Buber situates the ever-new 
challenge of loving relationship: ‘where we really stand, where we live, where we live a 
true life…the little world entrusted to us…in that section of Creation entrusted to us’ 
(Buber, 2002: 33). The practical experience of encounter in these terms is open to what 
is yet unfamiliar, unknown, and unpredictable, it is a manifestation of interest and 
attention and care, and it is far removed from prescriptive assumptions and absolutist 
guidelines which prohibit the possibility of growth and new understanding: ‘The highest 
culture of the soul remains basically arid and barren unless, day by day, the waters of 
life pour forth into the soul from those little encounters to which we give their due’ 
(Buber, 2002: 32).  When encounter, with experience, with the other, with life, is based 
on assumption and fore-knowledge, understanding and meeting is negated because 
‘what is untypical in the particular situation remains unnoticed and unanswered’ (Buber 
2004: 135). Relationship, openness to the other, demands an appreciation of ‘the 
uniqueness of every situation’ (Buber, 2004: 134): 
In spite of all similarities every living situation has, like a newborn child, a 
new face, that has never been before and will never come again. It demands 
of you a reaction which cannot be prepared beforehand. It demands nothing 
of what is past. It demands presence, responsibility; it demands you (Buber, 
2004: 135). 
 
According to Buber, ‘genuine responsibility exists only where there is real 
responding…to what happens to one [in] each concrete hour allotted to the person’ 
(Buber, 2004: 18, 19). He rejects the ‘illusion of a responsibility without a receiver’ 
(Buber, 2004: 53), and implicitly discounts the validity of ‘convictions’ and ‘values’ 
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that are proclaimed in the vacuum of distance and theory.
45
 Conviction and 
responsibility become real and meaningful in the concrete experiences of human 
relationships: ‘Only one thing matters, that as the situation is presented to me I expose 
myself to it as to the word’s manifestation to me’ (Buber, 2004: 80). 
 Awareness of personal responsibility and potentiality as distinct from the 
dictates of ‘the crowd’, persistent attempts at genuine dialogue and openness to the 
other as distinct from the many faces of monologue, ongoing acceptance and integration 
of the self in complexity and ambivalence, and a willingness to respond openly and 
unknowingly to the present moment, with its particular demand, its unique encounter, 
and its unpredictability, enable the possibility of genuine meeting, I-Thou relation, and 
the experience of love: ‘Everything is changed in real meeting’ (Buber, 1999: 242).46 
Here everything is possible because dialogue in the Buberian understanding of the term 
takes place: ‘dialogue in my sense implies of necessity the unforeseen, and its basic 
element is surprise, the surprising mutuality’ (Buber, 1999: 190). ‘The unforeseen’, the 
‘surprise’, entails the reality of uncertainty and the risk of unpredictability: ‘There is no 
certainty. There is only a chance; but there is no other. The risk does not ensure the truth 
for us; but it, and it alone, leads us to where the breath of truth is to be felt’ (Buber, 
2004: 83). In this mode of being the ‘magic of life’ is embraced:  
Believe in the simple magic of life, in service in the universe, and the 
meaning of that waiting, that alertness, that ‘craning of the neck’ in creatures 
                                                 
45
 Buber’s dismissal of ‘responsibility without a receiver’ is similar to Žižek’s interpretation of virtuous-
sounding phrases such as ‘human rights’ and ‘neighbourly love’. 
46
 Jung reiterates Buber’s assertion: ‘the meeting of two personalities is like the contact of two chemical 
substances: if there is any reaction, both are transformed’ (Jung, 2004: 49, 50). 
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will dawn upon you. Every word would falsify; but look! Round about you 
beings live their life, and to whatever point you turn you come upon being 
(Buber, 2004a: 20). 
 
This magic does not negate the imperfection and incomprehension pervading life; it 
insists that one ‘must put his arms around the vexatious world’ (Buber, 2004: 76) 
because ‘the man who has not ceased to love the human world in all its abasement sees 
even today genuine form’ (Buber, 2004: 70). This embrace of ‘the vexatious world’ 
echoes Nietzsche’s call for amor fati, and also resounds with Nussbaum’s view of 
philosophy and education: ‘Abandoning the zeal for absolute perfection as inappropriate 
to the life of a finite being, abandoning the thirst for punishment and self-punishment 
that so frequently accompanies that zeal, the education I recommend looks with mercy 
at the ambivalent excellence and passion of a human life’ (Nussbaum, 1994: 510).  The 
possibility of love emerges in the celebration of the beauty and mystery of that which is 
imperfect and incomprehensible. 
Buber’s proposition that the I-Thou relationship occurs only in rare moments 
and is inevitably replaced by the necessity of the I-It relationship is the subject of 
Kaufmann’s criticism of Buberian philosophy (Kaufmann, 2002: 263). However, 
Kaufmann justifies his inclusion of Buber as one of the philosophers who have 
contributed to ‘discovering the mind’, and hence to self-knowledge and self-awareness, 
by concentrating his admiration of Buber’s work on translation and hence on 
interpretation: ‘his theory of translation is his most enduring contribution to the 
discovery of the mind. It only needs to be extended beyond the art of translation to the 
art of interpretation not only of written materials but also of human beings – others as 
well as oneself’ (Kaufmann, 2002: 279). The topic of translation, of interpretation, and 
of hermeneutical philosophy is the one of the central contributions of the philosopher 
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Paul Ricoeur, and the following chapter examines how this dimension of thought can 
enhance an understanding of the possibility of love. 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
Paul Ricoeur 
he philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, like that of Buber, has a strong theological 
aspect which is outside the exploration of this thesis. Ricoeur has repeatedly 
stated his intention to maintain the autonomy and integrity of his 
theological and philosophical work as separate: ‘I am very committed to the 
autonomy of philosophy’.47 While his work ranges over diverse subjects – the problem 
of evil, the meaning of identity, human will, and human fragility - his philosophical 
writings have increasingly centred on hermeneutics as the key instrument in the search 
for meaning; he sees human experience as inherently interpretive; and he asserts that 
language is both the foundation and the form of one’s encounter with reality and one’s 
attempt to make sense of the world: 
The decisive feature of hermeneutics is the capacity of world-disclosure 
yielded by texts. Hermeneutics is not confined to texts nor to authors of 
texts; its primary concern is with the worlds which these authors and texts 
open up. It is by an understanding of the worlds, actual and possible, opened 
up by language that we may arrive at a better understanding of ourselves 
(Ricoeur, 1991: 490). 
 
William Hall explores Ricoeur’s work with the focus on ‘what his writings tell us about 
                                                 
47
 This is a statement from Ricoeur quoted by William David Hall in Paul Ricoeur and the Poetic 
Imperative: The Creative Tension between Love and Justice, p. 4. In an essay, “Ricoeur’s Philosophical 
Journey: Its Import for Religion”, David Tracy asserts Ricoeur’s achievement of this aim: ‘Ricoeur 
always keeps the genres clear in order not only to allow figurative and conceptual forms their distinct but 
dialogically related roles but also to keep properly distinct religion, philosophy and theology…Unlike 
some of his admirers, Ricoeur himself never allows philosophy or theology to be confused or conflated’ 
T 
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what it means to be human’, and he argues that ‘his philosophy can be viewed as a 
singular project which is centrally concerned with this question of human meaning’ 
(Hall, 2007: 4). Therefore, Ricoeur’s philosophy aims at greater understanding, of the 
world, of the subject, and of the relationship between them; it resonates with 
Nietzsche’s theory of ‘perspectivism’ which states that all knowledge is based on 
interpretation, and with Buber’s contention that life is essentially dialogical. 
Ricoeur’s examination of the role of language in human experience, its 
inevitable translation both across different language usages and within same-language 
contexts, and its power to reveal and to conceal the truth of who we are and how we 
live, forms the nucleus of his analysis of the human subject as ambiguous, fallible, and 
mysterious, but also as potentially powerful, loving, and creative. The expanse of this 
spectrum is noted by Richard Kearney as he addresses Ricoeur with the reflection: ‘It is 
remarkable that you should begin your philosophical career by reflecting on the nature 
of l’homme fallible (fallible man) and conclude by shifting the focus to l’homme 
capable’ (Kearney, 2004: 167). Human weakness, frailty and failure co-exist with 
human capability, power and possibility, and Ricoeur’s analysis may be construed as a 
commitment to strive towards the possible in full cognizance of its obstacles; thus it 
provides a relevant framework for the exploration of the thesis question. 
Ricoeur justifies his insistence on the hermeneutical nature of human existence 
because, he argues, ‘language is the only complete, exhaustive, and objectively 
intelligible expression of human interiority’ (Ricoeur, 1970: 545). This view of 
language, as ‘the only…intelligible expression of human interiority’, acknowledges the 
                                                                                                                                               
(Tracy, 1996: 202). 
Chapter Three: Paul Ricoeur 
 93 
limitations of language,
48
 and leads Ricoeur to work towards the possibility of a 
restorative hermeneutics wherein meaning is retrieved/restored/recovered through open 
and comprehensive attempts at interpretation. This may appear to conflict with a 
hermeneutics of suspicion which Ricoeur associates with Freudian psychoanalysis as 
the latter discerns a hidden meaning concealed or distorted in the conscious expression 
of language. However, as Kearney explains, for Ricoeur, the hermeneutics of suspicion 
is necessary for a hermeneutics of affirmation (Kearney, 2004: 7): 
Suspicion takes the form of a critique of false consciousness by the three 
‘masters of suspicion’ – Freud, Marx and Nietzsche…All three recognized 
that meaning, far from being transparent to itself, is an enigmatic process 
which conceals at the same time as it reveals. Ricoeur insists therefore on the 
need for a hermeneutics of suspicion which demystifies our illusions 
(Kearney, 2004: 7, 8). 
 
Both hermeneutical practices endeavour, albeit through different methods and 
directions, to disclose truth and meaning, and to confront the ambiguities of self-
knowledge and self-deception. Kearney, in his introduction to Ricoeur’s short thesis, On 
Translation, explains that for Ricoeur, translation ‘indicates the everyday act of 
speaking as a way not only of translating oneself to another…but also and more 
explicitly of translating oneself to oneself’, and he supports this view with a quotation 
from Dominico Jervolino: ‘To speak is already to translate (even when one is speaking 
to oneself); further, one has to take into account the plurality of languages, which 
demand a more exacting encounter with the different Other’ (qtd. in Ricoeur, 2006: xv). 
The titles of some of Ricoeur’s works, for example, The Course of Recognition, Fallible 
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Man, and Oneself as Another, suggest an outline of some of the obstacles to the 
fulfilment of human potential, the complexities inherent in encountering the alterity of 
the other,  and hence an analysis of the barriers to the experience of love.  
 Ricoeur’s work involves an acknowledgement of opposition and conflict as an 
inescapable dimension of human living. He notes the oppositional nature of diverse 
political ambitions, of different national aspirations, of contrasting ideological 
convictions, and of myriad philosophical and historical interpretations of human 
experience. Without cynicism, and without despair, Ricoeur acknowledges human 
failure to realize genuine human community as recounted throughout history. 
Underlying these failures, Ricoeur recognizes the conflicting nature of many inter-
personal relationships, as the human subject strives to discover, and to maintain, his or 
her identity in a world which is already interpreted before the individual’s entry to it: ‘In 
being born I enter into the world of language that precedes me and envelops me’ 
(Ricoeur, 2002: 27). This point is also made by Lacan who notes that before language is 
acquired, the subject is already in the symbolic dimension. Ricoeur’s response to the 
acknowledgement of difference and incompatibility is not merely to seek conciliation 
and agreement; he extends the proposition of the other great philosopher of 
hermeneutics, Hans Georg Gadamer, who suggests an open-minded meeting of different 
perspectives, with a view to reaching a new perspective, ‘a fusion of horizons’ 
(Gadamer, 2004: 367).  Ricoeur argues for an acceptance of difference, for a living-with 
diversity, and for a respect which honours the multiplicity of human thought and 
interpretation. According to David Kaplan, this is ‘one of Ricoeur’s many strengths as a 
philosopher…He tends to think in terms of opposites, pairs, and contrasts juxtaposed in 
such a way that highlights and preserves differences, while resisting the temptation to 
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synthesize a new unity’ (Kaplan, 2003: 1). Thus, Ricoeur advocates a focus on bridge-
building and mediation between diverse positions and interpretations rather than an 
unrealistic attempt to integrate difference. 
When Ricoeur defines the ‘ethical intention’ as ‘aiming at the “good life” with 
and for others, in just institutions’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 172), he is firmly asserting the 
existential bond between the self and the other, and he is also insisting on a philosophy 
of action, the practical expression of his philosophical thought. Ricoeur is using the 
phrase, “the good life” in the Aristotelian sense of “living well” or the Proustian concept 
of the “true life”; he explains that ‘the “good life” is, for each of us, the nebulous of 
ideals and dreams of achievement with regard to which a life is held to be more or less 
fulfilled or unfulfilled’, and he stresses the practical manifestation of this aim: ‘we 
would say that it is the unending work of interpretation applied to action and to oneself 
that we pursue the search for adequation between what seems to us to be best with 
regard to our life as a whole and the preferential choices that govern our practice’ 
(Ricoeur, 1992: 179). The living of ‘the good life’ entails living ‘with others’ and 
resounds with Buber’s definition of ‘community’. The difficulties involved in the open 
embrace of the other, in interpersonal and institutional realms, are aptly chronicled in 
various interpretations of human history, and continue to challenge contemporary ideals 
of peaceful co-existence between nations, groups, and individuals. These difficulties 
and challenges inevitably pose obstacles to the experience of love in human living, and 
are confronted and analysed creatively in the philosophy of Ricoeur. 
 
Chapter Three: Paul Ricoeur 
 96 
The Fragmented Multiplicity of the Subject 
We do not mistake ourselves without also being mistaken about others and 
our relations with them (Ricoeur, 2005: 257). 
 
Illusions pertaining to concepts of subjectivity, distorted assumptions regarding human 
nature, and mistaken perceptions of self and other, diminish the potential of human 
relationships and pose obstacles to the possible experience of love. Ricoeur’s analysis of 
the human subject examines and critiques diverse interpretations and descriptions which 
have been offered throughout the history of philosophy. He questions the concept of the 
self as a fixed unity which underlies the Cartesian cogito, and he notes ‘the humiliation 
of the cogito reduced to sheer illusion following the Nietzschean critique’ (Ricoeur, 
1992: 299); he rejects the contention of thinkers such as Michel Foucault that the 
subject is merely a construct of particular cultures; and he dismisses the description of 
subjectivity as a biochemical entity endorsed by some analytic philosophers. Instead, 
Ricoeur proposes a narrative understanding of subjectivity that takes into account the 
open-ended and fluid nature of one’s life description, and which, as Kearney points out, 
cannot be restricted to dogmatic formulations: ‘The narrative model of identity suggests 
that the age-old virtue of self-knowledge…involves not some self-enclosed ego but a 
hermeneutically examined life freed from naïve archaisms and dogmatisms’ (Kearney, 
2004: 199). According to this narrative understanding of identity, the temporal 
dimension of selfhood precludes fixed definitions, unchangeable certainties, and 
necessitates an acceptance of fragility, vulnerability and fallibility: ‘the Self is aimed at 
rather than experienced…the person is primarily a project which I represent to myself, 
which I set before me and entertain’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 69). Thus, Ricoeur explains the 
‘mobile’ nature of identity:  
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narrative identity is not that of an immutable substance or of a fixed 
structure, but rather the mobile identity issuing from the combination of the 
concordance of the story, taken as a structured totality, and the discordance 
imposed by the encountered events…it is possible to revise a recounted story 
which takes account of other events, or even which organizes the recounted 
events differently (Ricoeur, 1996: 6).  
 
As Morny Joy explains in her introduction to this aspect of Ricoeur’s work, in Paul 
Ricoeur and Narrative,  
Ricoeur’s approach is hermeneutical in that it accepts that we are constantly 
part of a process of interpretation and reinterpretation. We are involved in a 
constant evolution whereby the past is being integrated into the present, and 
the present refining its perceptions of the past and of its own definitions 
(Joy: 1977: xxvi).  
 
Thus, Ricoeur asserts that the temporal unfolding of life may be understood as the 
unfolding of a narrative, an open-ended life-story which is constantly renarrated in the 
light of reflection and experience: ‘Learning to narrate oneself is also learning how to 
narrate oneself in other ways’ (Ricoeur, 2005: 101). This resounds with Nietzsche’s 
words. ‘I tell myself to myself’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 214). This Ricoeuerian concept is 
aptly captured in the title given to one of Ricoeur’s essays on the theme, “Life: A Story 
in Search of a Narrator”, and he opens the essay with the following words: ‘That life has 
to do with narration has always been known and said; we speak of the story of a life to 
characterize the interval between birth and death’. However, Ricoeur adds a warning 
note: ‘And yet this assimilation of a life to a history should not be automatic; it is a 
commonplace that should first be subjected to critical doubt’ (Ricoeur, 1991: 425).  
Story-telling, personal as well as fictional, helps one to make sense of one’s life, and the 
importance of narration, especially in the light of insight gained through interpretation, 
memory and integration, is an essential characteristic of the psychoanalytic process as 
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outlined by Freud and Lacan. Judith Butler refers to this experience as Giving an 
Account of Oneself, and stresses that narration always implies a listening and receiving 
other: ‘An account of oneself is always given to an-other, whether conjured or existing’ 
(Butler, 2005: 21). According to Freud the unconscious also emerges as a narrative in 
dreams; Lacan expands on this theme, famously stating that ‘the unconscious is 
structured like a language’ (Lacan, 1999: 15); thus, through the medium of language in 
the psychoanalytic encounter, an integration of the past with the present is enabled in a 
re-narration of the subject’s life-story. This process, inside or outside the psychoanalytic 
setting, requires a radical shift from illusions of self-knowledge, self-transparency, and 
self-righteous possession of the truth of oneself and of others; it requires a different 
interpretation of the subject, a renunciation of ‘the ideal of the perfect translation’ 
(Ricoeur, 2006: 8). Accordingly, meaning can only ever be temporary, as the openness 
to ongoing interpretation precludes completion and fixity. This aspect of Ricoeur’s 
thought raises the question of authority, or authorship, regarding the narration of a life. 
Does this authority rest with the individual, or can other narrators of that life also be 
valid? This is central to Derrida’s critique of psychoanalysis, as he argues that the 
process of analysis inevitably involves the imposition of another’s truth on the subject 
(Derrida, 1998: 9).  Derrida extends his argument to question the validity of biography, 
whereby a person’s story is restricted to the perspective of the biographer, with its 
inevitable prejudices and selective emphasis. The analogy between biography and 
history is obvious – history is essentially constructed through whole or partial 
biographies, and hence is susceptible to similar arguments.
49
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Ricoeur explores the complicated nature of selfhood in Oneself as Another, and 
his conclusion is summarized by Kaplan, in Ricoeur’s Critical Theory, as the assertion 
that ‘the many different ways of posing the question of selfhood suggests that there is 
no single, unitary conception of the self but multiple aspects of selfhood that are 
illuminated by posing different questions’ (Kaplan, 2003: 83). Ricoeur refers to the 
influence of society on the conditions of our adjustment, echoing Freud’s discussion of 
the conflict between individual happiness and the demands of civilization: ‘most often 
we treat ourselves as objects. Working and social life require this objectification’ 
(Ricoeur, 2002: 101), but he suggests that the individual personality also plays a part in 
imposing these requirements, and thus he describes ‘a level of pretension that is 
determined jointly by society and the subject’s personality’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 101). 
Irigaray expands on this reference to the demands of society by stating that the 
consequence is the diminishment of love: ‘Besides the fact that love in our culture has 
been poorly cultivated…individual feeling and the approach of the other harmonize 
with difficulty to collective imperatives coming from the outside’ (Irigaray, 2002: 57).  
Unquestioned acceptance of illusory theories of selfhood which profess ideals of 
self-knowledge, self-sufficiency, and self-unity, entails a rejection of the essential 
multiplicity of the self, with its diverse and often discordant pluralities and variations. 
This is achieved only by a masking of one’s vulnerabilities and mutability. The 
necessary mask is that of unity and coherence, suggestive of a fixed subjectivity which 
is closed and secure from the permeations of encounter with experience, since this 
experiential encounter necessarily demands an openness to change and revision. The 
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mask of self-unity and self-completion also, either consciously or unconsciously, 
imposes a veil of a priori judgements and expectations on the other, whether this other 
is an event, a text or a person, and it therefore precludes and prevents a recognition and 
reception of difference or alterity, in oneself and in the other; if the self is fixed, the 
other is also fixed. The inherent danger and limitation of illusory unity is suggested by 
Kearney; ‘Narrative concordance can mask discordance; its drive for order and unity 
displacing difference…it can degenerate into oppressive grand narratives’50 (Kearney, 
2004: 110). The desire for unity and the corresponding denial of difference and 
complexity necessitates the oppression of that which does not correspond to this ideal, 
and the repression of one’s awareness of such ambiguity and plurality diminishes the 
possibility of mediation within oneself and with others:  
Man is not intermediate because he is between angel and animal; he is 
intermediate within himself, within his selves. He is intermediate because he 
is a mixture, and a mixture because he brings about mediations. His 
ontological characteristic of being-intermediate consists precisely in that his 
act of existing is the very act of bringing about mediations between all the 
modalities and all the levels of reality within him and outside him (Ricoeur, 
2002: 3). 
 
Ricoeur suggests that the self is therefore a mediation between constancy and change, 
between innate characteristics and the transformations which result from the ongoing 
character of lived experience, between what he describes as idem-identity and ipse-
identity:  
ipse-identity involves a dialectic complementary to that of selfhood and 
sameness, namely the dialectic of self and the other than self. As long as one 
remains within the circle of sameness-identity, the otherness of the other 
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than self remains within the circle of sameness-identity, the otherness of the 
other than self offers nothing original (Ricoeur, 1992: 3). 
 
This is very close to the thought of Derrida, as he also maintains that acknowledgement 
of ‘the radical otherness of the other…is the condition of my relation to the other’. For 
Derrida, the inability to know the other ‘from the inside’ is integral to human 
relationships and so also to love: ‘I cannot reach the other…This is not an obstacle but 
the condition of love’ (Derrida, 2004a: 14).51 The attraction of remaining within this 
closed circle of illusory self-knowledge and transparency also restricts access to the 
otherness of the self, and consequently limits the capacity for self-love because it denies 
an essential part of that self. It restricts the creation of a narrative identity whereby one’s 
life-story, one’s understanding of oneself, is enriched by the attempted synthesis of past, 
present and future, and by the willingness to revise and reinterpret one’s identity in the 
light of new experiences and new translations of previous stories one has told about 
oneself and others. In this way, as is argued by Kearney, ‘story-telling can also be a 
breeding ground of illusions, distortions and ideological falsehoods…narrative 
emplotment can easily serve as a cover up’ (Kearney, 2004: 199). The self is never a 
completed possession, it is never a fixed entity, it is never a self-sufficient cogito; rather 
it is a living, and therefore a growing, changing, and responding ‘becoming’ which is in 
the process of interpreting and reinterpreting itself and its world. It implies an exposure 
to life’s unceasing questions and challenges, a plurality of interpretations and answers, 
and an on-going tension between what it is and what it is becoming: ‘It seems, then, that 
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conflict is a function of man’s most primordial constitution; the object is synthesis; the 
self is conflict’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 132). In his introduction to Ricoeur’s oeuvre Figuring 
the Sacred, Mark Wallace summarises Ricoeur’s thesis of selfhood as ‘a task to be 
performed, not a given that awaits passive reception by the subject’ (Ricoeur, 1995: 3). 
Without acknowledgement of one’s complex and often contradictory nature, the self 
imposes a self-captivity to narrowness, disproportion, and alienation from itself and 
from others. Rejection of one’s multiplicity and mutability is a rejection of Nietzsche’s 
call for a more realistic appraisal of the subject as ‘Human, All Too Human’, and it is 
also a denial of human frailty and fallibility. The resulting self-righteousness, coupled 
with a pseudo-self-constancy, inevitably fosters an alienation from the full spectrum of 
being human, an estrangement from the diverse potentialities of self and other, and 
erects a barrier against the openness and mutuality inherent in any approach to the 
possibility of love. 
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Narrowness of Vision 
Habit fixes our tastes and aptitudes and thus shrinks our field of availability; 
the range of the possible narrows down; my life has taken shape (Ricoeur, 
2002: 57). 
 
The quest for certainty and security, for control and solution, and for fixity and 
permanence, is often sourced in a perceived need for acceptable self-image; this self-
image, whether individual or collective, personal or national, entails a confining 
restriction of boundaries, a selective portrayal of human nature, and the imposition of 
constricting limitations in the possibilities of human relationship. The experience of 
love is blocked in this narrowing of perception, as the self withdraws behind illusions of 
self-sufficiency, self-knowledge and self-acceptance. Vulnerability, fallibility, and 
change are rejected in favour of insurance against risk, but this insurance is maintained 
only through a refusal to encounter the possibilities of life in their fullness and 
ambivalence. 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self, his description of identity as narrative, and 
his emphasis on interpretation as essential to understanding, cohere in his insistence that 
mediation is integral to selfhood and being. Mediation is intrinsic to the individual’s 
relationship with himself or herself and the diverse complexities within the self; it is 
inherent in the individual’s encounter with the world; and it is prerequisite to the 
mutuality and reciprocity of genuine relationship between self and others. Ricoeur’s 
thesis of mediation resounds with Buber’s contention that life is essentially relational, 
and also echoes Buber’s acceptance of the individual’s incapacity to consistently 
maintain the vision of the other as a Thou in all areas of inter-relationships. Like Buber 
and Nietzsche, Ricoeur argues for a recognition of human fallibility and error, he calls 
Chapter Three: Paul Ricoeur 
 104 
for the embrace of plurality and tension within the human condition, and he warns 
against the consequences of a one-sided and narrow vision of human nature which 
denies its ambiguities and contradictions. As Irigaray states, ‘consciousness of the 
difficulty opens the way to new strategies’ (Irigaray, 2002: 61), while blindness and 
denial ensure that difficulties are ignored and neglected. Narrowness of vision can 
centre on one side of the polarities which Ricoeur sees as framing human existence; 
polarities of freedom and finitude, of responsibility and fallibility, of good and evil, and 
of self and other. Restriction of vision, and consequently of understanding, is ‘endemic 
to all of human thought, the tendency to avoid the risk of openness and otherness by 
seeking refuge “within the circle which I form for myself”’ (Ricoeur, 2002: xv). This 
results in a diminishment of perception, a narrowing of vision, and a closing off of 
possibility and understanding. The romantic poet, William Blake describes it thus: ‘For 
man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’ / narrow chinks of his cavern’ 
(Blake, 2004: 142). The closed circle of a one-sided interpretation of reality and of 
human nature is linked, but not synonymous, with Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Ricoeur 
echoes Nietzsche saying that, ‘All perception is perspectival’, but he suggests the 
possibility of transcending this limitation ‘by situating my perspective in relation to 
other possible perspectives that deny mine as the zero-origin’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 26). A 
refusal to consider other possible perspectives leads to a diminishment of life, a 
stagnation of growth, and a dismissal of the possibilities of the other. 
 The selective disavowal of one side of the apparent polarities inherent in the 
human condition is tempting in its illusory power to enhance one’s self-image. 
Nussbaum, in her expansive work on philosophy and literature, refers to this 
understandable attraction to a distorted vision: ‘When we examine our own lives, we 
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have so many obstacles to correct vision, so many motives to blindness and stupidity. 
The “vulgar heat” of jealousy and personal interest comes between us and the loving 
perception of each particular’ (Nussbaum, 1992: 162). Restricted vision, with its limited 
focus on selected aspects of human nature, can result in a veil of ignorance and illusion, 
distortion and denial. Concentration on human freedom, ‘the voluntary’, to the 
exclusion of human finitude, ‘the involuntary’, and a similar selection along the 
spectrum of good/evil, power/domination, responsibility/fallibility, intellect/emotion, 
and patient/agent, results in a distortion of individuality, as the other cannot be 
perceived as being like oneself, and one cannot see oneself as another. Instead, 
unacceptable, uncomfortable, unfamiliar aspects of human nature are projected 
elsewhere to one’s own situation, and the commonality of a shared human existence is 
denied. Denial of weakness and fault, of ‘fallibility; the constitutional weakness that 
makes evil possible’ (Ricoeur, 2002: xliii), and of any aspects of humanity which are 
deemed unacceptable, prevents the necessary confrontation with and resolution of the 
difficulties and conflicts which ensue in spite of their repression and denial, and thwarts 
the ‘opportunity for a much more extensive study of the structures of human reality’ 
(Ricoeur, 2002: xliii). A one-sided vision of oneself, of others, and of reality is mistaken 
in taking the part for the whole.  
Ricoeur argues that this denial is a denial of the essence of human nature: ‘the 
idea that man is by nature fragile and liable to err…designates a characteristic of man’s 
being’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 1). Denial of an essential aspect of human being within the self 
diminishes an approach to the humanity of the other. Ricoeur asserts that ‘My humanity 
is my essential community with all that is human outside myself; that community makes 
every man my like’, and he supports his argument by quoting  Alain: 
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In every human body all passions and errors are possible…There are as 
many ways of being wicked as there are men in the world. But there is also a 
salvation peculiar to each man, of the same complexion, of the same turn as 
he (qtd. in Ricoeur, 2002: 61). 
 
Ricoeur explains that ‘all values are accessible to all men, but in a way that is peculiar 
to each one. It is in this sense that “each” man is “man”’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 61.) Denial of 
this essential interrelationship of self and other, refusal to see oneself, in all one’s 
weakness and glory, in the other, and restricting one’s horizon to that of illusory self-
containment and self-righteousness, while superficially creating a sense of self-
satisfaction and security, inevitably results in one’s alienation from the reality of 
oneself.  
Ricoeur consistently asserts the relational and dialogical nature of human 
existence, he rejects the fantasy of individual self-sufficiency in an acknowledgement of 
the realities of human interdependence; however, he does not equate interrelationship 
with the negation of one’s existential solitude:  
the feeling of the primal difference between I and all others; to find oneself 
in a certain mood is to feel one’s individuality as inexpressible and 
incommunicable. Just as one’s position cannot be shared with another, so 
also the affective situation in which I find myself and feel myself cannot be 
exchanged (Ricoeur, 2002: 55).  
 
Rather, he suggests a respect for and an accommodation of both solitude and solicitude, 
a mediation between the incommensurable aloneness of the individual and the 
undeniable human striving for community and connection. Solitude, aloneness, is both 
challenging and inevitable, but the entrenchment of self-protection and projection 
results in alienation and loneliness. Erich Fromm asserts that in the absence of this 
mediation ‘our civilization offers many palliatives which help people to be consciously 
unaware of this loneliness’ (Fromm, 1995: 67). The palliatives range from ‘beneficial’ 
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categories of work, group membership, material compensation, to ‘destructive’ 
obsessions of drug and alcohol addiction, crime and psychosis. The obsessive character 
of these palliatives suggests their failure in satiating the desire which propels them.  
Ricoeur refers to the resulting ‘oblivion and dissimulation of the ontological destination 
of human desire…Crafts or professions, in fact, present themselves as careers more or 
less “open” or “blocked” in which we raise our level of pretension’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 
100). The numbing or ‘blocking’ effect of immersion in professional roles is also argued 
by Nietzsche: ‘A profession makes us thoughtless; therein lies its greatest blessing. For 
it is a bulwark, behind which we are allowed to withdraw when qualms and worries of a 
general kind attack us’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 241). The denial of one’s essential aloneness 
ironically diminishes the level of connection with others which could make one’s 
aloneness bearable and fruitful. This point is supported strongly by Ilham Dilham in his 
analysis of love, Love: Its Forms, Dimensions and Paradoxes. He states, ‘I argue that it 
is in accepting this separateness that we find our individuality and that it is only as such 
that we can establish a genuine reciprocity in our personal relationships’ (Dilman, 1998: 
1). However, the difficulties involved in finding our individuality are often sourced in 
the quest for relationships, especially when relationships are seen as potentially 
providing esteem and recognition. 
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The Fragility of Identity 
Nothing is more fragile, nothing is easier to wound than an existence that is 
at the mercy of a belief (Ricoeur, 2002: 125). 
 
The human need for recognition, reflection, affirmation and acknowledgement is a 
phenomenon explored and debated in philosophy and psychoanalysis. Many theorists 
look to the earliest experiences of infantile life to analyze and describe the development 
of this need in the human subject.
52
 Ricoeur examines the quest for recognition in its 
diverse manifestations, and outlines the fragility of a personal identity which is solely 
dependent on its provision by an other. He sees the quest for recognition and esteem as 
a basic human need; however, he suggests that if/when it resides solely in the 
convictions and opinions of others, it is constantly threatened. This understandable 
fragility can confine the subject to a fear-driven concentration on protection and 
performance, thereby precluding the possibility of open encounter with self and other 
which is prerequisite to the experience of love.  
The concept of identity is the subject of much philosophical debate, particularly 
in postmodern literature where cognizance of the dissolution of hitherto established 
sources of identity and meaning is central. Ricoeur situates identity in close proximity to 
recognition, and therefore as influenced by the perception of the other: ‘the demand for 
recognition expresses an expectation that can be satisfied only by mutual recognition’ 
(Ricoeur, 2005: 19). Self-recognition and self-identity require reflection, acceptance and 
support of others; hence, the ‘dialectic of identity confronted by otherness’ (Ricoeur, 
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2005: 103). According to Kearney, Ricoeur’s dictum is that ‘the shortest route from self 
to self is through the other…the self is never enough, is never sufficient unto itself, but 
constantly seeks out signs and signals of meaning in the other’ (Kearney, 1996: 1). 
Identifying the self through the other is a common thread in the philosophy of Hegel, 
Levinas and Lacan, although these three philosophers diverge in their analysis of the 
dialectic of self and other. Hegel’s analysis centres on the master-slave dialectic which 
is only resolved when both master and slave recognize the need for recognition by an 
other which is the same as itself; otherwise the proffered recognition is valueless. 
Levinas posits the other – its existence, its demands, its needs and its enhancement, as 
the basis of selfhood; accordingly, the self can only exist in a meaningful way when it 
‘answers’ to the call of the other. Lacan points to the mirror-stage as the moment when 
the subject begins to identify itself with the reflection emanating from the other, but he 
insists that this ‘subject supposed to know’ is merely the symbolization of a 
‘fundamental fantasy’ (Lacan, 1999: 67). Nietzsche expresses his understanding of this 
human need whereby ‘the individual wants to confirm the opinion he has of himself 
through the opinion of others and strengthen it in his own eyes’, but he warns of the 
danger of ‘habituation to authority which…leads many to base their own belief in 
themselves upon authority, to accept it only from the hand of others’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 
63). Ricoeur explores the interplay between identity and recognition stating that ‘I 
actively recognize things, persons, myself; I ask, even demand, to be recognized by 
others’ (Ricoeur, 2005: x), and suggests that this is the demand for recognition of ‘my 
genuine identity’ (Ricoeur, 2005: xi). However, the need for recognition by another as 
essential to our sense of identity coexists with a perception of the other, because 
different, as a possible threat to our fragile identity: 
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It is a fact that the other…comes to be perceived as a danger for one’s 
identity…is our identity so fragile that we are unable to bear, unable to 
endure the fact that others have different ways of leading their lives, of 
understanding themselves, of inscribing their own identity in the web of 
living together? (Ricoeur, 2004: 81). 
 
This is part of the tension between selfhood and alterity, the dialectic of the self and the 
other than self, whereby the fragility of personal as well as national, racial, cultural and 
institutional identity is commonly perceived to be threatened by difference, 
unfamiliarity and discordance. 
Ricoeur’s analysis of narrative identity entails an accommodation of all aspects 
of one’s self, of one’s life-story, with the integration of past, present and future as 
essential to a genuine narrative. This resounds with Nietzsche’s thought experiment of 
the eternal recurrence, whereby one must be willing to accept all of one’s life, even to 
the point of accepting the possibility of its recurrence over and over again, in order to 
take responsibility and autonomy for one’s self. However, there are difficulties inherent 
in this attempted integration. Memory is the door to the past, but it is susceptible to 
selective remembering and forgetting; action in the present is the action of the 
agent/subject, but it is correlative to its impact on the patient/other; the future is the 
focus of intentionality based on a trust in self-constancy and self-fulfillment, but it is 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of personal feeling and commitment, as well as to the 
unpredictable nature of the external world. Wordsworth acknowledges the difficulties 
encountered in the attempted creation of a life-story: ‘I cannot say what portion is in 
truth / The naked recollection of that time / And what may rather have been called to 
life / By after-meditation’ (Wordsworth, 2000: 420,421). Hence narrative is fragile, 
uncertain, and unfinished, and this fragility is coupled with the always present potential 
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to self-deception.
53
 The apparent paradox inherent in the concept of self-deception – 
how is it possible to deceive ourselves? – is given at least partial resolution in the 
inevitable gap between the unconscious dimension of the psyche and its manifest 
translation in conscious speech. Nietzsche sees it as the victory of pride over memory: ‘I 
have done that’, says my memory. ‘I cannot have done that’ – says my pride, and 
remains adamant. At last – memory yields’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 91). Freud agrees, stating 
that ‘there’s no guarantee whatever for what our memory tells us’ (Freud, 2006: 553), 
and explains the phenomenon from an individual and social perspective: ‘it is inherent 
in human nature to have an inclination to consider a thing untrue if one does not like 
it…society makes what is disagreeable into what is untrue’ (Freud, 1991: 48). The 
stories we tell ourselves about ourselves are not always truthful or comprehensive; the 
stories we tell to others about ourselves are sometimes coloured by our quest for 
recognition and approval. In the light of the analyses and insights developed through 
Freud and Nietzsche, the possibility of complete self-knowledge remains an 
unattainable ideal; self-deception is a phenomenon which must be acknowledged. 
According to Lacan, personal truth is often evaded, because ‘Truth does in effect seem 
to be foreign to us, I mean our own truth. It is no doubt with us, but without concerning 
us to the point that one really wants to speak it’ (Lacan, 2007: 58). In varying degrees, 
self-deception entails a disavowal of certain aspects of the self, and in the ensuing 
diminishment of the self, the possibility of love is weakened; it is thwarted in that parts 
of the self are withheld from awareness and recognition, and the experience of 
                                                 
53
 For an exploration of the phenomenon of self-deception see Herbert Fingarette’s classic study, Self-
Deception. 
Chapter Three: Paul Ricoeur 
 112 
communication, mutuality and intimacy is distorted and restricted. In an essay on 
Ricoeur’s philosophy of the self, Joseph Dunne outlines this possibility of self-
deception: ‘This is the province of self-deception, which might be defined as a 
significant discrepancy between the story one lives and the story one tells’, and this 
reflects ‘a deeper conflict within who one is, when one part is lived out only at the cost 
of disowning another part which, though disowned, continues to find disguised 
expression in one’s life’ (Dunne, 1996: 153). This concurs with Freud’s theories of 
repression and neuroses. As a result, ‘there is thus the whole margin hidden by 
censorship, prohibition, the margin of what is unspoken, criss-crossed by all the figures 
of the hidden’ (Ricoeur, 2006: 26). The ‘unspoken’, ‘the hidden’, the unconscious 
fantasies and motivations of human thought and action, are often beyond the power of 
speech to elucidate.  Echoing Lacan’s ‘empty speech’ Ricoeur refers to ‘the uses of 
speech where one aims at something other than the true, other than the real…namely, 
the lie’, and goes on to argue that this is not the greatest misrepresentation which speech 
is capable of, but rather that ‘it is language’s propensity for the enigma, for artifice, for 
abstruseness, for the secret, in fact for non-communication’ that curtails and diminishes 
the narrative identity of the subject. Kearney explains that ‘for narrative identity to be 
ethically responsible it must ensure that self-constancy is always informed by self-
questioning’ (Kearney, 2004: 112). The opposition between self-knowledge and self-
deception is deconstructed in this acceptance of the spectrum between them, a spectrum 
which may be diminished in an openness to self-questioning, and to the integration of 
the often uncomfortable answers which may ensue. 
Another difficulty encountered in the construction of a narrative of the self is the 
reality of entanglement between one’s life history and that of others; Dunne attests to 
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this aspect of narrative identity in Ricoeur’s philosophy: ‘The self…is historical through 
and through, and is enfolded ab initio within a web of relationships’ (Dunne, 1996: 
144). From birth, one’s history is linked to the histories of others, and as these histories 
unfold and reveal themselves one’s own narrative has to be continually revised. It has to 
be revised and refigured in an attempt to mediate one’s own identity with the radically 
different and changing worlds of others, and in the attempt to produce new meaning 
which integrates this difference.  Failure to do this results in deception regarding 
identity of the self, and confinement of the other to the status of the foreigner, the alien. 
The difficulties inherent in the construction of narratives extend to collective narrative 
relating the stories of groups and institutions. Kaplan outlines Ricoeur’s analysis of 
ideology in this respect: 
The danger of the stories groups tell about themselves is that they often 
become frozen oversimplifications, expressed in slogans and caricature, 
serving only the interests of power and authority. Ideology functions through 
this kind of collective memory, as well as through ritualization, stereotype, 
and rhetoric, all of which prevent us from interpreting and recalling things 
differently (Kaplan, 2003: 96). 
 
However, while Ricoeur insists on the necessity of exposing the dangers of ideological 
interpretations of reality, he also warns of the propensity of the critique to become 
another ideology.
54
 
                                                 
54The relevance of  Ricoeur’s warning may be discerned in the historical examples of the phenomenon 
whereby personalities and groups inspired by opposition and rebellion against established orders are 
transformed into protectors of newly-established orders. Kennelly refers to this phenomenon in Irish 
history where the achievement of freedom and independence from a colonial power coincided with the 
establishment, explicit or implicit, of another set of restrictions and ideologies. Žižek offers an ironical 
discourse on such reversals in his discussion of the paradoxical injunction ‘to enjoy’ which he discerns in 
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Ricoeur suggests a ‘triple quest’ in the constitution of the self (Ricoeur, 2002: 
126); this order ‘is built on the themes of having, power, and worth’, and these quests 
are intricately linked (Ricoeur, 2002: 113). The quest for having, for possession, is 
fuelled by a desire for control through appropriation of objects, and a dependence on 
this possession and ownership as a protection against loss. The loss which is feared is 
that of self-affirmation, and the mode of having as a bulwark against this threat can 
range from ‘a just possession which would distinguish among men without mutually 
excluding them’, to ‘unjust having’ which sees appropriation by the other as loss for 
oneself. In this sense ‘the category of having designates a vast domain in which the 
wrong done to others wears innumerable guises’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 221). A second root of 
self-affirmation follows from the relation of the quest for having, because having 
implies the power of man over man. The world of work, especially, posits the individual 
as a force dominating other forces. Ricoeur argues that almost all human actions entail 
the exertion of one will over another. This coheres with the philosophy of Nietzsche, 
where he argues that the exertion of one’s will, over everything that confronts it, is the 
‘will-to-power’ which underlines all human drive and life. Ricoeur differentiates 
between power-in-common whereby a community shares the exercise of power in order 
to live together, and power-over which can easily become violence towards the other. 
The descending slope is easy to mark off, from influence, the gentle form of 
holding power-over, all the way to torture, the extreme form of abuse…from 
the simple use of threats, passing through all the degrees of constraint, and 
ending in murder. In all these diverse forms, violence is equivalent to the 
diminishment or the destruction of the power-to-do of others. But there is 
something even worse…humiliation – a horrible caricature of humility 
(Ricoeur, 1992: 220). 
                                                                                                                                               
the ‘liberal’, ‘rule-free’ experience of contemporary society. 
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Ricoeur’s observation that the problem of power and the problem evil are intertwined is 
solidified by his experience of the atrocities of the concentration camps, the terror of 
totalitarian regimes, and the peril of nuclear power, (Ricoeur, 2002: xiv), and also by his 
personal response to cruelty and betrayal between man and man, man and woman, adult 
and child, and the myriad forms of suffering which are inflicted physically and verbally 
by one human being upon another. ‘the possibility of moral evil is inherent in man’s 
constitution’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 133); Evil is a reality of human life, ‘it is manifest only in 
the way it affects human existence…In all hypotheses, evil manifests itself in man’s 
humanity’ (Ricoeur, 2002: xlvi). In his analysis of the ethical dimension in Ricoeur’s 
thought, John Wall reminds us that ‘violence remains ultimately our own free choice, 
[and that if] we refuse to acknowledge our responsibility for violence…we deny our 
own freedom to re-create our own moral world’ (Wall, 2005: 109). This reference to our 
individual responsibility for and involvement in the reality of conflict is asserted by 
Ricoeur:  
Even if it is true that the real conflicts that stake out affective history are 
accidents, in the literal sense of the word, random encounters between our 
effort, our power of affirmation, and the forces of nature, or the familial, 
social, and cultural environment, the fact remains that all these external 
conflicts could not be interiorized if a latent conflict within ourselves did not 
precede them (Ricoeur, 2002: 132). 
 
This statement is echoed in the words of Lacan: ‘it’s never, in any way whatever, by 
another person’s excesses that one turns out, in appearance at least, to be overwhelmed. 
It is always because their excesses happen to coincide with your own’ (Lacan, 2007: 
12). Nietzsche anticipates this sentiment: ‘whatever may yet come to me as fate and 
experience…in the final analysis one experiences only oneself’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 173). 
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What Ricoeur terms ‘something even worse’ is the utmost assault upon the integrity of 
the other because it attempts to obliterate that which is deemed indispensable to human 
survival, one’s sense of worth or self-esteem. The desire for esteem as reflected in the 
eyes of another ‘is a desire to exist, not through a vital affirmation of oneself, but 
through the favour of another’s recognition’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 120). The ambiguity of this 
desire is noted by Nietzsche: ‘One man runs to his neighbour because he is looking for 
himself, and another because he wants to lose himself’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 87). It is in the 
realm of interpersonal relations that one desires acceptance, approval and recognition. 
As Kaplan asserts, ‘recognition is something we owe to others not merely as a courtesy 
but because it is a necessary human need’ (Kaplan, 2003: 156). The fragility of this 
esteem, dependent as it is on the opinion of the other, is open to deception, neglect, 
scorn and humiliation: ‘Here there is a threat of existing in a quasi-phantasmal manner, 
of being a reflection…the possibility of being no more than the word of another, the 
dependence on fragile opinion’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 121). Thus the quest for recognition by 
another cannot permanently answer the need for self-worth and self-esteem; unless this 
can also be discovered within the self there is a constant hunger for affirmation and 
recognition, and this takes precedence over any attempted connection with the other 
which is integral to the experience of love. 
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Solicitude 
Talking about love may be too easy, or rather too difficult. How can we 
avoid simply praising it or falling into sentimental platitudes? (Ricoeur, 
1996: 23). 
 
   
Ricoeur’s exploration of love ranges over concepts of friendship, agape, self-love and 
sexual love, and he discerns the desire for possession, power and worth as potentially 
motivating various manifestations of these experiences. Human fallibility, frailty and 
need can diminish the possibility of love in human living; the quest for recognition and 
affirmation can impose conformity to the demands and expectations of others; and the 
fear of one’s existential aloneness can propel a flight from the self towards the potential 
safeguard of belonging and acceptance. Ricoeur accepts these constraints on human 
capability, ‘self-recognition requires, at each step, the help of others’ (Ricoeur, 2005: 
69), but he suggests a dialectic of self and other which acknowledges human solitude, 
understands the need for self-esteem, and strives for co-existence of personal solitude 
and intersubjective solicitude: ‘my thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to 
self-esteem from outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem’ 
(Ricoeur, 1992: 180). Within this comprehensive and ambivalent framework, the 
possibility of love is enabled:  
My own self-esteem that I search for by means of the esteem of others is of 
the same nature as the esteem I experience for others. If humanity is what I 
esteem in another and in myself, I esteem myself as a thou for another. I 
esteem myself in the second person…I love myself as if what I loved were 
another (Ricoeur, 2002: 124). 
 
Freud says something similar when he refutes the precept of universal love: ‘I love 
another…if…he so much resembles me that in him I can love myself’ (Freud, 2002: 
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46). The dialectic between self-esteem and solicitude for others suggests that they are 
intrinsically linked. Lacan echoes this sentiment when he suggests the link between the 
experience of love and the acknowledgement by the subject of the ego-ideal: ‘It’s one’s 
own ego that one loves in love, one’s own ego made real on the imaginary level’ 
(Lacan, 1991: 142). This is also the argument of Fromm in his discussion of love:  
The love for my own self is inseparably connected with the love for any 
other being…love of others and love of ourselves are not alternatives. On the 
contrary, an attitude of love towards themselves will be found in all those 
who are capable of loving others. Love, in principle, is indivisible as far as 
the connection between ‘objects’ and one’s own self is concerned (Fromm, 
1995: 46). 
 
Esteem for oneself implies the esteem for the other, because the self is an other and the 
other is a self. One-sided esteem is not genuine; it is distorted in some way, as it infers a 
splintered and selective understanding of humanity. Žižek rejects the opposition of self-
love and altruism, supporting the arguments outlined above: ‘the true opposite of 
egotistic self-love is not altruism, concern for the common Good, but envy, 
ressentiment, which makes me act ‘against’ my own interests’ (Žižek, 2007: 312). 
 The lure of escape from one’s essential aloneness is often focused on a desired 
fusion with the other, but Ricoeur insists that this fusion is illusory and deceptive: ‘The 
one is not the other. We exchange gifts, but not places…the benefit of this admission is 
that it protects mutuality against the pitfalls of a fusional union…a just distance is 
maintained at the heart of mutuality, a just distance that integrates respect into intimacy’ 
(Ricoeur, 2005: 263). Kearney explains the attraction and impossibility of this desired 
union as ‘the lure of fusion, that is, for the illusion that some ecstasy or addiction might 
make us ‘one with the other’. But it cannot. The other will never ‘be’ me, nor even 
‘like’ me’ (Kearney, 2001: 13), and he urges ‘an awareness that no amount of intimacy 
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can ever grasp the other’ (Kearney, 2001: 14). In Ricoeur’s words ‘the lived experience 
of the other always remains inaccessible to me’ (Ricoeur, 2005: 157) Acceptance of this 
reality is not synonymous with failure or defeat in the realm of human relationships: ‘Is 
reality simply necessity offered to my resignation? Is it not also possibility opened to 
the power of loving?’ (Ricoeur, 1970: 550). Acknowledgement of human solitude and a 
respect for the alterity of the other enables the emergence of a dialectical esteem 
wherein self and other are recognized in their unique humanity. In this dialectic, ‘the 
voice of solicitude’ is heard, ‘the voice which asked that the plurality of persons and 
their otherness not be obliterated by the globalizing idea of humanity’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 
227).   
 Freedom from the constraints of identity and recognition sought exclusively in 
the affirmation of the other enables the attainment of personal autonomy and 
responsibility: ‘it is not a fate that governs my life from the outside but the inimitable 
way in which I exercise my freedom as a man’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 61). However, Ricoeur 
distinguishes between an illusory self-sufficiency and an autonomy which recognizes, 
and indeed celebrates, the need for otherness: ‘the selfhood of oneself implies otherness 
to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought without the other’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 
3). This need is not reducible to quests for assimilation, absorption, or control, but is 
intrinsically linked to esteem for the self and for the other than self: ‘The autonomy of 
the self will appear then to be tightly bound up with solicitude for one’s neighbour and 
with justice for each individual’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 18). This concurs with Fromm’s 
description of love: ‘Love is union under the condition of preserving one’s integrity, 
one’s individuality’ (Fromm, 1995: 16). As Kennelly notes, ‘the self knows that self is 
not enough’ (Kennelly, 2004: 425), and the possibility of love exists within a 
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welcoming acknowledgement of this insufficiency. Solicitude embraces the need for 
love, the need for others, without obliterating autonomy, responsibility, or self-esteem: 
‘To self-esteem, understood as a reflexive moment of the wish for the “good life”, 
solicitude adds essentially the dimension of lack, the fact that we need friends; as a 
reaction to the effect of solicitude on self-esteem, the self perceives itself as another 
among others’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 192). Love is transitive; it needs an object; ‘to love’ 
means ‘to love someone or something’. 
Ricoeur differentiates between solicitude and ‘obedience to duty’, and he argues 
that ‘its status is that of benevolent spontaneity, intimately related to self-esteem within 
the framework of the aim of the “good” life’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 190). Esteem, recognition, 
and the experience of love imply a mutuality which embraces self and other in their 
autonomy, frailty, capability and vulnerability. Ricoeur explains this mutuality with 
reference to Aristotle’s thesis on Philia: ‘the good man’s own being is desirable to him; 
given this, the being of his friend is then equally desirable to him’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 186). 
Faith in human goodness, in oneself and in others, co-existing with an 
acknowledgement of human frailty, fallibility and evil, enables the possibility of love. 
This is Ricoeur’s thesis, according to Wall: ‘for Ricoeur, love is given to the other from 
the self, originating in a prior faith in the self’s own human created goodness that is then 
applied to the other as another such self’ (Wall, 2005: 121).55 Self-esteem and self-
                                                 
55
 In response to the thesis question, Wall offers the following reflections: 
In brief, Ricoeur's view seems to be that love is what helps drive the self toward the other in the other's 
irreducible singularity. It functions, he says, as a corrective to golden rule justice ("do to others as you'd 
have them do to you") by refusing to let it become reduced to mere reciprocity ("do to others so that they 
do to you") but instead includes an element of genuine concern for the other as other. Love in this sense is 
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appreciation simultaneously opens to appreciation and respect for others, and this 
mutuality is enhanced rather than hindered by the embrace of solitude and distance: 
‘must one not, in order to make oneself open, available, belong to oneself in a certain 
sense?’ (Ricoeur, 1992: 138). As Kearney explains, ‘By deepening solitude, the self 
discovers that it receives from others all that it appreciates in its own being, and 
consequently it is not alone’ (Kearney, 1996: 44).  
 Ricoeur’s acknowledgement of human frailty, fallibility and evil does not belie a 
belief in the potential goodness of the human subject and the possibility of love and 
happiness within his appraisal. He situates this possibility in the concrete experiences of 
action and relation, and concurs with Buber when he states that ‘It is for the other who 
is in my charge that I am responsible’ (Ricoeur, 2005: 108). In the immediate, 
individual and unique encounters with reality, of self and other, choices are made, 
                                                                                                                                               
never, therefore, completed; nor does it stand alone; rather, it functions as a "hyperethical corrective" 
drawing us always beyond ourselves. At the same time, Ricoeur describes love as the second moment in a 
three-part "economy of the gift" that first starts in "faith" in the ultimate goodness of oneself within the 
universe, passes through "love" as the affirmation therefore of the humanity of the other, despite their 
difference, and thereby aims ultimately toward "hope" for a fully reconciled humanity. So, love in 
Ricoeur's view is not a stable ethic. It has the dual function of driving ordinary views of justice to their 
own wider implications and animating a movement toward the reconciliation of all. 
In my view Ricoeur also speaks to your term "possibility" -- indeed, as my book’s subtitle puts it, "the 
poetics of possibility." My view is that Ricoeur's notion of love represents a helpful way to speak of 
ethical life, not as applying fixed principles, but as opening the self up to wider possibilities -- in this 
case, meaningful relations to others. So, love for Ricoeur is never merely self-sacrifice but rather the 
poetic effort to stretch or expand oneself into wider imaginative relation to others. It takes poetics to 
imagine love for the other (2006: email). 
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judgements are considered, and the possibility of love presents itself: ‘The events that 
bespeak happiness are those which remove obstacles and uncover a vast landscape of 
existence’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 68). Ricoeur accepts the human desire for happiness, but sees 
its attainment as experienced in the encounters and ‘events’ through which life is 
directed: ‘happiness is not given in any experience; it is only adumbrated in a 
consciousness of direction. No act gives happiness, but the encounters of our life that 
are most worthy of being called “events” indicate the direction of happiness’ (Ricoeur, 
2002: 68). Deception, denial, projection and blindness pose obstacles to love, but these 
may be overcome in an on-going openness to ‘the vast landscape of existence’. Ricoeur 
sees this as the ‘function’ of the human subject:  
This essential openness or accessibility to…the “function” or the “project” 
of man as such, grounds the person in giving him a horizon of humanity that 
is neither I nor you but the task of treating the person, in me and in you, as 
an end and not as a means (Ricoeur, 2002: 136).  
 
Within this ‘horizon of humanity’, love is enabled, both as an attainable possibility and 
as the way of being which fulfils itself: ‘It is Eros, it is Love that shows that this aim, 
which is immanent to the function of man, is happiness anticipated in a consciousness 
of direction and of belonging’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 137). 
While Ricoeur acknowledges the fallibility and frailty of human nature, and 
while he insists on an acceptance of the reality of evil as a creation of humanity, he 
nevertheless maintains a belief in the primordial goodness of the human being, he 
confirms the possibility of hope even amid impossible constraints, and he expresses a 
love of life in spite of its brokenness: ‘Man is the Joy of Yes in the sadness of the finite’ 
(Ricoeur, 2002: 140). Thus he articulates the possibility of love as integral to human 
living, but, echoing Nietzsche and Buber, he sees the obstacles to this possibility as 
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resulting from misinterpretation, deception, fear and distortion. His emphasis on 
language as the medium of understanding, his argument that hermeneutical 
interpretation is essential to understanding, and his call for ‘the reappraisal of 
narratives’ (Ricoeur, 1996: 8) as an ongoing integration of self and other, of past and 
present, and of the known and the not-yet-known, suggest many of the principles of 
psychoanalysis as developed by Freud. Ricoeur’s exploration of Freudian thought, in his 
work Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, is prompted by his 
commitment to undergo a personal search for meaning and understanding. Thus, 
Ricoeur asserts the potential insight and interpretation which psychoanalysis offers 
when faced with the dilemmas of human experience. This discipline is the subject of the 
following section. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION TWO 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 Sigmund Freud 
he birth of psychoanalysis at the close of the nineteenth century coincided 
with a questioning of philosophical traditions and methods epitomized by 
Nietzsche’s assault on the cherished assumptions of metaphysics and 
rationalism hitherto deemed to be the legacy of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment 
had seen the questioning of religion as an explanation and a revelation of reality and of 
human life within that reality; science had been instigated as a more ‘enlightened’ and a 
more rational provider of truth and knowledge; but the ongoing nature of philosophical 
thought continued to encounter new challenges and the re-phrasing of old questions. 
Attempting to combine the exactness of scientific method with the openness of 
philosophical inquiry, psychoanalysis broached the terrain of the human mind, and 
attempted to explore the perennial questions of meaning, truth and life with an 
understanding enhanced by the discoveries of its founder, Sigmund Freud. In an essay 
titled “Freud’s Philosophical Roots”, John Hayes firmly states that ‘there are profound 
and inextricable links between psychoanalysis and philosophy’ (Hayes, 1988: 47), and 
these links continue to be the subject of exploration in contemporary analyses of 
Freudian thought.
56
 
 The theories of psychoanalysis as developed, outlined, and revised by Freud are 
the subject of debate in almost every area of the human sciences, and continue to 
provoke praise and criticism, adulation and disdain, interpretation and re-interpretation, 
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 I refer to writers such as Richard Boothby and Jonathan Lear who, like Ricoeur, offer a philosophical 
interpretation of Freud’s work.  
T 
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to the present day. In his writings, Freud often acknowledged the possibility of 
fallibility; echoing Nietzsche’s perspectivism, he prefaced many of his remarks as being 
his own speculations, ‘I therefore dare not set myself up as a prophet vis-à-vis my 
fellow men’ (Freud, 2002: 81), and he expressed the hope that what he had merely 
initiated would profit from the thought and experience of future reflection and insight: 
You will not find me inaccessible to your criticism. I know how difficult it is 
to avoid illusions; perhaps the hopes I have confessed to are of an illusory 
nature…If experience should show…that we have been mistaken, we will 
give up our expectations (Freud, 1995: 719). 
 
A poetic expression of these sentiments is offered by Auden in his poem, “In Memory 
of Sigmund Freud”: ‘For every day they die / among us, those who were doing us some 
good, / who knew it was never enough but / hoped to improve a little by living’ (Auden, 
1994: 273). It is not the purpose of this dissertation to offer a critique of Freud’s 
thought; the questionable nature of the scientific basis of his pronouncements and 
techniques, his limited and distorted representation of female sexuality and psychology, 
and the prejudices and limitations inherent in his historical and geographical position, 
are subjects explored  competently and comprehensively by many writers;
57
 the focus 
here is on a reading of Freud from the point of view of his contribution to our 
understanding of human nature, the limits to that understanding, and the obstacles which 
stand in the way of understanding, happiness and love within the experience of the 
                                                 
57
 Walter Kaufmann, Jonathan Lear and Adam Phillips provide commentaries on the issues which are 
sympathetic to Freud’s position; Philip Rieff is less enthusiastic in his appraisal and sees in Freud’s 
thought a conservative moralism; Richard Webster finds much to condemn and ridicule in his reading of 
Freud. Carol Gilligan, among other feminists, offers a feminist critique of Freud’s work and the gender 
bias underlying  psychoanalysis in general. 
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human condition.
58
 This is the view of Jonathan Lear as he outlines Freud’s legacy: ‘He 
listened to ordinary people, and, on the basis of what he heard, he transformed our 
conception of the human’ (Lear, 2005: 9). This contribution is summarized with hope 
and humility in the closing words of Freud’s short essay, “An Autobiographical Study”, 
where he reflects: 
Looking back, then, over the patchwork of my life’s labours, I can say that I 
have made many beginnings and thrown out many suggestions. Something 
will come of them in the future, though I cannot myself tell whether it will 
be much or little. I can, however, express a hope that I have opened up a 
pathway for an important advance in our knowledge (Freud, 1995:  41).  
 
The ‘pathway’ which Freud ‘opened up’ evolved from his theories of the unconscious, 
the structure of the mind, the influences of past experiences, and the interpretation of 
dreams as ‘the via regia to a knowledge of the unconscious element in our psychic life’ 
(Freud, 1997: 441). It has led to an acknowledgement of the indeterminacy of 
knowledge, especially self-knowledge, an awareness of unconscious forces motivating 
and directing human behaviour, and an attempt to understand and alleviate human 
distress through an innovative approach to language and interpretation. 
The development of psychoanalysis centred on the relationship between two 
human beings, the analyst and the analysand, and within this relationship the neurosis, 
sufferings and conflicts of the individual were explored through expression/narration, 
interpretation/hermeneutics, and understanding/integration. The revolutionary nature of 
this approach lay in the proposition that human suffering could be understood and 
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 Perhaps the words of Anthony Storr, in reference to the thought of Carl Jung, may be applicable here: 
‘Jung’s valuable contributions to psychotherapy and to the understanding of individuals can be 
appreciated without subscribing to the whole of his system of belief’ (Storr, 1998: 27). 
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alleviated by the presence of an understanding, listening and attentive other, rather than 
through the diagnosis-prescription model. The enriching power of dialogue, the 
cathartic liberation of narrating one’s life-story, and the potential for healing in an 
encounter with a non- judgemental, accepting and interpretive reflection of an other, not 
only heralded a radical innovation in the treatment of mental diseases but also suggested 
a new framework for an understanding of the human condition, and particularly the 
sourcing of that understanding in the realm of language. This resounds with Buber’s 
analysis of human life as essentially relational, and with Ricoeur’s description of the 
narrative identity of the self. In his analysis of Freud’s influence, Adam Phillips 
emphasises the role of language as the medium of psychoanalysis. He suggests that the 
work of listening and talking in a psychotherapeutic encounter aims at a re-description 
of the individual’s life story, a re-interpretation of what he finds unacceptable or 
unbearable, in such a way that it becomes tolerable, sensible, and hopefully pleasurable; 
‘that suffering can sometimes be transformed by applying words to wounds…the appeal 
to another person to listen and reply is fraught with hope’ (Phillips, 2006: 19). The goal 
of psychoanalysis for Freud was the amelioration of mental suffering, the release of the 
individual from unnecessary psychic conflict and constraint, and the liberation of the 
human subject to live, work and love in the world. He believed that bringing to 
consciousness the memories, desires, unfulfilled wishes and forgotten traumas which 
had been repressed, enabled the subject to attain a more realistic and a more honest 
understanding of motivation, feeling and behaviour, and ultimately empowered the 
individual to make an autonomous decision regarding a response to this increase in self-
knowledge. The psychoanalytic aim was ‘to uncover repressions and replace them by 
acts of judgement which might result either in the accepting or in the condemning of 
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what had formerly been repudiated’ (Freud, 1995: 18). However, these goals could only 
be pursued through self-honesty, self-acceptance, and self-integration. Thus, Freud’s 
psychoanalysis inevitably examines the obstacles to such an achievement, and 
contributes to an exploration of the potential obstacles to love. 
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The Unconscious 
The decisive rules of logic don’t apply in the unconscious; we could call it 
the Empire of the Illogical (Freud, 2006: 23). 
Freud’s development of psychoanalysis centred on his close observation of human 
behaviour including an on-going analysis of his own psyche, dreams and motivations. 
This observation led to a growing conviction that in many life situations unconscious 
influences impact on human thought, feeling and action, and from this insight Freud 
discerns many of the obstacles to love, health and optimum living. Misconceptions, 
disavowals and transferred feelings from one situation to another diminish the 
possibility of genuine relationship, with self and other, and according to Freud, distort 
and thwart the experience of love. Exploration of the unconscious, the retrieval of 
repressed material, and the assumption of personal responsibility, would, according to 
Freud’s theories, enhance self-knowledge and self-acceptance, and free the subject to 
make life-enhancing choices unrestricted by developmental arrest or traumatic 
fixation.
59
  
Through his studies, writings, clinical practice and self-analysis, Freud 
developed a new and broader picture of psychic life than had hitherto been considered. 
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 The positing of the unconscious as a propellant of human behaviour and motivation is rejected by 
Sartre’s critique of Freudian psychoanalysis; he develops the concept of ‘bad faith’ to account for the 
phenomenon of self-deception. (Sartre’s argument is outlined in his philosophical work Being and 
Nothingness, and is also explored in novelistic form in works such as Nausea and The Reprieve)  
However, his assertion that choice is an inescapable component of human living may cohere with Freud’s 
commitment to creating conditions favourable to informed and open decisions and choices freed from the 
limitations of disavowal and repression.  
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Examining the symptoms of malaise and unhappiness, Freud discerned that one’s 
conscious awareness of oneself is only one part of the mind’s structure; ‘mental 
processes are in themselves unconscious and …of all mental life it is only certain 
individual acts and portions that are conscious’ (Freud, 1991: 46). The original 
inspiration for the term was literary, as Lacan reminds us: ‘Freud called the locus of the 
unconscious ein anderer Schauplatz, another scene, borrowing a term that had struck 
him in a text by Fechner’ (Lacan, 2006: 183). Hence, Freud developed a model of the 
mind which would take account of the existence of the unconscious. His model breaks 
with the Cartesian cogito with its emphasis on direct introspection and transparency, 
and rational thought as the guarantor of ontology, and it overturns the pretension of 
consciousness to truth and meaning as an illusion masking its propensity to be 
inadequate, capable of mistakes and self-deception. On rare occasions, Freud makes 
reference to his debt to Nietzschean philosophy, and he credits him with some of his 
insights into the unconscious; ‘Nietzsche…whose guesses and intuitions often agree in 
the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psychoanalysis’ (Freud, 1989: 
67). Many Freudian concepts resound with those of Nietzsche, such as dreams, memory, 
and motivation, but Freud insists that he had ‘carefully avoided any contact with 
philosophy proper…I was less concerned with the question of priority than with keeping 
my mind unembarrassed’ (Freud, 1995: 38).60 Freud asserts that behind one’s conscious 
awareness of oneself lurks a powerful influence on one’s behaviour and health. This 
part of the mind’s structure Freud terms ‘the unconscious’, suggesting that what is 
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 For an exploration of the ‘conjunction’ between Freud and Nietzsche and an interrogation of ‘the 
interface between philosophy and psychoanalysis’, see Paul-Laurent Assoun’s work, Freud and 
Nietzsche. 
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conscious to the self is but a mere layer of awareness, and that the greater part of mental 
life lies hidden in this unconscious state: ‘Psychoanalysis…defines what is mental as 
processes such as feeling, thinking and willing, and it is obliged to maintain that there is 
unconscious thinking and unapprehended willing’ (Freud, 1991: 46). The reality of the 
unconscious, and its role in psychic life, demands a recognition of what the individual 
tries to hide from himself or herself. Repressed in the unconscious are the hidden, 
unacknowledged conflicts of the individual, disguised truths and buried memories that 
strive to be revealed.  
Freud believed that human behaviour is determined unconsciously by these 
primitive drives and impulses, but without our awareness of their influence. According 
to Lear, ‘this goes to the heart of Freud’s insight: that humans tend toward certain forms 
of motivated irrationality of which they have little or no awareness’ (Lear, 2005: 4). 
Human suffering can be understood and alleviated only through a recognition of hidden 
and denied wishes, frustrations, and desires: ‘Interpreting means finding a hidden sense 
in something’ (Freud, 1991: 115). This definition of interpretation later led to Freud 
being described, along with Nietzsche and Marx, as one of ‘the masters of suspicion’. In 
his Essay on Interpretation: Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur differentiates between 
interpretation as restoration of meaning and the hermeneutics of suspicion as 
exemplified by psychoanalysis: ‘Psychoanalysis…has uncovered a variety of processes 
of elaboration that are operative between the apparent and the latent meaning’ and he 
describes this hermeneutics as ‘a tearing off of masks, and interpretation that reduces 
disguises’ (Ricoeur, 1970: 17, 30). Among the masks to be uncovered through the 
insights of psychoanalysis is the mask of self-deception and its illusion of self-
knowledge. Freud understood the popular opposition to this analysis, and he likened it 
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to the difficulty in accepting the historical blows to naïve vanity produced by the 
discoveries of Copernicus and Darwin. Lacan explains that by comparing his discovery 
to ‘the so-called Copernican revolution’ Freud was ‘emphasizing that what was at stake 
was once again the place man assigns himself at the centre of a universe’ (Lacan, 2006: 
156). With the insights of psychoanalysis, the centrality of the human subject was again 
questioned. 
But human megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding 
blow from the psychological research of the present time which seeks to 
prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content 
itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind 
(Freud, 1991: 326). 
 
The assertion that the ego is ‘not even master in its own house’ infers that it lacks a full 
awareness of its motivations and expectations, that it is curtailed and directed by 
unconscious desires and fears, and that its claim to self-knowledge is illusory and 
mistaken. This difficulty in accepting the limitations of human knowledge, and the 
simultaneous challenge to our illusory and distorted view of human nature, lie, 
according to Freud, at the root of human suffering and unhappiness, and he urges a 
more honest appraisal of human nature which takes cognizance of its contradictions and 
conflicts. This involves an acceptance of the ambiguity pervading much of human 
emotion and thought; this ambiguity is evident in the motivation of human behaviour, 
and possibly is nowhere more influential than in the human striving for love. 
 Freud presents us with case histories in order to highlight the obstacles to love 
which arise when desire and motivation are camouflaged; idealization of the love-
object, rescue-fantasies, the search for parent-surrogates, and the prohibition of sexual 
activity under certain conditions, all point to a reluctance to acknowledge the 
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complexity of human experience. In the words of Auden, ‘Nothing can be loved too 
much, / but all things can be loved / in the wrong way’ (Auden, 1994: 885). Rejecting 
the validity of the Christian dictum of neighbourly love, Freud points to various 
historical manifestations of its incongruence: ‘After St Paul had made universal 
brotherly love the foundation of his Christian community, the extreme intolerance of 
Christianity towards those left outside it was an inevitable consequence’ (Freud, 2002: 
51). Freud’s argument against this dictum resounds with Buber’s avowal that one 
cannot love everyone one meets, and stresses the concrete and practical nature of love 
over universal theories: ‘My love is something I value and must not throw away 
irresponsibly. It imposes duties on me, and in performing these duties I must be 
prepared to make sacrifices’ (Freud, 2002: 46). 
The case histories outlined and analyzed in Freud’s texts are instructive, 
because, he asserts, they illustrate the contradictions inherent in all human behaviour; 
‘we who laugh at other people’s failings are not always free from them ourselves’,61 and 
he concludes that the mystery of love eludes systematization and tidy formulae; ‘things 
that have to do with love are incommensurable with everything else; they are, as it were, 
written on a special page on which no other writing is tolerated’ (Freud, 1995: 379). The 
‘special page’ on which love is written, the ‘madness’ of love, is a perennial theme of 
literature and philosophy, and is central to Lacan’s essay, ‘A Love Letter’, where he 
suggests that being in love is akin to madness! (Lacan, 1999: 81).  However, Lacan 
stresses that this interpretation reflects the limitations of the symbolic order, ‘when 
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 In light of Freud’s persistent atheism, it is interesting to note in this quote the echo of the biblical story 
of the prostitute and the words ‘He who is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone at her’ (John 
8:7). 
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you’re in love, you are mad, as ordinary language puts it’, and he suggests that love is a 
phenomenon that somehow transcends this constraint: ‘Love is a phenomenon which 
takes place on the imaginary level, and which provokes a veritable subduction of the 
symbolic, a sort of annihilation, of perturbation of the function of the ego-ideal’, and he 
asserts the thrust of this phenomenon: ‘Love opens the door…to perfection’ (Lacan, 
1991: 142).  Nietzsche also addresses the ambiguity of this ‘madness’: ‘There is always 
a certain madness in love. But also there is always a certain method in madness’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 68). Freud agrees, stating that ‘departures from the norm constitute 
precisely what is essential about being in love’ (Freud, 1995: 385). 
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Psychic Conflict 
It is a conflict, then, between what the drive demands and what reality 
forbids (Freud, 2006: 64). 
The ambivalence of love is perhaps relative to its essentially subjective character which 
militates against theoretical formulations and definitions, and which suggests some 
explanation regarding the diverse interpretations and explorations of the concept. As a 
subjective experience, whether loving or being loved, it is susceptible to the often 
conflicting and contradictory demands and needs of the individual, whereby 
juxtapositions such as desire and duty, fear and fortitude, self-preservation and self-
giving, and the myriad manifestations of the complexity of the human condition, jostle 
with each other towards the attainment of satisfaction. Peter Gay refers to ‘instinctual 
dualism’, such as ‘the great antagonists, love and hate, [which] wrestle for control in 
man’s social life quite as much as in his unconscious’ (Gay, 1998: 366). The ensuing 
conflicts of psychic life seek resolution in diverse forms and behaviours, including 
disavowal of ‘unacceptable’ sources of motivation, projection of ‘negative’ aspects of 
human nature onto convenient containers, or, in line with psychoanalytic aims, the 
attempted integration of the full spectrum of instinctual, emotional and mental 
experience. 
Freud’s study of the phenomenon of the unconscious led him to conclude that it 
contained no sort of unity or organisation, but rather uncoordinated impulses seeking 
satisfaction, often in opposition with each other. Perhaps foreshadowing Ricoeur’s 
assertion that ‘the self is conflict’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 132), he understood the mind as 
potentially in conflict with itself, and he understood this conflict as the primary cause of 
human anxiety and unhappiness. According to Boothby,  
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the genuine Freudian insight places the most important site of conflict not 
between our wishes and the world that limits their fulfillment, but between 
our wishes and ourselves. The problem is not [only] that we are prevented by 
reality from fulfilling our desire but that we are prevented from knowing that 
desire in the first place (Boothby, 2001: 278).  
 
The significance of desire, and the consequences accruing from its denial or its 
dismissal, is central to Lacan’s thought. Freud put forward a tripartite division of the 
mind, whereby different mental functions operate at different levels. His description of 
three conflicting or competing internal tendencies, the id, ego, and superego, which are 
not physical structures, but rather aspects and elements of a theoretical model, helps to 
explain the link between early childhood experiences and the mature adult personality. 
Here, Freud points to the inherent wisdom of poetic vision, stating that: ‘What poets and 
students of human nature had always asserted turned out to be true: the impressions of 
that early period of life, though they were for the most part buried in amnesia, left in-
eradicable traces upon the individual’s growth’ (Freud, 1995: 20). Thus, he encouraged 
a re-visiting of the past, ‘he merely told / the unhappy Present to recite the Past / like a 
poetry lesson’, with a view to enabling a more hopeful and a more autonomous 
encounter with the future, ‘to approach the Future as a friend / without a wardrobe of 
excuses, without / a set mask of rectitude’ (Auden, 1994: 274). Freud’s reference to 
poets as ‘students of human nature’, and his acknowledgement that his own insights, 
developed through arduous reflection and observation, are often intuitively and 
creatively known and felt by artists such as poets, makes the co-analysis of 
psychoanalysis and poetry in this thesis particularly appropriate from a Freudian 
perspective. 
According to Freud’s description of the tripartite division of the mind, the 
uncoordinated instinctual trends of psychic life form the id. As a primitive motivational 
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force, the id is ruled by the ‘pleasure principle’, demanding satisfaction now, regardless 
of circumstances and possibly undesirable consequences; ‘it contains everything that is 
inherited, everything present at birth, everything constitutionally determined’62 (Freud, 
2003:176). The desires of the id, to be centre-stage, to be omnipotent, and to be 
permanently satisfied, are driven by the instincts, which are the innate needs of psychic 
life. These desires are based on the demand for love, for total union and mergence with 
‘the beloved’, symbolized by the mother, and for the protection of that love, by the 
symbolic father. Ambivalence pervades the direction of these desires as the protective 
role of the father is alternated with his challenging position as the mother’s lover and 
thus as a threatening rival for her affections; love and hate are ambiguously and 
simultaneously experienced. Hence, there is an ongoing attraction of the mirage of the 
perfect love and the prototypes which embody it, replicating this state which is later 
‘forgotten’ but never fully abandoned.  
 In his analysis of the subject, Freud argues against the notion of a tabula rasa, a 
clean slate upon which the individual freely constructs his/her identity and sketches the 
outline of his/her life. According to Freud, the infant arrives into a world which is 
already created, already interpreted, already expectant. This thesis that the subject enters 
a world which is already interpreted, a world of language, is central to the thought of 
Ricoeur and Lacan. The interpreted world and its subsequent expectations and demands 
are reflected in the familial and societal mores and values which are directly or 
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 A major critique of Freud’s thought centres on the perception/interpretation that his theories confine the 
human subject to restrictions imposed by the determinism of biography and biology, thus limiting the 
possibilities of autonomy, responsibility and ‘free will’. This analysis, the apparent conflict between 
determinism and autonomy, is explored in my MA thesis, 2006. 
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indirectly imposed on the child, and which continue to potentially shape its 
understanding of and relation to, itself and the world in which it finds itself.  
 As the child moves from a narcissist conception of himself or herself as 
embodying the universe, and comes to a mature realisation of the existence of the 
‘other’, there is a grudging acceptance of the necessity of object-relations; this is 
experienced in the attempted accommodation of solitude and connection, self-
preservation and self-giving: ‘the two strivings – for individual happiness and for 
human fellowship – have to contend with each other in every individual’ (Freud, 2002: 
77). The reality of social and communal life entails a restriction of instinctual desires 
and primitive drives: ‘Men cannot remain children forever. They must in the end go out 
into “hostile life”. We may call this “education to reality”’ (Freud, 1995: 717). Hence, 
there is the emergence of ‘the reality principle’ which must be accommodated in 
frequent contradiction to ‘the pleasure principle’.  
The eventual understanding that immediate gratification is usually impossible 
and often unwise, and that ‘a child’s desires are incompatible with reality’ (Freud, 2006: 
147), comes with the formation of the ego. The ego develops as the child forms an 
image of itself in relation to its environment; it is the gradual emergence of the persona 
or social self, the public presentation of the self. This developmental phase is later 
described by Lacan as the mirror stage, and the ‘moment in which the mirror-stage 
comes to an end’, is the moment when the self is propelled into desire: 
It is this moment that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into 
mediatization through the desire of the other, constitutes its objects in an 
abstract equivalence by the co-operation of others, and turns the I into that 
apparatus for which every instinctual thrust constitutes a danger (Lacan, 
1977: 5). 
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The ego mediates between the conflicting internal demands of the id and the demands 
and constraints of the social world: ‘It has the task of self-assertion, and fulfils it with 
respect to the outside world…and with respect to the inner world…the id’ (Freud, 2003: 
176). In its attempted accommodation to the public and social environment, the ego is 
governed by the ‘reality principle’, and in subordinating the demands of the id, it serves 
as a ‘modifier’ of the ‘pleasure principle’, as it seeks more realistic and attainable goals. 
Freud explains: 
Thanks to the influence of the ego’s self-preservation drive it is displaced by 
the reality principle, which, without abandoning the aim of ultimately 
achieving pleasure, none the less demands and procures the postponement of 
gratification, the rejection of sundry opportunities for such gratification, and 
the temporary toleration of unpleasure on the long and circuitous road to 
pleasure (Freud, 2006: 135). 
 
The child learns that his/her needs are met in proportion to the supply by others, and this 
learning is inevitably followed by an acknowledgement of the power differentials at 
work in his/her surroundings.  Satisfaction of one’s needs is dependent on the good-will 
of one’s carers, and their good-will becomes a prerequisite of desire fulfilment: ‘the 
Freudian child suffers, so to speak, from an intensity of desire and an excess of 
vulnerability’ (Phillips, 2002: 151).  The intersubjective context of desire is reiterated 
by Ricoeur, in his interpretation of Freud; the desire of the self is confronted by the 
desire of the other: 
if desire were not located within an interhuman situation, there would be no 
such thing as repression, censorship, or wish-fulfillment through fantasies; 
that the other and others are primarily bearers of prohibitions is simply 
another way of saying that desire encounters another desire – an opposed 
desire (Ricoeur, 1970: 387).  
 
The ‘interhuman situation’ resounds with Buber’s analysis of human-being as 
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essentially intersubjective, with all the possibilities for growth and withdrawal which 
this entails. The potential for camouflage and subterfuge has been created; the 
experience, imaginary or real, of total, unconditional, unlimited love by another person 
becomes a distant dream of the past or an insatiable thirst in the present. The possibility 
of love seems to recede.  
The fulfilment of desire is frustrated by the tensions between what is sought and 
what is possible. Freud turns to the paradigm of the nuclear family and the mythology of 
Oedipus to portray these tensions: ‘the Oedipus fable should probably be understood as 
the poetic treatment of what is typical about such relationships’ (Freud, 2006: 476). He 
refers to ‘the profound and universal validity of the old legends’ and tells us that the fate 
of Oedipus ‘moves us only because it might have been our own’ (Freud, 1997: 156). 
Lear refers to the cathartic effect of this experience:  
It is the essence of Freud’s account of the appeal of great literature that we 
can in some way, dimly, recognize ourselves in it. And yet, it is only because 
the spectator remains aware of the gulf that separates his own life from that 
of the dramatic hero that he can enjoy indulging in imaginative 
identification. It is in this fine balance of sympathy and distance that a 
catharsis can occur (Lear, 1998: 54).  
 
Kennelly makes a similar point with reference to his ‘contemporary versions of three 
Greek tragedies’: ‘There’s an element of healing present pain when one converses with 
the mythic world’ (Kennelly, 2006: 7). The legend enables an acknowledgement, within 
the safe distance of a fictional/literary container, of our hidden desires and fears. This is 
a particular function of creative writing according to Phillips: ‘What distinguishes the 
creative writer is that – like the dreamer and the playing child – he has found a way of 
rendering unacceptable desires into sharable form’ (Phillips, 2001: 7). Referring to the 
imaginative uncovering of forbidden and denied desires, Freud explains the impact of 
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literary portrayals: ‘Like Oedipus, we live in ignorance of the desires that offend 
morality, the desires that nature has forced upon us, and after their unveiling we may 
well prefer to avert our gaze from the scenes of our childhood’ (Freud, 1997: 157).  
Freud corroborates this argument with a reference to Hamlet, and suggests that 
Hamlet’s hesitation in fulfilling his late father’s injunction to avenge his death is due to 
the repressed realisation that the murderer, his uncle, has in fact achieved what he 
himself desired, the death of his father and the possession of his mother. This 
interpretation of the dynamics of childhood and family life subverts the sentimental 
view of innocence and harmony idealized in the romantic tradition. ‘The desires that 
nature has forced upon us’ are complex and ambiguous, but ultimately centre on the 
desire for love, its offering and its reception. Morality, social demands, and the 
intricacies of human relationships can often frustrate and distort this desire. 
 In his critique of morality, and of religion as an aspect of that morality, Freud 
agrees with Nietzsche’s thesis that all moral values are pragmatic in nature and that their 
effect is often the creation of a herd-mentality and the diminishment of individual 
autonomy. Freud urges a rejection of the illusory consolations of religion in favour of a 
more realistic acknowledgement and appreciation of life as it is: ‘Of what use to them is 
the mirage of wide acres in the moon, whose harvest no one has ever seen? As honest 
small-holders on this earth they will know how to cultivate their plot in such a way that 
it supports them’ (Freud, 1995: 717). Freud acknowledges ‘the value and importance of 
religion’, but he argues that ‘it has no right in any way to restrict thought’; herein lies 
the danger of compliance to unquestioned conviction and formulation: ‘The prohibition 
against thought issued by religion to assist in its self-preservation is also far from being 
free from danger either for the individual or for human society’ (Freud, 1995: 789).  
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Freud reveals, in his depiction of human relations, in mythology, literature, and 
case histories, as well as in his discussion of his own dreams and experiences, the 
rivalries, deceptions, envies and jealousies – the love-hate triangles permeating the 
psychic life of the individual – and he sees the resolution of these conflicts through a 
tolerance for ambiguity, in contrast to their denial, as the key to optimum living. His 
reinterpretation of family life acknowledges the competitive nature of the child’s 
environment, and portrays the role of the family as constricting as well as protecting. 
The child gradually realises that desire is limited and thwarted by the unconsciously 
understood values and taboos of his community. Certain wishes and dreams are 
necessarily dismissed and ‘forgotten’, but as Freud explains in his description of this 
‘process of repression, which we must stress is not to be equated with abolition’ (Freud, 
2006a: 215), the unfulfilled wishes are never completely eradicated, but rather are 
buried in the unconscious of the ego from where they continue to exert an influence 
over our lives. Lacan concurs with this interpretation of repression: ‘This is what is 
essential in repression. It’s not that the affect is suppressed, it’s that it is displaced and 
unrecognizable’ (Lacan, 2007: 144). 
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Repression 
If the meaning of our dreams usually remains obscure to us…it is because of 
the circumstances that at night there also arise in us wishes of which we are 
ashamed; these we must conceal from ourselves, and they have consequently 
been repressed, pushed into the unconscious (Freud, 1995: 440). 
 
The ideal of self-acceptance remains a mirage of clichéd agreement unless it translates 
into acknowledgement and ownership of the vast complexity and ambiguity of human 
being. Disavowal, rejection and denial of selected aspects of the self in pursuit of a 
more ideal image, and the alternating affirmation and negation, are accomplished 
through selective amnesia, self-deception, or the projection of what is disowned onto a 
convenient other. Through this phenomenon, part of the self is deemed unacceptable 
and unwelcome; the self is not loved in its full and changing complexity. A corollary to 
this self-rejection is a simultaneous dismissal of the full possibility of the other. 
Incomplete versions of self and other, while seemingly convenient and pleasing, restrict 
the possibility of relationship, including that of love, to experiences which are partial 
and conditional. Thus, Freud’s description of the role of repression in individual and 
communal experience is pivotal to an exploration of the possibilities of love. 
Freud’s discovery that unconscious forces permeate and influence our desires, 
emotions, thoughts and actions, and that often there is an unconscious rejection and 
disavowal of uncomfortable and unacceptable drives and impulses, led to his 
formulation of repression as the activity whereby what is feared and unwelcome is kept 
from consciousness. The reasons for this repression are, in Freud’s analysis, to be found 
in early childhood experiences, when unpalatable realities, portrayed in private thought 
or public behaviour, in oneself or in one’s carers, overwhelmed the subject’s ability to 
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assimilate them. According to Freud, these repressed memories had their roots in sexual 
wishes or fantasies which could not be given expression in the face of adult codes of 
morality and reality. Thus the authentic experience of the child/adult did not fit the 
picture of reality which one was expected to embody, survival depended on acceptance 
of another reality, and these early experiences were denied and split off from 
consciousness. According to Freudian psychoanalysis, maturity entails coming to terms 
with these split-off aspects of the self, a withdrawal of projections, and integration of all 
that one is.  
 Adam Phillips, in his comprehensive study of Freudian thought, sees the 
attempt at unselective self-acceptance as one of the key roles of psychoanalysis:  
‘Psychoanalysis is, among other things, a redescription of the question: what would it be 
to accept ourselves and others’ (Phillips, 2006: xiv). In this sense, self-acceptance 
would entail a recognition and acknowledgement of aspects of humanity which are 
otherwise denied, or at least projected onto some monstrous other;
63
 passion, sexuality, 
aggression, envy and many other components of human nature which are rejected and 
denied in the quest for a superior image of who we are. Kearney points to this deception 
as a threatening obstacle to human relations; ‘The threat to a genuine relation to others 
comes in fetishizing the Other as much as it does in glorifying the Ego’ (Kearney, 2003: 
229). In the absence of acceptance, of self, of others, and of reality, denial and deception 
are inevitable, and the potential for love, of self and of others, is thwarted. 
                                                 
63
 The dangers inherent in this projection of evil, aggression, cruelty and terror, and any human 
characteristics which are deemed uncomfortable or unacceptable, are explored by Richard Kearney in his 
work Strangers, Gods and Monsters; the title is suggestive of the scapegoats which are constructed to 
facilitate this projection. 
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In his realistic appraisal of the individual’s life in society – family, community, 
culture – and the inevitable constraints that such relational living entails, Freud 
acknowledged the necessity of some degree of repression as one progresses from the 
narcissist preoccupation and infantile sense of omniscience of childhood to a more 
mature awareness of one’s place in the interconnectedness of human beings and their 
relation to the world: ‘Just as the planet still circles round its sun, yet at the same time 
rotates on its own axis, so the individual partakes in the development of humanity while 
making his own way through life’ (Freud, 2002: 77). As the child moves through a 
growing awareness of prohibitions and restrictions, expressed through the family and 
the larger community, it gradually develops a super-ego, an internalisation of the rules 
and judgements of the authority figures in its life, and the transition from an ‘objective 
fear to a conscience-based fear’ (Freud, 2003: 57). The critical and moralising function 
of the super-ego develops as external sources of judgement and punishment are 
internalised: ‘As the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego 
submits to the categorical imperative of its super-ego’ (Freud, 1995: 651). The super-
ego uses guilt, fear, and self-reproach as its primary means of enforcing these 
internalized rules; it functions as a voice of conscience, repressing the desires of the id, 
and forcing the ego to inhibit pleasure-seeking impulses in pursuit of morally acceptable 
goals. It sets up an image of ideals to be worked towards, and it acts as judge and censor 
in the inevitable conflict between desire and morality. The unavoidable tension between 
the ego and this prohibiting super-ego can result in profound feelings of melancholy and 
guilt: ‘The Uber-Ich imposes the strictest moral standards on its helpless victim, the Ich; 
indeed it represents the claims of morality as a whole, and we see at a glance that our 
moral feeling of guilt is the expression of the tension between the Ich and the Uber-Ich’ 
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(Freud, 2003: 56).  Depending on the nature of what has been internalised, this super-
ego will be compassionate, understanding and realistic, or punitive, unforgiving and 
idealistic, and most commonly operating on a continuum between the two. The 
characteristics of this internal authority will dictate the degree and the nature of the 
repression, while it will also be decisive in determining the influence of cultural and 
societal values and expectations on the individual. In a healthy developmental 
maturation the super-ego is internalized with awareness and flexibility, it is recreated in 
accordance with one’s own judgements and ongoing experience. In Ricoeurian terms, it 
coincides with re-interpretation and re-narration in an on-going embrace of experience 
and knowledge, and in this scenario it becomes a constructive and instructive force in 
the living of a satisfactory life; it becomes the ego-ideal, which enables the sublimation 
of one’s desires and passions in a way which facilitates a satisfactory compromise 
between individual satisfaction and the demands of civilization. In other cases however, 
the super-ego becomes a tormenting, critical and insatiable voice of condemnation and 
shame resulting in denial and repression. 
The repressive role of the internal super-ego is reflected in the power of ‘the 
cultural super-ego’ (Freud, 2002: 79). The analogy between the superego and the 
superstructure of the state is outlined in Freud’s critique of civilization, Civilization and 
Its Discontents, where he explores the inevitable conflict between the freedom and the 
drives of the individual and the repression and curtailment imposed by civilized society: 
‘it is a conflict, then, between what the drive demands and what reality forbids’ (Freud, 
2006: 64).  According to Gay, in his biography of Freud, ‘Freud found the predicament 
of civilized humanity easy to state: men cannot live without civilization, but they cannot 
live happily within it…at best, sensible human beings may merge a truce between desire 
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and control’ (Gay, 1998: 363). Freud describes civilization as ‘the sum total of those 
achievements and institutions that distinguish our life from that of our animal ancestors 
and serve the dual purpose of protecting human beings against nature and regulating 
their mutual relations’ (Freud, 2002: 27). The protective and regulating authority of 
society places the well-being of the community above the instinctual strivings of the 
individual; therefore, according to Freud, ‘individual liberty is not an asset of 
civilization’ (Freud, 2002: 32). Freud sees that society creates mechanisms to ensure 
social control of human instincts, and that consequently life in society necessarily 
frustrates some of our fundamental desires: ‘In this way civilization overcomes the 
dangerous aggressivity of the individual, by weakening him, disarming him and setting 
up an internal authority to watch over him, like a garrison in a conquered town’ (Freud, 
2002: 61).  While stressing the incompatibility of civilization and human happiness, 
Freud does not deny the necessary protective role of regulation and consensus: 
‘Civilized man has traded in a portion of his chances of happiness for a certain measure 
of security’ (Freud, 2002: 51). Freud argues that adaptation to social and cultural life 
necessitates the control of primitive instincts, especially sexuality and aggression: ‘We 
recognize that it is easy for the barbarian to be healthy, whereas it is a difficult task for 
the civilized human’ (Freud, 2006: 40). Thus, the development of personality is an 
ongoing accommodation of one’s deepest drives to the demands and laws of social 
living. This accommodation exacts a toll: ‘the restrictions imposed on our drives mean 
that a serious psychological burden is laid upon us’ (Freud, 1997: 101). Repression, 
denial, and subjugation characterized Western society in general, according to Freud, 
and the resulting breakdown and disaster were only too evident in the events of the 
twentieth century.  Linking ‘civilized sexual morality and modern nervous illness’, 
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Freud refers to the ‘double standards’ imposed by society: ‘a society that entertains such 
a double standard cannot carry ‘love of truth, honesty, and humanity’ beyond a certain 
narrow limit; it cannot help teaching its members to cloak the truth, to gloss over things, 
and to deceive themselves and others’ (Freud, 2002: 86). His critique of Western society 
was particularly directed against American culture, and its obsession with success and 
money. In a letter to Ernest Jones in 1921, Freud stated that for the Americans 
‘competition is more pungent with them, not succeeding means civil death to every one, 
and they have no private resources apart from their profession, no hobby, games, love, 
or other interests…and success means money’ (Gay, 1998: 383). Thus, in his biography 
of Freud, Gay notes that ‘his earliest comments on Americans had centred on their 
inability – as he saw it – to feel, or express, love’ (Gay, 1998: 386). One wonders if 
these comments are applicable to most Western nations. Indeed, Freud noted, in a letter 
to Wilhelm Fliess in March 1902, that both Europe and America were in thrall to some 
rule; ‘I have learned that the old world is ruled by authority, as the new is ruled by the 
dollar’ (Freud, 1985: 457). This analysis has led some commentators to view Freud’s 
vision as essentially pessimistic. In words which resound with Eliot’s observation, ‘Man 
cannot bear too much reality’, Freud poignantly reflects that ‘life, as we find it, is too 
hard for us; it brings us too many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In order 
to bear it we cannot dispense with palliative measures’ (Freud, 1995: 728). These 
palliatives measures range over dedication to career or some other worthwhile project, 
chemical intoxication, artistic sublimation, and the compensatory promises of religion.  
The pessimistic nature of Freud’s vision of human nature is central to Philip 
Rieff’s understanding of Freudianism. On a note of resigned disillusionment, he states 
that ‘psychoanalysis is yet another method of learning how to endure the loneliness 
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produced by culture’ and he refers to ‘the normality of disillusion and a controlling 
sense of resignation, which was the most for which Freud had hoped’ (Rieff, 1979: 43). 
He credits Freud with ripping away the facades of conventional notions of self-
understanding, freedom and honesty. He discerns in Freudian anthropology the idea of 
psychological man as essentially a contradiction, a creature of not finally satiable 
instincts, impulses, and desires, in endless tensions with himself or herself and society; 
he is tragically doomed: 
Freud maintains a sober vision of man in the middle, a go-between, aware of 
the fact the he had little strength of his own, forever mediating between 
culture and instinct in an effort to gain some room to manoeuvre between 
these two hostile forces. Maturity, according to Freud, lay in the capacity to 
keep the negotiations from breaking down (Rieff, 1966: 31). 
  
Certainly, Freud’s analysis is that human life is inevitably conflict-ridden, but in 
accepting this reality Freud enables us to deal with it; as Lear states, ‘For Freud 
discovered in the heart of these battles at least the potential for human growth’ (Lear, 
1998: 27). Nussbaum concurs with this ambiguity as it applies to love: ‘We deceive 
ourselves about love – about who, and how, and when, and whether. We also discover 
and correct our self-deceptions’ (Nussbaum, 1992: 261). By acknowledging the reality 
of conflict in human nature Freud enables the possibility of its accommodation and 
resolution. 
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The Art of Living Based on Love 
Our inborn instincts and the world around us being what they are, I could not 
but regard that love is no less essential for the survival of the human race 
than such things as technology (Freud, qtd. in Erikson, 1998: 20). 
 
 
In the practical situation of clinical work, Freud attempted to free his patients from the 
tyranny of repression, guilt and anxiety. However, the development of his thought led 
Freud to believe that as well as attempting to ease the pain of those who were mentally 
distressed, ‘psychoanalysis was also the starting-point of a new and deeper science of 
the mind which would be equally indispensable for the understanding of the normal’ 
(Freud, 1997: 30). The techniques of psychoanalysis were developed with the aim of 
bringing to consciousness that which had been repressed; these techniques were, the 
interpretation of dreams – the uncovering of their latent meaning as distinct from the 
distortions and displacements of their manifest expression, the rule of ‘free association’ 
– the demand for uncensored expression of one’s innermost thoughts, ‘a withdrawal of 
the watchers from the gates of the intellect’ (Freud, 1997: 17), and the provision of a 
non-judgemental, understanding and ‘neutral’ listener – the unprejudiced attention to 
the concerns of the individual. Buber also situates the domain of sleep, and the 
reduction of inhibiting forces in the experience of dreams therein, as a possible source 
of connection with ‘the undivided primal world that precedes form’; entry into the 
world, ‘into personal life’, entails a separation from this ‘cosmic connexion, with its true 
Thou’, and in sleep/dream there is a ‘slipping free in the dark hours to be close to her 
again; night by night this happens to the healthy man’ (Buber, 2004a: 26). Ricoeur 
concludes that ‘Indeed, dreams supply Freud with his ultimate proof of the unconscious’ 
(Ricoeur, 1970: 119). Through these techniques, according to Freudian psychoanalysis, 
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repressed wishes are revealed, traumatic events are recalled, and the lingering influence 
of past experiences is acknowledged. Nietzsche’s plea for understanding is answered: 
‘Listen to the dream which I dreamed, friends, and help me to read its meaning’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 156). Ricoeur echoes this sentiment: ‘narrating, like saying, calls for 
an ear, a power to hear, a reception’ (Ricoeur, 2005: 253).  
At the core of much of the neuroses which presented themselves in the 
consulting rooms, Freud identified love, its distortions, its loss, its necessity, and the 
obstacles to its experience, as a central factor, leading him to contemplate ‘this 
recognition of love as one of the foundations of civilization’ (Freud, 1995: 743). The 
universal need for love is often not gratified, and Freud suggests that the psychoanalyst 
attempts to replicate what has been neglected and lacking; 
the doctor, in his educative work, makes use of one of the components of 
love…side by side with the exigencies of life, love is the great educator; and 
it is by the love of those nearest him that the incomplete human being is 
induced to respect the decrees of necessity and to spare himself the 
punishment that follows any infringement of them (Freud, 1995: 591). 
 
The desire for happiness epitomised in the recollected infantile pleasures of being loved, 
cared for, attended to and responded to, and the unhappiness experienced when these 
desires are denied and unspoken, form the basis of the analytic encounter. In this 
practical application of Freud’s theories self-knowledge is facilitated by the encounter 
with another. The relationship between self and other, between analyst and analysand, 
enables an enlargement of consciousness, as conflicts and neuroses are interpreted and 
experienced with greater awareness. As Freud stated in a letter to Jung in December 
1906, ‘Essentially, one might say, the cure is effected by love’ (Freud, 1974: 10). Julia 
Kristeva concurs with this understanding as she asks: ‘For what is psychoanalysis if not 
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an infinite quest for rebirths through the experience of love?’ (Kristeva, 1987: 2). The 
absence of love and the obstacles to its experience result in alienation from reality, 
‘neurotics turn away from reality because they find it unbearable – either the whole or 
parts of it’ (Freud, 1995: 301). The need to love and to be loved is portrayed in the 
psychoanalytic setting by the development of ‘transference love’, whereby the 
analysand transfers feelings and wishes onto the analyst which actually belong to an 
earlier experience and an earlier relationship. As Ricoeur states, ‘the therapeutic relation 
acts as a mirror image in reviving a whole series of situations all of which were already 
intersubjective’ (Ricoeur, 1970: 474).  In this transference relationship, what is 
‘forgotten’ is acted out in a repetition of earlier relationships and responses; ‘the 
compulsion to repeat…takes the place of the impulse to remember’ (Freud, 2006: 395). 
The links between memory, forgetfulness and dreams, and the phenomenon of 
transference, is suggested by Nietzsche: ‘What we do in dreams we also do when we are 
awake; we invent and fabricate the person with whom we associate – and immediately 
forget that we have done so’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 101). 
With these techniques of psychoanalysis, Freud ascertains that most adult 
neuroses or mental suffering originate in childhood experiences, but he also claims that 
transference is a universal phenomenon in human experience. In exploring these 
childhood experiences which resulted in ‘the tangled roots of adult love’ (Gay, 1998: 
291), Freud developed a theory of sexuality which stated that most problems in living 
have their source in sexual or ‘erotic’ experiences. This theory of infantile sexuality was 
greeted with horror and disgust in Freud’s time, and today is still shunned by many. It is 
argued by some commentators, such as Lear, that Freud’s concept of sexuality was 
broader than its more common connotations, and is closer to our idea of ‘sensuality’, 
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sensual life in all its forms (Lear, 2005: 55). Freud elaborates on his theory in one of his 
later essays: ‘the sexual impulses are regarded as including all of those merely 
affectionate and friendly impulses to which usage applies the exceedingly ambiguous 
word ‘love’’ (Freud, 1995: 23). Indeed, Freud describes ‘two currents whose union is 
necessary to ensure a completely normal attitude in love…as the affectionate and the 
sensual current. The affectionate is the older of the two’ (Freud, 1995: 395). According 
to Freud’s theory, the present predicament of the individual is seen to be determined by 
the experiences, traumatic or otherwise, of the past; the symptoms of illness are 
interpreted as the translation of repressed material; and the restoration of psychic 
harmony and equilibrium is attained through the integration of conflicted and disowned 
aspects of the self. However, Freud frequently reminds us that the difficulties, in living 
and in loving, which are observed in the neurotic, are prevalent universally; ‘we have 
since found good reason to suppose that our patients tell us nothing that we might not 
also hear from healthy people’ (Freud, 1995: 439), and he postulates that transference 
‘is the essential character of every state of being in love’ (Freud, 1995: 385).  It is the 
rejection of reality, one’s own and that of others, that poses the obstacle to love and 
happiness, and thus Freud insists that it is only in embracing the conflicting, ambiguous 
nature of life in its ugliness and beauty, its pain and joy, that one can be free to live and 
love; ‘psychoanalytic treatment is founded on truthfulness’ (Freud, 1995: 382). 
 Lacan refers to this quest for truth as central to Freud’s work: ‘Freud was taken 
up in the quest for a truth which engaged him totally, including there in his own self’, 
and he interprets the scientific domain of this endeavour: ‘Freud progressed on a course 
of research which is not characterized by the same style as other scientific research. Its 
domain is that of the truth of the subject. The quest for truth is not entirely reducible to 
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the objective, and objectifying, quest of ordinary scientific methods. What is at stake is 
the realization of the truth of the subject’ (Lacan, 1991: 20, 21). Phillips asserts that 
psychoanalysis strives to overcome the projection, idealization, and fantasy whereby we 
hide from the reality of ourselves: ‘Psychoanalysis asks us to reconsider the 
unacceptable, in ourselves and in others, in our personal and cultural histories, in our 
desires and thoughts and feelings and beliefs’ (Phillips, 2006: xv). The difficulties at the 
heart of love are not proof of its impossibility, but rather the denial of its complexities 
and ambiguities pose obstacles which are insurmountable while they remained denied; 
‘we are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love, never so helplessly 
unhappy as when we have lost our loved object or its love. But this does not dispose of 
the technique of living based on the value of love as a means to happiness’ (Freud, 
1995: 733). Freud lists this technique as one of ‘the methods that human beings employ 
in trying to gain happiness’, and the following outline suggests his admiration for an ‘art 
of living’ based on love: 
this particular technique in the art of living…does not turn away from the 
external world: on the contrary, it clings to the things of this world and 
obtains happiness through an emotional attachment to them. Nor is it content 
with the avoidance of unpleasurable experience, a goal that derives, as it 
were, from tired resignation; indeed, it bypasses this goal, pays no attention 
to it, and adheres to the original, passionate striving for the positive 
achievement of happiness. Perhaps it gets closer to this goal than any other 
method. I am referring of course to the way of life that places love at the 
centre of everything and expects all satisfaction to come from loving and 
being loved’ (Freud, 2002: 19). 
 
The insights of Freud into the workings of the human mind demand a 
renunciation of unrealistic portrayals of human nature, an acceptance of vulnerability 
and fallibility, and a rejection of mirages of omniscience and invincibility; they propose 
a realistic awareness and acceptance of one’s limitations in order to grapple with the 
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vicissitudes of life as it is, and they urge a confrontation with the obstacles to love and 
happiness as the only route to overcoming them. These insights and their consequent 
demand for a comprehensive acknowledgement of the ambiguous and conflictual nature 
of the human subject, resound with much of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Freud’s writings, 
academic and personal, assert that the concepts of ‘human’ and ‘perfection’ are 
incompatible. For him this is an inescapable truth of the human condition. However, the 
imperfectability of the human being, echoed in Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human, 
and Ricoeur’s Fallible Man, is not an insurmountable obstacle to love and happiness, 
but rather an integral and often enriching component of their experience. Echoing 
Ricoeur’s description of ‘the good life’, Bettelheim outlines Freud’s comprehensive 
vision of a meaningful life where loving relationships are enabled through an 
acknowledgement of all aspects of human nature:  
The good life, in Freud’s view, is one that is full of meaning through the 
lasting, sustaining, mutually gratifying relations we are able to establish with 
those we love, and the satisfaction we derive from knowing that we are 
engaged in work that helps us and others to have a better life. A good life 
denies neither its real and often painful difficulties nor the dark aspects of 
our psyche (Bettelheim, 1984: 108). 
 
Freud’s thought explores and permeates areas of human being previously 
uncharted; his insights into human nature are the culmination of his self-observation as 
well as his clinical work, his attempts to understand the motivations, needs and 
potentialities of the human subject, and his ongoing openness to revision and re-
interpretation. Freud was passionate about the subject of his life’s work, and this 
passion accommodated the possibility of correction: ‘a person in love is humble’ 
(Freud, 1995: 560). His view of the human condition dispels with untenable 
glorifications and super-human depictions; but in embracing the reality of the human 
subject as imperfect, ambivalent, and not fully knowable to self or to others, Freud 
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remains convinced of the power of love to answer many human needs, and to enhance 
the experience of human living: ‘but he would have us remember most of all / to be 
enthusiastic over the night, / not only for the sense of wonder / it alone has to offer, but 
also / because it needs our love’ (Auden, 1994: 276). 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
Jacques Lacan 
he theories of psychoanalysis developed by Freud have been and continue 
to be interpreted and reinterpreted in diverse and often controversial ways 
by different personalities, different disciplines, and different cultures. 
Interpretation and commentary on Freud’s ideas range over the spectrum of rejection 
and ridicule, selective adoption and acquiescence, revision and re-reading. As Lacan’s 
biographer, Elisabeth Roudinesco explains, ‘psychoanalysis might well bring healing to 
every kind of society and the discovery of the unconscious might indeed have universal 
relevance; but that didn’t stop every country interpreting Freud in its own particular 
way’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 16). The French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, undertook to 
‘return to Freud’ with the professed intention of pursuing a meticulous re-reading of 
Freudian texts, an exposition of what he considered the misreading and 
misunderstanding of psychoanalysis, and a determination to remain loyal to ‘the letter’ 
of Freud’s thought: ‘We…are trying to articulate Freud’s thought and experience so as 
to give them their due weight and importance’ (Lacan, 1997: 181). Lacan sought to re-
situate psychoanalysis in a strict and comprehensive adherence to Freud’s work, and to 
shun any deviation from the text. According to Slavoj Žižek’s stated defence of Lacan, 
this has been admirably achieved: ‘Seen through the eyes of Lacan…Freud’s key 
insights finally emerge in their true dimension’ (Žižek, 2006: 2). Richard Boothby refers 
to Lacan as ‘arguably the most theoretically ambitious and sophisticated of all Freud’s 
interpreters’, and claims that ‘through Lacan’s rereading, Freud emerges as a 
philosophical thinker of the first order, whose contribution is to be ranked with that of 
T 
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Heidegger or Hegel’ (Boothby, 2001: 9).64  
Over the course of a long career, Lacan produced ideas which had their source in 
Freudian texts, but which were also formulated in the light of his own reading of 
philosophy and linguistics, and which inevitably bore the hallmark of his own response. 
Lacan credits Freud with developing the most revolutionary insights into the human 
mind. He examines in detail the particular textual expressions of Freudian concepts, and 
by relating them to philosophical developments as diverse as Plato and Hegel, Aristotle 
and Kant, St. Augustine and Nietzsche, he provides a unique interpretation of 
psychoanalysis.
65
 
Anyone capable of  glimpsing the changes we have lived through in our own 
lives can see that Freudianism, however misunderstood it has been and 
however nebulous its consequences have been, constitutes an intangible but 
radical revolution…everything…has been affected by it (Lacan, 2006: 165). 
 
Lacan’s thesis is that Freud’s discoveries are revolutionary and that their significance 
applies universally: ‘The meaning of what Freud said may be conveyed to anyone 
because, while addressed to everyone, it concerns each person…Freud’s discovery calls 
truth into question, and there is no one who is not personally concerned by truth’ 
(Lacan, 2006: 111). The questioning of ‘truth’ is also central to Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
and concepts such as universalism and relativism are henceforth central to ongoing 
description and debate pertaining to this issue. Postmodern thought, in particular 
                                                 
64
. Ricoeur, as another French interpreter of Freud, offers his own philosophical understanding of the 
work. 
65Lacan’s work incorporates various critiques of philosophy and philosophical endeavours; however, 
when confronted with the accusation that he is ‘attacking philosophy’, his response is: ‘That’s greatly 
exaggerated’ (Lacan, 2007: 146). 
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Derrida’s deconstruction, simultaneously mourns the apparent demise of absolute ‘truth’ 
and celebrates the diverse possibilities which ensue from this ‘loss’. Lacan argues that 
the meaning of Freud’s thought has not been fully embraced or understood, ‘Freud 
didn’t finish at a stroke the trail he blazed for us’ (Lacan, 1997:  88), and he assigns to 
himself the task of continuing this ‘trail’. 
 Lacan’s writing style is notoriously difficult to read and to understand; this is 
seen by some commentators as illustrative of Lacan’s objective in postulating the 
difficulties inherent in all understanding,
66
 while for others it is symptomatic of 
unnecessary obscurity and feigned profundity.
67
 The argument centres on whether the 
basic truth, the essential message of any writer, is best expressed in simple language, or 
whether simplicity and directness permit an ‘easy’ understanding which misreads the 
message. Lacan, referring to his use of terminology, points out that ‘the things I say are 
calculated to emphasize a certain mirage’ (Lacan, 1997:  253). Apart from the potential 
difficulties involved in striving for a ‘perfect translation’ of any work,68 and the added 
difficulty of translating an oral deliverance of ideas,
69
 Lacan’s work is strewn with 
philosophical, scientific, and linguistic references which he uses to foreground his own 
arguments. An added impediment results from the relatively recent chronological 
situation of his work, and the correlative issues of ownership and copyright, whereby 
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 See Charles Sheperdson’s essay “Lacan and Philosophy”, in The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, and 
the many commentaries of  J.A. Miller. 
67
 This is the contention of writers such as  N. Chomsky and R. Webster. 
68
 See chapter three for reference to Ricoeur’s reflections on ‘the perfect translation’. 
69
 Lacan’s preferred mode of communicating his ideas was the spoken word, lectures, seminars and  radio 
and television interviews, rather than the written form of standard publication. 
Chapter Five: Jacques Lacan 
 161 
much of his ideas, insights, and revisions await publication, translation, and general 
circulation. Much of the difficulty and obscurity experienced in approaching his work 
lies in Lacan’s preference for the exactness and clarity of mathematical science, and the 
resulting graphs, schema, and algorithms through which he  delivers his thought.  This 
thesis explores a reading of selected Lacanian texts with an acknowledgement of the 
potential involved in opening up a new way of thinking which appears to be at variance 
with accepted and familiar experiences of reading, writing, and expression. The material 
selected is limited to that which most obviously relates to the thesis question and 
concentrates on aspects of his work which are deemed relevant to Lacan’s thoughts on 
the possibility of love. 
In his exploration of various aspects of the human condition and particularly the 
concept of subjectivity, Lacan questions and analyses the way the human subject is 
structured by language, as he designates this structuring as central to human existence. 
The significance of language to an understanding of subjectivity is central to the 
philosophy of hermeneutics, and is the focus of thinkers such as Ricoeur and Gadamer. 
This description of the subject’s experience focuses on the meaning of subjectivity, the 
experiential stages determined in the development of the human subject, and the 
ambiguities and conflicts inherent in the living of a human life. According to Chiesa’s 
interpretation, ‘Lacan outlines a revolutionary theory of the subject and, despite his 
relentless attacks against philosophy, repeatedly invites it to collaborate with 
psychoanalysis in order to build on his groundbreaking investigations’ (Chiesa, 2007: 
5). One Lacanian translator and interpreter, Juliet Mitchell, thus summarises Lacan’s 
objective: ‘Lacan dedicated himself to reorienting psychoanalysis to its task of 
deciphering the ways in which the human subject is constructed’ (Mitchell, 1982: 5).  
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Lacan’s work is essentially an exploration of the following questions: what is a human 
being? what does it mean to be human? what does a human being need? how is a human 
being to live? and especially, what does a human being desire? Such questions have 
exercised the minds of philosophers from Plato and Aristotle, to Derrida and Kristeva, 
and have also inspired the world of literature, especially in its poetic offering. Integral to 
these questions is the concept of love. The central importance of this concept for 
Lacanian thought can be verified by Lacan’s statement that the question of love has 
always been pivotal to his work: ‘I’ve been doing nothing but that since I was twenty, 
exploring the philosophers on the subject of love’ (Lacan, 1999: 75). According to 
Lacan, psychoanalytic theory, as evidenced in Freudian texts, inevitably impinges on 
our understanding of love, and firmly positions this understanding within an ethical 
framework: ‘Analysis has brought a very important change of perspective on love by 
placing it at the centre of ethical experience’ (Lacan, 1997: 8). Nussbaum’s work on 
Hellenistic ethics may suggest that this is not altogether a ‘change of perspective’ as she 
explores Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic philosophers and the literature of poetic 
tragedy in a search for ‘a practical and compassionate philosophy’, (Nussbaum, 1994: 
3); her reading in these realms deals with human life in its complexity and ambivalence, 
and particularly with the place of love in ethical behaviour, and she suggests that this 
topic was central to the philosophy and literature of ancient Greece, and therefore was 
not an innovation of psychoanalysis.
70
 According to Alain Badiou, in his essay “Lacan 
and the Pre-Socratics”, two major themes of Lacan’s thought are ‘the primacy of 
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 I refer here to Nussbaum’s works, The Therapy of Desire, The Fragility of Goodness, and Love’s 
Knowledge. 
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discourse and the function of love in the truth-process’, and he reminds us that for 
Lacan ‘love…is what brings being face to face with itself’ (Badiou, 2006: 8,10). The 
possibility of love, in sexual and non-sexual forms, is therefore questioned throughout 
Lacan’s work, and in suggesting that it is often apparently impossible, he engages with 
the obstacles to its experience. 
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The Paradox of Language 
In everything that approaches it, language merely manifests its inadequacy 
(Lacan, 1999: 45). 
 
The centrality of language to human being pervades the disciplines of philosophy and 
psychoanalysis, and is creatively manifested in the experience of the poetic word. The 
human condition, in its manifold and ambivalent components, is explored, analyzed and 
defined through the medium of language. This applies consequently to the human 
experience of love. However, love is essentially a subjective experience, and while 
language is the vehicle of its communication and its description, the intrinsic limitations 
and constraints of the written or spoken word, particularly its inability to articulate fully 
the private, inner landscape of thought, emotion, desire and motivation, impact on the 
quality and range of intersubjectivity, and consequently on the possibility of love as a 
significant propellant of human relationship. 
Lacan’s formulation of his philosophy was informed by the radical 
developments in linguistics and anthropology, particularly evident in the works of 
Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Levi-Strauss. The influence of these writers extended 
to psychoanalysis, which at that time was embroiled in controversy and questioning 
regarding the Freudian legacy and its legitimacy. As an avid reader and 
conversationalist across many disciplines, Lacan was aware of the potential insights of 
Saussure and Levi-Strauss as applied to psychoanalysis, and the development of his 
thought reflected this influence. Lacan’s philosophy explores perennial questions 
pertaining to our understanding of concepts such as the subject, identity, recognition, 
desire, the good, and happiness. In tacit agreement with the philosophies of Buber and 
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Ricoeur, and in adherence to the analysis of human nature proffered by Nietzsche and 
Freud, Lacan emphasises the inter-subjective constitution of human desire and 
motivation, stating that desire is always desire for the other (Lacan, 2004: 300). 
However, in contrast to Buber’s contention that authentic relationship involves a 
perception of the other as a Thou rather than an object, and Ricoeur’s proposition of 
relationship as seeing oneself as another, Lacan’s view of human relationships places 
the subject as always at a distance from the object, the other. It is in this complex 
interrelationship between subject and object, self and other, that Lacan situates his 
anthropology of the subject. He reformulates and expands on the dialogical and 
linguistic exigencies of human nature which are central to the above-mentioned 
philosophies, and in rendering the subject as essentially a speaking being, a parle-étre, 
he outlines the potential obstacles to love, knowledge, truth and happiness which 
originate in the alienation of the subject from the real, from desire, from the self; an 
alienation that is congruent with the individual’s inescapable dependence on the 
distancing effect of language: ‘And the subject, while he may appear to be the slave of 
language, is still more the slave of a discourse in the universal movement of which his 
place is already inscribed at his birth, if only in the form of his proper name’ (Lacan, 
2006: 140). Thus, Lacan raises questions regarding the conception of the subject, the 
approach of the other, and the possibility or impossibility of a relationship between the 
two. He suggests that all of our understanding is susceptible to the illusions, mirages, 
and distortions which are often implied by the unquestioned supremacy which is 
allocated to the signifiers that define our experience – words which name and translate 
both our inner and outer perceptions. The power of signifiers to label our experience 
and define our actions entails a threat to individual interpretation of one’s personal 
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reality, and an attraction to the safety of conformity and adaptation, regardless of 
whether the object of adaptation is beneficial or destructive, life-enhancing or 
dysfunctional. 
 The paradox of language, in Lacan’s exposition, emerges from the conflict 
between the subject’s dependence on the apparatus of language as the only recourse 
available for expression, discourse, and relationship, ‘the world of interhuman relations, 
the world of language’ (Lacan, 1997: 121), and the failure of language to say it all: ‘The 
whole truth is what cannot be told. It is what can only be told on the condition that one 
doesn’t push it to the edge, that one only half-tells (mi-dire) it’ (Lacan, 2006: 92). As 
Nietzsche states, ‘not everything may be spoken in the presence of day’ (Nietzsche, 
2003a: 187). Lacan repeatedly returns to his argument that the truth can only be half-
said: ‘half-saying is the internal law of any kind of enunciation of the truth’ (Lacan, 
1997: 126), but he nevertheless considers the attempt essential and worthwhile. Auden 
echoes the paradox: ‘At lucky moments we seem on the brink / Of really saying what 
we think we think: / But, even then, an honest eye should wink’ (Auden, 1994: 695). 
Another poetic expression of this paradox is given by Philip Larkin, in his poignant 
portrayal of the commonly experienced conflict between honesty and kindness, the 
intensity of which appears to expand according to the degree of intimacy being 
experienced, and which is therefore relevant to the possibility of love: ‘Nothing shows 
why / At this unique distance from isolation / It becomes still more difficult to find / 
Words at once true and kind / Or not untrue and not unkind’ (Larkin, 1988: 129). The 
paradox of language, as both a means and an obstacle to communication, inevitably 
impacts on the communication, the experience, and the possibility of love, as it is 
constitutive of love that it is somehow communicable.  However, attention may be 
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directed to the somehow. Lacan’s emphasis on the failure of language to fully express 
the real, suggests that love cannot be communicated solely through words, but this is 
not an insurmountable obstacle: acknowledgement of the limitation of language opens 
the way for an understanding of what cannot be verbalized, and leaves a space for the 
potential significance of silence and action to be expressed and heard: ‘Truth hollows 
out its way into the real thanks to the dimension of speech. There is neither true nor 
false prior to speech’ (Lacan, 1991: 228). Lacan insists that ‘speech is in its essence 
ambiguous’ Lacan, 1991: 228), and it is sometimes within these ambiguous realms, 
which often resist symbolization and systematic analysis, that love finds its expression 
and its communication. 
Lacan formulates the mirror stage as the developmental moment in the subject’s 
life when recognition of itself is assumed. The reflection in the mirror, in the gaze of the 
other, is taken as representing the identity of the subject.  Roudinesco describes it thus: 
‘The mirror stage… [is] a psychic or ontological operation through which a human 
being is made by means of identification with his fellow-beings’ (Roudinesco, 2003: 
29). The child is captivated by its own image and misrecognizes this ‘image’ as its 
‘self’. Entry into what Lacan terms the imaginary realm is accomplished.  Henceforth, 
the child is aware of a rupture, a separation, between itself and the other; the pre-mirror 
stage of complete mergence with the source of need satisfaction is fractured, and thus a 
gap, a lack, is created. This lack is the birth of desire, the desire to return to the state of 
unspoken and unconscious equilibrium where there is no demand because every need is 
capable of satisfaction. Now the lack necessitates the communication of need and 
demand, and hence the development of the subject within language. Perhaps 
anticipating Lacan’s reflections on the limits of language, Nietzsche asks, ‘are words 
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and music not rainbows and seeming bridges between things eternally separate?’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 234). The child’s entry into language is an entry into the symbolic 
mode of identification and representation which precedes the subject; ‘language, with its 
structures, exists prior to each subject’s entry into it at a certain moment in his mental 
development’ (Lacan, 2006: 139). From this moment in development, this entanglement 
of individual and collective meaning, there are two forces which distance the subject 
from the real; the imaginary realm wherein one’s identity, one’s sense of self and one’s 
sense of the world, is constructed through the image, the reflection, the recognition, of 
the other: ‘The transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an 
image’ (Lacan, 2006: 4), and the symbolic realm wherein one abides by the laws, the 
structures, and the incompleteness of language in order to attain and maintain one’s 
identity as a human subject in the world: ‘Because the law of man has been the law of 
language since the first words of recognition presided over the first gifts’ (Lacan, 2006: 
61).  The irrevocable link between self and other, between the individual and the social 
world, establishes the potential dilemma between contradictory desires of autonomy and 
relationship, identity and recognition, solitude and connection. 
The paradox of language is its effect in distancing the subject from the real, the 
impossible to say, while simultaneously providing the only pathway to the reality of 
one’s experience, of oneself and of others: ‘The function of the mirror stage thus turns 
out, in my view, to be a particular case of the function of imagos, which is to establish a 
relationship between an organism and its reality’ (Lacan, 2006: 6). Lacan’s reference to 
‘The function of imagos’ resounds with concepts such as ‘the false self’,’ persona’, and 
‘the mask’ as signifiers of the public image of the subject which is variously close to or 
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distant from the inner, private self.
71
 The necessity of establishing a relationship 
between the organism and its reality is central to Freud’s analysis of the conflict 
between individual happiness and collective security, outlined in his essay Civilization 
and its Discontents, and this title is echoed by Lacan when he refers to ‘the malaise of 
civilization’ (Lacan, 2006: 29). According to Roudinesco, there is a continuity in 
Lacan’s ideas in that he is always ‘concerned with the relationship between the 
individual and society’, and she points to his confrontation with the political reality of 
his day as an impetus to this concern: ‘he needed to find out how fascism managed to 
harness human aspiration in the service of evil’72 (Roudinesco, 1997: 171). Lacan’s 
study of the subject in tension with the socio-cultural environment, the essence of the 
social bond, and the ensuing relationship between autonomy and constraint, leads him to 
the conclusion that repression is inevitable. ‘From the moment he begins to speak, from 
that exact moment onward and not before, I can understand that there is such a thing as 
repression’ (Lacan, 2006: 56). Repression is necessitated by an awareness that one’s 
position, as relative to the law, the law of others and their signifiers, implies a splitting 
off and a denial of that which is deemed unacceptable to that law. Boothby asserts that 
‘Lacan’s notion of alienation is absolutely fundamental to his thought’, and he relates 
this to the mirror stage: ‘The imaginary identification of the mirror stage is formative 
and enabling but also deeply alienating. Paradoxically, the subject is estranged from 
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 This conflict between inner and outer realities, between the mask and the real, is creatively explored by 
W.B. Yeats, in his poetry, drama, and prose. 
72
 The attempt to approach some understanding of evil, especially as manifested so blatantly and so 
shockingly in events of their lifetime, is evident in the works of many writers of this period, and inspired 
the title of one of Ricoeur’s works, The Symbolism of Evil. 
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itself in the very moment in which it achieves a measure of self-representation’ 
(Boothby, 2001: 141). The phenomenon of repression as the ‘forgetting’ of the truth is 
highlighted by Lacan as he links, through their echoing sound, the words Lethe, the 
river of forgetfulness, and aletheia, the Greek word for truth: ‘In every entry of being 
into its habitation in words, there’s a margin of forgetting, a lethe complementary to 
every aletheia’ (Lacan, 1991: 192).  
The alienation resulting from the child’s entry into language, into the world 
signified by others, situates the search for identity, the quest for an answer to the 
question, ‘who am I?’, in the response and reflection of the other. Deborah Luepnitz 
points to this self-estrangement in her feminist perspective on Lacan’s notion of 
identity: 
Having recognized ourselves in the mirror, we are bound to go through life 
looking outward for evidence of who we are…identity, for Lacan, is 
necessarily an alienated state, something crucial for functioning in the world, 
but also radically unstable…because in answer to the question ‘who am I? 
there is no truth that can be given by an agency outside the subject 
(Luepnitz, 2003: 225). 
 
These sentiments resound with Ricoeur’s explorations of the concepts of recognition 
and identity. Lacan argues that the images we have of ourselves are always filtered 
through language, through the signifiers of others, as experienced through family, 
community and culture. Alienation from the real, from the true, entails a repression or a 
displacement of one’s constitutive drives, and hence an incommensurability of the 
reality of oneself and that of others. In his clinical work, Lacan, like Freud before him, 
witnessed the suffering and confusion resulting from this alienation, and he stressed 
repeatedly that the aim of psychoanalysis was not the adaptation of the individual to a 
system of perceived normality; ‘There’s absolutely no reason why we should make 
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ourselves the guarantors of the bourgeois dream. A little more rigor and firmness are 
required in our confrontation with the human condition’ (Lacan, 1997: 303).  The 
absence of this confrontation results in ‘empty chatter about maturity, love, joy, peace’ 
according to Laing’s exploration of the dichotomy between sanity and madness: ‘What 
we call “normal” is a product of repression, denial, splitting, projection, introjection and 
other forms of destructive action on experience. It is radically estranged from the 
structure of being’ (Laing, 1967: 27). Chiesa claims that his book on Lacan 
‘acknowledges that Lacan progressively questions the very existence of a “normal” 
subject. The borderline between “normality” and “abnormality” is gradually blurred’ 
(Chiesa, 2007: 7). The failure to confront the reality of the human condition results in a 
diminishment of love, of self and of others, because what is in question is merely a 
mask, a disguise, a fiction: ‘Distance creates mirages’ (Lacan, 1997: 316). Mark Patrick 
Hederman, in his brief essay on love, Manikon Eros, opposes this argument, and 
describes it as ‘the depressing suggestion of Lacan…that we never have access to others 
as they are’ (Hederman, 2000: 26). He refers to Lacan’s famous statement regarding the 
impossibility of a sexual relationship: 
even though we can be enthralled by sexual desire, there is no such thing as 
a sexual relationship because our libidinal mechanisms are not involved with 
another person as such. So, as lovers we are like ships passing each other in 
the night…we are submerged in a solipsistic psychic miasma, and the 
periscope, which is just about able to pierce through, has distorted and 
restricted vision (Hederman, 2000: 26). 
 
Hederman accordingly interprets Lacan’s analysis of subjectivity as the confinement of 
a private world which can never grasp or gain access to the real of the other.  
The quest for recognition through the reflection and the signifier of the other 
resounds with Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, but Lacan is sceptical of the possibility of 
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a resolution to this dialectic, suggesting that lived experience rarely remains fixated 
within this binary opposition but vacillates between the two, and often combines 
elements of both master and slave. In Lacan’s constitution of the subject, whereby there 
is a demand for recognition from the other, as he says, ‘man’s…first objective is to be 
recognized by the other’ (Lacan, 2006: 58), there seems little place for Buber’s ideal of 
emphatic understanding and mediation integral to the ‘I-Thou’ relationship: Lacan 
asserts that ‘Between two, whatever they may be, there is always the One and the Other’ 
(Lacan, 1999: 49). Lacan, therefore, rejects the popular notion of the unifying power of 
love, sexual or otherwise, to merge two into one. This craving to merge with the other is 
a human experience explored from the philosophy of Plato to the present day. Fromm 
states categorically that ‘the deepest need of man…is the need to overcome his 
separateness, to leave the prison of his aloneness’ (Fromm, 1995: 8).73 Similarly, in the 
light of Lacan’s reference to the artifice of language, ‘language always involves artifice 
relative to anything intuitive, material or lived’ (Lacan, 1997: 136), its capacity to hide 
as much as it reveals, Ricoeur’s thesis of narrative identity appears to be susceptible to 
the distorting and limiting constraints of the law of language. Chiesa refers to this 
problem as ‘the mistaken equation between intentionality and consciousness’, and 
explains that ‘the subject is alienated in language because he never manages to say 
exactly what he really wants to say…words do not suffice to convey the subject’s desire 
appropriately, and consequently fail to satisfy it’ (Chiesa, 2007: 38). This analysis  
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 Philip Roth, in his most recent novel, Exit Ghost, offers an interesting and contemporary depiction of 
the urge to escape solitude and aloneness; he suggests that the preponderance of cell phones is an example 
of this craving, and he suggests that ‘to eradicate the experience of separation must inevitably have a 
dramatic effect’ (Roth, 2007: 64). 
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appears to be close to Nietzsche’s depiction of herd-mentality, where the desire for love, 
for acceptance, for recognition, results in a variable level of conformity to the symbolic 
law and a resentful acquiescence to the social imposition of distortion and repression. 
The loss of the real, integral to the subject’s entry into the symbolic domain of 
language, results in a gap, a lack, which henceforth separates the subject from his/her 
desire. 
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The Mystery of the Unconscious 
In fact, to a certain degree, at a certain level, fantasms cannot bear the 
revelation of speech (Lacan, 1997: 80). 
 
Human desire and motivation is often ambiguous, conflicting, and transient, and in the 
light of Nietzschean and Freudian insights, is sometimes expressed in distorted and 
concealing modes. The desire and motivation of love, the urge, decision, and need to 
love and to be loved, is susceptible to these exigencies, and may be thwarted by the 
voluntary or involuntary denial and deception which commonly accompanies the 
translation of human desire and need into socially acceptable mediums of language and 
behaviour. Hence, the possibility of love is diminished to a variety of disguises and 
pretences, as the subject strives to attain a compromise between authentic being and 
interpersonal and social expectations. 
However, there is another dimension to the subject which is not limited and 
defined by an external imposition - the law of language, of society, of the other – and it 
is the revelation and description of this dimension that Lacan interprets as the greatest 
Freudian contribution to an understanding of the human subject: ‘It all began with a 
particular truth, an unveiling, the effect of which is that reality is no longer the same for 
us as it was before’ (Lacan, 2006: 113). This is the dimension of the unconscious, that 
aspect of the mind which is outside of one’s awareness and understanding, and which 
resists systematization, measurement, and adaptation. In Nietzsche’s words, ‘Here there 
is much hidden misery that wants to speak out’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 314). It is the seat of 
all that is deemed unacceptable to one’s private and public image, all that is too 
frightening, incomprehensible, and ‘dangerous’ to confront, all that is repressed in order 
for the subject to survive in a world that designates, through language, the conditions 
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and expectations of human being: ‘The fundamental situation of repression is organized 
around a relation of the subject to the signifier’ (Lacan, 1997: 44). The universality of 
this phenomenon is attested by Freud: ‘No human individual is spared traumatic 
experiences…none is absolved from the repressions that they give rise to’ (Freud, 2006: 
39). Aversion towards certain aspects of humanity – evil, aggression, duplicity, greed, 
and much more – leads to a disavowal of unwanted parts of the self, and finds the 
solution in repression and selective amnesia; ‘Man deals with selected bits of reality’ 
(Lacan, 1997: 47).
74
 This resounds with Nietzsche’s assertion that the denial of our 
animal instincts is demanded by a morality which rejects and distorts the true nature of 
human life.  
The distorted image of human nature is attractive in its idealized picture of 
wisdom, goodness and kindness; ‘Those who like fairy stories turn a deaf ear to talk of 
man’s innate tendencies to evil, aggression, destruction, and thus to cruelty’ (Lacan, 
1997: 185). In this fairy-land, human experience is diminished to a pseudo-existence 
where passions of love and hate, compassion and destruction, are replaced by more 
‘comfortable’ and ‘polite’ representations. Here, Lacan is in agreement with Ricoeur’s 
thesis that evil is a reality of human nature, and that recognition of this reality entails the 
only possibility of confronting it.
75
 As Freud states, ‘one cannot destroy an enemy if he 
is absent or out of reach’ (Freud, 2006: 397).  Rather than the embrace of delusions  
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 This quote has strong echoes of Eliot’s observation, ‘man cannot bear too much reality’. Lacan’s 
familiarity with Eliot’s work is obvious in his use of extracts as elucidation of his own work; for example, 
see Écrits, pp.70 and 103-104. 
75
 This is a central argument in Ricoeur’s work, especially as outlined in Fallible Man and Memory, 
History and Forgetting. 
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pertaining to idealistic and unreal ideologies of human nature, Lacan, like Nietzsche and 
Freud before him, urges a more honest and realistic appraisal: 
 Lacan advocates that we recognize practical anti-humanism, an ethics that 
goes beyond the dimension of what Nietzsche called ‘human, all too human’, 
and confronts the inhuman core of humanity. This means an ethics that 
fearlessly stands up to the latent monstrosity of being human, the diabolic 
dimension that erupted in the phenomena broadly covered by the label 
‘Auschwitz’ (Žižek, 2006, 46). 
 
Adhering to Freudian doctrine, Lacan asserts that denial and repression is a futile 
attempt to eliminate what is ‘unbearable’, whether this is considered ‘evil’, ‘trauma’, or 
any concept which is deemed excluded from human nature; repression is counterpoised 
with the ‘return of the repressed’.  
Lacan looks to Freud’s exploration of the unconscious and finds there several 
pathways to the truth which is concealed therein; ‘The unconscious evinces knowledge 
that, for the most part, escapes the speaking being’ (Lacan, 1999: 139), but 
paradoxically, Lacan states that ‘the unconscious is only accessible through the artifice 
of the spoken word’ (Lacan, 1997: 48). What is repressed in the unconscious is not 
obliterated, but is expressed through various detours; ‘The true…is never reached 
except by twisted pathways’ (Lacan, 1999: 95). The difficulty attendant on any attempt 
to reach or to express ‘the true’ is humbly stated by the Irish novelist, John McGahern: 
‘I believe that it is a great achievement for any man to state, even once, a measure of his 
experience truthfully’ (McGahern, qtd. in The Irish Times 2006). From his clinical 
practice and general observation of human nature, Lacan observed that the unconscious 
is transmitted through dreams, fantasies, symptoms, slips of the tongue, jokes, and 
myriad hidden messages lurking behind speech and behaviour, by which ‘the path of 
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truth is suggested in a masked form’ (Lacan, 1997: 74), and that the interpretation of 
these transmissions, through psychoanalytic insight, can provide access to the real: ‘The 
real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious’ 
(Lacan, 1999: 131). As Žižek asserts in his interpretation of Lacan’s formulation of the 
Freudian unconscious, ‘The unconscious is…the site where a traumatic truth speaks out’ 
(Žižek, 2006: 3). The masked forms in which the unconscious is manifested, the dream, 
the symptom, the fantasy, can only be deciphered when they are expressed in language, 
in words which try to both reveal and conceal their latent content: 
We can only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part 
of it which is articulated by passing into word. It is for this reason that we 
have the right…to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end no 
other structure than the structure of language (Lacan, 1997: 32).  
 
It is here that the insights and techniques of psychoanalysis are used to enable the 
emergence of truth in human reality, and in so doing, to testify to the obstacles which 
hinder such truth; these are also the obstacles to the possibility of love. Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis posits truth as its ultimate purpose, characterized by Rieff as 
an ethic of honesty, while he also makes reference to the potential of literature to 
articulate truth: ‘Psychoanalysis…demands a special capacity for candour which not 
only distinguishes it as a healing movement, but also connects it with a drive toward 
disenchantment characteristic of modern literature’ (Rieff, 1959: 315). Freud states 
clearly ‘that psychoanalytic treatment is founded on truthfulness. In this fact lies a great 
part of its educative effect and its ethical value’ (Freud, 1995: 382). It is not suggested 
here that truth and love are synonymous, but it is argued that truth is essential to love, in 
the sense of a recognition of its motivation, desire, and experience, and an 
acknowledgement of the many guises which masquerade as love.  The relationship 
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between truth and love is explored by Badiou in an article titled “What Is Love?”  in 
which he claims that ‘love does not take the place of anything. It supplements, which is 
completely different. It is a production of truth’ (Badiou, 2000: 266). This relationship 
between love and truth inevitably posits the question of access to truth; is it ever 
possible, given Lacan’s exposition of the barriers to truth inherent in the subject’s 
constitutive position within the symbolic and the imaginary realms of human existence, 
and accepting the Freudian assertion of the powers of the unconscious, that truth can be 
accessed? Žižek bases his answer to this question on Lacan’s insight into the real: ‘truth 
itself can function in the mode of the Real’ (Žižek, 2006: 63). Thus, love, truth, and the 
real are intrinsically related, perennially questioned, and continue to elude fixed 
systematization and ultimate definition. Žižek’s interventions into the investigation of 
love will be explored in the next chapter. 
In the clinical setting, which can be used as a microcosm of the wider reality of 
love, its experience, its communication, its desire and need, its attempt and its failure, 
its indomitable recurrence and repetition, and which mirrors the interaction between 
subject and object, between self and other, the analysand approaches the analyst initially 
with a symptom, an experience, a behaviour, which is causing suffering and distress. 
From this initial encounter to the end of the analysis, everything that takes place is 
grounded in language, in some sort of discourse; ‘psychoanalysis has but one medium: 
the patient’s speech’ (Lacan, 2006: 40). An encounter is initiated and develops through 
dialogical action, an action which takes place through language, dialogue, the spoken 
word. As Lacan states, ‘psychoanalytic action develops in and through verbal 
communication, that is, in a dialectical grasping of meaning. Thus it presupposes a 
subject who manifests himself verbally in addressing another subject’ (Lacan, 2006: 
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11). According to Lacan, this approach is in fact a demand; a demand perhaps disguised 
in the request that the symptom be alleviated or eliminated altogether, and that the 
analyst fulfil the function of “the subject supposed to know” (Lacan, 1999: 67), the 
embodiment of the prototypical omniscience which variously takes form as God, 
Buddha, The Father, or in more contemporary categories of ‘the expert’. According to 
Lacan, his ‘formula of the subject supposed to know [is] the mainspring of the 
transference’ (Lacan, 2007: 186).  The subject/patient transfers the possibility of insight, 
understanding and truth onto the analyst as the figure empowered to guide, explain or 
dictate the terms whereby the symptoms and discomfort may be removed, and wherein 
vague, often unnameable desires such as meaning, purpose, authenticity and happiness 
may be attained. In psychoanalytic practice, this response is denied. Lacan claims that 
speech always implies a demand, that ‘all speech calls for a response’ (Lacan, 2006: 
40), even if this response is silence. The analyst’s response is to listen, to what is said 
and unsaid, whether in the symbol of the word or the symptom; ‘we must be attentive to 
the unsaid that dwells in the holes of discourse’ (Lacan, 2006: 91), and listen ‘in order 
to detect what is to be understood’ (Lacan, 2006: 46). This kind of listening accepts that 
the meaning which is striving to be articulated, and which is sourced in the deepest 
recesses of the struggling speaker, is prohibited or censored in the subject’s ego and so 
is often ‘impossible knowledge’, but Lacan claims that this impossibility can be 
overcome by listening to what ‘is said between the words, between the lines’ (Lacan, 
1999: 119), what he terms the ‘inter-dit’. 
In contrast to the initial demand of the analysand, the aim of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is therefore not the removal of the symptom, nor the directive 
pronouncements of ‘an expert in human living’, but rather the revelation of the 
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symptom’s meaning for the subject, its attempted expression of the subject’s desire, so 
that ‘a certain real may be reached’ (Lacan, 1999: 22); it is to enable a revelation of an 
answer to the question, ‘what does the subject want?’. As Žižek explains, ‘for Lacan, 
the goal of psychoanalytic treatment is not the patient’s well-being, successful social 
life or personal fulfilment, but to bring the patient to confront the elementary 
coordinates and dead-lock of his or her desire’ (Žižek, 2006, 4). According to Lacan, 
this meaning exists within the subject and is not to be discovered or imposed in the 
mirage of the other as possessing the truth; it exists in the unconscious of the subject 
and manifests itself in myriad forms which are often outside the scope of signification. 
It is above all a desire which has been denied and excluded from awareness, but which 
strives for acknowledgement through the detours of symptom and fantasy: ‘The 
unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie; 
it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be refound; most often it has already been 
written elsewhere’ (Lacan, 2006: 50). Lacan explains that this chapter, the unconscious, 
is written in bodily symptoms, childhood memories, life-style and vocabulary, and 
distortions of truth which its repression necessitates. It is in fact the subject’s history, ‘a 
page of shame that one forgets or undoes, or a page of glory that obliges’76 (Lacan, 
2006: 52). The meaning which is sought, demanded, by the subject, does not however 
emanate from ‘the subject supposed to know’; the analyst merely ‘frees the subject’s 
speech’ (Lacan, 2006: 80), by ‘suspending the subject’s certainties until their final 
mirages have been consumed’ (Lacan, 2006: 44); only thus is the desired meaning 
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 The co-existence of shame and glory, of gold and dross, in the repressed realms of the unconscious or 
the ‘shadow’, resounds with the theories of Carl Jung. 
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interpreted and understood. The relinquishment of the fantasy of a knowing, guiding, 
wise ‘other’, and the consequent acknowledgement that personal truth exists within the 
individual subject,  is also urged in Nietzsche’s thought as expressed in the words of 
Zarasthustra: ‘You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me…now I bid you 
lose me and find yourselves’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 103). The subject’s certainties are fixed 
in certain words, scripts and stories wherein one explains oneself to oneself, but the 
process of the psychoanalytic experience is a new reading of  the script: ‘You give a 
different reading to the signifiers that are enunciated than what they signify’ (Lacan, 
1999: 37). Thence, the subject recognizes his/her own truth, he/she allows it to come to 
awareness. Echoing Nietzsche’s perspectivism, ‘these are my truths’, Lacan states that 
‘truth has more than one face’ (Lacan, 2007: 172). The analyst is not the ‘one supposed 
to know’, he or she merely enables the subject to arrive at his/her own meaning, because 
‘true speech already contains its own response’ (Lacan, 2006: 93).  
This interpretation of the resolution of analysis is disputed by Derrida when he 
argues that in analysis a truth is imposed, no matter how this imposition is masked as 
interpretation, facilitation, or echoing of the subject’s own truth; ‘To analyze anything 
whatsoever, anyone whatsoever, for anyone whatsoever, would mean saying to the 
other: choose my solution, prefer my solution, take my solution, love my solution; you 
will be in truth if you do not resist my solution’ (Derrida, 1998: 9). Reflecting the 
paradox inherent in the psychoanalytic ‘rule’ of ‘free’ association, and the 
psychoanalytic explanation of ‘resistance’ to the analyst’s interpretation, Derrida’s 
argument poses questions of validity and ethics regarding the possible invasion of the 
private space of the individual and the forced acceptance of a new conformity, which 
may be a denied reality of psychoanalytic practice.  Lacan’s view repeatedly refutes this 
Chapter Five: Jacques Lacan 
 182 
and sees the end of analysis as coinciding with the subject’s relinquishment of the ideal 
of ‘the subject supposed to know’, and a corresponding avowal of self-ownership and 
responsibility. In Freud’s words, ‘people can only achieve insight through their own 
hurt and their own experience’ (Freud, 2006: 398). In an open recognition and 
acknowledgement of what is contained in the unconscious the subject confronts his/her 
desire, an answer to the apparently simple but difficult question ‘what do I want?’ and 
ultimately decides whether to pursue this desire or to endure its refusal. What has been 
achieved is at least the awareness and honesty whereby the choice can be made. 
According to Lacanian theory, through the insights and techniques of psychoanalysis 
the subject may approach the reality of desire, and discover, through experience, the 
truth therein; ‘Once one enters into the register of the true, one can no longer exit it’ 
(Lacan, 1999: 108). For Lacan, this constitutes ‘the law of desire’, the only proper 
ethical agency, an ethical agency which is far removed from philanthropy, pseudo-
altruism and impossible selflessness, and as an authentic motivating force it resonates 
with Nietzsche’s description of the will to power as the insatiable urge/desire to grow, 
to develop, and to overcome resistance.  
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From Demand to Desire 
I propose that…the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given 
ground relative to desire (Lacan, 1997:  319). 
 
What is this desire which Lacan insists is integral to the constitution of the subject? 
What is the desire revealed through psychoanalysis?  Why is this desire repressed or 
denied in the assumption of a conventionally lived life? And where is the position of 
love in this ambiguity of desire? Lacan asserts that the answers to these questions are 
facilitated by access to the unconscious: ‘That is why the unconscious was invented – so 
that we could realize that man’s desire is the Other’s desire, and that love, while it is a 
passion that involves ignorance of desire, nevertheless leaves desire its whole import’ 
(Lacan, 1999: 4). In questioning the popular portrayals of love as union and mergence, 
as a striving towards the One, as the release from the unbearable tenacity of separation, 
‘Love…is but the desire to be One’ (Lacan, 1999: 6),  Lacan argues that it is in the gap 
between what is real – essential aloneness – and what is sought – complete connection, 
that desire dwells. It ‘leads us to aim at the gap’ (Lacan, 1999: 5). However, the essence 
of desire is that it is not satisfied; a satisfied desire does not exist, and is automatically 
replaced by another version of itself. Ricoeur explains it thus: ‘the desire of desire has 
no end…non-saturated desirability…this allows us to go onward’ (Ricoeur, 2002: 127). 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of the ‘will to power’ is suggested here as the persistent and 
ongoing striving in the human being to push against what stands in its way of 
fulfilment, the very essence of the life-force itself, the achievement and cessation of 
which only exists in death. Life is ongoing, a process striving towards but always out of 
reach of completion. So desire is what can never be accomplished, achieved, finished. 
As Buber reflects, ‘does there already stir, beneath all dissatisfactions that can be 
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satisfied, an unknown and primal and deep dissatisfaction for which there is as yet no 
recipe of satisfaction anywhere?’ (Buber, 2004: 43). It is the essence of desire that it is 
insatiable. This conflict between desire and attainment is often intricately connected 
with the experience of love, its need, its communication, its possibility. The gap remains 
because ‘Everyone knows, of course, that two have never become one’ (Lacan, 1999: 
47). Rejection of this truth understandably results from the demand that one gets what 
one wants, and from the reluctance to acknowledge that satisfaction of desire is the 
antithesis of living. Living is desire, or as Nietzsche says, ‘Life is will to power’ 
(Nietzsche, 1968: 148). In Lacanian terms, the uncovering of desire, its revelation from 
the confines of symptom and displacement, metaphor and metonymy, is the work of 
psychoanalysis. Chiesa identifies this as the emergence of full speech: ‘In everyday life, 
human beings communicate through empty speech, [but] Lacan affirms that the 
subject’s alienation in language can be superseded by full speech. The latter’s 
emergence coincides with the subject’s assumption of his unconscious desire’ (Chiesa, 
2007: 39). In a similar way, Nietzsche asks, ‘Are your desires under a thousand masks?’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 310).   
A corollary of desire is the quest for love, and so love is at the forefront of 
psychoanalytical discourse: ‘the linchpin of everything that has been instituted on the 
basis of analytic experience: Love’ (Lacan, 1999: 39). Lacan credits Freud with 
unveiling many aspects of the phenomenon of love, in particular is narcissistic 
component: 
The beginning of wisdom should involve beginning to realize that it is in that 
respect that old father Freud broke new ground…to realize that love, while it 
is true that it has a relationship with the One, never makes anyone leave 
himself behind…everyone senses and sensed that the problem is how there 
can be love for another (Lacan, 1999:  47). 
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The paradox here is between the reality of narcissism which psychoanalysis witnesses in 
the various guises in which it attempts to disguise itself, and the urge to love, and/or the 
urge to be loved which propels the desire towards the other.
77
 The apparent narcissistic 
nature of desire – it is rooted in the domain of the self – does not limit its aim. When 
desire is directed towards the other, it can have various goals, across a spectrum; this 
can range from the aim of control and power over the other, appropriation of the other, 
the desire to have one’s own identity affirmed and recognized, to an acknowledgement 
of these potential aspect and attempts to transverse them. This enables a recognition of 
the other as not possessing that which one lacks, but rather as embodying vulnerability, 
incompleteness and disunity; the latter propels a desire to love, free of  need, control, or 
assimilation. While the philosophies of Buber and Ricoeur situate the human condition 
as essentially relational – a mediation between self and other, Lacan, following Freud, 
and indeed Nietzsche, claims that relationship with the other is preconditioned with 
narcissist self-interest. The self is always involved. It is a reality of the human condition 
that it is self-centred. This appears to be an uncomfortable reality to embrace, so it is 
masked and sublimated through various images and personas, such as the Ideal I of the 
mirror stage:  ‘a kind of mirage of the One you believe yourself to be’ (Lacan, 1999: 
47). Thus, interrelationships are based on semblances, negations of the truth, and are 
conducted within the framework of the mask: ‘It is only on the basis of the clothing of 
the self-image that envelops the object cause of desire that the object relationship is 
most often sustained’ (Lacan, 1999: 92).  
                                                 
77
 Idealistic notions and descriptions of love often discount the possibility of a real dilemma between the 
need/well-being/happiness of the subject and the simultaneous need of the loved other. It can be difficult 
to acknowledge the possibility of a conflict between the ‘needs’ of self and other.  
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 In his exploration of the concept of love, Lacan returns to Freud’s rejection of 
the Christian dictum that one should ‘love one’s neighbour as oneself’, and agrees with 
Freud’s assessment of love’s capacity as being limited to a choice of beings considered 
worthy of one’s love: ‘the energy that we put into all being brothers very clearly proves 
that we are not brothers’ (Lacan, 2007: 114).  Lacan differentiates between altruism and 
love, and reminds us that ‘in any encounter there’s a big difference in reality between 
the response of philanthropy and that of love’ (Lacan, 1997: 186). Mistaking one for the 
other is an obstacle to love, and for the recipient, is often felt to be insulting and 
manipulative. Highlighting the gap between the ideal of the good and the reality of 
human nature, Lacan warns that ‘only saints are sufficiently detached from the deepest 
of our shared passions to avoid the aggressive repercussions of charity’ (Lacan, 2006: 
15).  The altruistic goal of working for the other’s good begs the question as to the 
constitution of this good.
78
  Lacan explains the appeal of this altruistic goal: 
It is a fact of experience that what I want is the good of others in the image 
of my own. That doesn’t cost so much. What I want is the good of others 
provided that it remains in the image of my own…provided that it depends 
on my effort (Lacan, 1997: 187). 
 
In a different context, Wordsworth makes a similar point: ‘the class that does the most 
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 At the time of writing the solitary incarceration of one human being in an Irish prison for twenty three 
hours a day for over a year, has been justified as being ‘for his own good’. (See The Irish Times, May 
19
th
, 2007). It is difficult to ascertain in this situation an interpretation of ‘good’ or ‘inhuman’. One is 
reminded of Nietzsche’s observation: ‘let us not underestimate the extent to which precisely the sight of 
the judicial and executive procedures prevents the criminal from feeling his deed, the nature of his action, 
as in itself reprehensible, for he sees the very same kind of actions committed in the service of justice and 
then approved, committed with a good conscience’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 54). 
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harm consists of well-intentioned men, who, being ignorant of human nature, think that 
they may help’ (Wordsworth, 2007: 218). Nietzsche also warns that ‘great obligations 
do not make a man grateful, they make him resentful; and if a small kindness is not 
forgotten it becomes a gnawing worm’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 113). One imagines the 
experiences, joys, sorrows, needs, of the other as being a mirror of one’s own, and it is 
through one’s own experience, one’s own perception of the good, that one assumes to 
know what is good for the other. Lacan describes it thus: ‘The benevolent fraud of 
wanting-to-do-one’s-best-for-the-subject’ (Lacan, 1997: 219), and outlines the 
complexities and ambiguities which are involved: 
If one has to do things for the good, in practice one is always faced with the 
question: for the good of whom? From that point on, things are no longer 
obvious…Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the name 
of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting us not only 
from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes (Lacan, 1997: 319). 
 
The subtle slide from the position of wanting the other’s good to the more sinister 
proclamation that one is acting ‘for the other’s own good’ implies an assumption of 
knowledge that justifies one’s power over another who is deemed not to have such 
knowledge: ‘The domain of the good is the birth of power’ (Lacan, 1997: 229). This 
resounds with Ricoeur’s analysis of the relationship between the quests for possession, 
power, and worth. Hence, the essence of group psychology, the demand for obedience, 
and the suppressive power of tyranny emerges. The subtle nature of this slide accounts 
for the manifold guises in which it masquerades; the ‘strong’ parent, the ‘controlling’ or 
‘dependent’ partner, the ‘infallible’ teacher, the ‘civilizing’ colonizer, the ‘patriarchal’ 
president, and in Lacan’s day, the ‘protectors’ of the national good in the personages of 
Hitler and Mussolini.  Hence, Lacan states, ‘a radical repudiation of a certain ideal of 
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the good is necessary’ (Lacan, 1997: 230). The assumption of power in the guise of 
altruistic action, or as the expression of pseudo-love, is an attempt to obliterate the 
desire of the other: ‘The position of power of any kind in all circumstances and in every 
case, whether historical or not, has always been the same. Whether Alexander or Hitler: 
“I have come to liberate you from this or that…as far as desires are concerned, come 
back later, make them wait”’ (Lacan, 1997: 315). In Lacan’s vision, the obliteration of 
desire is the destruction of life itself; the repression of one’s desire necessitates duplicity 
and deception, betrayal of oneself and of others; ‘the first effect of repression is that it 
speaks of something else’ (Lacan, 1999:  62). Language can conceal as well as reveal, a 
point also made by Nietzsche: ‘To talk about oneself a great deal can also be a means of 
concealing oneself’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 105). 
  The unfolding of desire resulting from an articulation of the unconscious enables 
the decision to be made regarding its place in one’s life. According to Lacan, 
acknowledgement of one’s desire is essential to ethical living, and indeed to love; 
‘desire…therein lies the mainspring of love’ (Lacan, 1999: 50). He asserts that desire is 
at the root of one’s destiny, and therefore to reject it is to say no to life, no to 
Nietzsche’s admonition of amor fati. The key question for Lacan in relation to love, 
ethics, life, is; ‘Have you acted in accordance with the desire that is in you?’ (Lacan, 
1997: 314). Lacan warns against the betrayal involved in ‘giving ground relative to 
desire’ because desire is integral to being: ‘The channel in which desire is 
located…what we are as well what we are not, our being, and our non-being’ (Lacan, 
1999: 321). This is also Nietzsche’s conviction: ‘“To live as I desire to live or not to live 
at all”: that is what I want’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 285). Desire is central to who and what 
we are, it is unique and personal to the subject, and in Lacan’s terms it insists on our 
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response: 
Desire is nothing other than that which supports an unconscious theme, the 
very articulation of that which roots us in a particular destiny, and that 
destiny demands insistently that the debt be paid, and desire keeps coming 
back, keeps returning, and situates us once again in a given track, the track 
of something that is specifically our business (Lacan, 1999: 319). 
 
On this point Hederman concurs with Lacan that ‘desire is an inescapable condition of 
humanity’ and goes on to state that it is from an acceptance of this reality that love is 
born: ‘Such acceptance of reality is love. Love is the way we are in ourselves and 
amidst the others who surround us’ (Hederman, 2000: 37). Desire and love as a way of 
being is central to Lacan’s thesis: ‘In love what is aimed at is the subject…in something 
that is organized or can be organized on the basis of a whole life’ (Lacan, 1999: 50), but 
he differentiates between desire and love stating that ‘Love is distinct from 
desire…because its aim is not satisfaction, but being’ (Lacan, 1991: 276).79 Here again, 
the co-existence of self-love and love for the other is asserted: ‘Love, the love of the 
person who desires to be loved, is essentially an attempt to capture the other in oneself, 
                                                 
79
 This is quite close to the view of an Irish philosopher, Felix O’Murchadha, given in response to the 
thesis question:  
My initial reaction is to say that love is its own possibility, by which I mean 
that there is no nature of things be that of the individual human being or be 
that of the collective of a society etc. which makes love possible. Rather, 
love is that which transforms the way in which the world appears to us. One 
must of course make distinctions… In Greek there are at least three words 
for love, eros, philia and agape. In each case there is more than simply the 
instrumental: sexual satisfaction, cooperation between equals and self-
sacrifice are all possible without love and none of them make love necessary. 
But in each case love transforms the act and the other person for me 
(O’Murchadha, 2006: email). 
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in oneself as object’ (Lacan, 1991: 276).  
Lacan’s philosophical vision may appear to be pessimistic; he attempts to shatter 
illusions of relationship, goodness, and love. As Chiesa remarks, ‘Commentators have 
often stated that Lacan’s early work presents us with a uniquely pessimistic notion of 
love, which is easily reducible to imaginary narcissism’, but he claims that ‘already in 
his first theory of the subject, love transcends the imaginary order due to its proximity to 
the emergence of the ego-ideal’ (Chiesa, 2007: 23). The shattering of illusions enables 
the emergence of the real, and it is in the real that the possibility of love may be 
discovered. The difficulty in accessing the real, the obstacles outlined by Lacan as 
formulated in the constitution of the subject within the imaginary and the symbolic, and 
the complexity and ambiguity pertaining to any Lacanian definition of love, ‘love, in its 
essence is narcissistic’ (Lacan, 1999: 6), or ‘true love gives way to hatred’ (Lacan, 
1999: 146)), suggests a cynical attitude to love in Lacan’s thought, and a negative 
response to the thesis question ‘is love possible?’. However, Lacan also points to the 
central role of love in human living, particularly as regards how it functions in relation 
to the cornerstone of humanness – desire, and he points out that ‘people have done 
nothing but speak of love in analytic discourse’ (Lacan, 1999: 83). The pivotal role of 
love in releasing truth, desire, and freedom is stated clearly by Lacan when he urges 
recognition of ‘the imaginary servitude that love must always untie anew or sever’ 
(Lacan, 2006: 9). 
Lacan rejects idealistic versions of human being and human relationship, and he 
argues that love becomes a possibility within an embrace of human imperfection: ‘One 
wants to be loved for everything…for one’s idiosyncrasies, for one’s weaknesses, for 
everything’, and he suggests that love enables a different way of encountering and 
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recognizing the other: ‘to love is to love a being beyond what he or she appears to be. 
The active gift of love is directed at the other, not in his specificity, but in his being’ 
(Lacan, 1991: 276). The difficulties of love, the ‘impossibility’ of its symbolization, and 
the obstacles to its experience, do not in themselves constitute love’s impossibility, but 
rather point to its essential necessity, and the inescapable attempt to make possible the 
impossible. 
 
 CHAPTER SIX 
Slavoj Žižek 
Žižek enters the contemporary philosophical scene with the avowed intention to re-read 
Lacan in relation to Hegel, to revisit Hegelian thought in the light of Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic insights, and to abolish the false dichotomies between high and low 
culture. His career in philosophy is punctuated and influenced by the political upheavals 
and changes which have characterized Eastern Europe in recent decades, the escalation 
of the threat of ‘terrorism’ in the West, and the ensuing confrontations between the 
diverse ideologies, religions and cultures, traditional and emergent, which strive for 
dominance or survival in various global partitions. Thus, his political views inevitably 
intertwine with his philosophical explorations. 
 Echoing Lacan’s commitment to a ‘return to Freud’, Žižek returns to Lacanian 
insights with a comprehensive examination of the development and progression of 
Lacan’s thought. Commenting on the similar focus of direction in the work of both 
Lacan and Žižek, Sarah Kay explains the apparent paradox inherent in the drive to 
progress which is directed by an examination of the past: ‘Lacan presents his life’s work 
as renewing psychoanalysis through a return to Freud. This paradoxical formula, 
whereby progress is secured by looking back, is central to psychoanalytical thinking. 
Žižek’s work is dictated by this same temporal paradox’; Kay argues that ‘the point of 
après-coup is that it does not seek to repeat the past, but to release its significance for 
the present’80 (Kay, 2003: 19).  Simultaneously, Žižek re-reads what he considers to be 
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 Kay appears to be using the term après-coup in its psychoanalytic context. It is a term relating to the 
interaction between past and present, especially in the recall of memories, where the memories are 
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the tenets of Marxist philosophy, and consequently calls for a ‘return to Lenin’ in order 
to explicate the message and value of Lenin’s revolution. His work is characterized by 
an inter-disciplinary dimension as it draws from psychoanalytic, political, sociological, 
linguistic and cultural sources, and his method of presentation involves the use of film, 
literature and popular culture as accessible portrayals of philosophical concepts. This 
leads Kay to assert that ‘Žižek is the most vital interdisciplinary thinker to emerge in 
recent years’ (Kay, 2003: 123). Referring to his frequent resort ‘to examples from 
popular culture’, Žižek explains the reason for his method: it is done ‘in order to avoid a 
kind of jargon, and to achieve the greatest possible clarity, not only for my readers but 
also for myself’ (Žižek, 2006b: 56). Žižek is noted for his flamboyant style of address, 
his embrace of contradiction, and his often controversial exposure of dualities, 
deceptions and disavowals which characterize contemporary culture and subjectivity. 
Reflecting on these aspects of Žižek’s work, Tony Myers states that ‘Slavoj Žižek is a 
philosopher. He is, however, no ordinary philosopher, for he thinks and writes in such a 
recklessly entertaining fashion, he constantly risks making philosophy enjoyable’ 
(Myers, 2004: 1). What makes Žižek different from ‘ordinary philosophers’, according 
to Myers, is his persistent sense of wonder and amazement which he expresses in a 
limitless questioning of everything: ‘With all the guile of a child asking his parents why 
the sky is blue, Žižek questions everything that passes for wisdom about who we are, 
what we are doing and why we do it’ (Myers, 2004: 3). Žižek’s vision of subjectivity is 
grounded in Freud’s exposition of the unconscious as a permeating influence on 
behaviour, motivation and conflict; on Lacan’s triad of the real, the imaginary, and the 
                                                                                                                                               
influenced and acted on by the present context.  
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symbolic as the constitutive and often overlapping realms of human existence; and on 
his own examination of the role of ideology in the creation of unquestioned acceptance 
of portrayals of the human condition from pre-Socratic times to the ‘ideology-free’ 
assumptions of contemporary postmodernism. As a keen analyst of the workings of 
power and the invisible shadow of ideology, Žižek provides an insightful and 
contentious account of the contemporary subject. 
As an astute observer and commentator on historical and contemporary disasters 
and difficulties, Žižek examines political, social and individual issues with a 
combination of philosophical reflection and analysis of contemporary culture. His 
philosophical reading ranges over the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and 
Heidegger, and Derrida and Kristeva, while his portrayal of postmodernity is facilitated 
by references to a wide range of literature, music, art and film. This expanse of 
engagement is reflected in the prolific nature of his work, which examines many of the 
dilemmas and conflicts confronting society in the third millenium; globalisation, 
poverty, war, terrorism, racism, and the myriad repercussions of scientific and 
technological advances. The rapidity of scientific and technological progress is seen by 
Žižek as a fourth humiliation to the illusions of superiority and vanity which is preceded 
by the reversals of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud: ‘the latest scientific breakthroughs 
seem to add a whole series of further “humiliations” which radicalize the first three’ 
(Žižek, 2006d: 163). Both Freud and Lacan assert that the acknowledgement of the 
unconscious as a powerful, and complex aspect of the human condition, is comparable 
to the radical effects of the Copernican revolution and Darwinian evolution; each has 
resulted in a decentring of the human subject, relegating it to a more fragile and unstable 
condition: ‘man loses his privileged place and is reduced to just another element of 
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reality’ (Žižek, 2006d: 164).  Žižek posits a similar displacement emerging from the 
ever-new capacities of science and technology; he gives the example of the ongoing 
development of ‘virtual reality’ where intersubjective communication takes place 
between computer screens, and the paradox of human creation and human annihilation 
ensuing from the possibilities of human cloning. Therefore, he claims that 
psychoanalysis, far from being outdated and irrelevant, is in fact a radical discipline 
essential to human understanding: ‘my aim is to demonstrate that it is only today that 
the time of psychoanalysis has come’ (Žižek, 2006: 2). 
 Žižek’s work is concerned with a vast array of questions and conflicts. He 
theorizes on politics, work, ideology, evil and culture, and thus he deals with issues 
which may be considered universal in their application. However, Žižek insists on the 
inescapable ambiguity, antagonism and falsity inherent in the particular/universal 
divide; he asks ‘how does the particular participate in the universal?’ (Žižek, 1999: 
137), and this question positions his work as an investigation of subjectivity, an 
examination of individuality, and an exploration of issues which focus on the personal 
as well as the universal. Žižek is clear in his assertion of this necessity: 
 the Social, the field of social practices and socially held beliefs, is not 
simply on a different level from individual experience, but something to 
which the individual himself has to relate, which the individual himself has 
to experience as an order which is minimally “reified”, externalized…the 
gap between the individual and the “impersonal” social dimension is to be 
inscribed back within the individual himself: this “objective” order of the 
social Substance exists only insofar as individuals treat it as such, relate to it 
as such (Žižek, 2006d: 6). 
 
Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, Žižek’s work is approached with an emphasis on 
his reflections on the individual, the human being, the person who is experiencing life in 
relation to self, others and the wider social world. With this emphasis, his work provides 
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an exploration of perennial philosophical questions. What is a subject? What is human? 
What is truth? What is meaning? Žižek asserts the centrality of these questions in the 
contemporary world: ‘What we are witnessing today is a radical redefinition of what it 
means to be human’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext), and he insists on the pivotal importance of 
the ethical in this redefinition. The emphasis on ‘a radical redefinition of what it means 
to be human’ resounds firmly with Buber’s similar reflections on the subject, and  
implicitly with the explorations of all the writers examined in this thesis. The centrality 
of ethics to Žižek’s work is grounded in Lacan’s assertion ‘that ethics belongs to the 
Real’ (Žižek, 2006d: 49), and thus is often distorted and manipulated in the imaginary 
and the symbolic. However, Žižek asserts his conviction that the ensuing difficulties 
involved in approaching an ethical stance do not diminish its importance, and with a 
determined optimism, he looks to the Samuel Beckett play, The Unnameable, as a 
statement that ‘this simple persistence against all odds is ultimately the stuff ethics is 
made of’ (Žižek, 2006: 119). Within the realm of ethics, Žižek discusses the relationship 
between determinism and autonomy, responsibility and freedom, emotion and 
rationalism, in human motivation and behaviour, and within this discussion he 
inevitably posits love, its impossibility and possibility, as a concept which is integral to 
the ethical question. In his discussion of ethics in his work, On Belief, Žižek refers to 
the “ethics of the Real”, and in taking ‘the case of love’, he suggests the Lacanian 
response: 
Lovers usually dream that in some mythical Otherness (“another time, 
another place”), their love would have found its true fulfillment, that it is 
only the present contingent circumstances which prevent this fulfillment; and 
is the Lacanian lesson here not that one should accept this obstacle as 
structurally necessary, that there is NO “other place” of fulfillment, that this 
Otherness is the very Otherness of the fantasy? No: the “real as impossible” 
means here that THE IMPOSSIBLE DOES HAPPEN, that “miracles” like 
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Love…DO occur (Žižek, 2006c: 84). 
 
Hence, a selected reading of Žižek’s work focuses on the thesis question, the possibility 
of love, and provides an exploration of the obstacles to its experience.  
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The New Big Other 
I disavow what my eyes tell me and choose to believe the symbolic fiction 
(Žižek, 1997a: etext) 
 
Explorations and analyses of subjectivity, personality and the self are central to 
philosophical and psychoanalytical inquiry, and within this framework the question of 
identity inevitably arises. The paradox of personal identity, as a construct of subjective 
experience and of objective appraisal, of private meaning and public acknowledgement, 
is an issue explored by the writers previously outlined in this thesis. The fragility of 
identity impinges on the possibility of love, as the motivation to seek recognition and 
acceptance may overwhelm or displace the openness and vulnerability inherent in the 
experience of loving and of being loved. Žižek approaches this concept with an astute 
reflection on the enduring power of the superego in spite of the demise of its more 
traditional and conventional forms. For Žižek, the superego expresses itself in the form 
of the big Other, and while it has disintegrated in some of its older guises, it still 
maintains its power to confer or annul personal identity. As Myers states, ‘For Žižek, it 
is the big Other which confers an identity upon the many decentred personalities of the 
contemporary subject’ (Myers, 2004: 51). 
As an unflinching commentator and interpreter of the contemporary world, 
Žižek challenges ideological presuppositions, familiar convictions, and illusions of 
freedom and goodness. In this sense, his analysis of the human condition as experienced 
in contemporary life can be compared to Nietzsche’s call for a radical revaluation of 
values and morals, and a more honest acknowledgement of what it means to be human. 
Like Freud, he perceives the individual as having an ambiguous relationship with 
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culture and civilization. In his persistent re-reading of philosophy and literature as 
explorations of being, truth, and subjectivity, he resounds with Ricoeur’s hermeneutical 
analysis of experience and his acknowledgement of human frailty and fallibility.
81
 Žižek 
examines the assumptions, grounded in the postmodern deconstruction of binary 
oppositions such as right and wrong, East and West, foreigner and native, whereby we 
convince ourselves that we are now free from the tyranny of ideology, patriarchy, and 
other forms of authoritarian mastery and domination. For Žižek, the question remains: 
‘why, in spite of his ‘liberation’ from the constraints of traditional authority, is the 
subject not ‘free’? Why does the retreat of traditional ‘repressive’ Prohibitions not only 
fail to relieve us of guilt, but even reinforce it?’ (Žižek, 1997: 86). The demise of a 
society structured on authoritarian rules and values is seen by Žižek as a distorted 
fiction. According to Myers, this involves a double-fiction: 
The big Other always was dead, in the sense that it never existed in the first 
place as a material thing. All it ever was (and is) is a purely symbolic or 
fictional order. What Žižek means by this is that we all engage in a minimum 
of idealization, disavowing the brute fact of the Real in favour of another 
Symbolic world behind it…If we wish to remain loyal subjects we act as if 
the emperor really is wearing new clothes and not parading through the 
street naked. The big Other is thus a kind of collective fib or lie to which we 
all individuality subscribe (Myers, 2004: 49). 
 
Žižek examines the proposition that today “the big Other no longer exists”, but he asks 
                                                 
81
 Žižek does not adhere fully to the conventional interpretations of hermeneutical philosophy; for 
example he is critical of what he considers ‘the fundamental thesis of Gadamer’s hermeneutics…what we 
get in Gadamer is an “urbanized” (domesticated, “gentrified”) Heidegger, a Heidegger purified of 
disagreeable excesses which do not fit the academic circuit’ (Žižek, 2001: 169). 
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‘in WHAT sense’ is this the case (Žižek, 1997a: etext).82 Any temptation to self-
congratulatory stances is subverted by Žižek’s exposé of new, subtle, and often more 
sinister sources of control over thought and behaviour: ‘Instead of bringing freedom, the 
fall of the oppressive authority…gives rise to new and sterner prohibitions’ (Žižek, 
2006: 92). Lacan refers to ‘what keeps appearing in the guise of the superego’, and 
suggests that what the subject has done is to ‘change masters’ (Lacan, 2007: 13, 32). 
 The present age is often characterized by an apparently all-pervading 
permissiveness which seems to overturn the repression and constraint of previous eras; 
sexuality, religion, education, and the concept of work, are some areas which highlight 
changes of attitude and behaviour. However, Žižek points to the erroneous nature of this 
picture, and suggests that in many cases the subject is now constrained by subtler 
ideologies presented in the guise of humane-sounding values such as ‘human rights’, 
‘freedom of choice’, and ‘equality’: ‘You have a whole set of measures which power 
uses, but [it] disavows them…that is for me the obscenity of power’ (Žižek, 1999a: 
etext). The Western world is presented as symbolic of individual growth and 
advancement, but, in Žižek’s view, there are invisible codes of requirements which must 
be met in order to belong to this world; there is a ‘subtle coercion under the guise of free 
choice’ (Žižek, 1997: 57). Žižek terms this ‘the forced choice’, whereby submission to 
the symbolic law is devoid of choice because there is no alternative to the symbolic 
(Žižek, 2001: 77). Thus, Žižek points to the double-sided nature of ideology; on the one 
hand it is visible in the openly proclaimed standards and values of the social and 
                                                 
82
 The ironic co-existence of liberation from repressive authorities and ideologies and private, involuntary 
adherence to the basic tenets of such values and rules is poignantly portrayed in Ian McEwan’s latest 
novel, On Chesil Beach, 2007. 
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political domain, but on the other hand it is also sustained by the hidden, implicit, 
unspoken expectations and justifications underlying any social or political system. 
There is a trap which ‘makes us slide into ideology under the guise of stepping out of it’ 
(Žižek, 1999: 70). Acquiescence to ‘universal’ values and practices as constitutive of 
the social framework attempts to eradicate the existence of any divergence from the 
norm; it denies the reality of those who do not have a place within it: ‘a shared lie is an 
incomparably more effective bond for a group than the truth’ (Žižek, 1999: 99). As in 
Nietzsche’s description of herd-morality, adherence to popular opinion is easier and 
safer than risking any interrogation of ‘the way things are’. As Žižek says, ‘only very 
few are ready to question this world’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext).83 The attraction of the 
‘normal’, the socially accepted forms of thought and behaviour, is understandable, 
according to Žižek, when opposed to its alternative: ‘how can one survive a direct 
confrontation with the Sun, the ultimate Real, without getting burned by the rays of its 
heat?...the risks of this confrontation, paying for it the highest price of madness’ (Žižek, 
2004a: etext). In the ‘post-ideological’ fantasy of postmodernism, Žižek points to the 
paradox inherent in the gap between the awareness of the artificial/contingent 
construction of ideology, and the simultaneous acceptance of its power evinced in daily 
practice. ‘Our freedoms are increasingly reduced to the freedom to choose your 
lifestyle’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext).  
An example of the subtle, unspoken  limitation of freedom in the postmodern 
                                                 
83
 On this point, Žižek credits Nietzsche with raising the topic of ‘cogito and madness’ (Žižek, 
1999: 189), and placing Nietzsche’s question in a contemporary setting, he asks ‘in what does 
this difference between the ‘mad’ (paranoid) construction and the ‘normal’ (social) 
construction of reality consist? Is ‘normalcy’ ultimately not merely a more ‘mediated’ form of 
madness?’ (Žižek, 1999: 254).  These sentiments resound firmly with the thought of R.D. 
Laing as outlined in his works The Divided Self and The Politics of Experience. 
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world is, according to Žižek, the pervasive, unconditional injunction to enjoy, the 
command that the subject must experience pleasure in all aspects of experience, and 
must especially be seen to do so: it is ‘the official ideology of our postmodern society as 
bent on instant gratification and pleasure-seeking’ (Žižek, 1997a: etext). Guilt 
accompanies any failure to fulfill this demand: ‘Superego is the reversal of the 
permissive “You May!” into the prescriptive “You Must!”, the point in which permitted 
enjoyment turns into ordained enjoyment’ (Žižek, 1999b: etext).  The injunction to 
enjoy, and to be seen to enjoy, gives rise to obsessive concern with the appearances of 
enjoyment; the creation of ‘the beautiful body’, the adherence to fitness regimes, and 
the myriad preparatory exercises which are deemed essential to the achievement of 
enjoyment in intellectual, sexual, individual and communal forms: ‘in a digitalised 
universe that is artificially constructed…we seem to live more and more with the thing 
deprived of its substance’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext). Žižek offers a multitude of examples 
wherein the appearance of enjoyment is expressed in the popularity of the form without 
its substance; ‘meat without fat, coffee without caffeine…and even virtual sex without 
sex’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext), and the myriad forms of interpassivity whereby even 
emotions are experienced indirectly as in canned laughter, mock horror, and the many 
adult variations on the Japanese toy, tamagochi, where feelings of love and care are 
delegated to inanimate objects: ‘tamagochi is a machine which allows you to satisfy 
your need to love your neighbour…without bothering your actual neighbours with your 
intrusive compassion’ (Žižek, 1999:109).  Thus, he believes that ‘in our “society of the 
spectacle”, in which what we experience as everyday reality more and more takes the 
form of the lie made real, Freud’s insights show their true value’ (Žižek, 2006f: etext).  
Injunctions from the superego abound in everyday life, ‘from direct enjoyment in sexual 
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performance to enjoyment in professional achievement or spiritual awakening’ (Žižek, 
2005: 152).  Fashion, food, life-style, and all the conscious and unconscious decisions 
and behaviours which project a presentation of the self, are regulated to endorse 
unspoken rules: ‘even the most intimate attitude towards one’s body is used to make an 
ideological statement’ (Žižek, 1999: 81). Enjoyment is now a duty, and fear of failure in 
performing this duty imposes a permanent anxiety; one must do one’s duty and also be 
seen to enjoy doing so.
84
 In this sense the obligation to do one’s duty is doubled by the 
insistence that one freely chooses to do so. Žižek argues that the injunction to “enjoy!”, 
rather than enabling the experience of pleasure, satisfaction, happiness or love, in fact, 
paradoxically hinders such a possibility: ‘the direct injunction “Enjoy!” is a much more 
effective way to hinder the subject’s access to enjoyment than the explicit Prohibition 
which sustains the space for its transgression’ (Žižek,1997a: etext).85   
The illusion of freedom ensuing from more ‘liberal’ and more individualistic 
platitudes of personal freedom, free choice, equality, and self-creation, often belies its 
opposite. Freedom of choice is permitted ‘but with the explicit exclusion of the choices 
which may disturb the public’ (Žižek, 2006c: 122). Žižek offers the analogy of a 
common childhood experience to portray the duplicity involved. The child in the 
traditional family situation was ordered/compelled to obey instructions such as behaving 
politely to relatives, respecting the elderly, and acknowledging his/her subservient 
position with regard to the adult world. Now, in contrast, the child is told that there are 
no rules, that one must make up one’s own mind, and that one is free to choose. The 
                                                 
84
 The command to enjoy is also explored by another psychoanalytic cultural theorist, Todd McGowan, in 
his book The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment. 
85
 McGowan concurs with this argument that enjoyment needs a barrier to be experienced fully. 
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reality of this situation is that the child intuitively knows what is expected of him/her, 
what behaviour is still being demanded, but there is now the added imposition that one 
must pretend that one chooses, and for that reason that one enjoys the ‘freely-chosen’ 
behaviour: 
beneath the appearance of free choice there is an even more oppressive 
demand than the one formulated by the traditional authoritarian father…a 
false free choice is the obscene superego injunction: it deprives the child 
even of his inner freedom, instructing him not only what to do, but what to 
want to do (Žižek, 2006: 92). 
 
Žižek looks to the literature of Kafka,86 Kundera, James and others to highlight the 
subject’s inscription within conscious and unconscious laws, and in William’s Styron’s 
fictional account of Nazi brutality, Sophie’s Choice, he outlines the traumatic 
experience of the forced choice (Žižek, 2001: 70). As a prisoner of the war camps, 
Sophie is given the choice to save the life of one of her two children; if she does not 
choose, they will both die. Hence she is given an impossible choice, but nevertheless 
she is forced to choose. The situation resounds with the failure of universally applicable 
ethical solutions or guidelines portrayed in mythology and literature throughout history; 
Sophocles’ Antigone, Coetzee’s Disgrace, McEwan’s Atonement, and Greene’s The End 
of the Affair,  explore variations of a similar dilemma: ‘the paradox of the forced choice 
that marks our most fundamental relationship to the society to which we belong: at a 
certain point, society impels us to choose freely what is already necessarily imposed 
upon us’ (Žižek, 2006a: 275).  
The illusion of freedom, the feigned proclamation of free choice, and the refusal 
                                                 
86
 The world of Kafka’s fiction is that of guilt, alienation and impossibility, according to Žižek: ‘Kafka’s 
universe is eminently that of the superego’ (Žižek , 1999: 48). 
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to acknowledge the impact of unspoken injunctions and expectations that constrain 
human behaviour, result in a diminishment of responsibility and autonomy: ‘We can go 
on making our small choices, “reinventing ourselves” thoroughly on condition that these 
choices do not seriously disturb the social and ideological balance’ (Žižek, 2006c: 122).  
The unconscious imposition of expectations and codes of behaviour can result in the 
subject’s alienation from the real kernel of desire and being as life is lived with the 
assumption of the symbolic gaze of the other: ‘I am only what I am for the other, in so 
far as I am inscribed into the network of the big Other. An insurmountable gap separates 
forever what I am ‘in the real’ from the symbolic mandate that procures my social 
identity’ (Žižek, 1999: 135). Human experience is restrained and limited, and in the area 
of inter-relationships the experience of love is often distorted and thwarted. 
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Neighbourly Love 
In true love I hate the Beloved out of love. I hate the dimension of the 
beloved person’s inscription into the socio-symbolic structure. I hate him or 
her on behalf of my very love for him as a unique person (Žižek, 1999a: 
etext). 
 
 
Žižek revisits Freud and Lacan in their interrogative analysis of the Christian injunction 
‘to love one’s neighbour as oneself’, and he outlines their rejection of its possibility and 
its expediency. Their argument centres on the assertion that the concept of universal 
love disavows that which is unlovable in human nature, and that love must in some 
sense be an autonomous decision. Simply, Žižek asserts that love cannot be 
commanded. In his analysis of this Christian dictum, Žižek poses the question: ‘who is 
the neighbour?’ He turns to Lacan’s answer that ‘the neighbour is the Real’: and thereby 
concludes that the injunction to ‘love thy neighbour’ and correlative preaching about 
equality, tolerance and universal love ‘are ultimately strategies to avoid encountering 
the neighbour’ (Žižek, 2004: 72) in all his/her vulnerability, frailty, obscenity and 
fallibility – the traumatic Real of the neighbour. Derrida concurs with this argument 
when he states that ‘The measure is given by the act, by the capacity of loving in 
act…living is living with. But every time, it is only one person living with another’, and 
he concludes with the assertion that ‘A finite being could not possibly be present in act 
to too great a number. There is no belonging or friendly community that is present, and 
first present to itself, in act, without election and without selection’ (Derrida, 2005: 21). 
The universality of idealistic proclamations of love actually precludes the possibility of 
loving the neighbour as a Real, traumatic, inaccessible other; the popularity of 
humanitarian causes lies in their inherent paradox whereby one can ‘love’ from a 
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distance without getting involved: 
it is easy to love the idealized figure of a poor, helpless neighbour, the 
starving African or Indian, for example; in other words, it is easy to love 
one’s neighbour as long as he stays far enough from us, as long as there is a 
proper distance separating us. The problem arises at the moment when he 
comes too near us, when we start to feel his suffocating proximity – at this 
moment when the neighbour exposes himself to us too much, love can 
suddenly turn into hatred (Žižek, 2001: 8). 
 
Nietzsche states the case in his typically aphoristic style: ‘There is not enough love and 
kindness in the world to permit us to give any of it away to imaginary beings’ 
(Nietzsche, 1984: 89).  
The avoidance of the encounter with the actual, singular and concrete experience 
of the neighbour is propelled by an aversion to one’s own vulnerability and lack which 
might be mirrored in the other.  The proximity of love and hate, the imperceptible 
slippage from one to the other which characterizes so much of human existence, in 
personal, social and political experience, is explored and reflected throughout literature, 
and is a recurring theme in the works of all the writers examined in this thesis. As Lacan 
states, ‘not to know hatred in the least is not to know love in any way either…there is no 
love without hate’ (Lacan, 1999: 89). In his depiction of the neighbour as a 
concretization of the Real, Žižek argues that access to the real is therefore not 
impossible, (it is to be found through the neighbour), but traumatic and threatening. 
Encountering the real via the neighbour confronts us with the raw, vulnerable, and 
conflicting nature of human being, and such an encounter is often avoided in favour of 
more acceptable and idealistic generalisations of humanity. In his analysis of human 
relationships, Žižek offers a careful critique of the ethics of Levinas, and particularly his 
insistence on the subject’s responsibility to answer the other’s call: ‘Levinas asserts the 
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relation to my neighbour, my unconditional responsibility for him, as the true terrain of 
ethical activity’ (Žižek, 2005: 146). Žižek asserts that the limitation of Levinasian ethics 
lies in its selective conceptualization of what it is to be human: 
The limitation of Levinas is not simply that of a Eurocentrist who relies on 
too narrow a definition of what is human, a definition that secretly excludes 
non-Europeans as “not fully human”. What Levinas fails to include in the 
scope of “human” is, rather, the inhuman itself, a dimension which eludes 
the face-to-face relationship between human beings (Žižek, 2006d: 111). 
 
He asks if Levinas, with his call for an ethical response to the other, is not reducing the 
concept of the other to ‘the “gentrification” of the neighbour’, and thereby excluding 
everything that is deemed ‘inhuman’, and everything which does not fit into the already 
symbolized social world. Žižek’s emphasis on the ‘inhuman’ or the monstrous as 
inherently constitutive of being-human, is opposed by Richard Kearney as being ‘too 
alarmist’: ‘The danger of Žižek’s approach is the risk that our entire culture becomes 
little more than a symptom of an incurable postmodern pathology’ (Kearney, 2003: 
99).
87
 Yet the exclusion of what is deemed inhuman monstrosity from a vision of human 
nature raises fundamental questions. By what and by whose criteria is such a distinction 
made? Has this distinction been changed and revised through different historical periods 
and in different cultural experiences? Where is the monstrosity in the juxtaposition of 
judicial, educative, or ‘rehabilitationary’ actions which purportedly serve to ‘protect’ 
society from ‘inhuman’ evil through processes which are themselves susceptible to the 
                                                 
87
 Thus, Kearney, in arguing for the acknowledgement of the stranger, the monster, within oneself, rather 
than its projection on to another, still insists on the necessity of discernment in distinguishing between 
some monsters and others.  
.  
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label ‘inhuman’?  These questions contain at least the seeds of their answers, in that 
they may elicit diverse and ambiguous responses, and so suggest a deconstruction of the 
universality presumed in the opposition of human/monstrous. 
 The search for the certainty of the ethical position denies the absence of external 
guarantees and evades the responsibility of ethical reflection, hence the popularity of 
empty catch-phrases preaching moralistic convictions such as ‘brotherhood of man’, 
‘universal peace’, and ‘justice for all’, and the co-existence of concrete situations which 
subvert the actuality of such clichés even in the midst of their proclamations. According 
to Myers, ‘For Žižek, the truth is always to be found in contradiction rather than the 
smooth effacement of differences’ (Myers, 2004: 17). In his critique of the ideology of 
human rights, Žižek points to the duplicity involved in situations which disguise their 
motivation behind a veil of pseudo-love for the other:  ‘charity is part of the game, a 
humanitarian mask hiding the underlying economic exploitation’ (Žižek, 2006e: etext). 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality, his exposition of the hypocrisy inherent in the 
disavowal of selected aspects of human nature, and his reversal of the false dualities 
descriptive of the human animal, are cited by Žižek in his argument that definitions of 
what it is to be human often exclude that which is inhuman as belonging to a radically 
different other. In arguing the difference between the concepts ‘not human’ and 
‘inhuman’ he echoes Nietzsche’s assertion that we are ‘human, all too human’: 
“he is not human” means simply that he is external to humanity, animal or 
divine, while “he is inhuman” means something thoroughly different, 
namely, that he is neither simply human nor simply inhuman, but marked by 
a terrifying  excess which, although it negates what we understand as 
“humanity”, is inherent to being-human  (Žižek, 2005: 160).   
 
Throughout his work, Žižek looks to the experience of the holocaust as an inescapable 
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confirmation of evil, deception and ideology, in the lived and recorded experience of 
human beings. The aggression, brutality, cruelty – the ‘inhuman’ acts – which were 
performed by the Nazis and their supporters, make it impossible to deny the reality of 
evil in the world, and inevitably poses questions regarding what human beings are 
capable of: ‘the unbridgeable GAP between the horror of what went on and the “human, 
all too human” character of its perpetrators’ (Žižek, 2005c: 38). As Auden reflects, ‘we 
shan’t, not since Stalin and Hitler, / trust ourselves ever again: / we know that, 
subjectively, / all is possible’ (Auden, 1994: 692). The ideological framework which 
encompassed the atrocities of the holocaust was based on ‘love’ of one’s nation, defence 
against the enemy, and loyalty to ideals and aspirations. Žižek offers a psychoanalytic 
interpretation of this perplexing historical event. Accordingly, the ideology was based 
on the fantasy of ‘the one supposed to know’, the ultimate expert, often represented in 
the master signifier of God, the analyst, the expert, and in this case, the Fuhrer. The 
success of this ideological illusion depended on the simultaneous depiction of a 
threatening other, in this case, the Jew, onto whom was projected everything that posed 
a threat to the realisation of the fantasy: ‘There is no ideology that does not come into 
being without asserting itself in the guise of one ‘truth’ against another’ (Žižek, 1999: 
54). Nietzsche explains it thus: ‘People whom we cannot tolerate, we try to make 
suspect’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 243). Concurrently, the fantasy that the other held the key to 
truth and liberation necessitated a suspension of personal responsibility and autonomy. 
Thus, when confronted with the reality of their crimes, Nazi supporters had recourse to 
the excuse that they were merely following orders, doing their duty, and therefore not 
responsible; they did what they did out of love – love of country, cause, leader – and so 
they cannot be held accountable. Hindsight, historical perspective, and the safety of 
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temporal distance enables a rejection of such contestable denials, and a demand for 
justice and retribution for what is deemed ‘inhuman’ behaviour. The danger of 
complacent self-righteousness and moralistic superiority which might underlie this 
stance of authentic judgement is exposed by Žižek as he reminds us that the perpetrators 
of these inhuman acts were not a separate species or a category of ‘sub-human’, but 
were in fact ordinary human beings, living their everyday lives within a historical 
context: ‘it is all too easy to dismiss the Nazis as inhuman and bestial – what if the 
problem with the Nazis was precisely that they remained “human, all too human”?’ 
(Žižek, 2006d: 42). They were not some monstrous other, radically different from us; 
they were the same as us in that they were human beings. Hence, the portrayal of the 
Nazis as monstrous bears at least some similarity to the Nazi’s psychological projection 
of evil and threat onto the Jews.  
The atrocity of the holocaust is commonly held to be the pinnacle of evil in the 
Western world, but it has its repetitions throughout history and throughout the world, as 
Buber reminds us: ‘I do not think any basic change took place in the human race when 
the Nazis came into power…it is a question of proportion, not of basic content…similar 
brutalities have occurred before in history’ (Buber, quoted in Hobes, 1972: 146). Taking 
the example of colonial exploitation and degradation in South Africa, as experienced at 
first hand, the novelist Doris Lessing is at pains to point out the fallacy of smug disdain 
towards the evils of the past: ‘I do not think it can be said too often that it is a mistake to 
exclaim over past wrong-thinking before at least wondering how our present thinking 
will seem to posterity’ (Lessing, 1995: 50). Contemporary events await the analysis of 
history, but inevitably portray similar dichotomies and contradictions. Nietzsche 
reminds us that ‘when we consider earlier periods, we must be careful not to fall into 
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unjust abuse’ as the events of these times ‘cannot be measured by our standards’ 
(Nietzsche, 1984: 70).  
The safety, survival of ‘the free world’, as embodied by the West and especially 
by North America, is the ideal demanding and attaining loyalty and allegiance to 
leaders, parties, and nations, and finding its expression in selected codes pertaining to 
what it is to be human; what does not fit the norm is excluded, whether it is the East, the 
terrorist, or the Muslim, and this other is conveniently scapegoated as the threat to all 
that is held dear. Paradoxically, when the ‘free world’ is confronted with incontestable 
evidence of its own brutality and terrorism, committed in the name of ‘fighting 
terrorism’ – ‘rendition’, the scenes at Guantanamo Bay and others – there is an aversion 
to the reality that this evil is perpetrated by ordinary, recognizable men and women of 
the Western world; but Žižek reminds us that ‘what shocks us in others we ourselves 
also do in a way’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext). The confrontation with evil understandably 
evinces a reaction of condemnation and rejection of this incomprehensible, monstrous 
other, but Žižek suggests that a more courageous response is necessary. In his 
reflections on the WTC bombing September 11
th 
2001, Žižek urges an 
acknowledgement of the political, economic, and ideological realities which preceded 
the event, and he warns against the dangers implicit in one-sided oppositions of 
right/wrong, good/evil, and crime/punishment. To support his plea, Žižek quotes from 
Derrida’s speech in which he refer to the WTC attacks: ‘my unconditional compassion, 
addressed to the victims of September 11, does not prevent me from saying it loudly: 
With regard to this crime, I do not believe that anyone is politically guiltless’; Žižek 
concludes that ‘this self-relating, this inclusion of oneself in the picture, is the only true 
‘infinite justice’’ (Žižek , 2007: 287).  
Chapter Six: Slavoj Žižek 
 213 
Now the injunction to ‘love thy neighbour’ is exposed in its unacceptable and 
repulsive  command: ‘”Love thy neighbour!” means “Love the Muslims!” OR IT 
MEANS NOTHING AT ALL’ (Žižek, 2001c: etext). In order to confront the true, the 
real dimensions of this and other traumatic events, the simple objectivization of the 
monstrous other must be subverted: ‘Whenever we encounter such a purely evil 
Outside, we should gather the courage to endorse the Hegelian lesson: in this pure 
Outside, we should recognize the distilled version of our own essence’ (Žižek, 2001c: 
etext). Here, Žižek is restating the position of Nietzsche, Buber and Ricoeur, in their 
acknowledgement of the conflictual nature of subjectivity, their rejection of polarities of 
good and evil, and their call for a more comprehensive understanding of human nature. 
This is also an argument central to the work of Julia Kristeva explored in Strangers to 
Ourselves where she relates the drive to demonise the other back to an unconscious 
process whereby we externalise the ‘foreigner’: ‘Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: 
he is the hidden face of our identity…by recognizing him within ourselves, we are 
spared detesting him in himself’ (Kristeva, 1991: 1). Kristeva looks to psychoanalysis 
as an aid to transcending the projection of the foreigner/other/monster, and she recalls 
that Freud did not refer to foreigners but to the uncanny strangeness of ourselves: 
The foreigner is within me, hence we are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner, 
there are no foreigners. Therefore Freud does not talk about them. The ethics 
of psychoanalysis implies a politics: it would involve a cosmopolitanism of a 
new sort that, cutting across governments, economies, and markets, might 
work for a mankind whose solidarity is founded on the consciousness of its 
unconscious – desiring, destructive, fearful, empty, impossible (Kristeva, 
1991: 192). 
 
In highlighting the hypocrisy and contradiction which is sometimes implicit in 
proclamations of neighbourly love, Žižek paradoxically does not reject the value of the 
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concept; like Kristeva,
88
 he looks to the psychoanalytic insights of Freud and Lacan, as 
he endeavours to approach the complexities of object-relations, the obstacles to inter-
subjectivity, and the possibilities of  love within these perplexities. 
                                                 
88
 Žižek is critical of Kristeva’s Strangers to Ourselves because he states that ‘there is a danger that issues 
of economic exploitation are converted into problems of cultural tolerance…here we have a pure pseudo-
psychoanalytic cultural reductionism’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext).  
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Traversing the Fantasy 
The only way to achieve this suspension, to break the chain of crime and 
punishment/retribution, is to assume the utter readiness of self-erasure. And 
LOVE, at its most elementary, is nothing but such a paradoxical gesture of 
breaking the chain of retribution (Žižek, 2004: etext). 
 
Žižek’s insistent expose of duplicity and deception, in political, sociological and 
personal realms calls into question the motivation and direction underlying many 
‘virtuous’, ‘humane’, and ‘altruistic’ behaviours and convictions. The conclusion of his 
inquiries may initially suggest a negative and a cynical vision of the possibilities of 
human living, and so may point to a rejection of the possibility of love. However, Žižek 
increasingly explores the concept of love within a realistic appraisal of human being, 
and he continues to use psychoanalytic insights to support this realism: ‘Psychoanalysis 
reintroduces notions of Evil and responsibility into our ethical vocabulary’ (Žižek, 
2007: 313). The centrality of love to Žižek’s thought is asserted by Kay: ‘If, in his 
earliest writings, Žižek was most interested in belief, he has always identified 
psychoanalysis as a source of hope, and now, increasingly, he has turned to love as the 
way of fulfilling that hope’ (Kay, 2003: 123).  
Freud discovered that behind much of the neurosis and suffering he encountered 
in his clinical work lay a primordial fantasy of totality, omniscience, completion and 
satisfaction, sometimes symbolized by the cocoon-like safety and need-free contentment 
of existence in the womb. The separation of the subject from this fantasmatic illusion 
creates, according to Lacanian theory, a lack, an incompleteness, and a wish to 
obliterate this gap. Žižek sees this thrust towards completion and harmony as being 
decisive in the motivation of inter-subjectivity. The subject is aware of a lack, an 
emptiness, and a discord, and the resolution of this discomfort is translated into a belief 
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that the other is in possession of that which is most ardently desired: ‘This object is 
what is unconsciously believed will fill the void at the core of being’ (Žižek, 1999: 3). 
This need is imagined and symbolized in many forms; recognition, acceptance, 
knowledge, and love are some of the signifiers of this demand: ‘Fantasy is a way for the 
subject to answer the question of what object they are for the Other, in the eyes of the 
Other, for the Other’s desire’ (Žižek, 2006b: 58). Žižek refers to Lacan’s exposition of 
desire and offers the following interpretation: ‘The problem with human desire is that, 
as Lacan put it, it is always a ‘desire of the Other’…desire for the Other, desire to be 
desired by the Other, and especially desire for what the Other desires’ (Žižek, 2007: 
313). Therefore, the approach to the other is propelled with a view to providing what is 
missing in the self, and the other is seen as either withholding this magical synthesis or 
as bestowing it conditionally. The acknowledgement of a lack in oneself, a deficit which 
may be filled by the other, is more bearable than the realisation that the lack is also in 
the other: ‘fantasy is precisely an attempt to fill out this lack in the Other’ (Žižek, 
2006b: 333). Hence the encounter between subject and object, and the ensuing 
relationship which is sometimes defined as love, raises the question: who or what do we 
love? Žižek argues that when love is impelled with a need to provide what is absent in 
the self, or in the other, it is based on illusion: ‘the other sees something in me and 
wants something from me, but I cannot give him what I do not possess’ (Žižek, 1999: 
163). The first illusion is that the other holds the magical key which will replace that 
which is missing; the second illusion is that the lack in the subject can ever be 
obliterated: Both of these fantasies must be traversed, the integral void must be accepted 
as constitutive of both subject and object, if the condition of authentic love is to be 
experienced. Kay explains the link between the real and the traversing of the fantasy: 
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‘‘traversing the fantasy’ – a phrase referring to the outcome of Lacanian therapy, in 
which we glimpse that what we had taken for reality was all along an illusion masking 
the space of the real, and so have an opportunity to build ‘reality’ afresh’ (Kay, 2003: 
5). As with Žižek’s identification of the neighbour with the Real, the other, if it is to be 
loved, must be recognized and embraced in all its limitation, emptiness and 
vulnerability. The raw, conflicting, ambiguous nature of the other is glimpsed in 
moments, gestures, or simply intuitions of the real; these momentary glimpses are 
enabled by the subject’s acknowledgement of his/her own incompleteness, lack and 
disharmony. When both illusions are overturned there is an acceptance that the other 
does not possess what the subject lacks, and simultaneously an awareness that the 
subject does not possess what the other desires: ‘the subject gets proof that the agalma, 
the ‘hidden treasure’, is already wanting in the other’ (Žižek, 2006b: 47). 
 There are many obstacles to traversing the fantasy, and according to Žižek these 
must be recognised if they are to be overcome. One such obstacle is the concept of 
subjectivity: ‘subjectivity must be reinvented’ (Žižek, 2001a: etext). The illusion of a 
transparent, knowable, fixed subjectivity is renounced by Žižek, (as it is by Freud and 
Ricoeur), and he takes Nietzsche’s definition of active and passive nihilism as a 
signpost towards his argument: 
Active nihilism, in the sense of wanting nothing itself, is this active self-
destruction which would be precisely the passion of the real – the idea that, 
in order to love fully and authentically, you must engage in self-destruction. 
On the other hand, there is passive nihilism, what Nietzsche called ‘The last 
man’ – just living a stupid, self-satisfied life without great passions (Žižek, 
2001a: etext). 
 
The self which is to be destroyed in the assumption of active nihilism and authentic love 
is the illusory self seeking its completion, justification, and meaning in the desire of the 
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other. This self-destruction is synonymous with the end of an analysis, according to 
Žižek, because the ‘“effect of truth”, the “self-understanding” which emerges at end of 
analysis means that ‘I am not the same subject as before’ (Žižek, 2001: 33).89 The 
ongoing creation and re-creation of the self resounds with Nietzsche’s idea of 
‘becoming’ as opposed to being; the simultaneous renunciation of former self images 
which no longer hold validity is part of the process of narrative identity, as discussed by 
Ricoeur; the sentiment echoes the lines from Eliot’s “Four Quartets”: ‘You are not the 
same people who left that station / Or who will arrive at any terminus’ (Eliot, 2004: 
188).  
There are many barriers to such truth and understanding, and it is often more 
comfortable to maintain one’s established sense of self than to risk the erasure of 
familiar roles, masks, and self-images, because the gaze of the big Other, albeit in less 
recognizable forms than hitherto experienced, is still imagined consequential to one’s 
inclusion in the symbolic/social world. The persistence of the Other in ‘post-
ideological’ times is evident in many guises; the expert, possessor of knowledge and 
understanding, who will tell one what to do, what to believe, what to desire. Žižek 
follows Lacan’s depiction of desire as ‘the desire of the other’, the desire for what the 
other wants. The world of media, and especially advertising, daily bombards us with 
images of what we should want, and the success of the enterprise lies in the belief that if 
others want something then it must be worth having. These never-satisfying entities, 
symbolized in material wealth and comfort, intellectual success and prestige, and the 
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 Hederman echoes this sentiment in his exploration of love: ‘Unless my old self dies, it remains alone’ 
(Hederman, 2000: 40). 
Chapter Six: Slavoj Žižek 
 219 
many characteristics of a desirable life-style, are mere substitutes for our real desire 
which remains hidden from us, and they are detours of avoidance whereby 
responsibility and freedom are inhibited. Žižek refers to these detours as gadget or 
fetish, and explains that ‘a fetish can play a very constructive role of allowing us to cope 
with the harsh reality’ (Žižek, 2001b: etext). Therefore he asks, ‘What is your gadget, 
your favourite illusionary escape-hatch?’ (Žižek, 2001b: etext). An array of possible 
answers abounds in the almost obsessive consumerism which characterizes 
postmodernity: ‘Post modernism is the cultural logic of late capitalism, or the response 
of culture to its colonization of the commodity’ (Myers, 2004: 45).  
Similarly, the growth of a victim-culture in recent times, where victimhood 
appears to be encouraged, glorified, or approached with a view to retaliation and 
reparation, is seen by Žižek as another phenomenon which maintains the fantasy of the 
other-supposed to know, the powerful other who will interpret one’s story and redress 
the wrongs which have been endured. ‘“The culture of complaint” thus calls on the big 
Other to intervene, and to set things straight’ (Žižek, 1997a: etext). The necessity of 
testimony and accountability is not questioned here, but Žižek suggests that the 
proliferation of the status of victim often involves an underlying assumption of 
impotence and subjugation because it maintains the aura of helplessness and 
powerlessness of the victims and ‘is designed to prevent them turning into active 
agents’ (Žižek, 2004: 143), while enhancing the notion of knowledge and capability 
residing in the powerful other; herein lies the paradox of victimization: ‘the ideological 
construction of the idea of subject-victim…an extremely violent gesture of reducing the 
other to the helpless victim’ (Žižek, 1999a: etext). Examples abound; from revisionist 
readings of colonial suppression and exploitation to tribunals of justice, of truth, and of 
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employment. Here, Žižek considers it important to differentiate between two levels of 
victimization: 
On the one hand we have the upper-middle-class discourse of victimization 
in our own societies. This is the narcissistic logic of whatever the other does 
to you is potentially a threat…we are all the time potentially victims of 
verbal harassment, sexual harassment, violence, smoking, obesity – an 
eternal threat…Then we have the third world catastrophes – or even with us 
the homeless and the excluded…there is an invisible distance here (Žižek, 
2004: 143). 
 
In either case, Žižek discerns a duplicity; in engaging in ‘humanitarian exercises’, the 
‘benevolence’ of the Western world maintains its distance from third world victims, and 
in embracing the status of victimhood for itself, the Western subject reaffirms the 
authority of the big Other as the symbolic source of protection and retribution. On a 
personal, intersubjective level, a similar fantasy is perpetuated whereby one seeks in the 
other what the other does not possess. In shifting the burden of fulfilment, knowledge, 
redress, or whatever it is which is sought, onto another, the subject reinforces the 
ideological fantasy of the other/the master/the saviour, and experiences an illusory sense 
of liberation and immunity from responsibility and action. 
Only by traversing the fantasy, by acknowledging the basic gap or lack in both 
subject and object, is the possibility of love opened; when ‘all the burden falls back 
upon the subject since he renounces any support in the Other’ (Žižek, 2001:59). The 
imperfection and incompleteness of the subject, the impossibility of fully penetrating 
the kernel of one’s being, and the simultaneous acknowledgement of a similar lack in 
the other, would appear to attest to an utter incommensurability between subject and 
object, between self and other; but it is in the celebration of this very impossibility and 
inaccessibility that Žižek locates ‘love’s most sublime moment’ (Žižek, 2001: 58):  
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What defines love is this basic discord or gap…the lover seeks in the 
beloved what he lacks, but as Lacan puts it, “what the one lacks is not what 
is hidden within the other”…the only thing left to the beloved is thus to 
proceed to a kind of exchange of places, to change from the object into the 
subject of love, in short: to return love…by reaching his hand back to the 
lover and thus answering the lover’s lack/desire with his own lack (Žižek, 
2001: 58). 
 
While Žižek is often critical of deconstruction, and of Derrida in particular, the above 
statement resounds strongly with Derrida’s reflections on love and friendship. Derrida 
explores the concept of love/friendship through a reading of Plato and Aristotle, but 
especially through a reading of Nietzsche, and his conclusion of love as an act echoes 
the image of the hand being reached back to the lover; ‘life, breath, the soul, are always 
and necessarily found on the side of the lover or of loving…one can love being loved – 
or to be lovable – but loving will always be more, better and something other than being 
loved’ (Derrida, 2005: 10).90 The focus on loving over the desire to be loved resounds 
with Nietzsche’s statement that ‘the demand to be loved is the greatest kind of 
arrogance’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 239), and it is also for Žižek the gesture wherein genuine 
love emerges, and which reverses the status of the loved one from object to subject: 
I am truly in love not when I am simply fascinated by the agalma of the 
other, but when I experience the other, the object of my love, as frail and 
lost, as lacking ‘it’, and my love none the less survives this loss…we now 
have two loving subjects instead of the initial duality of the loving one and 
the loved one the object of love…[the object of love] thus acquires the status 
of another subject (Žižek, 1999: 164). 
 
Lacan maintains the distinction between the self and the other within the experience of 
love, but he also stresses the transference of attention to the being of the other as central 
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 A statement by Kearney suggests the link between the thoughts of Derrida and Žižek here: ‘Desire of 
the other as separate and transcendent is desire as gift rather than appropriation’ (Kearney, 2001: 69). 
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to this experience: ‘Love, now no longer conceived of as a passion, but as an active gift, 
is always directed, beyond imaginary captivation, towards the being of the loved 
subject’ (Lacan, 1991: 276), and he reiterates the focus of this direction: ‘Love aspires 
to the unfolding of the being of the other’ (Lacan, 1991: 277). The transformation of the 
object into a subject described above echoes Buber’s differentiation between the ‘I-It’ 
relationship which objectifies the other, and the ‘I-Thou’ experience wherein the other 
is embraced as a self. Žižek may be considered cynical about human relationships, 
communication, and the possibility of love; Kearney refers to his ‘uncompromising 
scepticism’ and ‘nihilistic cynicism’, and he quotes the criticism of M. Brockelman for 
‘his insistence upon the total ‘unrepresentability’ of the…subject’ (Kearney, 2003: 257). 
However, in highlighting the difficulties, ambiguities, and failures inherent in the reality 
of human experience, Žižek simultaneously attests to the intrinsic urgency of love for 
human living, and to his persistent conviction in the possibility of love. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION THREE 
POETRY
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
William Wordsworth 
 
 
he centrality of language to human experience, its expression, its 
communication, and its analysis, and the limitations of this phenomenon in 
fully realising the symbolization of being in the world, provides a link 
between the disciplines of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and poetry. While all three 
attempt to express, question, and reflect upon the human condition, the distinction of the 
poetic word as a medium with a unique potential to disclose and articulate the truth of 
being human, is asserted by many philosophers and psychoanalysts, including the 
writers explored in the previous sections of this thesis. Nussbaum, asking ‘if it is love 
one is trying to understand, that strange unmanageable phenomenon or form of life’, 
states that while ‘literary form is not separable from philosophical content’, the 
language of literature may enable a greater understanding: 
there may be some views of the world and how one should live in it – views, 
especially, that emphasize the world’s surprising variety, its complexity and 
mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty – that cannot be fully and 
adequately stated in the language of conventional philosophical prose…but 
only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more allusive, 
more attentive to particulars (Nussbaum, 1992: 3). 
 
 Nietzsche, although somewhat critical of poets in some ways, himself adopted a poetic 
form in his use of aphorisms, his Zarathustra reads like a confessional lyric poem, and 
he admits that ‘there are so many things between heaven and earth which only the poets 
have let themselves dream!’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 150).  Freud speaks enviously of the 
T 
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relative ease with which poets discovered and expressed truths of the human condition; 
‘Everywhere I go I find that a poet has been there before me’,91 and went on to explain: 
‘We laymen have always been intensely curious to know…from what sources that 
strange creature, the creative writer, draws his material, and how he manages to make 
such an impression on us with it and to arouse in us emotions of which, perhaps, we had 
not even thought ourselves capable’ (Freud, 1995: 436).  
In his study of love ‘as an experience common to all human beings’, the 
contemporary psychoanalyst, Andre Green, echoes the sentiments of Freud as he 
humbly asserts that ‘the creation of poets goes far beyond the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of love’: 
I think that art, mainly literature, and especially poetry, undoubtedly gives a 
better introduction to the knowledge of love, which we grasp by 
intuition…the detour through imaginative and poetic language of a very 
general human experience has proved to be more efficient than the ideas 
born from an experiment which has undeniably committed itself to the most 
constant and careful investigation of love relationships (Green and Kohun, 
2005: 5). 
 
Buber sees in lyric poetry ‘the tremendous refusal of the soul to be satisfied with self-
commerce’, and a manifestation of relation as essential to human being: ‘Poetry is the 
soul’s announcement that even when it is alone with itself on the narrowest ridge it is 
thinking not of itself but of the Being which is not itself’ (Buber, 2004: 213). In an 
interview with Richard Kearney,  Ricoeur offers his reflections on the ‘prejudice and 
bias’ of ordinary language, and concludes that: 
we need a third dimension of language which is directed…towards the 
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disclosure of possible worlds…this third dimension of language I call the 
mytho-poetic. The adequate self-understanding of man is dependent on this 
third dimension of language as a disclosure of possibility (Ricoeur, 1991: 
490).   
 
Ricoeur states that ‘the philosopher relies on this capacity of poetry to enlarge, to 
increase, to augment the capacity of meaning of our language’ (Ricoeur, 1991: 450). 
Both Lacan and Žižek turn to poetic devices to explore the unconscious process at 
work.
92
 The power of poetry to disclose truth, to lift the veil of accustomed modes of 
seeing, and to express new visions of possibility and reality, is aptly described by 
Guillaume Apollinaire as he gives his definition of the poet: 
Poets are not simply men devoted to the beautiful. They are also and 
especially devoted to truth, insofar as the unknown can be penetrated, so 
much that the unexpected, the surprising, is one of the principal sources of 
poetry…since men must live in the end by truths in spite of the falsehoods 
with which they pad them, the poet alone sustains the life whereby humanity 
finds these truths.
93
 
 
 
The quest for understanding, of the subject and the world, which is explored through 
philosophy and psychoanalysis, is also central to the poetic act, its creation and its 
reception. Adrienne Rich, in a reflection on her developing attraction to poetry, points to 
its potential revelation and interpretation of human understanding: 
Poetry soon became more than music and images; it was also revelation, 
information, a kind of teaching…I thought it could offer clues, intimations, 
                                                 
92
 Lacan refers to ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonymy’ as modes of language which may aid understanding, and 
makes direct use of poetic references to elucidate his thought; Žižek turns to Wordsworth’s lines, “On 
Boating”, to discuss the co-existence of the sublime and the monstrous in human experience. 
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 This quotation is taken from an excerpt from “The New Spirit and the Poets”, chapter 9, in Poetry in 
Theory: An Anthology 1900-2000, ed. Jon Cook. 
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keys to questions…What is possible in this life? What does “love” mean, 
this thing that is so important? What is this other thing called “freedom” or 
“liberty” – is it like love, a feeling? What have human beings lived and 
suffered in the past? How am I going to live my life? (Rich, 2004: 505). 
 
Thus poetry is another mode whereby the human being seeks understanding, of the self, 
the other, and the world, and it addresses and explores the questions which inspire 
philosophy and psychoanalysis in all aspects of inquiry, albeit in its own unique way. 
Wordsworth is a poet who radicalized the poetic experience in its content, 
method and purpose, and who, anticipating the philosophers and theorists of the 
previous sections, posited truth as the ultimate raison deter of thought and of the poetic 
act: ‘poetry is the most philosophical of all writing…its object is truth…not standing 
upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion; truth which is its 
own testimony’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 605). The world of the late eighteenth century 
which formed the background of Wordsworth’s poetic work was the scene of turbulent 
change, violence and upheaval. It saw the questioning of European thought in 
philosophy, politics, and literature, as revolutionary ideals of individual freedom and 
social change propelled revolt against established orders. Revolutions in America and 
France hinted at a possible new and bright socio-political future. A revolutionary spirit 
permeated the political and social realm, with a commitment to replace long-accepted 
traditions of government, society and individuality with the radical embrace of the 
ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity. Enthusiasm for change expressed itself in 
revolutionary action which was often ambiguous in its methods, and the ensuing 
devastation and brutality of the reign of terror across Europe led to disillusionment 
among many who had supported the revolutionary dream. For those, the idealistic 
dreams of this period were followed by uncertainty and incomprehension in the face of 
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the violence and bloodshed which seemed to mock the very concepts which inspired 
them; words like liberty, equality, and fraternity sounded hollow in the aftermath of war 
and terror.  
The life of Wordsworth spans this period of transition from unfettered hope and 
determined optimism to acknowledgement of the human cost of revolt and 
industrialisation, and many Wordsworthian commentators situate their analysis of his 
work within this framework. Thus, explorations and interpretations have dealt with his 
poetry as a portrayal of his shifting political views, his embrace of solitude as a gradual 
detachment from the complexities of a changing civilized world, and the personal 
conflicts and failures which are variously attributed to the writer of the poems.
94
 The 
reading of Wordsworth’s poetry for the purposes of this thesis does not pursue this 
analysis except as it impinges on the thesis question, and concurs with the poet’s claim 
that ‘All men ought to be judged with charity and forbearance after death has put it out 
of their power to explain the motives of their actions’ (Wordsworth, 2002: 126). Suffice 
to suggest that the poet, faced with concrete examples of the failure of theoretical ideals 
of equality and fraternity, sublimated these values into a love of the world and its 
inhabitants which confronted him in reality. In the words of David Bromwich, ‘he 
began as a moral thinker about society, and ended as a moral thinker about personal 
experience’ (Bromwich, 2000: 74). Like Freud later, he rejected the doctrine of 
‘universal love’ while concentrating on his personal reaction to the flesh and blood 
characters of his actual experience. This resounds with Buber’s positing of genuine 
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 The concentration on the personality of the poet is evident in the following works: Paul Hamilton’s 
Wordsworth, 1986; David Bromwich’s Disowned by Memory: Wordsworth’s Poetry of the 1790s, 2000. 
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relationship and experience of love in the practical, concrete situations of lived 
experience. While Wordsworth’s poetry is radically personal, exploring questions of 
humanity through a persistent examination of his own psychological and emotional 
development, the emphasis here is on the poetic word rather than the character of the 
writer.  
 The political and social upheaval that characterized the end of the eighteenth 
century was paralleled by major changes in European thought, particularly articulated in 
philosophy and literature, and combining to epitomize the period defined as 
romanticism. Stuart Curran, in the preface to The Cambridge Companion to British 
Romanticism, describes this period as ‘a crucial transition between an Enlightenment 
world view and the values of modern, industrial society’ (Curran, 2005: xiii). The 
disillusionment which followed the revolutionary attempts at political democracy and 
individual freedom did not diminish the impact of the new vision of the subject, and the 
subject’s place in the world. The concept of subjectivity took on new meanings which 
suggested an inter-weaving of freedom and responsibility, the acknowledgement of the 
powers of the imagination, and the prominence of feeling and passion as a primary 
factor in the acquisition of knowledge about the human being in the world, over the one-
sided adherence to reason as the repository of truth and knowledge.  Irving Singer 
considers the new importance given to the emotions to be central to the romantic vision: 
‘What distinguished Romanticism from earlier forms of idealism…[was] the 
extraordinary importance that was given to feeling rather than reason’, and he continues 
to explain that this did not translate into a negation of reason altogether: ‘It is not the 
case that the Romantics believed that “feeling is all”, as some commentators have 
suggested, but only that feeling is primary, both in morals and in the acquisition of 
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knowledge about the world’ (Singer, 1984: 285-6). The elevation of the imagination is 
seen by P.M.S. Dawson as also crucial to the romantic achievement: ‘The Romantics’ 
faith in the power of imaginative vision to transform the world is the source of some of 
their greatest achievements’, and he suggests that this was a political as well as a poetic 
ideal of romanticism: ‘In a society whose practices and beliefs constituted a denial of 
the human imagination and creativity it was the poet’s role to keep open a sense of 
alternative possibility’ (Dawson, 2005: 71,73). An attempt to reunite what had 
previously been dissected, heart and mind, body and soul, passion and reason, human 
being and nature, inspired the philosophy and literature of this period, and Wordsworth, 
as the ‘historian of the heart’, sought, through autobiographical narration, self-analysis, 
and the development of a personal poetic and linguistic vision, to give expression to the 
tenets of the romantic period. Focusing upon personal experience and an increase in 
self-consciousness, Wordsworth’s poetry embodies an analysis of the past by the 
present, ‘emotion recollected in tranquillity’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 611); an 
accommodation of unconscious influences and motivations on mood and behaviour, and 
a narration of dreams and memories as a route towards self-discovery. The deepening 
insights into the psychological development of the human being which are enabled by 
this poetic endeavour are paralleled by a similarly increasing uncertainty of self-
definition which foreshadows Nietzsche’s introspective analysis and rejection of 
traditional understanding of selfhood and subjectivity:  Harold Bloom comments on ‘a 
very complex nineteenth century questioning of the notion of a single, separate self, a 
questioning that culminated in the analytics of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, but which 
may be stronger in the poets even than it was in the great speculators’ (Bloom, 1976: 
135).  
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Anticipating Freud and the psychoanalytic techniques of free-association and 
interpretation, Wordsworth’s poetry is a searching and a poised act of self-examination. 
The similarities between Wordsworth, and Freud and Nietzsche, are highlighted by 
Bloom when he seeks to define his understanding of ‘strong poets’; he states that 
‘strong poets present themselves as looking for truth ‘in the world’… two of the 
strongest poets in the European Romantic tradition [were] Nietzsche and Freud’ 
(Bloom, 1976: 2). The urgency of the search for truth is proclaimed by Wordsworth: 
‘Intelligent lovers of freedom are from necessity bold and hardy lovers of truth’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 668). The commitment to self-analysis and introspection evident in 
Nietzsche and Freud is foreshadowed by Wordsworth’s intense preoccupation with 
personal reflection and autobiographical reference as a source of his poetic truth. He 
asserts the value of humility and honesty in a questioning of the inner self as 
prerequisite to truth and love: 
 …true knowledge leads to love, 
True dignity abides with him alone 
Who, in the silent hour of inward thought, 
Can still suspect, and still revere himself, 
In lowliness of heart (Wordsworth, 1984: 31). 
 
 The inner quest which the poet undertakes involves both mind and heart, as 
Wordsworth professes his conviction that the soul arrives at truth through both emotion 
and reason, and that knowing accompanied by feeling enables the experience of 
empathy that underlies caring and love.  
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Neglect of the Heart 
The differences, the outside marks by which, 
Society has parted man from man, 
Neglectful of the universal heart (Wordsworth, 1984: 574). 
 
  
Reacting against classicism and the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on rationality, 
order, and inevitable social progress, romanticism promoted the primacy of subjectivity, 
unfettered imagination, and emotional spontaneity. As the acknowledged standard-
bearer of romanticism in English literature, Wordsworth seeks a new definition of the 
poet, his/her work, and his/her method. In The Preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1802), co-
authored with Samuel Coleridge, Wordsworth provides a manifesto in defence of his art 
which differs radically from the measured ornamentation and rigid conventions 
implicitly accepted by the prevailing literary canon. He champions a more realistic and 
naturalistic type of writing and argues that the exposition of the heart of man is central 
to the poetic process: ‘my theme / No other than the very heart of man’ (Wordsworth, 
1984: 575). The acknowledgement of feeling and passion as integral to human 
experience leads Wordsworth to examine the hitherto neglected possibilities implicit in 
a recognition of the heart as the seat of a different level of knowledge, and he defines 
his vision of  poetry accordingly: ‘Poetry is passion: it is the history or science of 
feelings’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 594), and he proposes an expansion of philosophy to 
integrate this hitherto neglected source of truth: ‘philosophy enlightened by the 
affections’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 668). In his role as a teacher and trainer of 
psychoanalysts, Lacan makes a similar plea: ‘I urge you…at the heart of your own 
search for the truth, to renounce quite radically…the use of an opposition like that of the 
affective and the intellectual…by using it one gets into a series of blind alleys’ (Lacan, 
Chapter Seven: William Wordsworth 
 233 
1991: 274). The enlightenment and understanding ensuing from ‘the affections’ is 
shown by Wordsworth to be primarily sourced in the capacity to love; his poetry centres 
on the essential necessity of a willingness and a commitment to feel a sense of love of 
life in all its manifestations, resounding with Nietzsche’s amor fati, and it therefore 
examines the phenomena, personal and cultural, which hinder this possibility. In an 
implicit critique of ‘what is now called science’, Wordsworth argues that it needs ‘to put 
on…a form of flesh and blood’ in order to address the complexities and diversities of its 
subject’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 607). In contrasting ‘the knowledge both of the Poet and 
the Man of Science’ Wordsworth puts forward his conception of the poet and his work: 
The Man of Science seeks truth as a remote and unknown benefactor; he 
cherishes and loves it in his solitude: the Poet, singing a song in which all 
human beings join with him, rejoices in the presence of truth as our visible 
friend and hourly companion. Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all 
knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of 
all Science…the Poet binds together by passion and knowledge the vast 
empire of human society…Poetry is first and last of all Knowledge – it is as 
immortal as the heart of man (Wordsworth, 1984: 606). 
 
Wordsworth’s insistence on the heart as the essence of the poetic act is later echoed by 
Derrida in his response to the question “What is poetry?” in 1998; he questions the 
possibility of an answer, but insists that any attempt involves knowing ‘how to renounce 
knowledge’; thenceforth he offers his  response: ‘I call a poem that very thing that 
teaches the heart, invents the heart, that which, finally, the word heart seems to mean 
and which, in my language, I cannot easily discern from the word itself’ (Derrida, 2004:  
536). Wordsworth’s admonishment against the one-sided emphasis of science is based 
on its neglect of the heart, and he sees this bias as detrimental to human knowledge and 
truth: 
Our meddling intellect  
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things; 
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We murder to dissect. 
Enough of science and of art; 
Close up these barren leaves; 
Come forth, and bring with you a heart 
That watches and receives (Wordsworth, 1984: 131). 
 
His plea for recognition of the heart’s knowledge resounds with the ideas of the 
seventeenth century philosopher, Blaise Pascal, whose writings exerted a significant 
influence on romanticism, and particularly on the work of Rousseau. Pascal asserted 
the dominating faculty of the imagination in the complex quest for truth, and he posited 
the intuitive mind as a necessary correlation to rational thought: ‘the heart has its 
reasons which reason itself does not know’ (Pascal, 1999: 150-158); the paradoxical 
inter-twining of passion and reason is echoed later by Nietzsche in his attack upon the 
degradation of passion and the misunderstanding of reason: ‘As if every passion did not 
have its quantum of reason’ (Nietzsche, 1968:  208).  Wordsworth elevates the 
imagination to a position of power and revelation which enhances awareness, of self, of 
others, and of the natural world: ‘the power of the human imagination is sufficient to 
produce such changes even in our physical nature as might almost appear miraculous’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 611).  
Wordsworth’s embrace of the truth of emotional experience is a consistent 
commitment throughout his work: In his essay, “Wordsworth’s Poetry to 1798”, 
Duncan Wu refers to this pervasive concern: ‘From his earliest writings to his last…he 
was endowed with an intuitive understanding of the human mind, and from the first 
attempted to describe the inner truth of the emotions’ (Wu, 2003: 26). In embracing the 
world of emotion and imagination, the poet inevitably focuses on internal experience, 
resulting in a self-examination that necessitates an exploration of his personal past 
through the power of memory and interpretation. Through memory the adult mind 
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contends with its childhood origins. In this way, an integration of the self is attempted, 
where earlier experiences, events and encounters are revisited with the objectivity which 
distance, temporal and spatial, facilitates. Simultaneously, the present circumstances of 
the poet are opened to inquiry and understanding when viewed against the background 
of the past. The resulting narrative of the self, which is expanded to accommodate on-
going interpretation and understanding, resounds with Ricoeur’s thesis on narrative 
identity and the importance of memory in formulating that identity. 
 Inevitably, in the light of new thinking characteristic of this period, the concept 
of childhood and the significance of early experience took on a different meaning and 
importance than had hitherto been contemplated, and the psychological and emotional 
significance of this period of life became a subject of study across diverse disciplines. 
This later became a cornerstone of Freud’s psychoanalysis with its emphasis on 
explaining mental and emotional distress through a re-narration of past experiences in a 
therapeutic setting, its insights into the phenomena of memory, forgetting, and 
repetition, and its recognition of the unconscious as a powerful factor in human 
experience. For Wordsworth, the child embodies all the possibilities for freedom, 
creativity and enthusiastic curiosity, which are later diminished to varying degrees by 
the gradual immersion in civilization; the child is an earlier self unburdened by the 
consciousness of adult cares. Buber sees the development of the child as being impacted 
by both nature and society: ‘He is educated by the elements, by air and light and the life 
of plants and animals, and he is educated by relationships’ (Buber, 2004: 107). Arguing 
for the intelligence of the body as a source wisdom, Nietzsche looks to the truth of the 
child: ‘I am body and soul’ – so speaks the child. And why should one not speak like 
children?’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 61). While Freud did not idealize childhood in this way, 
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his analysis of the influence of earlier life-events and trauma, and the conflict between 
the individual and civilization, resounds with Wordsworth’s thesis. For Freud, the 
process of socialization involves the internalization of injunctions and expectations 
which restrict the unbounded freedom and curiosity of the child’s initial experience of 
the world; there is a gradual awareness that certain experiences, feelings, and desires are 
at variance with social mores, and hence the repression of certain aspects of the self. 
Wordsworth’s glorification of childhood appears to refer to the innocence and creativity 
which precedes the demands of socialization, a phase which might be seen to be lost as 
the child enters the Lacanian realms of the imaginary and the symbolic. Both 
Wordsworth and Freud discern a loss of self, to varying degrees, in the social adaptation 
of the human being, and a diminished self lacks the integration which enables the 
experience of love, of oneself and of others. Both writers point to this consequence; 
Wordsworth confronts it in his analysis of his own development, while Freud 
encounters it in the distress of his patients as they attempted to express their concerns 
through the transference of love onto the analyst. Echoing the thought of both writers, 
Nietzsche offers his reflections on childhood: ‘The child is innocence and forgetfulness, 
a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 55). 
According to Wordsworth, the new orientation of poetic expression which he 
advocates, necessitates the cultivation of a different poetic language, an articulation of 
human experiences grounded in the actual lives of ordinary people; he wants ‘a 
selection of the language really spoken by men’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 602). The 
necessary relationship between understanding and language, later developed in the 
thought of the philosophers and theorists of the previous sections, is explored by 
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Wordsworth as he examines ‘in what manner language and the human mind re-act on 
each other’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 596), and he seeks a language which reflects and 
resounds with the lived activity which he observes around him.  This leads him to 
concentrate his attention on the individuals who inhabit the landscape of hills and 
valleys to which he is consistently drawn. His sources of inspiration therefore differ 
radically from that of his predecessors, but Wordsworth argues against any exclusions 
from his poetic explorations: ‘It is the honourable characteristic of Poetry that its 
materials are to be found in every subject which can interest the human mind’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 591). The inclusive nature of poetry is also attested by Seamus 
Heaney when he says: ‘Poetry, let us say, whether it belongs to an old political 
dispensation or aspires to express a new one, has to be a working model of inclusive 
consciousness’ (Heaney, 2000: 572).  
Creating a new poetic vision, in content and form, Wordsworth combines the 
narrative style of the ballad with the lyric’s emotional content; both forms had been 
considered inferior to the strict demands of serious poetry, but Wordsworth defends his 
position while acknowledging the impact of rigid prejudice in depreciating something 
new and unfamiliar: ‘that most dreadful enemy to our pleasures, our own pre-
established codes of decision’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 591). The difficulty inherent in a 
renunciation of the familiar is also noted by Freud: ‘Hardly anything is harder for a man 
than to give up a pleasure which he has once experienced. Actually, we can never give 
anything up; we only exchange one thing for another’ (Freud, 1995: 438). 
Consequently, what is radically new is often dismissed as untenable; as Nietzsche says, 
‘to hear something new is hard and painful for the ear; we hear the music of foreigners 
badly’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 115). Wordsworth is committed to the embrace of a new poetic 
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vision which involves ‘breaking the bonds of custom’ whereby one tends ‘to dwell upon 
those points wherein Men differ from each other, to the exclusion of those in which all 
Men are alike’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 658). The acknowledgement of universal 
experiences of thought and feeling, regardless of social role or status, enables a 
recognition of one’s own needs, desires, fears, strengths and weaknesses reflected in the 
other, and according to Wordsworth, results in understanding, empathy, compassion, 
and ultimately love of the other and the self. This resounds with Žižek’s argument that 
love is only possible in an acceptance that the other/beloved does not possess the 
attributes and solutions which are felt lacking in the self. The willingness to recognize 
the frailty, fallibility, confusion and conflict which may appear in the other, as also 
definitive of the self, enables the possibility of approaching the other, not as a receptacle 
of disowned projections, but in an openness and vulnerability to alterity and difference 
in oneself and others; in the words of Ricoeur, it is the attempted acknowledgement of 
‘oneself as another’. The revolutionary nature of this poetic vision, its rejection of 
established criteria and restrictions, inevitably provoked disdain and ridicule. 
Wordsworth retorts with a psychoanalytic interpretation of projection which often 
underlies the critic’s scorn: ‘The lash, which they are aiming at my productions, does, in 
fact, only fall on phantoms of their own brain’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 640). His 
contemporary, Blake, puts it thus: ‘O’er my sins thou sit and moan: / Hast thou no sins 
of thy own? / O’er my sins thou sit and weep, / And lull thy own sins fast asleep’ 
(Blake, 2004: 90). Acknowledging the attraction of familiarity and repetition, later 
explored by Freud as the compulsion to repeat, Wordsworth accepts the difficulties 
inherent in moving beyond habitual pleasure and security: ‘we not only wish to be 
pleased, but to be pleased in that particular way in which we have been accustomed to 
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be pleased’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 614). Thereby, he acknowledges the obstacles which 
hinder the growth of understanding, openness, and vulnerability, and which diminish the 
capacity to love. 
The world of nature, its magnificence and power, its turbulence and gentleness, 
and its particularity and universality, provides the canvas upon which Wordsworth 
paints the human experience: ‘Poetry is the image of man and nature’ (Wordsworth, 
1884: 605). Through his own love of nature and through an exploration of his own 
psyche, Wordsworth expresses through his poetry a conviction that love is a powerful, if 
sometimes elusive, instrument of mediation between self and the universe, between self 
and others, and between the disparate complexities of the individual psyche. The 
celebration of love which underlines Wordsworth’s poetry was characteristic of 
romanticism in general, according to John Jones, in his analysis of the period: ‘The 
work of the Romantics, poets and novelists, celebrates the fact of love, as once 
marvellously evident and difficult beyond despair, and about which the age immediately 
preceding them had been less than honest’ (Jones, 1970: vii). In an attempt to approach 
a more honest analysis of love Wordsworth sources his investigations in an encounter 
with his own inner realities, and his poetry moves across the inner and outer landscapes 
combining an observation and a translation of the relations between the private 
individual and the characters which inhabit his/her world, and the interactions between 
the human being and the natural world. The connection between love of nature and love 
of man is a persistent theme in his poetry, as stated by John Beer when discussing 
Wordsworth’s faith in the lessons of the heart:  
Wordsworth believed that in attending to the motions of his own heart he 
was making a study that could be of value to all his fellow human beings. He 
hoped, among other things, to show by this study how the love of 
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nature…must inevitably lead to the love of man (Beer, 1978: 13). 
 
The concept of love is therefore central to Wordsworth’s work, and in his poetic study 
of human nature and his exploration of the mind and heart, he portrays both the 
possibilities of its experience and the obstacles which sometimes prevent its realization. 
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Loss 
Whither is fled the visionary gleam? 
Where is it now, the glory and the dream? (Wordsworth, 1984: 298). 
 
Impermanence and transience, as inescapable realities of the human condition, propel an 
equally real desire to transcend the sorrow and limitation which often accompanies a 
realization of finitude and unpredictability; literature abounds with diverse approaches 
to this perennial conflict: ‘The immortal Mind craves objects that endure’ (Wordsworth, 
1984: 287). Wordsworth’s encounter with the vicissitudes characteristic of life in all its 
forms is explored on one level through his favourite image of the daffodil; 
contemplation of the beauty and splendour of a daffodil-filled meadow instills a 
momentary joy, ‘A poet could not but be gay / In such a laughing company’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 303), and the memory of this joy retains the power to soothe in 
times of solitude and reflection. However, the imagery of the daffodil evokes the 
sentiments of an earlier poet, Robert Herrick, when he immortalizes the flower as a 
symbol of the brevity of life: 
We have short time to stay, as you, 
We have as short a spring; 
As quick a growth to meet decay, 
As you, or anything (Herrick, 1919: 252).   
 
The sorrow pertaining to a confrontation with change and death is intensified to 
unbearable proportions when it involves loss of the beloved. In the sonnet “Surprised by 
Joy” (Wordsworth, 1984: 334), Wordsworth expresses his personal anguish and 
inconsolable grief in the face of such loss. The death of his beloved daughter, ‘my most 
grievous loss’, is ‘the worst pang that sorrow ever bore’, and there is no compensation 
to be found in memory or forgetfulness. The poet realizes that this loss is final, and its 
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pain a constant companion: ‘neither present time, nor years unborn / Could to my sight 
that heavenly face restore’. A momentary relief from this grief, a fleeting encounter 
with joy, results from an involuntary forgetting of his loss, but only serves to reprimand 
the poet for his perceived disloyalty, as he admonishes himself for being ‘beguiled’ and 
‘blind’. In the wake of such irreparable loss, described in a letter as ‘oppressed with 
sorrow and distracted with anxiety’ (Wordsworth, 2002: 110), and in the alternating 
responses of denial, anger and incomprehension, the experience of love is revealed as 
potentially fraught with risk, pain, and personal fragmentation.  
Freud describes the human response to loss, whether real or perceived, as having 
two possibilities; when the loss is experienced as unbearable, the subject/patient refuses 
to accept its reality, described by Wordsworth as ‘unwilling to forego, confess, submit’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 448), and adopts as a coping mechanism the introjection of the lost 
object into the self, and subsequently directs the anger, depreciation and loathing 
evoked by the loss onto this introjected aspect of the self. The possibility of love, of self 
and others, is sabotaged as the self becomes the target of attack and condemnation. 
Wordsworth sees this reaction as understandable and universal; ‘Man / As long as he 
shall be the Child of Earth, / Might almost ‘weep to have’ what he may lose’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 435). According to Freud’s analysis, the resulting melancholia can 
only be alleviated by a conscious acceptance of the loss, a working through the grief, 
and a letting go of the loved object: in the words of the poet ‘grief will have its course’ 
(Wordsworth, 2002: 83). Herein lies the work of mourning which is essential to 
psychological recovery. For Freud, the psychoanalytic encounter provides a potential 
space for such healing, as it offers an exploratory relationship based on acceptance, 
openness and understanding; similarly, Wordsworth addresses his recollections, 
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confusions and reflections to a beloved friend, usually Coleridge or his sister Dorothy, 
confident in the power of their love to support his often painful and uncertain 
explorations. 
Through the poems collected in the Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth is committed 
to acknowledging the lives of those who exist beyond the social order of identity and 
recognition, and through an imaginative sensitivity to human suffering, he attains an 
emphatic understanding of the experience of loss and the possibility of mourning. 
Particularly in the narrative poems, we are presented with characters who have 
experienced separation and loss to varying degrees: like “Michael”, who grieves for his 
lost son, and who endures the heart-breaking sorrow only through the power of love: 
‘There is a comfort in the strength of love; / ’Twill make a thing endurable, which else / 
Would break the heart’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 236), Margaret, of “The Ruined Cottage”, 
frozen in time and space as she dementedly awaits the return of her long-departed 
husband, and whose psychological fragmentation and despair is mirrored in the signs of 
ruin and decay imprinted on her cottage: ‘About the fields I wander, knowing this / 
Only, that what I seek I cannot find’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 40),  and “The Old 
Cumberland Beggar”, bereft of name and home, who unknowingly elicits the poet’s 
emphatic feeling and reflection on the universality of human needs and desires: 
…the poorest poor 
Long for some moments in a weary life 
When they can know and feel that they have been  
Themselves the fathers and the dealers out 
Of some small blessings, have been kind to such 
As needed kindness, for this single cause, 
That we have all of us one human heart (Wordsworth, 1984: 53). 
 
These characters portray varying levels of alienation and dislocation, from community, 
purpose, or self, which accompanies the ‘progress’ and materialism of industrialization, 
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and the estrangement between the subject and the environment is depicted by the poet as 
an emotional and personal loss.
95
 According to David Bromwich, these characters, 
particularly the Cumberland beggar, portray an image of humanity which exists outside 
of conventionally assumed categories: ‘what is suspended is the rational conception of a 
person, a plan of life, a social context with intelligible meanings and obligations’, 
(Bromwich, 2000: 5), and yet these poems ‘make us know more deeply certain feelings 
that belong to humankind’ (Bromwich, 2000: 97) The narrative element of these poems 
gives voice to these otherwise silent and ignored experiences of human sorrow, and 
manifests the connection between mourning and language which became central to 
psychoanalytic practice. In “The Idiot Boy” Wordsworth presents the inner world of a 
boy whose linguistic limitations prevent expression and communication; Johnny’s 
speech is beyond the reach of the untrained ear. However, the mother’s love for her son 
gives her access to his thoughts and feelings, and his humanity is dignified by the 
language through which this understanding is described. The language and subject-
matter of these poems resulted in rejection and criticism which Wordsworth answers 
with his radical philosophy of poetry as ‘a natural delineation of human passions, 
human characters, and human incidents’ (Wordsworth, 2002: 50). This is the claim 
asserted in the preface to the collection, and through the poems this claim is reiterated 
and justified as the poet argues for the dignity of all human beings regardless of social 
definition: 
                     …’Tis Nature’s law 
That none, the meanest of created things, 
Of forms created the most vile and brute, 
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 The alienation of the individual in modern times is a theme explored in many literary and philosophical 
works, and is a basis of  Eliot’s poem, “The Wasteland”, which will be examined in the next chapter. 
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The dullest or most noxious, should exist 
Divorced from good, a spirit and a pulse of good, 
A life and soul to every mode of being 
Inseparably linked (Wordsworth, 1984: 51).
96
 
 
His aim is to highlight the universality of human experience, and ‘to shew that men who 
do not wear fine cloaths can feel deeply’ (Wordsworth, 2002: 65). These thoughts 
provide a visionary contrast to the technological and utilitarian attitude which became 
popular in the service of the industrial revolution and its aftermath, and the poet’s 
opposition to prevalent thinking is a significant characteristic of romantic poetry. This is 
the argument proffered by Dawson, in his essay “Poetry in an Age of Revolution”: 
The real focus of the Romantics’ critique of their age is on the moral and 
social values in whose name both the increase of industry and the 
rationalization of agriculture took place. These social tendencies implied a 
redefinition and a revaluation of human nature and of the human person to 
which the poets were all finally opposed (Dawson, 2005: 67).  
 
The interdependence of human subjects, the mediation necessary for identity and 
recognition,
97
 and the universal dignity of each human being, underlie Wordsworth’s 
sense of love which opens an alternative path to understanding; ‘we have all of us one 
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 These lines address the ambiguities of the human condition explored by the writers of previous 
sections; the proximity of good and evil as outlined by Nietzsche and Ricoeur, the co-existence of the 
sublime and the monstrous as discussed by Žižek, and the call for a realistic appraisal of human nature by 
Freud. 
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 The interdependence of identity and recognition is a theme explored by Ricoeur throughout his 
philosophical writings, for example Oneself as Another and The Course of Recognition. It is also relevant 
to Lacan’s exposition of the mirror stage wherein the child/adult increasingly seeks recognition of identity 
and worth in the reflection of others. 
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human heart’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 53), and which recalls Buber’s vision of the I-Thou 
relationship as prerequisite to genuine encounter, and other philosophical reflections on 
love and friendship.
98
 He hopes, through his poetry, to enhance the recognition of this 
intersubjectivity: 
I hope…they may…in some small degree enlarge our feelings of reverence 
for our species, and our knowledge of human nature, by shewing that our 
best qualities are possessed by men whom we are too apt to consider, not 
with reference to the points in which they resemble us, but to those in which 
they manifestly differ from us (Wordsworth, 2002: 66). 
 
 The understandable reluctance to expose the self to the vulnerability inherent in love, 
its potential transience and infirmity, and ‘the impotence of grief’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 
43) in the experience of loss, are obstacles to the repeated embrace of love in its totality. 
Wordsworth’s commitment to the significance of love does not negate the difficulties 
which this implies, and some of his greatest poems, such as “The Prelude” and the 
“Immortality Ode”, can be seen as an attempt to work through the process of grief 
pertaining to loss and change, and ultimately to enhance self-understanding. 
 The autobiographical and confessional nature of Wordsworth’s poetic 
inspiration portrays a commitment to introspective analysis and questioning, and a 
persistent revisiting of past experiences in order to map the poet’s development and 
elicit greater understanding of his emotional and mental constitution. An examination of 
the different developmental phases of a life inevitably confronts the poet with the reality 
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 For example, Heidegger’s concept of ‘care’, Derrida’s reflections on ‘the gift’ and ‘forgiveness’, and 
Foucault’s critique of institutional violence directed against the unacceptable ‘other’, whether criminal, 
madman, or political rebel. 
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of loss; every life is marked with little deaths as growth and change imply the necessity 
to relinquish the familiar in an embrace of the new. When loss is experienced as an 
involuntary removal of that which is held dear, the human response is to resist the 
perceived stealth of what is considered essential to the self through whatever means 
present themselves: flight from reality takes many forms, and Wordsworth 
acknowledges this human trait:  
And is there one, the wisest and the best 
Of all mankind, who does not sometimes wish 
For things which cannot be, who would not give, 
If so he might, to duty and to truth 
The eagerness of infantile desire? (Wordsworth, 1984: 392).  
 
 The joys and sufferings which compose the lived experience of the human being 
are seen by Wordsworth as being vulnerable to loss and change: 
Unhappy man! Thy sole delightful hour 
Flies first; it is thy miserable dower 
Only to taste of joy that thou may’st pine 
A loss, which rolling suns shall ne’er restore (Wordsworth, 1984: 20).  
 
 The process of growth in the human being as well as in the world of nature, involves a 
simultaneous shedding of the old in an accommodation of the new, and the ebb and flow 
which permeates all of life is sometimes reflected in emotional reactions: ‘As high as 
we have mounted in delight / In our dejection do we sink as low’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 
261). Maturation implies a subtle distancing from infancy, childhood and youth, but the 
changes and losses which are wrought in the human experience do not have the 
consolation of retrieval or renewal that nature enjoys.
99
 As Thomas Kinsella reflects in 
                                                 
99
 Adam Phillips suggests an interesting analysis of the losses implicit in the inevitable transition from 
childhood passion and intensity to adult compromise and disillusionment; he suggests that writers such as 
‘Rousseau…Blake…Wordsworth…and Freud…seemed to retell the biblical story of the Fall…in this 
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his poem “Mirror in February”, facing his middle-aged face in the mirror, ‘I read that I 
have looked my last on youth / And little more; for they are not made whole / That 
reach the age of Christ’, and in contrast to the rejuvenation of the trees outside his 
window, he resigns himself to the reality that he is ‘not young, and not renewable, but 
man’ (Kinsella, 1996: 54). The inevitability of loss, and in particular the loss of 
unconscious and unquestioned union and integration with the natural universe which 
characterizes the child’s experience, ‘the radiance which was once so bright’, is a 
central theme explored in the “Immortality Ode” (Wordsworth, 1984: 297): ‘But yet I 
know, where’er I go, / That there hath passed a glory from the earth’. As an adult poet 
eliciting the power of memory to enhance self-understanding, Wordsworth evokes 
images, of people, places and events from his earlier self, and from contemplation on 
this period of life, he develops a conviction that it is a stage of unrepeatable innocence, 
creativity and freedom. Freud questions this evocation of childhood and refers to the 
impact of retrospection in the formation of adult memories of earlier experiences: ‘This 
age of childhood, in which the sense of shame is unknown, seems a paradise when we 
look back upon it later, and paradise itself is nothing but the mass-fantasy of the 
childhood of the individual’ (Freud, 1997: 139, 140). Yet, echoing Wordsworth’s 
reference to ‘the radiance’ of the child,  Freud also laments the ‘influence’ of forces 
such as ‘religious education’ which results in ‘relative atrophy’ in the adult subject: 
‘Think of the depressing contrast between the radiant intelligence of a healthy child and 
the feeble intellectual powers of the average adult’ (Freud, 1995: 715). The attributes of 
childhood which Wordsworth laments, ‘The things which I have seen I now can see no 
                                                                                                                                               
tradition…there is a new fall, the fall into adulthood…the fall out of childhood’ (Phillips, 2005: 71). 
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more’, precede the development of ‘the sense of shame’ resulting from the constraining 
and limiting influences of a gradual adaptation to social life, with its demands for 
conformity and acquiescence,
100
 and convince the poet that the child is the ‘best 
philosopher’, (Wordsworth, 1984: 299), having a wisdom which is not distorted by 
external and conflicting expectations. Buber echoes this sentiment, stating that in 
attempting an understanding of the human subject, and especially the development of 
the human relationship to others and to the world, ‘We receive fuller knowledge from 
the child’ (Buber, 2004a: 26). Using his personal memories, Wordsworth associates 
childhood with unfettered imagination, primary feeling, and the possibility of union 
with the expansive world of nature: ‘A child, I held unconscious intercourse / With the 
eternal Beauty, drinking in / A pure organic pleasure’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 390).  With 
the loss of the intensity of instinctual drives and the oceanic feeling of being at one with 
the universe,
101
 Wordsworth discerns in the transition to adulthood a substitution of 
learned behaviours, adherence to social norms, and preoccupation with material affairs: 
‘Shades of the prison-house begin to close / Upon the growing boy’.  Meanwhile, the 
urgency of loss is temporarily repressed and denied, ‘doomed to sleep’ (Wordsworth: 
1984: 390), only to surface in dreams and memory, and in a yearning to re-capture some 
of the magic of this lost time when ‘I conversed with things that really are’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 402). The reference to ‘things that really are’ suggests a parallel to 
                                                 
100
 One is reminded here of Lacan’s mirror stage when the child loses contact with the real self and enters 
the imaginary and symbolic realms wherein one’s identity is increasingly mirrored through the 
recognition of others. 
101
 Freud referred to the narcissism which can be traced to the feeling of omnipotence and self-
centeredness which characterizes early childhood. 
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Lacan’s differentiation of the real from the imaginary and the symbolic, and his 
exposition of the mirror stage as the developmental moment when the real is distorted 
and overshadowed by the attraction of the image. Lacan links this development with the 
growing awareness of loss, a sense of lack, and the birth of desire which is often 
misinterpreted and directed away from its real target and onto an illusory other who will 
fulfill this lack. The repression of these early memories, these ‘days / Disowned by 
memory’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 391), through being split off from awareness, constitutes 
a fragmentation of identity and personality, a ‘wavering of my mind’ (Wordsworth, 
1984: 391), and an alienating dejection which thwarts love of self and one’s 
surroundings. A sense of estrangement from parts of the self, from objects of love, and 
from the harmony of nature, combines with a nostalgia for what is lost, and in 
Wordsworth this nostalgia is strengthened to become a determined commitment to 
employ the power of memory as a method of restoring that which is gone.  In his 
analysis of the poet’s work, and in particular “Tintern Abbey” as a poem deemed to be 
unsurpassable as a poem of memory, Harold Bloom credits Wordsworth, along with 
Nietzsche and Freud, with radically expanding the concept of memory through 
addressing the complexities, defenses and repressions which impact on this 
phenomenon (Bloom, 1976: 52). 
The attempted recovery of these early years, through reflection, revisiting, and 
memory, while never fully achievable; ‘We see but darkly / Even when we look behind 
us’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 417), is deemed by Wordsworth to be essential to self-
knowledge and integration, ‘to understand myself’ and ‘to know / with better 
knowledge how the heart was framed’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 391). This is the work which 
he undertakes in his autobiographical poem “The Prelude”. He is aware of the difficulty 
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of this project, ‘hard task to analyze a soul’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 398), and anticipating 
the environment of a psychoanalytic encounter, he adopts a confessional tone in 
addressing an emphatic listener whose presence, real or imagined, enables 
understanding and interpretation. As a reading of his own psychic processes, the self-
initiated self-exploration undertaken by the poet is a paradigm of the psychoanalytic 
rule of free-association on which Freud bases the success of the analytic encounter. It is 
an example of an important shift of focus in romantic poetry, as the emphasis is changed 
from its mimetic qualities, its mirroring of the external world, to an illumination of the 
inner experience, the growth of the poet’s mind and the development of the self. A 
recollection and appreciation of one’s past enables an understanding of one’s present 
situation – a central tenet of Freudian psychoanalysis – and the poet ‘endeavoured to 
retrace / My life through its first years’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 392) in order to discover 
‘the individual hour in which / His habits were first sown’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 397). 
“The Prelude”, therefore, anticipates the general Freudian acceptance of the importance 
of childhood in the adult psyche, but it also adheres to Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence, the acceptance and integration of all aspects of one’s fate, one’s life. 
This attempted integration involves a recognition and a re-evaluation of ideals 
and dreams which are sometimes betrayed or lost through the contingencies of reality, 
inner and outer experiences. The courage to accept the possibility that one’s convictions 
and hopes are susceptible to correction and revision requires an honest appraisal of 
one’s past and present, in the emotional, spiritual, and physical realms, and in the case 
of Wordsworth, a determination to transcend and transform loss, failure, and betrayal 
into a reconciling triumph. In Books IX and X of “The Prelude”, the poet describes the 
youthful search for meaning and purpose within the given circumstances of life, in his 
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case, amid the contradictory ideals and methods of the French Revolution: ‘I looked for 
something that I could not find’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 510), and the difficulty in 
matching one’s inmost thought and feelings with those of popular opinion: ‘impotent to 
make my hopes put on / The shape of theirs, my understanding bend / In honour to their 
honour’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 515). The temptation to escape the pain of solitude through 
immersion in the ‘crowd’ is explored by Buber as an obstacle to genuine relationship, 
and results in Nietzsche’s ‘herd-mentality’. By contrast, the experience of emotional 
and intellectual intimacy which accompanies transitory periods of shared commitment 
and hope has the power to transcend human isolation and mistrust: ‘Bliss was it in that 
dawn to be alive, / But to be young was very heaven’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 550). The 
alternation of certainty and doubt, of hope and despair, suggests to the poet that his 
mind is divided and conflicted: ‘Having two natures in me, joy the one, / The other 
melancholy’, and he struggles with ‘false imagination’ and ‘the errors into which I was 
betrayed / By present objects, and by reasonings false’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 554). The 
reality of psychic conflict and the fragmented multiplicity of the self are key themes in 
the work of Freud and Ricoeur, and Wordsworth attempts to transcend the potential 
distortions and limitations which may be unconsciously assumed in the absence of 
awareness and understanding. 
The poetry of Wordsworth confronts the reality of loss and separation in human 
life, in relationship, in ideals, and in a persistently changing sense of self which is 
sometimes susceptible to betrayal when ‘the pledges interchanged / With our inner 
being are forgot’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 417). Using his personal development and 
memory as a paradigm, he gives an honest exposition of the anger, confusion and 
despair which ensue from these experiences: ‘Thus strangely did I war against myself’ 
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(Wordsworth, 1984: 560), but he searches for a power which can transform such loss 
into a triumph of restoration. This power he identifies as love, love of nature and love of 
human persons. His love of nature, as a power and harmony pervading all of life, is a 
commitment to Nietzsche’s amor fati, as he acknowledges that this life, this world, is 
the ground of human experience: ‘in the very world which is the world / Of all of us, the 
place in which, in the end, / We find our happiness, or not at all’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 
550). Buber agrees with this assertion: ‘human life exists, though brokenly, in the 
world’ (Buber, 2004: 109), while Nietzsche echoes this sentiment stating that human 
‘happiness should smell of the earth and not of contempt for the earth’ (Nietzsche, 
2003a: 140), and he claims that ‘a good, human thing was the world to me today, this 
world of which so many evil things are said’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 206). For Wordsworth, 
it is only in the ‘familiar face of life’, the ordinary and commonplace, that love can be 
discovered and experienced, and despite the vulnerability which characterizes human 
existence, he insists on the power of love to maintain hope and resilience: ‘To fear and 
love / To love as first and chief, for there fear ends’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 582). 
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Solitude and Attachment 
Points have we all of us within our souls 
Where all stand single (Wordsworth, 1984: 409). 
 
The gradual repression of instinctual ‘appetites’, ‘glad animal movements’, and ‘the 
coarser pleasures’ through which the young child apprehends the environment 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 133), results from internal and external pressures to adjust to the 
social world; it is ‘the inevitable yoke’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 300). The above quoted 
words bring to mind Nietzsche’s analysis that man had raised himself too much above 
the animal, and that this distorted view of human nature which denied the often 
unconscious impact of natural instincts and drives, had diminished the capacity of fully 
loving and embracing life in its complexity. The artifice of social life, with its attending 
values and expectations, becomes an unconscious burden which restricts individuality 
and creativity:  
Full soon thy soul shall have her earthly freight, 
And custom lie upon thee with a weight, 
Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life (Wordsworth, 1984: 300). 
 
The negation of certain aspects of humanity, where ‘the true and the false [become] so 
inseparably interwoven’ results in a ‘thrusting out of sight the plain humanities of nature 
by a motley masquerade of tricks’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 617). The repression of ‘the 
plain humanities of nature’ is the demanded price of socialization and civilization, as 
Freud convincingly argues in Civilization and its Discontents. At each developmental 
stage, the child surrenders something of the ‘bliss’ and ‘glory’ of ‘a time when meadow, 
grove, and stream, / The earth, and every common sight, / To me did seem / Apparelled 
in celestial light’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 297), until eventually this vision of life fades 
from awareness: ‘At length the Man perceives it die away, / And fade into the light of 
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common day’. In Freudian terms, the superego exerts an increasing influence as the 
child/adult accommodates itself to the demands of civilization, and authenticity is 
replaced by imitation: ‘As if his whole vocation / Were endless imitation’ (Wordsworth, 
1984: 300).  
The confining boundaries of socialization, experienced in education, 
employment and family life, diminish the subject’s freedom to express and to act on 
individual feeling and desire, as conformity and popularity take precedence over 
personal values and original thought. This jeopardizes the possibility of love between 
unique subjects, as ‘the dreary intercourse of daily life’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 135) 
overshadows ‘the primal sympathy’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 302) which discerns in nature 
and humanity a force of beauty and of love:  
The insinuated scoff of coward tongues, 
And all that silent language which so oft 
In conversation betwixt man and man 
Blows from the human countenance all trace 
Of beauty and of love (Wordsworth, 1984: 404). 
 
These lines resound with Buber’s contention that much of human conversation is 
motivated by utility, promotion of self image, and fear of disclosure of vulnerability and 
imperfection; it is a pseudo-dialogue which precludes genuine communication between 
self and other, and it is in Lacanian terms ‘empty speech’ which seeks to hide or 
disguise personal truth. Thus, life can be diminished to a futile struggle to gain 
acceptance, security, and admiration, through an endless series of performances and 
projects: 
Then will he fit his tongue  
To dialogues of business, love, or strife; 
But it will not be long 
Ere this be thrown aside, 
And with new joy and pride 
The little Actor cons another part, 
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Filling from time to time his ‘humorous stage’ 
With all the Persons, down to palsied Age, 
That Life brings with her in her Equipage (Wordsworth, 1984: 300). 
 
The preoccupations and demands of social life, ‘Empty noise / And superficial 
pastimes’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 410), are also sought as a protection against the pain of 
solitude wherein one may be faced with a frightening realization of vulnerability and 
need, and an awareness that ‘every soul is a world of its own’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 234). 
The subject, while inherently alone and separate, physically and psychologically, 
nevertheless is imbued with the drive to connect with what is exterior to itself. 
Wordsworth echoes Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power when he states that ‘there 
is an active principle alive in all things’ which seeks to move beyond itself: 
All beings have their properties which spread 
Beyond themselves, a power by which they make 
Some other being conscious of their life (Wordsworth, 1984: 676). 
 
This urge to connect, to make an impact on the other, as it is perceived in the natural 
and the human domain, is intrinsic to human existence: ‘for we live by hope / And by 
desire; they are the very blood / By which we move’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 677), and thus 
the reality of human solitude is constantly resisted and denied. This is the paradoxical 
nature of the human being, and in acknowledging the apparent contradiction 
Wordsworth does not negate the validity of either solitude or connection. The 
conflicting desires for solitude and community, and the simultaneous fears of isolation 
and engulfment, are explored by the poet in his quest for self-knowledge. According to 
John Jones, in his interpretation of the poet’s work, this dilemma is central to 
Wordsworth’s self-analysis:  ‘Solitude and attachment, the huge abstractions moving 
through Wordsworth’s life and poetry’ (Jones, 1970: 48). The poet confronts the 
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repercussions of this conflict through a persistent attempt at deciphering, through 
reflection, memory and analysis, his own psychic interiority as it reveals itself in honest 
contemplation: ‘What distinguishes Wordsworth is the enormous importance which he 
attaches to introspection, or the inward eye’ (Jones, 1970: 92), and he concludes that the 
real difficulties and conflicts exist within: 
When men in various vessels roam the deep 
 Of social life, and turns of chance prevail 
Various and sad, how many thousands weep 
Beset with foes more fierce than e’er assail 
The savage without home in winter’s keenest gale (Wordsworth, 1984: 14) 
 
According to the poet, the only possibility of approaching an understanding of human 
nature is through self-exploration, ‘by stripping our own hearts naked’ (Wordsworth, 
1984: 622), and succumbing to the perils and insights which solitude can provide: ‘Nor 
star nor needle know the tempests of the soul’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 27). 
The introspection pursued by Wordsworth in a search for self-understanding, 
where ‘we have traced the stream / From darkness, and the very place of birth / In its 
blind cavern’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 583), resounds with the psychoanalytic process of 
remembering and interpreting, as illusions and repressions give way to expression and 
integration. Thus Wordsworth addresses his doubts and confusions to an understanding 
and attentive observer and listener, he freely explores the multi-faceted nature of his 
emotional and mental development, and he is rewarded with insights which are difficult 
to accept but which contain the source of true liberation. In Book XIII of “The Prelude”, 
he reflects on one such discovery, the realization of personal freedom and responsibility, 
and anticipating Lacan’s assertion that the patient must eventually relinquish the illusion 
of ‘the one supposed to know’, and look to his/her own heart and desire, Wordsworth 
argues that imagination and love are ‘each in each’, and can only be developed in a 
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spirit of individual and personal truth: 
Here must thou be, O Man! 
Strength to thyself; no Helper hast thou here; 
Here keepest thou thy individual state: 
No other can divide with thee this work, 
No secondary hand can intervene 
To fashion this ability. ‘Tis thine 
In the recesses of thy nature, far 
From reach of outward fellowship, 
Else ‘tis not thine at all (Wordsworth, 1984: 583). 
 
However, having gained this sense of self-responsibility and self-ownership, the subject 
is enabled to experience the joy and transformation of love in honest relationship, 
(honest because it is not masking need or fear). The connection between self-awareness 
and the embrace of the other underlies the explorations of Wordsworth’s poetry, and is 
particularly portrayed in “The Prelude”; as Gill explains, ‘Tracing the development of 
his poetic imagination Wordsworth needs to demonstrate that its growth involved the 
embrace of other human beings, that its power stemmed not from solipsistic self-
communing but from its human centredness’ (Gill, 1991: 74). An acceptance and an 
understanding of the self enables an acceptance and a love of others in their ‘human, all 
too human’ realities. 
 Through an imaginative encounter with the inner self and a corresponding 
openness to the power of the natural world, Wordsworth establishes the possibility of 
synthesis and reconciliation of apparent opposites; his poetry is essentially a poetry of 
mediation.  Anthony Storr, in his exploration of the joy and pain of solitude, refers to 
the human desire for ‘wholeness or integration; a condition in which the different 
elements of the psyche, both conscious and unconscious, become welded together in a 
new unity’, and he points to Wordsworth’s “Prelude” as an example of this process 
(Storr, 1997: 193). In this quest for unity and integration, Wordsworth questions the 
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reality of intransigent binaries, and destabilizes the perceived boundaries between 
human and non-human, small and great, outer and inner, and especially solitude and 
connection. Echoing the poet’s attempt at synthesis and wholeness, Storr explains the 
elusiveness of this goal while emphasizing its significance: 
Man’s adaptation to the world is largely governed by the development of the 
imagination and hence of an inner world of the psyche which is necessarily 
at variance with the external world. Perfect happiness, the oceanic feeling of 
complete harmony between inner and outer worlds, is only transiently 
possible. Man is constantly in search of happiness but, by his very nature, is 
precluded from finally or permanently achieving it in either interpersonal 
relations or in creative endeavour…The happiest lives are probably those in 
which neither interpersonal relationships nor impersonal interests are 
idealized as the only way to salvation. The desire and pursuit of the whole 
must comprehend both aspects of human nature (Storr, 1997: 202). 
 
To strengthen his argument, Storr closes his reflection with the following lines from the 
“Prelude”: 
When from our better selves we have too long 
Been parted by the hurrying world, and droop, 
Sick of its business, of the pleasures tired, 
How Gracious, how benign, is Solitude (Wordsworth, 1888: 587). 
 
In his extensive commentary on The Nature of Love, Irving Singer points to the 
‘Romantic preoccupation with oneness [as] a reaction against the dualism of the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries’, and sees the role of the imagination as that 
of enabling harmony and unity of phenomena which previous philosophies had 
dissected: ‘Imagination assumed its central importance because it seemed, by its very 
nature, to unify the categories of sense and intellect, passion and rationality, matter and 
mind’ (Singer, 1984: 288). For Wordsworth, his abiding love of nature encompasses a 
love of all of life, and thus obliterates the separation of the human and the material 
world. His love of nature leads him inevitably ‘to the love of human Kind’ 
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(Wordsworth, 1984: 501), and to an appreciation of love expressed in simplicity and 
humility, in the ‘little, nameless, unremembered acts / Of kindness and of love’ 
(Wordsworth, 1984: 132). An appreciation of the ordinary, the simple, and the often 
unnoted expressions of kindness and love, is also seen by Nietzsche as crucial to our 
humanity: ‘Goodwill…I mean those expressions of a friendly disposition in 
interactions, that smile of the eye, those handclasps, that ease which usually envelops 
nearly all human actions…it is the continual manifestation of our humanity’ (Nietzsche, 
1984: 48). The belief in the innate goodness of the human being and the capacity for 
benevolence and love amidst the inevitable frustrations and failures characteristic of 
human life, is seen by Stephen Gill as a prevailing conviction throughout the poet’s 
work: ‘Across his creative lifetime Wordsworth returned repeatedly to meditations on 
such topics as the relation of human beings to their world, the function of moral 
development, and the core values which give life its worth’ (Gill, 2003: 157). Love of 
life, in its natural and human manifestations, is one such core value; ‘We live by 
admiration, hope, and love’ (Wordsworth, 1858: 345). The reality of pain and suffering, 
of doubt and uncertainty, ‘The still, sad music of humanity’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 134), 
does not preclude the possibility of a ‘cheerful faith that all which we behold / Is full of 
blessings’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 135), and this faith is enhanced by momentary feelings 
of harmony wherein ‘We see into the life of things’ (Wordsworth, 1984: 133). What is 
then seen, realized, and embraced as a vision of life is the centrality and significance of 
love as the often difficult, elusive, and thwarted experience of human being: 
From love, for here 
Do we begin and end, all grandeur comes,  
All truth and beauty, from pervading love,  
That gone, we are as dust (Wordsworth, 1984: 582). 
 
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
T.S. Eliot 
he world of Western Europe which encapsulated the romantic era gradually 
settled into a period of relative stability and confidence as nation states 
solidified their positions and began to enjoy a sense of security in the 
aftermath of revolutionary wars.
102
 An optimistic and self-congratulatory attitude, 
suggesting lasting achievement and on-going progress issuing from a rationalized 
world, began to express itself in the political, economic and scientific realms, and this 
was reflected in literature as in other art forms. This attitude of optimism and certitude 
boasted unprecedented advancement in all areas of human endeavour, and this uncritical 
idealism and metaphysical transcendence characterized intellectual activity in the 
literature and philosophy of Western Europe throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
 However, rumblings of discontent and doubt tentatively questioned the validity 
of this definitive vision of reality, and Nietzsche’s onslaught on the metaphysical 
tradition came before the turn of the century. Gadamer refers to the impact of 
Nietzsche’s ‘radical questioning’: ‘Nietzsche was less the inventor of some other 
particular philosophical doctrine than the symbolic expression of the crisis of modern 
life’ (Gadamer, 1991: 218). James McFarlane credits Nietzsche with ‘a uniquely 
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 The solidification of nation states in this period was considered by Nietzsche to foster estrangement 
and disintegration; he refers to ‘the morbid estrangement which the lunacy of nationality has produced 
and continues to produce between the peoples of Europe’, and he claims that this is ‘only an interlude’ 
preceding an acknowledgement that ‘Europe wants to become one’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 189). 
T 
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influential role in the Modernist period’ due to ‘his ruthless questioning of the 
nineteenth century’s idées recus, [and] his total repudiation of traditional morality’ 
(McFarlane, 1991: 79). Another contributor to this volume, Alan Bullock, asserts that 
Freud exerted a uniquely significant influence on this period: ‘No single man, probably, 
has exercised a greater influence on the ideas, literature and art of the twentieth century 
than Freud’ (Bullock, 1991: 67). A combination of social developments and individual 
discoveries heralded a gradual unmasking of the illusions supporting traditional values 
and doctrines; the growing social fragmentation, which paralleled the increasing 
industrialization and mechanization of work and labour, suggested that progress might 
be ambiguous and double-edged, while the writings of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche 
forced a revolutionary challenge to human mastery and knowledge, as Darwin and 
Einstein offered scientific evidence of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. 
According to Peter Child’s analysis, in his delineation of this period, certain writers 
effected radical change: 
Certain writers in different fields did change the world in the sense at least of 
massively altering people’s most fundamental interpretations of ‘reality’. 
Not least in any such list would be the six figures…Freud, Darwin, Saussure, 
Nietzsche, Einstein and Marx…in terms of politics and history, psychology, 
philosophy, language and science (Childs, 2000: 26). 
 
The role of writers in foreseeing, reflecting and effecting change, particularly in this 
period of increasing questioning and revaluation is also highlighted by Alan Bullock, in 
his analysis of modernity in his essay “The Double Image”: 
It is more likely that the artists, the writers and the thinkers of the 1900s with 
their more highly developed sensitivity were responsive to trends and 
conflicts – social, moral, intellectual, spiritual – already beginning to appear 
over the horizon, and sought for new forms, new languages, in which to 
project these in advance of their time (Bullock, 1991: 69).  
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The failure of secularization and technological progress to provide coherent and 
consistent meaning relating to questions of ‘truth’, subjectivity, and tradition, 
culminated in the incomprehensible horror of World War 1. Conventional norms of 
individual responsibility and social control buckled under the shocking realization of 
their failure, and disenchantment with traditional versions of progress and achievement 
fostered a rejection of established modes of thought and a determination to explore new, 
‘modern’, perspectives in viewing and interpreting the new reality which presented 
itself.  
Experimentation, in thought, language, and activity, became characteristic of the 
‘new’ era, and this was central to radical developments in all areas of the arts; as such, 
modernist literature sought to break away from the restricting adherence to preceding 
traditions, and to creatively respond to the realities of fragmentation and ephemerality 
which threatened personal and social stability. In the realm of poetry, the search for a 
revolutionary artistic expression was initiated especially by the American poet, Ezra 
Pound, as he and his followers repudiated what they saw as the dishonest sentimentality 
and subjective emotionalism of Wordsworth’s romanticism. While Wordsworth saw his 
poetic vision as a break from his immediately preceding tradition, and although his 
poetic project involved a revolutionary creation in form and content, the romantic 
tradition which he had initiated was now deemed to have lost its energy and relevance. 
The autobiographical nature of romantic poetry, with its narrative and lyrical emphasis, 
and its pastoral conventions and traditional regularity of rhythm and rhyme, were now 
considered inadequate to address the modern experience, and a new poetic discipline 
was inaugurated wherein language and voice were subjected to experimentation and 
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renewal.  
As with any historical or literary period, the modernist label is suffused with 
complexity and contradiction, and its use is inevitably limited to retrospective analysis 
and interpretation. Most commentators on the period acknowledge the difficulties 
involved in any attempt to categorize an interpretation of modernism into neat 
precisions of either time or definition; the seeds of modernism lie beyond the obvious 
rejection of romanticism and classicism; the concerns and methods of its now-identified 
intellectual and literary exponents defy any uniform classification; and the 
reverberations of its radical experimentation and exploration continue to exert an impact 
in ‘postmodern’ experience. The paradoxical nature of the modern tradition is central to 
the study of the period by Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane: 
The period we are calling the Modern shows us not the mere rehabilitation of 
the irrational after a period of ordered Realism, or for that matter the reverse, 
a period of Classicism after a phase of Romanticism, but rather a 
compounding of all these potentials: the interpenetration, the reconciliation, 
the coalescence, the fusion – perhaps an appallingly explosive fusion – of 
reason and unreason, intellect and emotion, subjective and objective 
(Bradbury and McFarlane, 1991: 48).   
 
The ‘explosive fusion’ was particularly evident in the growing search for new linguistic 
possibilities deemed necessary to symbolize the experience of thought and feeling 
which was inaccessible to traditional language usage, and the poetic genre was one 
significant vehicle of  this exploration. 
 The publication of T.S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land” in 1922 is often cited as the 
inaugural moment in the development of modernist poetry, and in its form and structure, 
its imagery and references, it epitomizes the successful expression of Pound’s stated 
poetic requirements; Lyndall Gordon, in her account of the poet’s life, describes it as 
Chapter Eight: T.S. Eliot 
 265 
‘the poem that fired the imagination of the ‘lost’ generation’ (Gordon, 2000: 146). The 
poetry of Eliot grapples with the apparent absence of meaning in modern life; it exposes 
the personal and social fragmentation and disenchantment often masked by assumed 
conventions in behaviour, communication, and relationships; and it explores the diverse 
impediments to authenticity and integrity in the private and public expression of 
experience. J.C.C. Mays sees this as the achievement of Eliot’s poetry: ‘He is a great 
modern poet for the reason that he translated the sad accidents of his own life into 
poetry in a way that miraculously contained the exultation and despair of a generation’ 
(Mays, 2006: 110-111). In form and content, Eliot’s poetry launched a uniquely original 
and unfamiliar interpretation and portrayal of modern reality. The personal voice, the 
Wordsworthian ‘I’, was replaced by a diversity of voices and personas, reflecting the 
absence of a unified, harmonious self; the beauty of the pastoral landscape was 
foreshadowed by the drab, disparate, sprawling sterility of urban development, and the 
pleasurable sound effects of familiar rhythm and structural constancy gave way to an 
unpredictable multiplicity of contrasting styles and a reversal of traditional associations 
of sequence and destination.
103
  
The urgent necessity of initiating a new poetic tradition is the logical supplement 
to the realization that the old conventions and assumptions no longer served to express 
and embrace a new world devoid of prescriptive rules and values: ‘We cannot revive old 
factions / We cannot restore old policies / Or follow an antique drum’ (Eliot, 2004: 
196). Eliot’s use of language to accommodate the new realities in poetic form results in 
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 This is not to deny that modern poetry also built upon the Romantic tradition. The influence of the 
Romantic inheritance on modern poetry is explored by Cleanth Brooks in Modern Poetry & the Tradition. 
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a radically different achievement, an achievement that reverberates through linguistic 
explorations, in philosophy and in literature, to the present day.  Eliot espoused an 
‘Impersonal theory of poetry’ which questioned the relation of the poem to its author, 
stating that ‘Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation is directed not upon the poet but 
upon the poetry’ (Eliot, 1975: 40), and he disputed Wordsworth’s poetic formula of 
‘emotion recollected in tranquillity’: ‘For although every poet starts from his own 
emotions, his struggle must be to transmute his personal and private agonies into 
something rich and strange, something universal and impersonal’ (Eliot, 1975: 17).104 
However, Eliot acknowledged the revolutionary poetic vision of the romantic poet, and 
he concurred with Wordsworth’s insistence on the use of language reflecting common 
speech: 
While poetry attempts to convey something beyond what can be conveyed in 
prose rhythms, it remains, all the same, one person talking to another…the 
immediacy of poetry to conversation is not a matter on which we can lay 
down exact laws. Every revolution in poetry is apt to be, and sometimes to 
announce itself to be a return to common speech. That is the revolution 
which Wordsworth announced in his prefaces, and he was right (Eliot, 1975: 
111). 
 
However, as Eliot points out, ‘meanwhile the spoken language goes on changing’ (Eliot, 
1975: 112), and this change is often a reflection of alterations in every sphere of human 
living. In his essay “Eliot as Philosopher”, Richard Shusterman points to Eliot’s 
attempted fusion of tradition and interpretation, comparing it with the hermeneutical 
philosophy of Gadamer, and states that ‘as Eliot recognized with Wittgenstein, since 
language depends on social use, its meaning changes over history through the changing 
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 This is a quotation from Frank Kermode’s introduction to the Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot. 
Chapter Eight: T.S. Eliot 
 267 
situations and applications which it must address’ (Shusterman, 2006: 41). Thus, in the 
perceived unfamiliarity of a new age, a new poetic form is deemed essential. According 
to Helen Gardner, one of the earliest commentators on Eliot’s work, the poet has 
‘effected a modification and an enrichment of the whole English poetic tradition’ 
(Gardner, 1972: 2). Poems such as “The Waste Land”, “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock”, “Four Quarters”, and “The Hollow Men”, wrestle with the uncharted 
territory of social and individual disenchantment and dissolution, the eclipse of personal 
and collective meaning and purpose, and the alienation of the subject from previously 
assumed sources of direction and support.  
 Sterility, meaninglessness, bleakness and brokenness, are the recurring images 
pervading Eliot’s modernist vision.105 Unity and coherence are confined to the poetic 
structure, while disintegration and dissonance ground the thematic backdrop. Whence 
the possibility of love in this portrayal of reality? The vision of life, in the physical, 
psychological, and spiritual spheres that are explored and interpreted in Eliot’s work, 
may be described as a world reflecting the absence of love; this absence is palpable in 
the feigned attempts at communication between human beings, in the ceaseless longing 
for security and permanence, and particularly in the self-disgust which is only fleetingly 
averted through momentary immersion in social niceties and pseudo-communication: 
                                                 
105
 The sense of meaningless, despair and bleakness which is characteristic of much modernist literature is 
reflective of ‘a world threatened by disintegration’: this is the description of Albert Camus in his Nobel 
speech, and as a representative of a later generation of modernists, he offers the following understanding 
of the disillusionment of the age: ‘I think that we should understand – without ceasing to fight it – the 
error of those who in an excess of despair have asserted their right  to dishonour and have rushed into the 
nihilism of the era’ (Camus, 1957: etext). 
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‘We grope together / And avoid speech’ (Eliot, 2004: 85).  Gardner argues that ‘love, 
including in itself all other virtues’, is a central theme of Eliot’s poetry, from its absence 
in the earlier poems, ‘where faith and hope and love are known in terms of their 
opposites’, and which ‘compelled him to contemplate another vision’, to the conclusion 
of the “Four Quartets”, that ‘All shall be well, when all is gathered in love, and the rose, 
the symbol of natural beauty and natural love, is one with the fire, the love by which all 
things are made’ (Gardner, 1972: 185). A reading of Eliot’s poetry therefore enables an 
investigation of the obstacles to love, the resulting personal and collective malaise, and 
thus indirectly highlights the urgency and persistence pertaining to an inescapable 
search for love’s possibility. 
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Fragmentation 
These fragments I have shored against my ruins (Eliot, 2004: 75). 
 
The sense of fragmentation reflected in the social and personal reality of the early 
twentieth century is captured in its essence in the words of a near contemporary of Eliot, 
W.B. Yeats: ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold’ (Yeats, 1967: 99). The collapse 
of the ‘centre’, the systems and structures hitherto credited with authority and 
management in the political, social, economic and personal realms of human existence, 
expressed itself in undeniable terms of material destruction and financial ruin which 
characterized the early twentieth century, ‘an age which advances progressively 
backwards’ (Eliot, 2004: 161). The urban hell of London city epitomized for Eliot the 
post-war reality of devastation and failure, and the city is the canvas upon which he 
portrays the human face of this alienating environment. It is representative of the 
‘Unreal City’ and the corresponding unreality of the human experience within its 
confines: ‘I was neither living nor dead’ (Eliot, 2004: 62). In an essay titled “The Poetry 
of the City”, G.M. Hyde argues that ‘the Modernist literature was born in the city and 
with Baudelaire – especially with his discovery that crowds mean loneliness and that the 
terms ‘multitude’ and ‘solitude’ are inter-changeable for a poet with an active and fertile 
imagination’ (Hyde, 1991: 337). The words of Nietzsche point to the experience of 
loneliness amid the pseudo-camaraderie to which one does not really belong: ‘to be thus 
in company is truly more lonely than to be alone’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 177). Loneliness, 
anonymity, and isolation characterize the modernist world, and suggest what Buber 
refers to as one of the ‘epochs of homelessness’ in ‘the history of the human spirit’ 
(Buber, 2004: 150). Eliot paints the death-in-life landscape of ‘half-deserted streets’ and 
‘sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells’ (Eliot, 2004: 13), and discerns behind the 
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stagnating concealment of ‘fog’ and smoke’ another landscape of disunity, conflict and 
confusion. This is the subject of R.D. Laing’s aptly titled book The Divided Self. It is 
the intensely self-conscious alienation of personal psychic fragmentation, the split self 
of public compliance and civility and private turmoil and rebellion; Peter Childs links 
this modernist depiction of the fragmented self to the unavoidable influence of Freud’s 
insights: ‘With the publication of Freud’s work, The Interpretation of Dreams, 1899, it 
became clear to many writers that there wasn’t a unitary narrative self to which each of 
us might conform…the self was not fixed and stable, but evolving, fluid, discontinuous 
and fragmented’ (Childs, 2000: 51). It is in this psychological, emotional and mental 
breakdown of purpose and direction that Eliot situates the collapse of the centre, and his 
poetry explores the alternating efforts and impasses which characterize the hidden 
experience of that inner desolation. 
 In a poem which encapsulates the inner torment of the modern subject, “The 
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”, Eliot posits in the title the dilemma of human desire 
and social demand. The poem is titled ‘love’ song, suggestive of the significance of love 
in the maintenance of life, but the emotions and thoughts expressed through the poem’s 
persona highlight the obstacles and rationalizations which silence the henceforth 
repressed desire and fundamental need to love and to be loved underlying the psychic 
conflict of the split self, the ‘you and I’ of Prufrock’s monologic ruminations. The poem 
therefore undertakes to articulate the unsayable, to symbolize the unconscious flow of 
conflicting thoughts and emotions, ‘to make audible or perceptible the mind’s inaudible 
conversations’ (Bradbury and McFarlane, 1991: 49). The impossibility of 
comprehensive articulation, the ceaseless conflict between desire and fear, and the 
apparently futile attempts to reconcile personal integrity with public image, are explored 
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by Eliot in this early poem, and these themes are consistently developed throughout his 
poetic career: ‘Themes and approaches which preoccupied him to the end of his career 
already emerge in “Prufrock”, the opening poem of the first book…it strikes the tone of 
effort and the futility of effort which is central to Eliot’s writing’ (Mays, 2006: 110-
111). The resulting malaise pervading the individual and his environment is 
symptomatic of un-lived life, and this is ‘a central, recurring theme of Eliot’s poetry’ 
according to Raine: ‘Prufrock’s failure to seize the day, his resolve to remain repressed, 
avoiding the element of risk that is part of truly living, is something Eliot was to return 
to’ (Raine, 2006: 2). 
 The persona of the poem exudes a fearful timidity portrayed in a repressed 
yearning to connect and to communicate, to speak and to be heard, to reveal and to be 
affirmed. These desires, suggestive of innate human needs, (as explored by all the 
writers outlined in this study), are couched in persistent self-questioning and 
procrastination:’ ‘Do I dare? and ‘Do I dare?’(Eliot, 2004: 14). The risk being 
questioned is that of vulnerability in the awareness that one cannot predict or control the 
reaction of another; but Prufrock projects his own self-depreciation and self-loathing 
onto any encountered other and imagines the expected rejection by the other as a 
repetition of his own self-criticism: ‘I should have been a pair of ragged claws / 
Scuttling across the floors of silent seas’ (Eliot, 2004: 15). Here the voice of the internal 
superego is berating and dismissive, resulting in a paralysis which makes action 
impossible. Freud’s description of the ‘ego ideal’106 as an agency corresponding to 
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 Ambiguity pertains to the notion of the ‘ego-ideal’, as Freud’s reference here suggests strong links 
with a berating super-ego. However, Lacan sees the development of the ‘ego-ideal’ as contingent on 
maturation and self-striving, and he links its acknowledgement with the desire and the possibility of love. 
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‘what we call our ‘conscience’, suggests a self-consciousness which is sometimes 
experienced in ‘delusions of being …watched’, judged, and evaluated: ‘A power of this 
kind, watching, discovering and criticizing all our intentions, does really exist. Indeed, it 
exists in every one of us in normal life’ (Freud, 1995: 559). This perceived awareness of 
a watchful gaze, judging our actions, is also suggested by Lacan’s big Other. Eliot’s 
portrayal of the self is that of a battleground between desire and social constraint, or as 
Freud described it, between the id and the superego. Prufrock’s self-image, which he 
attempts to conceal even from himself, is that of a worthless coward living his life in 
carefully rehearsed performances, patterned responses, and adherence to empty rituals 
of trivial routines: ‘I have measured out my life with coffee spoons’ (Eliot, 2004: 14). 
The image of the ‘coffee spoons’ is an example of Eliot’s formulation of the “objective 
correlative” whereby emotion is expressed through ‘a set of objects, a situation, a chain 
of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the 
external facts, which must end in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is 
immediately evoked’ (Eliot, 1975: 48). Murdoch explains it thus: ‘[With] T.S. Eliot’s 
‘objective correlative’ we see through, pass through, the busy multiplicity of particulars 
and contemplate, touch, become one with, ‘the thing itself’’ (Murdoch, 1993: 59). The 
ironic juxtaposition of the trivial action and the measurement of a life evokes the regret 
                                                                                                                                               
On one level, the ‘ego ideal’ is at a distance from the reality of the self, and therefore may be suggestive 
of a false or a public image which disguises the perceived fallibility and flawed nature of the self; there is 
thus a gap between the desired presentation of the subject and the privately-held images of the self. On 
another level, the ‘ego-ideal’ is a goal that is striven towards, a goal that is never permanently reached, as 
the nature of the organism insists that it continually seeks to expand and to grow. Nietzsche’s doctrine of 
the will to power and Lacan’s reflections on ‘desire’ are evoked here. 
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and despair of a humdrum existence and a wasted lifetime. The rigorous shielding of the 
self in habitualisation, of behaviour, speech, appearance and image, defensively blocks 
an opening of the self to the other, and therefore poses an obstacle to the experience of 
love. 
 Prufrock’s fear of vulnerability and failure to embrace risk is coupled with an 
obsessive concern with outward appearance, public image, and the conformity to 
expected behaviours: ‘Shall I wear my hair behind? Do I dare to eat a peach?’ (Eliot, 
2004: 16). The repression of his innate needs is reflected in the prudery suggested by the 
symbolization of his name, and Prufrock baulks at the exposure of his ‘all too human’ 
reality.  Freud’s concept of repression and its resultant neuroses is here manifested in 
poetic form; the conflict between the desire to connect and the fear of ridicule and 
rejection confines Prufrock to an endless internal monologue which defies decision and 
resolution, ‘a hundred visions and revisions’ (Eliot, 2004: 14), and which subtly erodes 
any hope of reconciliation between these warring psychic forces. Exposure of his real 
self is perceived as a potential assault on his conventional image; he does not dare 
‘disturb the universe’ (Eliot, 2004: 14), because he is aware of the fixed identity which 
has been imposed on him through habit and routine: 
And I have known the eyes already, known them all –  
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase, 
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin, 
When I am pinned and wriggling and wriggling on the wall, 
Then how should I begin 
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways? 
And how should I presume? (Eliot, 2004: 15). 
  
The inner torment of his self-conscious sense of inadequacy and his conviction that he is 
trapped in the critical and disapproving gaze of others is poignantly captured in the 
imagery of the above lines: the alliteration, assonance and cacophony in words such as 
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‘fix’, ‘formulated’, ‘pinned’, ‘sprawling’, and ‘wriggling’ convey the tortured psychic 
incarceration which defines Prufrock’s fragmented existence. The maintenance of this 
identity, although restrictive, painful, and unflattering, appears preferable to the risk of 
annihilation which its withdrawal would entail. Prufrock’s fixed identity is impervious 
to the change, growth and transformation involved in an openness to loving others and 
accepting love. It negates and suppresses the desire for the experience of love. Moody 
suggests that this is the key to Prufrock’s fear: ‘Prufrock’s fear is a fear of the human 
city and of human relations. More particularly, it is a fear of being not understood, not 
recognized; and so of losing identity, of becoming a non-person’, and he goes on to 
equate this with the desire to be accepted and loved: ‘It is apparent that the root of his 
fear is in the primary human need to be loved’ (Moody, 1996: 184,185). This resounds 
with Ricoeur’s exploration of the concept of identity, and his understanding that one’s 
identity is often precariously dependent on the ‘fragile opinion’ of the other (Ricoeur, 
2002: 121). Prufrock stays locked within the familiarity and security of his fixed image 
rather than risking the uncertain danger of discovering who he really is. His inner life 
remains hidden, not just from others, but also from himself.
107
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 The mask of conformity to public image implies the existence of a ‘real’ self behind the false façade. 
The dichotomy between the false and the real self is explored in diverse areas of thought, literature and 
art. It is particularly central to the work of the psychoanalyst, Donald Winnicot. However, the acceptance 
of ambivalence in relation to any understanding of the human subject is embraced by all the writers 
outlined in this thesis, resulting in a rejection of easy oppositions; Nietzsche expresses his admiration for 
the construction of masks, and indeed argues for its necessity; Žižek suggests that the initially adopted 
mask gradually merges with the real self so that it is not possible to separate them. The most noted 
modernist writer who explores the concept of the mask is Yeats. His theory or doctrine of the mask 
explores the opposition, conflict and tension between the mask and the inner self, and rather than 
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The conflicting nature of Prufrock’s meditations comes to an ironic conclusion 
with an unfavourable comparison to the heroic stature of another procrastinator, another 
character whose sensitivity and self-doubt silences his expression of love; Hamlet 
allows the obstacles of jealousy and betrayal to repress his love for Ophelia, and 
Prufrock never delivers his love-song. His desire for love is thwarted by his fear of 
rejection, his fear that he might be misunderstood. Yet the desire for love is the 
repressed motivation of the entire monologue; this is the primary human need/demand 
that Freud and Lacan saw as pervading the psychoanalytic encounter, and which seeks 
its fulfillment as essential to personal healing and happiness. Prufrock turns aside from a 
full confrontation with his unconscious wishes, he contradicts any new interpretation of 
his dilemma, and he recoils from an integration of his conflicting and disparate selves. 
In the words of Raine, he ‘flinches away from the moment of crisis, with its maximal 
potential for self-revelation’ (Raine, 2006: 68). While he momentarily confronts the 
realities of his failure and the sterility of a loveless future, he recoils from the 
frightening possibilities of a different way of living, and thus settles for a life which he 
knows is empty and meaningless, where love only exists in the safety and isolation of 
his private fantasy. He commits the Lacanian crime of ‘giving ground to his desire’. 
Therefore, he maintains an anti-heroic persona, a fawning politeness, and a ridiculous 
figure, and he continues to view the possibility of love as a song which he cannot sing 
or hear: ‘I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each. / I do not think that they will 
sing to me’ (Eliot, 2004: 16). 
                                                                                                                                               
rejecting the mask or the anti-self, Yeats advocates an embrace and integration of this struggle and 
antithesis as an essential condition of self-discovery and wholeness. 
Chapter Eight: T.S. Eliot 
 276 
Failure of Communication 
Words, after speech, reach into the silence (Eliot, 2004: 175). 
 
The emptiness and barrenness of a fragmented psychic experience portrayed through the 
persona of a particular protagonist in “Prufrock” is explored and universalized through 
the multitude of anonymous voices which inhabit the world of “The Waste Land”. 
Through a diverse array of human voices selected across conventional divides of time 
and space, myth and history, gender and age, this poem abides by Eliot’s theory of 
impersonality whereby poetic utterance is ‘a mode of access to voices and realms of 
experience beyond the authorial self’ (Zilcosky, 2005: 21). This is the impersonality of 
‘the poet who, out of intense and personal experience, is able to express a general truth; 
retaining all the particularity of his experience, to make of it a general symbol’ (Eliot, 
1975: 251).  The symbol of “The Waste Land” evokes the sense of alienation, 
fragmentation, and isolation which Eliot perceives in the particularities of a post-war 
Europe, but it simultaneously attempts to give expression to emotional experiences 
which are universally identifiable even if not easily acknowledged. As David Moody 
states ‘the waste land of the poem is essentially the landscape of an inward desolation. It 
is the poetic mind or psyche that is as if dead, and which is struggling against its death’ 
(Moody, 1996: 116). The multiplicity of voices clamouring through this barren 
landscape conveys the fractured variety of the modernist self, and these disparate 
personalities, in their isolating differences and subtle similarities, merge to express the 
multi-layered enigma of the modern consciousness. A major feature of this symbolized 
consciousness is the failure of communication, both within and between individuals: ‘I 
can connect / Nothing with nothing’ (Eliot, 2004: 70). This resounds with the frustration 
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of failed articulation and the failure of language to translate the deepest introspective 
experience which confines Prufrock to a meaningless existence: ‘It is impossible to say 
just what I mean!’ (Eliot, 2004: 16).  The ‘personages’ of the waste land share with 
Prufrock the isolation and passivity of an existence where communication fails; as 
Moody says, ‘while they are dramatic voices, they are not involved in any significant 
action. They are isolated fragments of a static predicament, and the more they speak the 
more they say the same thing’ (Moody, 1996: 150).  
The obstacles to connection, with the self and with the other, is a central theme 
of the philosophy and psychoanalysis explored in this thesis; Buber’s work is primarily 
focused on the relational character of human living, and his concept of the ‘I – Thou’ 
relationship is developed with an acknowledged awareness of its possible distortions 
and alternatives; these distortions and their accompanying deceptions are highlighted by 
Nietzsche in his analysis of human nature; and the insights of psychoanalysis hinge on 
the ambiguous nature of language as the imperfect vehicle of communication and the 
source of concealment and misinterpretation. Like Lacan, Eliot acknowledges the 
incapacity of language to communicate the complexity of human being, especially the 
innermost depths of emotional experience: ‘The expression of one’s feelings calls for 
resources which language cannot supply’, but he is not deterred from the pursuit of this 
expression, and he sees in poetry the possibility of this ideal: ‘While language 
constitutes a barrier, poetry gives us a reason for trying to overcome the barrier’ (Eliot, 
1948: etext). The Freudian commentator, Adam Phillips, draws a link between Eliot’s 
reflections and the goal of psychoanalysis. Quoting from “The Waste Land”, he portrays 
the poet’s ‘venture’ as ‘a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate / With shabby 
equipment always deteriorating / In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, / 
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Undisciplined squads of emotion’, and he concludes that ‘A poem is an air raid, a 
surprise attack, it conquers internal countries of inarticulacy. And it is not worlds apart 
from Freud’s now famous slogan of usurpation, where id was there ego shall be’ 
(Phillips, 2001: 37). 
The images of death, sterility, and isolation suggested in the symbolized waste 
land evoke a spiritual and emotional disintegration as the inhabitants of the poem 
wrestle with a life devoid of meaning, a longing for escape from a numbed existence, 
and a fear of the risks which this escape necessitates.  Raine agrees with this analysis of 
the symbolism of the poem: ‘The desert is a candid, recognizably familiar symbol for 
spiritual aridity, for the failure of feeling’ (Raine, 2006: 83).  Risk entails the possibility 
of pain and failure, and it demands an awakening to the full spectrum of lived 
experience in contrast to the comforting darkness of a dulled and limited engagement 
with reality. Eliot suggests the reluctance of the subject to grapple with these difficulties 
by overturning the traditional poetic associations of Spring; in a startling reversal of 
conventional expectation, the poet claims that ‘April is the cruellest month’ (Eliot, 
2004: 61), because it demands a surrender of the illusory comforts of darkness and 
denial, and a confrontation with personal realities: ‘mixing / Memory and desire, stirring 
/ Dull roots with spring rain’ (Eliot, 2004: 61). It is cruel in that ‘what was thought dead 
is painfully brought to life’ (Raine, 2006: 75). Nietzsche also describes the pain of this 
experience: ‘My past broke open its grave, many a pain buried alive awoke: they had 
only been sleeping, concealed in winding sheets’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 182-183). The 
apparent neglect of ‘roots’ or origins is characteristic of modernism, as the past was 
increasingly seen as a phenomenon which failed to provide answers, but the 
significance of memory and psychic origins and their impact on  personal experience is 
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central to Freudian psychoanalysis. Without the integration of past and present, memory 
and desire, root and branch, there is only ‘A heap of broken images’ (Eliot, 2004: 61), a 
disintegrated personality incapable of connection with self and others. 
The failure of communication, with the disparate complexities of the inner self, 
and with the feared and desired reality of the other, results in a frustrating isolation 
which precludes the expression of thought and feeling: ‘I never know what you are 
thinking’ (Eliot, 2004: 65); the possibility of love cannot exist within this vacuum. 
Feigned attempts at relationship, a woman ‘hardly aware of her departed lover’ (Eliot, 
2004: 69), do not diminish the pain of isolation and the unconscious awareness that life 
in its fullness is blocked and evaded: ‘each in his prison / Thinking of the key, each 
confirms a prison / Only at nightfall’ (Eliot, 2004: 74). The universality of this 
predicament, the barriers to love, of self, of other, and of life, is seen by Helen Gardner 
as the subject of the poem: 
Although “The Waste Land” may begin with the ‘dilemma of the modern 
mind’, it discovers that the modern dilemma is the historic dilemma…its true 
subject is ageless…that beneath both beauty and ugliness there lurk in all 
classes and in all ages boredom and terror; all wars are the same war, all 
love-makings the same love-making, all homecomings the same 
homecoming (Gardner, 1968: 88-89). 
 
The boredom, the alienation, and the despair of an unlived life is but one side of this 
‘modern dilemma’, as the withdrawal from a fully experiential encounter with reality is 
perceived as the antidote to the terror which such an encounter evokes. A commitment 
to avoidance, of self and of others, precludes a living engagement with reality: ‘I could 
not / Speak, and my eyes failed, / I was neither / Living nor dead, and I knew nothing’ 
(Eliot, 2004: 62). An openness to life in all its complexity is rejected in favour of a 
shallow grasping at survival and a gaze averted from life’s possibilities: ‘Sighs, short 
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and infrequent, were exhaled, / And each man fixed his eyes before his feet’ (Eliot, 
2004: 62). The inability to express anything reflects the inability to feel anything, and 
this is the deadness of inner desolation depicted in the poem. Passion, love, lust, and all 
the full expressions of being human are merely mimicked in a parody of encounter and 
relationship: ‘His vanity requires no response, / And makes a welcome of indifference’ 
(Eliot, 2004: 68), and the sexual act is followed by relief that another failed attempt at 
connection has been endured: ‘Well now that’s done: and I’m glad it’s over’ (Eliot, 
2004: 69). In an essay on “Tradition and T.S. Eliot”, Jean-Michel Rabaté points to 
‘really astonishing convergences between Lacan and Eliot’ (Rabaté, 2006: 219), and the 
lines quoted above may point to one such convergence. While the context and the 
intention of the poetic utterance here may differ from Lacan’s statement that ‘there is no 
such thing as a sexual relationship’, the suggested echoes can be heard.  
‘The partial anaesthesia of suffering without feeling’ (Eliot, 2004: 294) is the 
condition of a life where feeling has been stifled and numbed. In this silencing of the 
inner world there is nothing real or meaningful to communicate: ‘And so the 
conversation slips / Among velleities and carefully caught regrets’ (Eliot, 2004: 18). 
The ‘slippage’ of language is a subject which Eliot consistently revisits, and it is stated 
pessimistically in “Four Quartets”: ‘Words strain, / Crack and sometimes break, under 
the burden, / Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, / Decay with imprecision, will not 
stay in place, / Will not stay still’ (Eliot, 2004: 175). Raine perceives a link here with 
the later insights of Derrida: ‘Long before Jacques Derrida coined the term 
‘deconstruction’ – to define language’s semantic indeterminacy, its insoluble, inevitable 
and diametric ambiguities – Eliot was using its slippage very consciously and precisely’ 
(Raine, 2006: 99). In the absence of expression, of thought and feeling, the reality of the 
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self is diminished, distorted and denied, and a masquerade of subjectivity engages in a 
pseudo-dialogue with other masks and pretences. Communication fails in the tyranny of 
fear; fear of rejection, fear of being misunderstood, and fear of confronting the mystery 
and strangeness of the self. In his analysis of Eliot’s poetry, Shusterman points to ‘the 
terrifying problem of personal communication already poetically expressed in early 
works like “Prufrock”’, and echoing Nietzsche, he explains: 
the world is always experienced from an individual perspective…An 
individual’s mental life consists in a changing series of…finite centres, and 
there is no guarantee that his centres will harmonize with others or even with 
themselves. There is thus no guarantee that one’s experience or self will be 
understood by others (or even by one’s subsequent self). Communication of 
the inner life is always a courageous act of faith across a gulf of privacy and 
difference (Shusterman, 2006: 35).  
 
The failure of communication is symptomatic of a rejection of reality, and a negation of 
complexity and difference, within self and others. The denial of essential aspects of the 
self involves a repression of certain feelings and desires, and in this selective and 
incomprehensive interpretation of the human subject the possibility of love, its passion, 
desire, and experience, is thwarted and side-stepped. 
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The Lost Self 
Where is the Life we have lost in living? 
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? (Eliot, 2004: 147). 
 
The failure to attempt an integration of the fragmented nature of the self and the related 
failure to communicate the reality of one’s being, result from a combination of self-
deception or the repression of one’s personal truth, conformity to image as a provider of 
security and identity, and fear of risk and vulnerability inherent in exposure of the inner 
self. A false self-sufficiency, constructed in fearful caution and withdrawal, precludes 
an open and accepting approach to the fluidity and unfamiliarity of self and others, and 
this erects a blocking obstacle to the realization of love. The reality of the self is 
rejected, disowned, and buried beneath an accumulated mound of masks and disguises: 
‘Inside my brain a dull tom-tom begins / Absurdly hammering a prelude of its own, / 
Capricious monotone / That is at least one definite ‘false note’’ (Eliot, 2004: 19).  
The stagnation and paralysis pertaining to the unlived life involves a rejection of 
life’s possibilities. Eliot describes such a retreat and avoidance in the poem “Animula”, 
where life is restricted to meaningless trivialities, ‘Content with playing cards and kings 
and queens’, an insatiable need for security, ‘Eager to be reassured’, and a repudiation 
of love and passion, ‘Unable to fare forward or retreat, / Fearing the warm reality, the 
offered good, / Denying the importunity of the blood’ (Eliot, 2004: 107). The denial of 
‘the importunity of the blood’ resounds with Nietzsche’s critique of a morality and a 
way of life which attempts to obliterate or control the passions, and echoes 
Wordsworth’s appeal for the recovery of ‘the heart’ as essential to human life. The 
anonymity of the subject of the poem, ‘the little soul’, is seen by Raine as suggestive of 
a life unlived: ‘the ‘little soul’ of the title is appropriately nameless because the 
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individual has in effect refused to encounter the forces that shape us as individuals’ 
(Raine, 2006: 2). Life is unlived because there is no self to engage with life; the self has 
been buried beneath ‘deliberate disguises’ (Eliot, 2004: 85), and has been replaced by a 
‘shadow of its own shadows, spectre in its own gloom’ (Eliot, 2004: 107).  
Eliot’s poetry appears to portray a world of failure; failure to live, failure to love, 
and failure to express being. Desperation and unease, despair and disguise, alienation 
and anxiety, and an array of emotional negativity seems to usher from the poetic word. 
Paradoxically, the entire oeuvre is expression, searching, learning and unlearning, an 
unceasing attempt ‘to construct something / Upon which to rejoice’ (Eliot, 2004: 89). 
The desire for expression is unquenchable, and Nietzsche links this human urge to the 
need for love: ‘Something unquenched, unquenchable, is in me, that wants to speak out. 
A craving for love is me, that itself speaks the language of love’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 
129). Eliot’s poetry can be perceived as ‘a triumph over the waste regions of the self 
and its world’, because as Moody argues, ‘the most positive and necessary 
achievements in art and life are those which triumph over what would negate us’ 
(Moody, 1996: 132,133). The human instinct to survive, to create, and to find reasons to 
rejoice, propels the desire to find meaning, purpose and direction, even in the 
confrontation with meaninglessness, emptiness and confusion: ‘But perhaps neither gain 
nor loss. / For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business’ (Eliot, 2004: 
182).
108
 Failure does not preclude a new start, apparent impossibility does not obliterate 
possibility, and despair does not permanently disable hope. Herein lies the power of 
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 There is a strong echo of the sentiments of these words in Kennelly’s poem, “Begin”: ‘And something 
that will not acknowledge conclusion/insists that we forever begin’ ( Kennelly, 2004: 478). 
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love, according to Hederman: ‘Negotiating the storms and the minefields that may 
always hamper communication, it is still possible to reach each other in love’ 
(Hederman, 2000: 90). The embrace of this ambiguity at the root of the human 
condition is one the ‘uses of poetry’ according to Eliot: ‘Poetry…makes us…a little 
more aware of the deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum of our being, to 
which we rarely penetrate; for our lives are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves, and 
an evasion of the visible and sensible world’ (Eliot, 1975: 96).  
The ‘unnamed feelings’, the unconscious desires and fears, and the strength and 
fragility of the psyche, are aspects of the human condition explored consistently in 
philosophy and psychoanalysis; from Nietzsche to Ricoeur, from Freud to Žižek, the 
conflictual and ambiguous nature of the human being is both the source and the 
direction of the search for understanding. ‘Poetry attempts to convey something beyond 
what can be conveyed in prose rhythms’ (Eliot, 2004: 111), and according to Eliot, there 
are moments and experiences in the writing of poetry, when habitual barriers to 
understanding are capable of being removed. Eliot describes such moments: 
Though we do not know until the shell breaks what kind of egg we have 
been sitting on. To me it seems that at these moments, which are 
characterized by the sudden lifting of the burden of anxiety and fear which 
presses upon our daily life so steadily that we are unaware of it, what 
happens is something negative: that is to say, not ‘inspiration’ as we 
commonly think of it, but the breaking down of strong habitual barriers – 
which tend to re-form very quickly. Some obstruction is momentarily 
whisked away. The accompanying feeling is less like what we know as 
positive pleasure, than a sudden relief from an intolerable burden (Eliot, 
1975: 89-90).
109
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 The sentiments and word choice of this statement resonate with Nietzsche’s commentary on the 
‘genius of the heart’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 219). 
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The whisking away of obstruction, suggesting the temporary lifting of inhibition and 
censorship which seeks to control much thought and behaviour, is comparable with 
Freud’s description of the liberating power of the technique of free association. It allows 
for the attempted representation of failure/lack – in communication, in the real self (in 
the Lacanian sense), in the possibility of love – while paradoxically sourcing possibility 
and attainment in this acknowledgement. While Eliot’s poetry strips away comforting 
illusions and traditional conceptions of life and the human subject, to lay bare the 
realities of desolation, suffering and loneliness, it nevertheless attempts, in the 
penetration of these experiences, to discover a power which endures and surpasses pain, 
and which states against all the odds that ‘All shall be well and / All manner of things 
shall be well’ (Eliot, 2004: 198). This is a power which can integrate the failures and 
losses, the errors and disappointments, and the despair and deceptions of “Prufrock” and 
“The Waste Land”, with ‘The moments of happiness’, ‘the sudden illumination’ (Eliot, 
2004: 186), and the possibility of ‘love beyond desire’ (Eliot, 2004: 195). The enigmatic 
reference to ‘love beyond desire’ allows for an ambiguity in its interpretation; perhaps 
the experience of love is more potent than what could be wished for/desired, or it is 
complete in itself, without desire’s unceasing need and demand for more. 
 The necessity of integration, of past and present, of fear and courage, of 
melancholy and hope, ‘compelled [Eliot] to contemplate another vision’ according to 
Gardner: ‘After “The Waste Land” Mr Eliot’s poetry becomes the attempt to find 
meaning in the whole of his experience, to include all that he has known. To do this, he 
enters into himself, finding within himself his own music and his own language’ 
(Gardner, 1968: 185). The entry into the depths of the self is the voyage of recovery, it 
enables the excavation of all that has been camouflaged, repressed and buried, and it 
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involves the use of memory to elucidate ‘the passage which we did not take / Towards 
the door we never opened’ (Eliot, 2004: 171). This suggests the ongoing creation of a 
narrative identity as described by Ricoeur, which is open to changing interpretations of 
oneself and one’s relationships with others. Unlike Prufrock’s fixed identity, fluidity 
and transformation enable the experience of love, of oneself as evolving and responding 
to changing insights, perspectives and horizons, and of others in acknowledgement of 
their indefinable and ungraspable alterity. Gordon sees this as the task undertaken in 
“The Four Quartets”: ‘Eliot took up the challenge of his autobiography: to make sense 
of one’s life…to fuse past and future into a single pattern’ (Gordon, 2000: 358). As in 
the psychoanalytic encounter, the past is revisited with the hope of a more 
comprehensive interpretation, fantasies are traversed, and the familiar vision of the self 
and the world it inhabits is broadened and unfixed; re-interpretation offers the 
possibility of a different meaning to experience: ‘And approach to the meaning restores 
the experience / In a different form’ (Eliot, 2004: 186). Freud’s insight into the 
pervading influence of past experience, his use of dreams and free association to gain 
access to repressed memories, and his conviction that an integration of past and present 
is essential to psychic health, are echoed in Eliot’s words: ‘A people without history / Is 
not redeemed from time’, and the poet elaborates on the necessary direction which 
integration calls for: 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time. 
Through the unknown, remembered gate 
When the last of earth left to discover 
Is that which was the beginning (Eliot, 2004: 197). 
 
 Eliot accepts the difficulty of the endeavour because it means that ‘every moment is a 
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new and shocking / Valuation of all we have been’ (Eliot, 2004: 179), and it entails a 
mode of conception which differs from the more linear pattern of experience: ‘And the 
way up is the way down, the way forward is the way back. / You cannot face it steadily’ 
(Eliot, 2004: 187). 
The paradoxical reversion of direction, of discovering the heights of experience 
in the depths of one’s being, is also proclaimed by Nietzsche: ‘Whence arise the highest 
mountains? I once asked. Then I learned that they arise from the sea…the highest must 
arise to its height from the deepest’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 175). The poet acknowledges the 
pain which inevitably accompanies this honest appraisal of one’s life as it inevitably 
confronts one with shame and guilt: 
And last, the rending pain of re-enactment 
Of all that you have done and been; the shame 
Of motives late revealed, and the awareness 
Of things ill done and done to others’ harm 
Which once you took for exercise of virtue. 
Then fools’ approval stings, and honour stains (Eliot, 2004: 194-195). 
 
The sentiments of these lines resound with Lacan’s discourse on philanthropy and 
altruism and with Nietzsche’s critique of traditionally revered virtues, and his 
assessment of the actual motivation inspiring ‘virtuous’ behaviour; the ‘re-enactment’ of 
the past and the resulting ‘awareness’ is akin to the challenge of Nietzsche’s doctrine of 
the eternal recurrence, whereby everything is accepted as being an integral part of the 
whole of a life, and a joyful embrace of the past, even to the point of wishing its 
recurrence, is an essential prerequisite to love of life in all its manifestations, amor fati: 
‘Time present and time past / Are both perhaps present in time future’ (Eliot, 2004: 
171). This relates to Lacan’s view of the situation of our experience as being in the 
‘future anterior’: ‘What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, 
since it is no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future 
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anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the process of becoming’ (Lacan, 
2006: 84). Nietzsche states it thus: ‘Our destiny commands us, even when we do not yet 
know what it is; it is the future which gives the rule to our present’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 
10), and perhaps anticipating Ricoeur’s discussion of narrative identity, he describes the 
integrative nature of experience: ‘I am of today and of the has-been; but there is 
something in me that is of tomorrow and of the day-after-tomorrow and of the shall-be’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 150).   Eliot uses the image of the river, moving, changing, flowing, 
yet containing in its essence all that it has been and will be, to suggest the fluidity of 
personal integration within the changing circumstances of life: ‘The river is within us, 
the sea is all about us’ (Eliot, 2004: 184), and this process is an ongoing accommodation 
of loss and change and growth: ‘the time of death is every moment’ and so ‘You are not 
the same people who left that station / Or who will arrive at any terminus’ (Eliot, 2004: 
188). This is a poetic utterance of Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity, as it captures 
the differentiation between ‘two major meanings of “identity”…ipse or idem…identity 
in the sense of ipse implies no assertion concerning some unchanging core of the 
personality’ (Ricoeur, 1994: 2). 
The recovery of the self, in an acceptance of its vulnerability, fallibility, and 
fluidity, enables a compassionate love of self and a corresponding openness to the 
mystery and the shared humanity of the other. This acceptance of mystery, of self and 
other, is grounded in humility, an acknowledgement of the limits of knowledge: ‘The 
only wisdom we can hope to acquire / Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless’ 
(Eliot, 2004: 179), and  this spirit of unknowing and uncertainty allows for a loving 
approach to the other: ‘We appreciate this better / In the agony of others, nearly 
experienced, / Involving ourselves, than in our own’ (Eliot, 2004: 187). Eliot’s 
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understanding of the human condition as fallible, inscrutable, and paradoxical concurs 
with the similar visions of all the writers explored in this thesis, and he humbly asserts 
that the ideal of love, ‘a lifetime’s death in love, / Ardour and selflessness and self-
surrender’ is perhaps only achievable ‘for the saint’; but an ordinary life, flawed and 
imperfect, can attain at least moments of such love, ‘hints and guesses,’ and this is 
enough to maintain the quest for those ‘Who are only undefeated / Because we have 
gone on trying’ (Eliot, 2004: 190). In these moments, there is an inter-mingling of self-
relationship, ‘Knowing myself yet being someone other’, and a loving response to the 
other as ‘Both intimate and unidentifiable’ (Eliot, 2004: 193). Here intimacy and 
distance, sameness and difference, are embraced as characteristics of oneself and the 
other-than self, and these experiences, transitory and fleeting, encompass Buber’s vision 
of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship, where the other is approached, not as an object foreign to 
the self, but in the spirit of Ricoeur’s dictum of ‘oneself as another’.  
The poetry of both Wordsworth and Eliot testifies to a search for transcendence 
beyond the limitations of the self, beyond the confines of science and knowledge, and 
beyond what can be apprehended through the structures of language. In each case this 
search leads to a commitment to love; ‘Love is the unfamiliar Name…Which human 
power cannot remove’ (Eliot, 2004: 196). For Wordsworth this is the love of nature in 
all its mystery and power, for Eliot it is the love of a Christian God. Wordsworth’s love 
of nature unfolds the possibility of joy and compassion in the experience of being 
human through the love of others. Eliot appears to designate an exclusive choice, 
between divine and human love, and his personal response is to choose the absolute of 
the divine. As Gordon argues, ‘Eliot’s idea of love does not fit our usual categories, 
sexual and romantic…Eliot wanted nothing less than perfect love, part of his longing for 
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‘the impossible union’ (Gordon, 2000: 238). This desire for ‘impossible union’ 
resonates with Lacan’s analyses of the sexual relationship and the inescapability of 
desire. Moody argues that Eliot’s vision of love ‘never comes to love in the ordinary 
human way’ and he finds it ‘hard to credit a love of God which is not first of all a love 
of other beings’.110 However, echoing Nietzsche’s perspectivism, Moody interprets 
Eliot’s stance as ‘one way of being in the world…other ways are possible’ (Moody, 
1996: 194). Recalling  Žižek’s confident assertion that ‘the impossible does happen, that 
“miracles” like love do occur’, Eliot claims that in spite of all the obstacles, ‘The broken 
standards, the broken lives, / The broken faith in one place or another’,  there exists the 
possibility of hope and love, because ‘nothing is impossible, nothing’ (Eliot, 2004: 
163).  
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 Richard Kearney also questions this separation of divine and human love: ‘we are compelled to ask 
here if it possible ever to fully separate out the strands of desire and love that mesh so intimately in the 
term eros…can one desire the infinite – including infinite justice – without first loving the finite beings in 
front of us? Can one desire the alterity of goodness without loving human others?’ (Kearney, 2001: 65). 
 CHAPTER NINE 
Brendan Kennelly 
 
he sentiments, questions, and potential conclusions which emanate from the 
statement that ‘other ways are possible’ (Moody, 1996: 194), serve as an 
introduction to the theories and concepts associated with the 
inconclusiveness of the term ‘postmodernism’. Debate continues on the elusive nature 
of the reference and meaning pertaining to this attempted symbolization of the 
contemporary period, its situation within a historic framework, and its negation as being 
merely an extension of modernism or a fleeting phenomenon quickly surpassed by 
‘post-postmodernism’. Perhaps it is not feasible to interpret, analyse and label in any 
objective and cohesive way the immediate experience of life in the world before it has 
passed from the confinement and unmeasured expansiveness which characterizes 
subjective engagement with reality. One of the foremost thinkers and commentators on 
‘the postmodern condition’, Jean-Francois Lyotard, states that ‘the general situation is 
one of temporal disjunction which makes sketching an overview difficult. A portion of 
the description would necessarily be conjectual’ (Lyotard, 1999: 3). Clearly marked 
epochs of history are only definable in retrospect, and remain open to revision and re-
interpretation as distance enhances or hinders present understanding. 
The enlightenment, classicism, romanticism, and modernism, are concepts 
denoting shifts in consciousness relating to social, economic, cultural, political and 
intellectual development; underlying the changes in understanding within these realms 
is a corresponding evolution of thought and vision in relation to the individual as the 
T 
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subject creating, experiencing and portraying the visible and invisible, the conscious 
and unconscious, the signified and wordless effects of ‘changes’ in the world. Yet it is 
the same subject that is involved and implicated; it is the human being, developing and 
regressing, evolving and staying the same, adapting and rebelling, who expresses and 
describes the reality of being in the world at any particular moment, while also being the 
subject studied and defined. Buber acknowledges this paradox: ‘The sickness of our age 
is like that of no other age, and it belongs together with them all’ (Buber, 2004: 47). In 
this sense, there is continuity, and even repetition discernible in diverse historical 
periods. Nietzsche explains it thus: ‘That which an age feels to be evil is usually an 
untimely after-echo of that which was formerly felt to be good – the atavism of an older 
ideal’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 102). What is constant is the insatiable quest for knowledge and 
understanding, particularly in relation to questions of truth, justice, happiness and love, 
expressed in diverse forms according to diverse situations of culture and civilization; the 
human being continually, uniquely, and personally, attempts to make sense of him/her 
self and the relationships, to others and to the world, which are the basis of the 
experience of human life: ‘The present is a question. / The future is not an answer’ 
(Kennelly, 2006: 17). The disciplines of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and literature, and 
especially poetry, in exploring these various but constant efforts at understanding and 
meaning, inevitably return to the concept of love as being central to this experience. The 
question of love pervades the experience of the human being regardless of time and 
space. Perennially, established convictions and assumptions are exposed to the 
interrogation of new insight, wrought through the emergence of original thought and 
vision or inescapably imposed through confrontation with hitherto unexpected and 
unimagined manifestations of the natural and human world. According to Nietzsche, 
Chapter Nine: Brendan Kennelly 
 293 
this is synonymous with philosophical thought: ‘It seems to me more and more that the 
philosopher, being necessarily a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, has 
always found himself and had to find himself in contradiction to his today’ (Nietzsche, 
2003: 143). Radically or tentatively, obviously or subtly, quickly or slowly, values, 
‘truths’, knowledge and interpretation, are revaluated and revised to accommodate the 
doubts and questions which have been raised. So it is with the periods explored in this 
thesis; from romanticism through to Nietzsche’s ‘perspectivism’, from the discoveries 
of psychoanalysis through to the embrace of modernism, there is discernible an on-
going reaction against modes of thought and understanding which are no longer tenable, 
and a corresponding attempt to initiate new visions and perspectives. 
111
 
The gradual erosion of certainties and absolutes appears to reach  unprecedented 
proportions in the present age, and the ‘postmodern’ world is characterized by an 
awareness of the extent and rapidity of this collapse. The unfolding of awareness and 
acknowledgement of the horrors of Auschwitz provided a concentration of horrors 
spanning twentieth century history and continues to spill over into the present 
millennium. In the light of the Shoah and more recent atrocities across the world, it is no 
longer thought possible to definitively ascertain what the human being is capable of, or 
to provide systematic definitions as to what constitutes the human subject. This is also 
the conclusion of Buber in his analysis of the first world war, when ‘man faced the 
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 The overlapping of thought – interpretation and re-interpretation – between different ‘epochs’ is often 
discernible in the similarity in arguments and assessments of writers from diverse historical periods; as 
Kearney notes: ‘one also witnesses an uncanny commingling of modern and postmodern perspectives in 
the texts of a writer like Nietzsche, who has exerted as much influence on the deconstructionists as on the 
existentialists’  (Kearney, 1988: 19). 
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terrible fact that he was the father of demons whose master he could not become. And 
the question about the meaning of this simultaneous power and powerlessness flowed 
into the question about man’s being, which now received a new and tremendously 
practical significance’ (Buber, 2004: 188). Žižek’s argument that the ‘inhuman’ is 
paradoxically inherent in ‘the human’ is suggested by these reflections, as is Nietzsche’s 
exposition of the commonly distorted view of human nature. 
 The possibility of love, the evidence of its obliteration in such incontestable 
terms, and the spectre of reality devoid of its experience, are central issues of concern 
underlying much of the literature of the present day. Theodor Adorno saw in the horror 
of Auschwitz the ultimate sign of the impossibility of language to speak the truth and 
famously declared that after Auschwitz there can be no poetry; this sentiment is 
understandable in its context, but despite the failures of language, literature, including 
poetry, continues to testify to the unconquerable urge to express the human quest to 
make sense of experience.
112
 Making sense of life, and of the subject’s experience of it, 
inevitably involves reflection on what is deemed essential to optimum human living, 
what a human being needs in order to flourish, and what happens when these needs are 
thwarted and distorted. Any reflection on these issues inevitably addresses the concept 
of love as a phenomenon that impinges strongly on human being, need, and growth; 
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 Charles Bernstein argues forcibly for the possibility of this expression: 
We can act: we are not trapped in the postmodern condition if we are willing 
to differentiate between works of art that suggest new ways of conceiving of 
our present world and those that seek rather to debunk any possibilities for 
meaning. To do this, one has to be able to distinguish between, on the one 
hand, a fragmentation that attempts to valorize the concept of a free-floating 
signifier unbounded to social significance…and, on the other, a 
fragmentation that reflects a conception of meaning as prevented by 
conventional narration and so uses disjunction as a method of tapping into 
other possibilities available within language (qtd. in Cook, 2004: 550).   
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according to Nietzsche, ‘kindness and love [are] the most curative herbs and agents in 
human intercourse’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 48), and thus love is a theme explored, albeit in 
diverse contexts and from varying viewpoints, in postmodern poetry. 
In the postmodern world, meta-narratives, encompassing fixed and absolutist 
understanding of the human condition in religious, political, social and historical terms, 
are deemed to be oversimplifications and distortions of complexity, ambiguity, 
contradiction and diversity, and their proffered interpretations are rejected as being 
artificially and falsely imposed. For Lyotard, this is a definition of postmodernism: 
‘Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodernism as incredulity towards 
metanarratives’ (Lyotard, 1999: xxiv). In his discussion of this period, Kearney refers to 
Lyotard’s intention: ‘to unmask Grand Narrative as a concealment, even suppression, of 
little narratives’, and to envisage ‘an open culture based on a plurality of narratives…an 
accumulation of thousands of little histories, futile and serious’ (Kearney, 1998: 204, 
205). Previously, meaning was associated with grand narratives of religion, history, and 
nationalism, but now those narratives have become splintered and meaning is unstable.  
Pat answers are no longer tenable in the face of challenges to orthodox views of reality 
or meaning; traditional codes of morality are replaced by a plurality of perspectives and 
interpretations, and the comforting illusions of conformity and security are unmasked. 
In the absence of the authority of the metanarrative to make sense of the human 
condition, diverse aspects of this condition are explored without the safety and 
familiarity of universal and normative judgements. Previously accepted concepts are 
destabilized; the linguistic construction of such concepts is examined with a recognition 
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of the split between the sign and the referent,
113
 a deconstruction of binary oppositions 
which tend to depreciate the second element, the other, in the pair,
114
 and a blurring of 
the boundaries between the known and the unknown, the internal and external, the 
subjective and objective.
115
 
Thus, postmodernism is associated with the absence of absolutes, especially in 
relation to issues of meaning, truth, morality, language and subjectivity, and an 
acknowledgement that ‘The whole story will never be told’ (Kennelly, 2006: 100).  This 
absence can be interpreted and reflected in a negative and cynical response which is 
variously expressed as nihilism, relativism, and angst, or as a nostalgic yearning for a 
rehabilitation of what is deemed lost; as Foucault explains, ‘It is understandable that 
some people should weep over the present void and hanker instead, in the world of 
ideas, after a little monarchy’ (Foucault, 1997: 327). The surrender of claims of 
infallibility attributed to the professed certainties of the great authorities of former 
decades relativizes the truth values of all knowledge.  However, absence can also 
highlight presence as the eclipse of exclusive conceptions of reality and the human 
opens the way for the emergence of multiplicity and diversity in thought and vision, an 
acceptance of personal responsibility and reference in the construction of meaning and 
truth, and a corresponding humility and graciousness in an acknowledgement of the 
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 The acknowledgement of that which exceeds knowledge or signification is a central element of 
Lacanian thought. 
114
 This is central to the philosophy of Derrida, as he sees every concept as being susceptible to 
deconstruction, and thus to multiple and changing meanings and interpretations. 
115
 Freud’s insights, especially his exploration of the influence of the unconscious, led to a questioning of 
the validity of these boundaries in an analysis of human experience. 
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validity and dignity pertaining to different interpretations and different truths. This ideal 
resounds with Nietzsche’s description of ‘mature freedom of the spirit which is fully as 
much self-mastery and discipline of the heart, and which permits paths to many 
opposing ways of thought’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 7). Steven Connor sees this possibility as a 
key question in an understanding of postmodernism: ‘could it be possible to found 
postmodernism not just on the negative claim to go beyond the narrowness of particular 
value systems but in some more positive value-claim of its own?’ (Connor, 2004: 15).  
According to Kristeva, this is the challenge of the present situation: ‘we are, for the first 
time in history, confronted with the following situation: we must live with different 
people while relying on our personal moral codes, without the assurance of a set that 
would include our particularities while transcending them’ (Kristeva, 1991: 195). 
Connor echoes this sentiment: ‘It is the attempt to remain responsive to the claims of the 
other without resorting to the violence of formalization and objectification that 
characterizes postmodern ethics’ (Connor, 2004: 15). Kearney concurs with this 
‘prospect of a postmodern imagination’ and suggests that ‘a postmodern ‘poetics of the 
possible’’ entails an ‘ethics of the possible’ (Kearney, 1998: 194, 201).  
 The literature of postmodernism, and especially its poetry, grapples with this 
duality, avowing the validity of both aspects; it strives to express the ambiguity and 
fluidity of subjective truth with an acceptance of its corresponding responsibility, and at 
the same time it challenges the boundaries between subjective and objective, inner and 
outer, self and other, as it aims to reach through words for the essence of human being 
which is otherwise beyond words; the ‘essence’ referred to here applies to the 
particularity of the unique individual and an attempt to discern some universal 
characteristics of personal experience. It attests to the possibility of meaning in the 
Chapter Nine: Brendan Kennelly 
 298 
absence of conventional signification; it seeks to bear witness to that which within our 
world exceeds our ability to know it. Thus, it attempts an opening to hitherto denied or 
repressed aspects of the human condition, it risks confrontation with the marginalised, 
unacceptable, and unuttered complexities of human experience, and it endeavours to 
embrace ever-new horizons and interpretations of human being.  
Kennelly is a poet whose work spans the transition between the temporal periods 
of modernism and postmodernism, and a reading of his work resists the constraints of 
both labels. His poetry, like much of the literature explored in this thesis, is ultimately 
the expression of a personal response to the private and public experience of his world, 
but it enables an interrogation and an analysis of this world as something which is 
shared by the reader. The poetry of Kennelly consistently examines and questions the 
world in which we live, and while its particular emphasis is on the ambiguities and 
tensions characteristic of contemporary Irish culture, its honesty, courage, and humour 
create a fusion between the particularity of the experience of one’s nation and the 
universal concerns with man’s life in the world. In this sense, Kennelly fulfils the 
description of the poetic act articulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer when he says that 
‘poetry makes the universal more visible than any faithful narration of facts and actual 
events which we call history can ever do’ (Gadamer, 1986: 129). Reflecting the ever-
changing face of culture and identity within an Irish context, Kennelly’s work exposes 
the deceptions and inconsistencies of popular moral platitudes - a poetic utterance of 
Nietzsche’s revaluation of morality - while also giving voice to the unspoken realities of 
suffering and failure. As Lucy Collins states, ‘From his earliest work Kennelly has been 
attuned to the weaknesses and cruelties inherent in human behaviour and has placed 
these decisively, even relentlessly, in an Irish context’ (Collins, 2003: 212). With a plea 
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for openness, his writings invite the reader to confront the uglier side of a national 
image, the hidden cruelties of self-righteous bravado, and the intolerance implicit in 
cowardly conformity. Echoing Freud’s conviction that honest acknowledgement of the 
realities of human nature is the only route to personal freedom, and Nietzsche’s  
rejection of moral consensus in favour of the creation of one’s own values as the basis 
of authenticity, Kennelly’s poetry enables a greater understanding of ourselves within 
the larger framework of the contemporary world.  
Kennelly’s painstaking critique of general complacencies and inhibitions is 
explored through an equally honest expression of his own vulnerability and weakness, 
his own limitations and confusions, and his own faltering attempts at self-understanding 
and self-creation expressed through his poet personas. For Kennelly, this is the basis of 
poetry; this is his understanding of the poet’s activity: 
I believe that poetry must always be a flight from this deadening 
authoritative egotism and must find its voices in the byways, laneways, 
backyards, nooks and crannies of the self…a poet, living his uncertainties, is 
riddled with different voices, many of them in vicious conflict. The poem is 
the arena where these voices engage each other in open and hidden combat, 
and continue to do so until they are all heard (Kennelly, 1990: 12). 
 
In accepting the complexity of the human psyche, and the corresponding contradictions 
of our social world, Kennelly is ultimately honest enough to tell us that he has no 
answers; in this sense he echoes Rilke’s exhortation that we should ‘try to love the 
questions themselves’ (Rilke, 2004: 31). Out of this openness to experience, and 
acceptance of uncertainty and contradiction, there emerges for Kennelly the possibility 
of an affirmative serenity and a joyous celebration of what it is to be human, a 
determination to persist in a search for what is positive and good, and a belief in the 
immeasurable potential for hope and love in the human spirit; as Collins states, 
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Kennelly ‘surprisingly moves towards a celebration of human endurance’ (Collins, 
2003: 213).    
The poetry of Kennelly thus concurs with many of the insights of the theorists 
explored in previous chapters relating to the possibility of love; the incontestable impact 
of unconscious influences in personal and societal experience, the repression and 
distortion of unacceptable realities, the conflictual nature of psychic life, and the 
inevitable interconnection between ambiguous polarities. It explores the ambiguities 
pertaining to the possibility of love, the obstacles which mitigate against its experience 
and communication, and the immeasureable consequences ensuing from its absence in 
all areas of life; it echoes Freud’s sentiment that: ‘In the end we must necessarily start 
loving if we are not to fall ill, and we must necessarily fall ill if refusal makes us 
incapable of loving’ (Freud, 2006: 370),116 as it unabashedly exposes the personal and 
social ills accruing from love’s distortions and denials while simultaneously attesting to 
the significance of love in the creation of a meaningful life. 
                                                 
116
 Nietzsche’s comment that ‘We must learn to love, learn to be kind, and this from earliest youth’  
(Nietzsche, 1984: 251), is also evoked here. 
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Misreading the Past 
Do not distort me, twist me, misrepresent me, 
Let me be truthful as the dance (Kennelly, 2004: 166). 
 
Echoing the psychoanalytic focus on an examination of the past as a route to an 
understanding of the present, and Ricoeur’s vision of identity as an ongoing narrative of 
the self which integrates past, present and future, Kennelly reaches for a more 
comprehensive engagement with contemporary life through a discerning hospitality to 
historic influences. The finitude of subjectivity is an aspect of temporal and historical 
contingencies; the subject is limited by spacio-temporal boundaries and is also impacted 
by inheritance from the past. The question of time, integral to lived experience in the 
present and also to any understanding of the past, is explored in a unique manner by 
Kennelly. While accepting the practical necessity of straightforward, chronological, 
linear, time, he suggests that poetry, like Freud’s description of the unconscious, 
belongs to a less fixed, less rigid image of time, that of ‘memory and dream, of 
lightening mental relationship, of surprising, even shocking connection’ (Kennelly, 
2004: 19). The analogy between poetry and the world of the unconscious is frequently 
suggested by Kennelly: ‘Looking back over the poems I’ve tried to write, they all 
seemed to be moments, or stabs of memory, or sudden images, and seemed independent 
of chronological time’ (Kennelly, 2004).  His Selected Poems has ‘its own necessary 
architecture’, because, he asserts, poetry dictates its own shape and sense of time: ‘The 
power of poetry is directly linked to, and measured by, its capacity for surrender. To 
memory, to difference, to dreams, to what is perplexing or frightening, to diversity, to 
voices, to history and mythology’ (Kennelly, 2004: 18). The word-choice of this 
statement – ‘memory’, ‘difference’, ‘dreams’, ‘voices’, ‘history’, ‘diversity’ – suggests 
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an index of some of the key ideas of Freud, Nietzsche, and the other theorists outlined 
previously. In his poetry, Kennelly explores themes of repression, denial, complexity 
and ambiguity, echoing Freud’s theories of psychical conflict and unconscious 
motivation, and also suggesting  Nietzsche’s call for a reevaluation of values and the 
necessity of creating one’s own rules of morality. He acknowledges the significance of 
‘memory, history and forgetting’, as outlined by Ricoeur, and he subverts the 
domination of subtle ideologies as analysed by Žižek. Kennelly turns to the visionary 
power of dreams and memory, especially in his epic sequences, “Cromwell”, “The 
Book of Judas”, and most recently and most personally, “The Man Made of Rain”, to 
explore and confront personal, national and universal concerns. Kennelly’s acceptance 
and portrayal of reality, as distinct from the more comfortable illusions of pretence and 
denial, places him in relation to all the theorists explored in this thesis, and similarly and 
uniquely, empowers him to reach for a celebratory engagement with life as it is. 
In opposition to the ahistoricism that postmodernity is occasionally accused of, 
whereby the past is deemed to be irrelevant, and the sometimes self-glorifying 
construction of a one-sided historical interpretation, Kennelly focuses on the past as a 
way of informing the present. Nietzsche also advocates an examination of the past as a 
route to greater understanding of the present: 
There are great advantages in for once removing ourselves distinctly from 
our time and letting ourselves be driven from its shore back into the ocean of 
former world views. Looking at the coast from that perspective, we survey 
for the first time its entire shape, and when we near it again, we have the 
advantage of understanding it better on the whole than do those who have 
never left it (Nietzsche, 1984: 256). 
 
Nietzsche considers this one of the poet’s functions: ‘Poets…help the present acquire 
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new colours by making a light shine in from the past’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 104).  
Kennelly’s poetry seeks in the exploration of  the past a relinquishment of fixity and 
closure characteristic of traditional interpretations, and a questioning of the pseudo-
unity of grand narratives built on simplistic oppositions of native/foreigner, 
victim/oppressor, good/evil: ‘I knew the world is most at ease / With acceptable 
insanities’ (Kennelly, 2004: 351). In this sense Kennelly’s work embodies what Richard 
Kearney terms a ‘just imagination…which dispels the hegemony of Grand Narrative in 
favour of little narratives without degenerating into the arbitrary or the cynical’ 
(Kearney, 1998: 209). Kennelly seeks the truth of the past in the ‘little narratives’, the 
concrete experiences of ordinary individuals which often contradict the accepted 
ideologies of their time: ‘He listens to the silence and hears / a revealing story’ 
(Kennelly, 2006: 20). This resounds with Paul Sheehan’s discussion of ‘legitimation’ in 
postmodernity, which is ‘plural, local, and immanent’, as ‘The death of the grand 
narrative thus heralds the birth of the local narrative, with its emphasis on diversity and 
heterogeneity’ (Sheehan, 2004: 29).  
In seeking a more comprehensive and a more honest appraisal of the influence 
of history on contemporary life, Kennelly echoes Freud’s analysis of the dominant 
formative influences of one’s personal past and Nietzsche’s exploration of the origins of 
man’s attitudes and beliefs. As an uncompromising reader of Irish history, with an 
openness to its ugliness and deceptions, Kennelly urges us to come to terms with the 
damaging reverberations of a post-colonial nation which has often substituted an 
outwardly imposed authority with another of its own choosing. The repressive 
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censorship laws which sought to silence some of the great literary voices of the time
117
 
are cited by Kearney as an example of lingering colonial influences in the newly-
independent state: ‘The irony is that when Ireland finally achieved her independence in 
the early decades of this century, the colonial prejudice against the existence of a 
thinking Irish mind was not immediately disregarded’ (Kearney, 1997: 172). The 
juxtaposition of dearly-won national freedom and comprehensively imposed social 
suppression is also noted by Collins: ‘In addressing a culture comparatively recently 
grown from sexual timidity, Kennelly again places explicit expression against a 
background of stultifying Catholic morality’ (Collins: 2003: 215). The birth of the new 
state initiated an insistence on a selective and exclusive understanding of Irish 
nationality, defined as innocent, conservative, and idyllically pastoral, and forced its 
development through repression and subjugation of dissent and difference.
118
 The 
human experience of love, in all its potential manifestations, was a particular target of 
forced repression and distortion. The denial of sexual pleasure as innate to human 
existence, and the resulting frustrations and deceptions, resonate with Freud’s 
pronouncement that most mental suffering has its roots in the perversion and denial of 
sexual desire. Nietzsche also outlines the deleterious effects of the distortion of human 
                                                 
117
 The banning of  John McGahern’s work is an obvious example.  
118
 See article 41, 1, 2, and 3 of Bunreacht na hEireann, p.136. ‘The State recognises the Family as the 
natural primary and fundamental unit group of society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable 
and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law’; ‘In particular, the State recognises 
that by her life within the home, woman gives to the state a support without which the common good 
cannot be achieved’; ‘The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of marriage on 
which the family is founded, and to protect it against attack’. 
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nature:  
Everything natural, to which man attaches the idea of badness, sinfulness (as 
is still his habit in regard to the erotic, for example) burdens him, clouds his 
imagination, makes his glance timid, lets him quarrel with himself and 
makes him unsure, lacking confidence…yet this suffering about the natural 
is in the reality of things totally unfounded…men have become worse by 
labelling the unavoidably natural as bad and later feeling it to be so 
constituted (Nietzsche, 1984: 99). 
 
By using his poetry as social protest, Kennelly points to the inordinate authority and 
power invested in institutions of state, Church and family, with the subsequent 
disempowerment of individuality and opposition. The attraction of fixed certainties 
sourced in powerful institutions, had, according to John McDonagh, in his analysis of 
Kennelly’s work, a devastating effect on the emotional and intellectual life of the state. 
There were influential elements within the Free State that sought to construct 
a fixed historical interpretation in which the past became a simple paradigm 
of the oppressor and the oppressed, excluding the possibility of unstable and 
shifting interpretations of that history, and it is precisely in this framework 
that Kennelly achieves his critical importance (McDonagh, 2004: 103). 
 
The ‘influential elements’, in particular the family, the Church, and the school, are areas 
traditionally and romantically associated with ideals of love, nurturance and care, but 
Kennelly subverts these comforting images, and seeks to give voice to a more truthful 
picture: ‘May the silence break / And melt into words that speak / Of pain and 
heartache’ (Kennelly, 2004: 116), because ‘There’s a story behind every pain’ 
(Kennelly, 2006: 15). 
 The ‘pain and heartache’ associated with  the brutal and dehumanising 
experience of an Irish education for many children, in which power translates as 
violence, and powerlessness is an easy target, is poignantly portrayed in Kennelly’s 
poem, “The Stick” (Kennelly, 2004: 37). The calm determination of the school teacher 
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in choosing his weapon of instruction with a view to its utmost wounding power, ‘the 
right size and shape’ (Kennelly, 2004: 37), is echoed in the fearful stillness of the silent 
trees, suggesting the unspoken urge to cruelty and aggression inherent in the intended 
violence: ‘How much violence hides in educated voices?’ (Kennelly, 2006: 54). 
Nietzsche’s assertion, repeated by Lacan, that ‘moral’, altruistic, philanthropic 
behaviour is often a façade for more primitive and self-serving drives is suggested here 
as the brutality of the teacher is disguised in the name of education and ‘improvement’. 
The experience of love of self and others, is thwarted; in Nietzsche’s words ‘we suffer 
little children to come to us, to prevent them in good time from loving themselves’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 211). The individuality of the children is subsumed in anonymous 
categorisations of ‘farmers, labourers, even singers, fiddlers, dancers’ (Kennelly, 2004: 
37). This is in stark contrast to Buber’s description of the ‘humility of the educator’ who 
recognizes that ‘in the manifold variety of the children the variety of creation is placed 
before him’ (Buber, 2004: 112). From Kennelly’s perspective, violence insisted that 
‘correct’ answers would be reproduced, that curiosity and ‘thinking’ would be punished, 
and that the price of ‘learning’ would be the loss of human dignity and self-expression. 
The mind-splitting contradiction between ideology and reality demanded a ‘double-
think’ as the perpetrator of terror was ‘the one-supposed-to-know’, the embodiment of 
the ideals which were to be emulated! Kennelly’s portrayal of the distortion of 
education resounds with the reflections of Buber who states that ‘Compulsion in 
education means disunion, it means humiliation and rebelliousness’, and who asserts the 
necessity of integrity in the person of the educator as a simple presence through which 
the child develops the capacity to learn in his/her own way: ‘Intereference divides the 
soul in his care into an obedient part and a rebellious part. But a hidden influence 
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proceeding from his integrity has an integrating force’ (Buber, 2004: 107). The actual 
irrelevance of much of what was being taught to children who would rapidly face the 
emigrant’s world of emotional and cultural disconnection as they confronted the 
isolation, inferiority, and shaming ridicule of job-hunting queues in the ports and 
building sites of English cities, is encapsulated succinctly in the incomprehension 
screaming in Kennelly’s question, ‘What Use?’ 
What use is that language to a man out of work? 
A fat bastard of a teacher rammed it down my throat 
For eight years before I could quit 
That school where I learned nothing 
But Sorrowful, Joyful and Glorious Mysteries 
And answers to questions I never understood 
And that damned language bringing tears to my eyes 
Every time I struggled to say a word (Kennelly, 1987: 40).  
 
The reduction of education to a compliant reiteration of imposed doctrines, and the 
stifling of voices which might have diverged from the inflexibility of the regime, was 
also central to religious teaching. Images such as ‘sallyrod’, ‘lashed’, ‘bare legs’ and 
‘bled’, evoke the powerlessness and humiliation of young boys being force-fed litanies 
of creed, captured in the poem “Catechism” (Kennelly, 2004: 40). The critique of 
religion by Freud and Nietzsche as a tool of suppression and subjugation is reiterated in 
Kennelly’s rejection of a passionless and loveless Christianity which negates the 
affirmation of many aspects of humanity. Repression and fear, resulting in emotional 
and cultural emigration and alienation, are exposed consistently in Kennelly’s poetry, 
with a simultaneous admiration and compassion for those who were excluded and 
ignored in the consensus of compliance and denial, the consensus which Nietzsche 
termed the ‘herd mentality’: ‘The road of agreed silence / Led to oblivion’ (Kennelly, 
2004: 254). 
 For many, the experience of childhood, in contrast to Wordsworth’s vision of 
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innocence and bliss, was marred by injustice, cruelty, and rejection, resulting in a 
diminished sense of self wherein the experience of love continued to be eluded. While 
he recognises much that was rich and beautiful in the culture of the recent past, such as 
community, landscape, and boundary, Kennelly refuses to adhere to the false image of 
idyllic rural innocence and charming achievement of Irish nationality, symbolized in 
fantasies of loving families and compassionate leaders, but rather strives to portray the 
realities of life as lived by the individual personalities that were contained in that 
society. Themes of repression, especially repression of sexuality and passion, the power 
of unconscious motivation and memories, and the hidden exclusion involved in the 
repetitive glorification of accepted hierarchies and moralities, are unmasked by 
Kennelly as essential to an understanding of the present. Reiterating a basic argument of 
the writers previously explored in this thesis, Kennelly’s poetry urges a willingness to 
come to terms with the legacy of the past, a legacy which is open to ongoing 
interpretation, and which is based on a revaluation of individual and national identities, 
and on the interweaving of contradictory impulses and desires. In this sense, it resounds 
with Ricoeur’s description of a narrative identity which is open and fluid. Only thus is 
an understanding of the present, its contradictions and dilemmas, its hopes and fears, its 
failures and possibilities, approachable and possible. 
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Crisis of Meaning  
When I cut the lies out of my life 
I still must live as best I can (Kennelly, 2004: 100). 
 
This is the background out of which the postmodern culture of contemporary Ireland 
has emerged, and it is as a critique of this ambivalent phenomenon that Kennelly’s 
poetry is explored by some contemporary commentators, in particular Ake Persson, in 
his aptly titled work Betraying The Age. Persson considers Kennelly’s poetry as a 
window to the challenges and possibilities of this fragmented era. Economic progress, 
material wealth and technological innovation, coupled with loss of faith in institutional 
authority, disclosures of corruption and hypocrisy in political and religious affairs, and a 
tentative rejection of hierarchical and patriarchal assumptions, has led to an apparent 
vacuum of moral and spiritual guidance and inspiration. The recent social and economic 
history maps a journey from relative poverty to gaudy prosperity and from the religious 
to the secular. The inevitable dissolution of metaphysical and religious values, with the 
corresponding breakdown of absolutes and certainties, is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s 
acknowledgement of a necessary period of nihilism, and Freud’s insistence on 
individual responsibility and freedom, as inescapable challenges in the creation and 
development of one’s personal life. While Kennelly recognises the ambiguities and 
contradictions of our ‘unparalleled progress’, and the collapse of previously considered 
‘givens’,119 he is determined to celebrate the joy of diversity and deconstruction. In the 
preface to his collected poems, Familiar Strangers, he states that acceptance of the 
ugliness of reality co-exists with celebration of the gift of life: 
                                                 
119
 Terms quoted from Paul Lakeland, Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age. 
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And while poetry must always explore and reveal the realities of this 
barbarous darkness in a post-colonial land (or anywhere), confronting the 
violence, cynicism, corruption and “sophistication” that seem to accompany 
wealth, it must also, somehow, always, cling to a vision of plain human 
dignity, celebrate the gift of life, the very act of giving that is poetry itself 
(Kennelly, 2004: 19). 
 
These sentiments subscribe to Nietzschean amor fati even in the face of its obstacles. 
Thus Kennelly’s poetry embodies a two-fold structure; it is a critique of bland, half-
hearted, half-lived complacency which negates the failure and suffering amid the mask 
of superficial success, but it is also a joyous reception of the challenges and questions 
forged by this honest appraisal. The avoidance facilitated by protective defences and 
pseudo-engagement recalls the death-in-life existence of the personas in Eliot’s work, 
but Kennelly envisages the possibility of a passionate and welcoming embrace of life in 
its fullness, accepting its ambiguities and its mysteries. 
In his study of Kennelly’s work, Persson argues that the poet ‘is engaged in 
social and artistic protest in order to question, challenge and subvert established values 
and norms in Irish society’ (Persson, 2001: 1). The socio-cultural context of many of 
Kennelly’s poems attempts to confront us with the forgotten, the hidden, and the 
excluded elements of our national image. Referring to the poet’s ‘subversion of 
established viewpoints’, Collins argues that ‘Kennelly’s desire to let the voiceless speak 
through his poetry is linked by him to a conviction that poetry is a force for change, yet 
one that must accommodate multiple – and often distinctly marginal – viewpoints 
within its scope’ (Collins, 2003: 213).  In “The Loud Men”, Kennelly parodies the 
authoritarian and judgemental assumptions of those who insist on forcing their 
convictions on society, ‘bullies’, ‘politicians’, ‘and bored, truculent men’ (Kennelly, 
2004: 281). These are the personas of the ‘experts’, the ‘subjects supposed to know’, 
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which Lacan exposed as fallacious and illusory. The self-righteousness of moral 
superiority is only made possible through the scapegoating and victimisation of the 
Other, the different, the unassimilated: ‘My madness is what you fear / to encounter in 
yourself’ (Kennelly, 2006: 36). This stance of authority and power is, according to 
Kennelly, a refusal to acknowledge the reality of their own darkness: ‘They proclaim 
their own emptiness. / Because / by spitting in the eyes of others / they run like madmen 
from themselves’ (Kennelly, 2004: 281); what is not accepted within is projected 
outward. Nietzsche notes that ‘inconsiderate thinking is often the sign of a discordant 
inner state which craves numbness’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 246). Kristeva and Kearney both 
explore this human propensity to disown aspects of the self through defensive projection 
onto ‘strangers, gods and monsters’, and a refusal to recognise the foreigner within.120 
This relates to Nietzsche’s argument that ‘you yourself will always be the worst enemy 
you can encounter; you yourself lie in wait for yourself in caves and forests’ (Nietzsche, 
2003a: 90). The loud self-assertion of the powerful in society is in stark contrast to the 
silence of the poor, the wounded, and the ostracised, captured in the poem through the 
image of childhood poverty in the person of Sheila Lehane: ‘Her suffering would not 
allow her to be loud’ (Kennelly, 2004: 281). Scapegoating of the marginalised and the 
hidden, whether by selective labelling, condescending philanthropy, or projective 
condemnation, is a superficial response to the darkness of everyday exploitation, 
injustice, and the violation of human dignity. Love is not possible in these 
circumstances; the other is distorted to embody what cannot be accepted and so cannot 
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 Titles such as Strangers, Gods and Monsters (Kearney), and Strangers to Ourselves (Kristeva), open 
to an exploration of this phenomenon. 
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be loved, but the self is also depleted and reduced by this fabrication because, as 
Kearney notes, ‘scapegoating does not work in the long run…liars can fool others but 
not themselves…the projection of inner hostilities onto some outer adversary is 
ultimately condemned to fail. The ploy of demonizing others returns to plague the 
inventor’ (Kearney, 1997: 66).  This resonates with Nietzsche’s warning: ‘He who 
fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And 
when you gaze long enough into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you’ (Nietzsche, 
2003: 102). 
Kennelly’s insistence on providing a space and a voice for those in society who 
may not fit the contemporary ideal of respectability and success is revealed in much of 
his poetry, and poignantly so in the short poem, “The Good” (Kennelly, 2004: 155).  
Here he expresses his admiration for a risk-laden, but life-enriching openness to self and 
the world. This is the risk rejected by Prufrock and the characters of “The Waste Land”. 
The image of the bird in flight suggests movement and vitality, while also hinting at the 
courage of risk: ‘They do not think of safety, / are blind to possible extinction’ 
(Kennelly, 2004: 155). The good are not concerned with safety and stability, preferring 
instead the adventure of possibility. Their willingness to expose their fragile 
vulnerability, and their acceptance of the reality of failure/extinction, ensures the 
genuineness and authenticity of self-integration: ‘And when most vulnerable / are most 
themselves’ (Kennelly, 2004: 155). We have difficulty perceiving these unassuming 
‘Good’, because we are blinded by our fixed assumptions, our ‘casual corruption’ 
(Kennelly, 2004: 155). We prefer to hide behind ‘The small protective sanities’ of group 
and mask, ensuring that no authentic meeting can take place between ourselves and 
others (Kennelly, 2004: 156). Buber’s vision of the I-Thou relationship is not 
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experienced in closure to complexity and difference. In this alienation from the realities 
of self and others the experience of love is not possible, as human relationships are 
diminished by the unconscious falsities ‘that hide men from themselves’ (Kennelly, 
2004: 156). In contrast, the good risk the nakedness of self-revelation, and though aware 
of the threat of condemnation and misunderstanding, they still seek the best in life. They 
embrace the paradox of light and darkness, master and victim, earth and sky, body and 
spirit, and proclaim through their action the ultimate affirmation, a welcoming 
acceptance of reality, ‘Content to be itself’ (Kennelly, 2004: 156). This can be read as a 
contemporary interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence, amor fati, and 
the ideal of the overman, as the paradoxical images of light and darkness, of joy and 
sorrow, provide a metaphor for the experience of moving towards a fuller and more 
accepting understanding of the human subject and the human condition, an 
understanding which enables an affirmative celebration of one’s fate. A willingness to 
trust in the ambiguous beauty of all of life suggests a childlike innocence that is not 
destroyed by the potentially crushing insights of ‘maturity’. One is here reminded of 
Wordsworth’s portrayal of the child as the ‘best philosopher’. The good retain the grace 
of resilience and desire in the face of triumph and disaster, ‘the vulnerable grace / of any 
bird in flight’ (Kennelly, 2004: 156). Kennelly’s tentative assertion that he may have 
‘one or two among his friends’ who embody the humanity of the ‘good’ (Kennelly, 
2004: 156), is an expression of his admiration for a childlike innocence and sense of 
wonder which he considers essential to the human spirit: 
I have never surrendered to the language of rational explanation or 
analysis…I prefer the language of wonder, speculation, outrageous and often 
hilarious possibility, and this has stayed alive in me. I have therefore in me a 
child (Kennelly, 1994: 180).  
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This expressed preference for wonder and possibility resounds with Nietzsche’s 
description of maturity: ‘Mature manhood; that means to have rediscovered the 
seriousness one had as a child at play’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 94). Kennelly is here rejecting 
the pseudo-‘maturity’ and balanced mediocrity of half-living, the adjustment and 
conformity to Freud’s superego or Žižek’s ‘big Other’, preferring to empathise with 
those who do not fit neatly into a rational equilibrium, and he is restating Freud’s theory 
that events, memories and desires of childhood are never fully abandoned or fully lost, 
but are preserved and unravelled as the adult narrator/poet/analysand communes with 
his younger self. Like Wordsworth, Kennelly refuses to surrender the richness of 
childish enthusiasm as the price of socially-accepted sophistication and success. He 
concurs with Nietzsche’s claim: ‘You must yet become a child and without shame’ 
(Nietzsche, 2003a: 168). 
The articulation of unvoiced complexities and contradiction in opposition to the 
silence and betrayal inherent in narrow historical interpretations of events and 
characters, is attempted in epic proportions in Kennelly’s “Cromwell” and “The Book 
of Judas”. Kennelly’s preferred adoption of diverse voices within his poetic expression, 
his rejection of the façade of a unified, fixed identity, and his selection of a variety of 
personas within his work, is a reflection of his admiration for the Portuguese poet, 
Pessoa, and his multiplicity of poetic voices. Kennelly’s writing therefore concurs with 
Nietzsche’s rejection of a definitive self, and acknowledges the existence of disparate 
and often conflicting components within the psyche. This accords with Freud’s 
description of the structure of the mind, and the often conflicting needs of the private 
individual and the culturally influenced super-ego. Through the voices of the disgraced 
and disparaged characters of Cromwell and Judas, Kennelly uncovers in dreamlike 
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sequence the unconscious and latent meanings concealed in these historical figures. The 
gradual uncovering of repressed hatred and fear, of learned prejudices and assumptions, 
and the possibility of attaining a more truthful interpretation of the past, is analogous to 
the hermeneutical experience of Freud’s psychoanalysis, whereby the narration of the 
past is reviewed and examined, and it also adheres to Ricoeur’s vision of narrative as an 
ongoing interpretation and integration of newly acquired horizons of understanding. In 
an interview in The Irish Times in May 2004, Kennelly urges the expression of darkness 
as a valid and inescapable component of human experience: 
Think of that marvellous line of Frank O’Connor’s: ‘celebrate the darkness 
and the shame’. You don’t celebrate shame, but I think poetry does, or it 
can…how easy hatred is. But if you find out enough about a person, you’re 
bound to find things that you like…this is my idea of celebration, to step 
outside yourself and find a sympathetic, intelligent place for someone that 
you were trained to hate (Kennelly, 2004a).  
 
Through the vilified personas of Cromwell and Judas, hitherto confined to ‘fixed’ 
interpretations, Kennelly articulates the darknesses and frustrations, the cruelties and 
deceptions, and the cowardice and terror which are projected onto these otherwise silent 
containers. The projection of the unacceptable, its repression and denial, is rooted in the 
desire for idealistic images of who we (as distinct from these untouchables) are. The 
temptation to claim moral rectitude or perfect judgement regarding historical events, the 
subjugation of one’s darkest thoughts and raw impulses, have the effect, according to 
both Freud and Nietzsche, of extinguishing the vitality and intensity of our connection 
with ourselves and our past. The experience of love is thwarted in the obliteration of 
passion and fullness. Kennelly’s poetry abandons this duplicitous reading of history, 
and by giving expression to hitherto silenced voices, it elicits a recollection and 
resolution of repressed knowledge and truth. Through an imaginative exploration of self 
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and history, the poet enables the possibility of a different interpretation; this is the 
contention of Kearney in his discussion of these poems. Recalling Freud’s theories on 
dreams and the unconscious, and Wordsworth’s belief in the powers of the imagination, 
Kearney aptly states that ‘The imagination knows no censorship’, and goes on to assert 
Kennelly’s achievement:  
Passing thus through the psychic purgatory of self-analysis, disclosing the 
ideological memories which drive us to fury and despair, Kennelly is finally 
in a position to explore a utopian dimension of myth which points beyond 
the ruins of the past. Having debunked the demons of Cromwell and Buffun 
– by transmuting them into mock-heroic fictions – the poet imagines the 
possibility of another kind of home in history…Once he has stripped the ‘old 
man’, ‘swaddled in lies’ of his false mythology, Kennelly is liberated into a 
positive ignorance, free to reconnect with foreclosed dimensions of being 
(Kearney, 1997: 139-140). 
 
Kennelly’s willingness to embrace a more realistic and a more comprehensive account 
of human nature, with its triumphs and failures, its positives and negatives, is a 
reiteration of Nietzsche’s description of the human subject as ‘human, all too human’, 
and echoes Ricoeur’s acknowledgement of ‘fallible man’. According to McDonagh, the 
epic sequences of these poems allow Kennelly to explore a random selection of images 
and events which portray the inevitable conflict between authority and powerlessness. 
Every story of success is reliant upon a story of failure for its very essence. 
Kennelly is clearly driven towards the latter as a source of inspiration 
because it is largely experiences of betrayal, eviction and brutalisation that 
strip away the veneer of polite hermeneutics to reveal a muddied and often 
brutalised reality (McDonagh, 2004: 140). 
 
Disconnectedness from past and present realities has resulted in a loss of 
identity, sense of place, and sense of history, with a tendency to replace what has been 
lost with surrogate identities available through material success. Freud refers to this 
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understandable quest for palliatives in an effort to alleviate the pain of living, and 
Ricoeur explores the search for recognition and identity through modes of power and 
possession. The impossibility of satiating spiritual hunger with the material trappings of 
a consumerist society is given ironic expression in Kennelly’s parody of the deification 
of “Money” as the overwhelming metaphor for value: 
 
You’ve made me your way, your truth and your life, 
The only God you adore. 
I grant, in return, what your heart most desires; 
More (Kennelly, 2004: 450). 
 
The difficulty of finding meaning in the midst of such contradiction and uncertainty, 
and the importance of appearance to the image of success, often necessitates a masking 
of vulnerability, loneliness and fear: ‘Almost everyone needs a cover’ (Kennelly, 2004: 
444), and the resulting sense of alienation and isolation can result in the destruction of 
meaning altogether: ‘Loneliness / has a sleepless bite’ (Kennelly, 2006: 8). Kennelly 
gives voice to the hidden losses and silent screams of despair and woundedness, while 
simultaneously insisting on the indestructible human capacity for hope and connection: 
‘He hears a voice poised between hope and despair’ (Kennelly, 2006: 27).  In an 
interview with Richard Pine in 1990, Kennelly refers to the spectre of despair and 
suicide
121
 in contemporary society, but insists on the intertwining of nightmare and 
                                                 
121
 The questions arising from the concept of suicide are pursued in the three disciplines of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and poetry: Hamlet reflects on the dilemma, ‘to be or not to be’; Albert Camus claims 
that suicide is the philosophical problem: ‘Deciding whether or not life is worth living is to answer the 
fundamental question in philosophy. All other questions follow from that’ (Le Mythe de Sisyphe, 1942); 
the Italian poet, Cesare Pavese claims that ‘no one ever lacks a good reason for suicide’, while his 
compatriot, Antonio Porchia reflects that ‘truth has few friends and those few are suicides’. 
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hope: 
Who knows out of what moody swings or rhythm somebody decides to 
commit suicide or to live, who knows out of what gelling of emotional 
rhythms one opts for the assertion of continuity….I think it has to do with 
that genuinely fundamental and essential tension between the sinking into a 
bottomless darkness and the desire to rise into a civilized, sharable light, 
where I know the faces of my friends, where I can share their words, their 
laughter, where I can once again resume negotiations of friendship and 
connection. So as a writer I am given to beginnings (Kennelly, 1994a: 174). 
The acknowledgement of the significance of interpersonal relationships in the creation 
of a meaningful (and therefore a liveable) life echoes the philosophies of Buber and 
Ricoeur, favouring an open-ended understanding of human nature which accounts for 
self and other, sameness and difference, capabilities and vulnerabilities. References to 
intersubjectivity, relationship, and the power of love, are suggested in the word choice 
of the statement quoted above; ‘sharable’, ‘friends’, ‘words’, ‘negotiations’, ‘friendship’ 
and ‘connection’ evoke an understanding of the human subject as essentially needing to 
love and to be loved, and the suggestion that life itself may be extinguished if love is 
absent. A similarly acknowledged need for love is expressed by Nietzsche: ‘What I have 
always needed most to cure and restore myself, however, was the belief that I was not 
the only one to be thus, to see thus – I needed the enchanting intuition of kinship and 
equality in the eye and in desire, repose in a trusted friendship; I needed a shared 
blindness, with no suspicion or question marks’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 4). The absence of 
‘suspicion’ or judgement, the sense of complete acceptance, and the co-existence of 
solitude and connection, evoke the experience of love, an experience captured in the 
lines of a poem from the 13
th
 century Sufi mystic, Rumi: 
Out beyond ideas of wrongdoing and rightdoing, 
There is a field, I’ll meet you there. 
When the soul lies down in that grass, 
The world is too full to talk about, 
Ideas, language, even the phrase each other 
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Doesn’t make any sense (Rumi, 1996: 36). 
  
The necessity of scrupulous self-scrutiny, sometimes facilitated and enhanced by 
the support and revelation proffered by genuine interpersonal relationships, in the 
creation of a meaningful life, is akin to Freudian and Nietzshean philosophies: ‘Now he 
sees a true friend is a challenge / and a shadowpresence guiding him / across a 
dangerous bridge’ (Kennelly, 2006: 8). Honest introspection and self-scrutiny are 
central to Nietzsche’s writings, wherein he gives expression to the spectrum of drives 
and emotions, constructive and destructive, which pervade human motivation and 
behaviour; but Nietzsche also acknowledges the role of relationship in the enhancement 
of life and sees this need as a central quest in human being: ‘One seeks a midwife for 
his thoughts, another someone to whom he can be a midwife: thus originates a good 
conversation’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 100). Kennelly’s honesty articulates the multi-faceted 
composition of the human experience, and through an openness to the nature of memory 
and mutability, and the relationship between the changing material world and the inner 
landscape of personal experience, he mirrors Freud’s goal of psychoanalysis to 
interrogate the power of memory and to explore the mysterious otherness of one’s self.  
Throughout his poetry, Kennelly urges an open-ended understanding of human 
nature which accounts for self and others, sameness and difference, capabilities and 
vulnerabilities. Closer perhaps to Freud’s pronouncements on the benefits of the 
dialogical nature of the psychoanalytic encounter than to Nietzsche’s reliance on 
personal introspection, Kennelly suggests that one can make sense of oneself mainly in 
and through one’s involvement with others. Like Buber, Kennelly accepts the 
difficulties involved in the quest for authentic inter-relationships, and states that his aim 
is ‘to try to be truthful to the way your imagination works. Because individual 
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imaginations work in the most extraordinary ways, and we share very little of it with 
each other’ (Kennelly, 2004). Acknowledgement of incommunicability obliterates the 
authenticity or logic of judgement of self or other, according to Nietzsche: ‘No 
experiences of a man…however close he is to us, can be so complete that we would 
have a logical right to evaluate him in toto. All evaluations are premature, and must be 
so…the gauge by which we measure, our own nature, is no unchangeable quantity…one 
ought not to judge at all’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 35). The acknowledgement that much of the 
inner life is incommunicable concurs with the assertions of Lacan and Žižek when they 
proclaim the impossibility of fully knowing or being known by another.  According to 
Derrida and Irigaray, acceptance of this unknowability and unsharability is the very 
basis of love. According to this viewpoint, the quest for meaning and worth aims for 
genuine mutuality, a mutuality based on both our common humanity and our individual 
uniqueness: ‘Self knows that self is not enough, / the deepest well becomes exhausted’ 
(Kennelly, 2004: 425); this reflects the philosophical claim of Buber and Ricoeur that 
there is no unmediated self-understanding: ‘It is not me you see, but you. / Is there 
anywhere in the world / you do not meet yourself?’ (Kennelly, 2004:  431). Nietzsche 
offers an answer to this question: ‘Yet your friend’s face is something else beside. It is 
your own face, in a rough and imperfect mirror’ (Nietzsche, 2003a: 83).  
Agreeing with Kennelly that ‘self is not enough’, Ricoeur argues that no one 
alone could be a person, one can make sense of oneself only in and through one’s 
involvement with others: ‘Thereby another is not only an other, but my like…man is 
this plural and collective unity of destination and the differences of destinies are to be 
understood through each other’ (Ricoeur, 1965: 138). The focus on sameness amid 
diversity is also a tenet of Wordsworth’s poetic dictum.  Empathy, the willingness to 
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place oneself in the situation of the other, the attempt to recognise the ‘I’ in the ‘You’, 
resonating with Buber’s philosophy of authentic relationship, and the acceptance of the 
mystery that enfolds the universe in an undeniable inter-connectedness and inter-
dependence, is embraced by the poet as the transcendence of the self towards a love of 
the other. The notion of self-awareness and self-knowledge, in isolation from the direct 
and indirect influence of past and present relationships, is rejected by Kennelly as he 
utters his admiration for the integrity evoked in the image of the ‘island’: 
If I ever learn to make what I feel and see 
As a whole 
As the island appears to be 
I shall recognise 
The roots of sadness behind people’s eyes 
And link them with my own (Kennelly, 2004: 328). 
 
Like Eliot, Kennelly is willing to undertake the ‘transient yet upsetting incursions into 
the mere, messy self which nevertheless remains the truest if murkiest source of poetry’ 
(Kennelly, 2004: 323). The poet, in risking the vulnerability of self-honesty and self-
expression, in searching deeply for his own naked truth, and in revealing what is rather 
than what is wished for, offers glimpses of universal truths and meanings, moments of 
experience shared in our common humanity: ‘It coincides with a music I find in myself’ 
(Kennelly, 2004: 337), and in these moments the possibility of love may be glimpsed 
and experienced.  
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Celebration of Life 
But from the corruption comes the deep 
Desire to plunge to the true; 
To dare is to redeem the blood, 
Discover the buried good, 
Be vulnerably new (Kennelly, 2004: 370). 
 
The collapse of certainties and absolutes, the deconstruction of previously revered 
polarities, and the fragmentation of traditional assumptions, can be interpreted as a 
vacuum in contemporary society, an absence of signposts and direction. This situation 
may suggest a different interpretation however, as it signals possibilities inherent in 
viewing life as always new, always in the process of becoming. From this horizon, the 
absence of pre-given assurances and expectations enables the quest for individual 
autonomy and self-responsibility. The power of poetry, as evidenced in Kennelly’s 
work, is to stand apart from the isolating dichotomies of good and evil, man and 
woman, history and status, body and soul, and to initiate an encounter which is truly 
honest, truly human. Nietzsche’s titles, Beyond Good and Evil and Human, All Too 
Human, resound with these sentiments.  
As dialogue, intra-psychic or inter-relational, Kennelly’s poetry is a heart-to 
heart communication and connection, deriving its authenticity from a ruthless 
abandonment of the superficial and contrived. It is a refusal to comply with what 
Wordsworth denounced as ‘the neglect of the heart’. In an effort to reveal ourselves to 
ourselves (in mirroring the revelatory activity of Freudian psychoanalysis and the 
inclusiveness of Ricoeurian narrative identity), it expresses what is innermost in the 
human heart; it does not provide tidy summaries; it does not assume answers; rather it 
rejoices in the immeasurable confusions, contradictions and possibilities of what it 
means to be human. It embraces Nietzsche’s appraisal of human being as rational and 
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irrational, self-seeking and propelled towards the other, and it determines to seek love 
within and in spite of these realities. Freedom and limitation, urgency and continuity, 
life and death, co-exist in the humility of the poetic expression of difference and 
sameness which enables us to see in our unique experience an echo of the universal. In 
this accommodation of the essentially mysterious nature of life, Kennelly’s poetry is 
created and experienced in humility and tolerance. In tune with Nietzschean doctrines of 
perspectivism and self-creation, it does not seek to impose diagnoses or solutions; it 
forces no moralistic dogmatism. In asking his own questions, Kennelly voices our own 
confusions; and in celebrating the infinite complexity of life, he offers a glimpse of one 
man’s truth. His willingness to confront the ambiguous nature of human life, and his 
ongoing effort to ‘comprehend the incomprehensible’ is captured in his dedication of 
The Book of Judas to those who share his task: 
For all good dreams 
Twisted, exploited and betrayed. 
For all those 
Conveniently and mindlessly damned 
By you and me. 
And for all those writing and unwriting 
Poets of humanity 
Who have a bash 
At comprehending the incomprehensible (Kennelly, 1991: Dedication). 
 
The articulation of many voices, and the insistence that they be heard, is an 
implicit agreement with all the writers previously explored. After reading Kennelly’s 
poetry, with particular reference to these writers, ‘we are more human than we were 
before’ (Kennelly, 2004: 466). In this spirit of humility and celebration, the experience 
of love, of self, of others, and of life itself, is sought, glimpsed and at least momentarily 
attainable; it is integral to human living, and it is possible, even if only in the 
undramatic, ordinary, unnoted moments of concern and kindness which are felt in 
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simple expressions of being human; what Wordsworth refers to as ‘that best portion of a 
good man’s life; / his little, nameless, unremembered acts / of kindness and 
love’(Wordsworth, 2000: 132), and described by Nietzsche as ‘Goodwill…I mean those 
expressions of a friendly disposition in interactions, that smile of the eye, those 
handclasps, that ease which usually envelops nearly all human actions…it is the 
continual manifestation of our humanity’ (Nietzsche, 1984: 48). 
  Through Kennelly’s poetic communication we have access to the ebb and flow 
of one life in search of truth, meaning, and love, and we take courage and sustenance 
from his explorations, as they resound with our deepest experiences. An encounter with 
Kennelly’s work confronts us with the reality of limitation and possibility; historical, 
biological, environmental and anthropological influences, intertwined with the often 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable vicissitudes of human relationships, inevitably impact 
on the subject’s mental, emotional, and physical make-up. However, an acceptance of 
these determining factors does not negate an acknowledgement of the potential freedom 
co-existing within this framework, a freedom which is based on the ongoing pursuit of 
ever-changing truth and possibility. This acceptance of the paradox inherent in the 
human condition is central to Kennelly’s poetry, and in his welcoming reception of the 
questions and contradictions of human living, in his willingness to forego certainties 
and stagnation, he insists on our freedom to create and re-create ourselves and our lives. 
Central to this creative act is the possibility of love. 
As a critique of the vanities and repressions of our contemporary world, the 
poetry of Kennelly also exposes the potential for Nietzsche’s amor fati and Freud’s 
ideal of self-acceptance as providing the basis of authentic hope and genuine joy. In this 
sense, love is possible, when the subject is willing to embrace the reality of paradox and 
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ambiguity in human life. To love one’s fate, to ‘keep on going’, to lose and to find 
meaning over and over again (eternal recurrence), is to live with an intimate 
appreciation of simply being alive; such is the determination to continually seek to 
transcend the limitations that confine us, a determination which is asserted in the 
imagery and symbolism of the celebratory poem, “Begin” (Kennelly, 2004: 478). Here 
Kennelly embraces the birth and death at the core of every experience when the poet 
persona states that, ‘every beginning is a promise / born in light and dying in dark’, he 
recognises the ‘bridges linking the past and future’, and he admits the necessity of ‘the 
loneliness that cannot end / since it is perhaps what makes us begin’ (Kennelly, 2004: 
478). The sentiment of these lines is close to Nietzsche’s admiration of a fervour ‘for 
seeking the truth, a search that does not tire of learning afresh and testing anew’ 
(Nietzsche, 1984: 264). The mystery of hope in the face of despair, the resilience of 
restarting after failure, and the belief in love as something worth striving for, combine in 
the poet’s confident assertion that life is meaningful, and that the search for that 
meaning is in itself worthy of our effort. 
Though we live in a world that dreams of ending 
That always seems about to give in 
Something that will not acknowledge conclusion 
Insists that we forever begin (Kennelly, 2004: 478). 
 
The insistent tone of persistence and affirmation of these lines is a statement of belief in 
humanity’s potential to overcome the limitations and frustrations of determined 
positions, and fulfilment of Kennelly’s hope that ‘sometimes a poem becomes a 
sharable moment of light’ (Kennelly, 1990: 11), perhaps akin to the ‘sharable moment’ 
of insight which is Freud’s goal in psychoanalysis. The temporary failure of love does 
not prevent the innate human search for its possibility, and the conviction that the quest 
is worthwhile and capable of fulfillment. 
 CONCLUSION 
Your task is not to seek for love, but merely to seek and find all the barriers 
within yourself that you have built against it (Rumi, 1999: 84). 
 
This thesis has approached a concept which, it asserts, defies definitive description or 
definition. Although a universal experience, across history, geography, chronology and 
gender, the question of love resists analyses and conclusions which are universally valid 
or applicable. The modest aim of this thesis has been to examine this question through a 
selected reading of the works of writers and thinkers who have impacted at least to 
some degree on how the human condition is understood, and particularly on how the 
experience of love, as a significant aspect of that condition, is explored and illuminated. 
The argument of the thesis has been that such exploration and illumination is enhanced 
through the trans-contextual and interdisciplinary nature of the selected readings. The 
enhancement asserted by the method and focus of this particular research is based on the 
evidence provided that the question of love’s possibility is a central, essential, 
inescapable concern of human existence as depicted in the three disciplines of 
philosophy, psychoanalysis and poetry, and across different historical dimensions.  
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The Interdisciplinary and Trans-Historical Centrality of Love  
The work of all nine writers explored in this work attests to the centrality of love in any 
attempt to approach an understanding of the human being. The literature studied across 
the disciplinary and historical dimension of the thesis abounds with exploration, 
observation, analysis and interpretation of the phenomenon of love. Each of the writers 
offers a unique portrayal of the diverse manifestations of the need/desire to love and to 
be loved which may be discerned in the conscious or unconscious motivations 
underlying human behaviour. 
Nietzsche posits ‘will to power’ as the principle thrust of human life, whereby 
the organism continually seeks to overcome and overpower resistances and limitations. 
The insatiability and progressive thrust of this drive as described by Nietzsche resounds 
with Freud’s analysis of how the pleasure principle, while inevitably modified by the 
reality principle, is essentially superseded by the strength and the persistence of the 
death drive which impels the organism towards its own destruction as it paradoxically 
seeks to overcome itself. The impossibility of permanent satisfaction or equilibrium 
within the living organism is also suggested in Lacan’s exposition of desire as the 
unquenchable ground of human being. Žižek firmly concurs with this appraisal of the 
key significance of desire in human living, while Buber and Ricoeur discuss the 
intricacies of desire in relation to happiness, power and self-fulfilment. The three poets 
also give expression to the onward thrust which propels the urge to life; each of the 
poets, in similar and differing ways, engages with this ‘development thrust’ (Lear, 1998: 
220). 
As a conclusion of the research outlined in the previous chapters, this thesis 
offers a possible interpretation of the variously described force which permeates human 
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life - will to power, desire, growth, overcoming - as the expression of love, its necessity, 
its persistence, and its indomitable impact, in diverse forms. For Wordsworth it is the 
spur towards love of nature and of others, concomitant with a love and an acceptance of 
self; for Eliot it is an unpredictably changing focus and direction that ultimately leads 
beyond the self and the confines of humanity towards a religious or divine love; and for 
Kennelly it is the impetus demanding and enabling an ever-recurring attempt to ‘begin 
again’ as the self seeks continually, in spite of failure and disappointment, to express 
and to receive love. From this analysis, each of the poets approaches the concept of love 
both as the motivating thrust towards transcendence, of the self, the known world, and 
relationship between the two, and as the means, attainment and experience of such 
transcendence. From this interpretation, it is argued that the possibility of love is a 
central concept underlying the philosophies, theories and expressions of all nine writers 
explored here; it is a thread which links the disciplines of philosophy, psychoanalysis 
and poetry across a historical spectrum; and consequent to this argument, the reflection 
is proffered that perhaps this is the key question which underlies the search for truth, or 
truths, and its expression, which lies at the heart of these studies.  
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The Primary Obstacles to Love  
The obstacles to love which are highlighted by the unique focus of the research fall into 
three main categories: fear, failure of communication, and self-deception. These are 
variously explored by the different writers as potentially thwarting the possibility of 
love, its desire, its experience and its communication. The three categories, like all the 
variables of human nature, are not distinct and separate, but rather originate in and 
through each other and are variously manifested in diverse combinations and 
permutations. Consensus and divergence is discernible in the unique commentary, 
analysis and insight offered by the individual writers into these impediments, but an 
attempted overview enables discussion and conclusion regarding insight and 
illumination which may be furnished therein. 
 The pervasive presence of fear in the experience of human living, in personal, 
social, national and global realms, is reflected and explored by all the writers. 
Accordingly, it is manifested in psychoanalytic terms as ‘anxiety’, ‘repression’, 
‘trauma’, and as filtered through the super-ego and the big Other. Nietzsche and Buber 
identify fear as the underlying force behind the phenomenon of herd-mentality and 
compliance with the crowd; an understanding of the phenomenon is advanced through 
Freud’s elucidation of the child’s fear of loss of love, a fear which is intermittently 
repressed and denied, but which continues to motivate behaviour throughout life; this 
fear translates variously as that of rejection, abandonment, judgement, and exclusion. 
Ricoeur explains the fear implicit in seeking recognition from another, and the ensuing 
threat to the subject’s sense of identity. The poets illuminate the experience of fear 
pertaining to love and loss, and all the uncontrollable facets of human experience. The 
fear of the solitary and the existential aloneness of the human subject is poetically 
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explored in the work of Wordsworth, and in all the works reviewed in this study the 
dichotomy between solitude and connection is acknowledged and assessed. According 
to these reflections, the self is essentially alone; there are recesses within the self which 
cannot be shared. On the other hand, Buber and Ricoeur also stress the inter-subjectivity 
of human existence and argue that the self cannot be a self without mediation and 
encounter with others.
122
 Kennelly reiterates this paradox. Fear of confronting human 
solitude results in many impediments to love, as a basic reality of self and other is 
denied.  The desire for connection, security, certainty and control belies a fear of 
openness to risk and vulnerability, and precludes a genuine encounter with self and 
others which is prerequisite to the experience of love. The rejection of risk and 
vulnerability, and the ensuing withdrawal from life and from love, is documented 
especially in Eliot’s “Prufrock”, but it is also explored by the other writers. All concur 
with the analysis of fear as a reluctance to encounter the flawed, imperfect, ambiguous 
reality of the self and of the other, an attempted avoidance of uncertainty and 
incomprehension relative to the human condition, and an effort to evade the existential 
aloneness which characterizes human being. All the writers acknowledge the 
understandable nature of these fears within the complexities of human living, though 
Nietzsche is more adamant in his insistence on the necessity of overcoming the 
restrictions imposed through a passive acceptance of fear’s power. His exhortations 
                                                 
122
 The title of Judith Butler’s exploration of ethics in the contemporary world, Giving an Account of 
Oneself, resounds with Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity. Here, she echoes the sentiments of Buber 
and Ricoeur regarding the self and the other: ‘One seeks to preserve oneself against the injuriousness of 
the other, but if one were successful at walling oneself off from injury, one would become inhuman’ 
(Butler, 2005: 103). 
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calling for self-creation, self-responsibility and self-empowerment do not stress the 
corresponding necessity of relationship, attachment and recognition as forcibly as the 
other writers.  
The subject’s enmeshment in the structures and the laws of language, as outlined 
clearly by Lacan and Ricoeur, entails an acknowledgement of the failure of language to 
fully express human being. Eliot concurs with this analysis of the limitations of 
language, and the ensuing difficulties pertaining to communication, meaning, and 
relationship. The experience of being human is closely bound to the existence, 
acquisition and use of language, but paradoxically, the complex needs of human 
expression often lie beyond the power of language to articulate and communicate. Thus, 
faced with this inevitable predicament, the subject resorts to alternative expressions of 
need, desire, thought and feeling, described by Freud and psychoanalysis generally as 
symptom formation, displacement, transference, duplicity and repetition, with the 
ensuing relational difficulties of communication and interpretation. At this point, as 
argued by Buber, human relationships are diminished, reduced to pseudo-encounters, 
intersecting monologues replace authentic dialogue, and the self is alienated from itself.   
The loss of the self precludes the possibility of love, because, as portrayed 
especially in Eliot’s poetry, the vacuum is filled with desperate attempts to obliterate the 
emptiness; performance, duplicity, subterfuge, and a host of image-making manoeuvres, 
are efforts to substitute an acceptable persona for the feared, denied, and lost  self. As 
outlined by the writers, the subject, as a speaking being, strives to give expression to 
itself, physically, intellectually, and emotionally, and a significant instrument of this 
attempted expression is the use of language in order to mediate and relate, both within 
the self and between the self and others. The attempt to accomplish what Lacan refers to 
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as ‘full speech’, to articulate the inner world as the poets strive, and to create and to 
share a Ricoeuerian narrative of the self, are aspects of human being which are observed 
and investigated by the philosophers, psychoanalysts and poets who are the focus of this 
research. All the literature which has been explored here situates love at the centre of 
the self which seeks expression, and when language fails to articulate this essence, 
through the many ambiguities, repressions, fears and conflicts inherent to human nature, 
as outlined and analyzed in various ways by the writers, the possibility of love is 
thwarted and diminished. Language often fails to communicate the desire for love, the 
commitment to love, and the experience accruing from both: ‘I have phrases and whole 
pages memorized / but nothing can be told of love’ (Rumi, 1996: 224). Love cannot be 
captured/interpreted/explained/portrayed/expressed fully in language; indeed, the being 
of humanness cannot be articulated; however, this does not mean that it cannot be 
approached, its meaning experienced, its truth lived. 
However, perhaps the most significant aspect of the failure of language, in 
relation to love’s possibility, lies in its propensity to deception, of others, but more 
significantly, of the self. All the writers under review take cognizance of this 
phenomenon, as it is manifested in diverse relationships between the disparate elements 
of the self, in interpersonal encounters, and in historical, biographical and sociological 
misrepresentation and misinterpretation. Ricoeur and Žižek outline the problems posed 
in any attempt to attain an honest and unprejudiced narration of the past, the other, and 
the uncomfortably unfamiliar. These problems are portrayed poetically by Kennelly 
through his investigation into the common erection of scapegoats and villains as 
convenient receptacles of human evil and destruction that enable the self-deception of 
an individual or group. Throughout the thesis, the phenomenon of projection has been 
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addressed through various terms applied by the individual writers; Jews, Nazis, 
Muslims, Cromwell, Judas, the foreigner, the other. 
The subjective nature of truth, while always a contentious issue, is a 
characteristic acknowledged with varying definitiveness by all nine writers, and a 
corollary of this is the acknowledgement that conflict, horror, disgust, and many other 
‘negative’ attitudes towards outer realities have their source in personal experience, 
albeit an experience often denied or repressed out of consciousness. The paradox of 
self-deception emerges as a constant of human nature, and is explored by all the writers. 
Nietzsche and Freud particularly attest to the ability, the willingness, and the 
determination of the subject to deceive him or herself. Nietzsche points to factors such 
as fear, pride, image, and the irresponsibility attendant on accepting external sources of 
value and judgement, as enabling the adoption of deception within the self, while Freud 
seeks an understanding of repression and denial, compulsion and repetition, and the 
multiple manifestations of self-deception observable in ‘neurotic’ and ‘normal’ 
behaviour, by attempting to discover the hidden and unconsciousness origins of the 
subject’s current situation. The work of the three poets is a courageous exploration 
towards self-discovery, and as such, it continually encounters, highlights, and seeks to 
understand the allure of deception. An overview of this topic, as explored through all 
the writers under review, suggests that deception, of self and of others, is a major 
obstacle to authentic relationships, to the possibility of love; the self cannot be loved as 
a mere caricature of its reality, and the other cannot be loved by a subject whose self is 
camouflaged. 
The reality of deception asserted by all the writers necessitates a corresponding 
discourse on the nature of truth, and it is the conclusion of this thesis that the 
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philosophers, psychoanalysts and poets are in full agreement on the subjective nature of 
truth. It is not within the domain of this thesis to explore the vastness and the 
complexity pertaining to a concept such as ‘truth’, but it is asserted that there is 
agreement and coherence between all the writers outlined, as they refute universal or 
absolutist depictions of this concept. The relationship between love and truth is 
approached directly or indirectly by all the writers, and their various reflections lead to 
the conclusion that love is impossible in the absence of personal truth.
123
 Truth is the 
main casualty of each of the obstacles to love discerned through the research; fear, 
deception and the failure of communication are inextricably linked, causally and 
impactfully, and without personal truth, conceptualized variously by the different 
writers in the thesis, the possibility of loving and being loved is threatened and 
diminished. 
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 The Greek philosophers variously define the object of love as ‘the beautiful’ and the ‘good’. Keats’ 
dictum, ‘beauty is truth , truth beauty’ (Keats, 2006: 906), suggests a correlation, or even an equivalence 
between love as love of beauty and love as love of truth. 
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Glimpses of Love’s Possibility  
 
It has been argued in this study that the question of love’s possibility is a (or the) 
motivating force in the theoretical, analytic and creative writing of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis and poetry, as these areas are represented by the writers selected and 
explored. Asserting that the question of love is a common and central thread uniting all 
three disciplines may seem to suggest a nebulous connection, but this study claims that 
the identification of a common thread, that weaves gently through the thought of all the 
thinkers under review, has important implications for the way we view the knowledge 
of what it is to be human. Exploring the literature of those who have influenced, not 
only their own discipline, but arguably the thinking of their historical epoch and 
beyond, through the lens of the apparently narrow and particular focus of the centrality 
of love, illuminates these individual and diverse writings, and shows that the 
interconnection and disconnection between these (and other) disciplines is 
fundamentally what may enable a greater understanding of human existence. A central 
aspect of this understanding is an acknowledgement of the significance of love, its 
necessity, its experience, and its frustration, in human living. The research has firmly 
asserted this claim. It has argued that the question of love is central to all the literature 
studied, that at least some of the obstacles to love’s possibility are identified through the 
focus of the exploration, and it concludes with an overview of the conditions of love’s 
possibility glimpsed or highlighted through the study. 
 A condition of love asserted by all the writers is a willingness to approach a 
realistic appraisal of human nature in the place of idealistic and theoretical abstractions, 
which deny the complexity and multiplicity inherent in the concept. Only thus can a 
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real, flesh and blood person love an other in an open embrace of incompleteness, 
incomprehension, separateness, and possibility. Acknowledgement of the complexity of 
self and other necessitates a tolerance for ambiguity, a relinquishment of certainties, and 
an openness to vulnerability and unpredictability. The integration of the full spectrum of 
human being, including its less attractive and less consoling attributes, is portrayed by 
Nietzsche as an essential prerequisite to the experience of love, of self, of others, and of 
life. The honesty and courage implied by this attempted integration is urged by all the 
writers; it forms the basis of psychoanalytic practice as explicated by Freud, Lacan and 
Žižek, it is deemed essential to authentic dialogue and relationship as outlined by Buber 
and Ricoeur, and it is a compelling motivation and inspiration of the poetic works 
explored. Wordsworth undertakes a searching discovery of himself, and finds therein an 
ability to love himself and his fellow human-beings; Eliot seeks the illumination of what 
is hidden, buried, or disguised within the self, and the ensuing growth of compassion 
and love which this difficult encounter enables. Kennelly gives expression to his own 
vulnerability and that of others, he acknowledges his uncertainty and fallibility, and he 
directs his praise towards the embrace of risk which love demands. Resounding with the 
other writers, Kennelly welcomes the ambiguity of apparent contradictions that lie 
beneath concepts such as good and evil, hope and failure, solitude and connection, and 
self and other. The traditional opposition between love of self and love of the other, 
between selfishness and altruism, is questioned and critiqued by all the writers under 
review. While Nietzsche and Freud insist on the persistence of at least some traces of 
narcissism in all experiences of love, and avow the drive of self-preservation in all 
human behaviour, writers such as Buber and Ricoeur suggest the possibility of self-love 
co-existing with a genuine and unconditional love for others. All writers concur on the 
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essential necessity of self-love and self-acceptance as a condition of the ability to love 
another and to receive the other’s love. They point to the distortions and 
misinterpretations which ensue when this condition is not met, and to varying degrees, 
they posit love of self and of others as intricately and essentially linked.
124
 
 A corollary of tolerance and acceptance of ambiguity in human nature, as 
suggested by the research, is the humility inherent in an ongoing process of openness to 
self and to others. This humility is sourced in an acknowledgement that full self-
knowledge or self-transparency is not possible; this reality of the human condition is 
explicitly asserted through the insights of Freud and Nietzsche, with particular reference 
to their reflections on morality, the unconscious, repression and duplicity. The narrative 
identity of the subject as outlined by Ricoeur entails a constant openness to revision and 
reinterpretation, and echoes Nietzsche’s reference to the ‘process’ of becoming. The 
humility which enables an avowal of ignorance with regard to the self is also essential 
in a loving approach to the difference and incomprehension of the other. Lacan and 
Žižek argue that the acknowledgement of this incommensurability is essential to the 
possibility of love, and that it is indeed a central aspect of love’s experience. They both 
point to the dangers pertaining to an assumption of knowledge regarding others, and like 
Ricoeur, suggest a relation between such a conviction and the justification of power 
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 The ability and willingness to love the self is therefore deemed essential to the possibility of inter-
subjective love, by all the writers outlined. However, the question remains open as to how the human 
subject acquires this ability; is it inherent in being human? Is it a natural aptitude which is sometimes 
‘educationally’ modified or removed by external rules and expectations? Is it something which can be 
only be attained after it is experienced through the reflection and love of an other? These questions are 
posed through the research without definitive or categorical conclusion. 
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which may be exercised under euphemistically-termed motivations. Complete self-
knowledge is exposed as a fantasy, and the demand to fully know or understand, self or 
an other, can result in convenient conclusions and grandiose generalizations.   
 While all the writers explored in this study assert the prevalence and endurance 
of love’s impediments and failures, each writer is equally committed to the portrayal of 
love’s possibility within the constraints and complexities of human living. The 
testimony of the failure of love provided through this study, its impermanence, its 
volatility, its proximity to hate, and all the vicissitudes which assail the possibility of 
love, does not negate the conviction expressed by the writers that love can be 
experienced, given, and received. The affective experience of hatred and annoyance can 
co-exist with a continued commitment to love, which can integrate ‘negative’ 
experiences and emotions without denying them. Love is most clearly portrayed in the 
concrete, momentary, and transitory encounters of human living, and Buber especially 
insists on centering the reality of love in the experiential encounter of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’. 
Nietzsche also suggests that the ‘affect’, the emotion, underlying love, cannot be 
commanded or promised.  However, this does not negate the possible endurance of love. 
It is the conclusion of this thesis that the concept of love emerging from the study is 
something greater than an emotional, intellectual, sexual, physical or theoretical 
experience; it is all of these and more, and its possibility persists in spite of its recurrent 
impossibility. This conclusion is particularly supported by the expression of the three 
poets in their unique and personal accounts, and the poetic word appears to be capable 
of overcoming the dilemmas and conflicts posed in relation to the question, as it 
surrenders claims to certainty and knowledge, and is satisfied with offering glimpses 
whereby the truth of love may be approached. 
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“Late Fragment” 
 
And did you get what 
You wanted from this life, even so? 
I did. 
And what did you want? 
To call myself beloved, to feel myself 
Beloved on the earth (Carver, 2002: 456). 
 
 
…. 
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